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T O W A R D  T H E  E N D of the summer of , the coeditors, then a pair of
green-as-groceries graduate students preparing doctoral dissertations on
Chinese religions in Taiwan, began sharing our interests in some of the
larger historical developments that had been taking place in religions beyond
our immediate research interests. We began asking other scholars of our
acquaintance if they would be interested in putting together a modest panel
for the  annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion on the
topic of religious change in postwar Taiwan. The response was so over-
whelming that we ultimately created two panels, the second for the 
annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. From there, it was nat-
ural to exploit the momentum gained from those panels and try to collect
polished versions of the papers into a book. We did it, and here it is.
It is unfortunate that Professor Julian Pas passed away shortly after com-
pleting the first revision of his essay and could not, therefore, attend to
subsequent revisions or see its publication here. The final editing was done
by Philip Clart and Charles Jones, with timely assistance from Paul Katz.
Both editors hope that this, Professor Pas’ last scholarly essay, will serve both
to memorialize him and to inspire readers to search out other materials by
this fine scholar. This volume is dedicated to his memory.
We would like to thank Patricia Crosby of the University of Hawai‘i Press
for her support of this endeavor. As novices in the book-editing business, we
could not have finished this project without her solid advice and pertinent
suggestions. We would also like to recognize the contribution of the anony-
i˙ x
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mous reviewers for the University of Hawai‘i Press and, most of all, the
patience of the contributors to this collection, who remained committed to
a publication project that took longer than we originally expected. Well, gut
Ding will Weile haben, as the German proverb goes, and we hope that the
finished product is, indeed, a “good thing” that was worth waiting for.
A note on the romanization conventions employed in this volume: As a
rule, the Hanyu pinyin system is used for the romanization of Chinese terms
and names, unless another spelling is in general use. Such exceptions include
some place-names (e.g., Taipei rather than Taibei, Kaohsiung rather than
Gaoxiong), names of well-known figures (e.g., Chiang Ching-kuo rather
than Jiang Jingguo, Shih Ming-te rather than Shi Mingde), and names of
Taiwanese scholars who use a nonstandard romanization of their name in
their own English publications (e.g., Chiu Hei-yuan rather than Qu
Haiyuan, Sung Kwang-yu rather than Song Guangyu). In all such cases, the
Hanyu pinyin version of the name is provided parenthetically at the first
occurrence only.
The editors would like to thank the School of Religious Studies at the
Catholic University of America for financial assistance with the preparation
of the frontispiece map, and the Catholic University of America’s research
grant-in-aid program for financial assistance in preparing the index. The
index was prepared by Edna Paulson and Associates.
x
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T H I S  C O L L E C T I O N starts from the premise that religious traditions are not
static objects to be described and cataloged so as to arrive at an eternally
valid knowledge of them. The various encyclopedias or dictionaries of reli-
gion and religions now available are very useful reference works, but they
may also lull their readers into a false sense of possessing authoritative, con-
cise, and immutable knowledge about particular religious traditions. In fact,
what such reference works provide are abstractions of traditions, summaries
of core beliefs and practices that supposedly remain more or less constant
over time and across di¥erent geographic areas. Such abstractions have their
value—and we ourselves are certainly responsible for our own fair share of
them. As ideal types, they can help us structure our perception of empirical
reality, leading to an understanding of the religious phenomena with which
we are faced.
At the same time, we must not confuse these ideal types with the empiri-
cal reality. There will always exist a—greater or smaller—gap between a tra-
dition’s abstraction and its concretization in life. A lived religious tradition
is a social construction that is conditioned by many factors, including, but
not limited to, class, political system, climate, economic conditions, textual
traditions, and institutional structures. As these factors keep changing, so do
religions, even as they themselves become factors in the social construction
of other areas of culture. Seen in this way, religions (like all of culture) are
not things but dialectical processes, parts of the ongoing endeavor of human
beings to draw on various cultural resources in order to make sense of and
1
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to inject meaning into the world that surrounds them and to enable them
to live and work together.
What is true for religion is equally true for academic theories of religious
change. Much scholarly analysis has gone into creating theories of modern-
ization and its e¥ects on religious life, practice, and belief. However, an ideal
type of “modernization” runs the same risk as an ideal type of any given reli-
gious tradition: the risk of providing a mirage of unity and singularity for
what might really be a host of local conditions and phenomena that could
more fruitfully be studied in the plural.
The assumption that a single model of modernization, generated by
analysis of data coming primarily from the West, could help understand
what is going on with the religions of East Asia has been questioned in recent
years. Tong Shijun (), for example, examines the applicability of Jürgen
Habermas’ theories of modernization to China and calls attention to debates
regarding modernization that took place in the early twentieth century
among Chinese intellectuals. They equated “modernization” with “Westerni-
zation” and utilized the native philosophical categories of ti (substance) and
yong (function) to frame their questions: Were cultural and technological
importations from the West simply manifestations of a yong that did not
a¥ect the Chinese ti, or were yong and ti so interrelated that the one
necessarily a¥ected the other? In other words, could one import Western
technology without becoming Westernized? Tong himself concludes that a
Western theory such as Habermas’ can, indeed, be utilized to understand
China’s transformation in the twentieth century—if properly qualified.
Another example is Stevan Harrell’s () anthropological look at
recreational patterns in modern Taiwan. While noting that urban Taiwanese
go out and play in much the same ways as Westerners, Harrell raises the
question: Is this really Westernization, or is it simply that urban folk who
need to get away from the bustle of city life find their activities necessarily
channeled into certain choices? In doing so, he questions whether one can,
as the Chinese intellectuals studied by Tong did, equate modernization with
Westernization. Both Harrell and Tong lead us to question whether one can
look at the way(s) in which Western culture has modernized and use it
either as a model for (the early Chinese intellectuals reported by Tong) or a
model of (Harrell) the process in China.
While the essays included in this volume do not by and large present
theoretical considerations of this sort (a notable exception being the pieces
by Jochim and by Nadeau and Chang), they still contribute in important
ways to the exploration of these questions by providing concrete data for
2
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further analysis. After all, the purpose of theories is to interpret data, and,
without data, theories become mere speculation without application.
A dynamic view of religion and modernization as ongoing processes (as
outlined above) makes them harder to grasp, a decided disadvantage if one
seeks quick and easy certainty. It means that one must remain open to the
presence of plurals where one is tempted to postulate singulars. However,
such a perspective is not a sophisticated academic nicety but an urgent
necessity in the present world. This introduction was written in the Ameri-
can Midwest and in Washington, D.C., about four months after the terrorist
attacks on the United States of  September . One important strand of
the public debate that transpired in the intervening months centered on the
terrorists’ claim to define a normative Islam that justified their actions. Could
they conceivably stand for Islam? Or was theirs such a distorted interpreta-
tion of the tradition that it did not really represent Islam at all? The main-
stream view seemed to champion the latter position, claiming that “real
Islam” was peace loving and could never be utilized to justify mass murder.
Scholars of religion must distance themselves from these turf wars over
the definition of “real Islam” (in the singular) and, instead, analyze the situ-
ation by using plurals. We must look at the al-Qaeda version of Islam as one
among many existing concretizations of the tradition and examine its con-
stituent elements and determining factors. Only then will we arrive at an
appropriate understanding of the terrorists’ vision of Islam and their partic-
ular reading of Islamic traditions. At the same time, it is commonly acknowl-
edged that Islamic (as well as other types of) fundamentalism come into
being as a response to modernity, and so the scholar must also determine
which concretization of modernity is operative. (On this, see Lawrence
[] and Marsden [].) It is the scholar’s task to provide an under-
standing of the way in which the religious tradition and the process of
modernization manifest themselves; it is the policymaker’s task to tackle
Islamicist terrorism on the basis of such a nuanced understanding of its
character and nature. Any approach tied to a monolithic concept of a single
“Islam” or a single “modernity” will lead nowhere and remove any basis for
dealing realistically with this brand of religious fanaticism.
What does this have to do with religions in the prosperous and peaceful
island nation of Taiwan, whose potential for religiously motivated violence
seems to be almost nonexistent? While the political stakes may not be as high
here, the same approach to the study of religious life is required as in the
Islamic world (or anywhere else, for that matter). We must forgo the singu-
lars in favor of plurals to arrive at an understanding of the religious
3
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experience of Taiwan both in the here and now and in historical perspective.
For example, arriving in Taiwan with an abstract idea of “Buddhism,” we 
will right away be faced with a range of “Buddhisms,” some of which are
addressed in the present volume: the Venerable Xingyun’s Buddha Light
Mountain; the Venerable Zhengyan’s Tzu Chi Foundation; the Buddhist
Association of the Republic of China; the miraculous intervention of the
bodhisattva Guanyin in the lives of lay Buddhists as recounted in the
devotional literature; the “popular Buddhism” of the so-called vegetarian
sects (Zhaijiao). All these are specific concretizations of “Buddhism” that
must be understood in and from the sociocultural context that shaped their
construction.
The main purpose of the present volume will be the presentation of such
plurals and the examination of their development over time, mostly focused
on the twentieth century. If we take the proposition that religion is an
ongoing dialectical process seriously, we should not expect any of the reli-
gious traditions on Taiwan to have stood still. In fact, throughout its
recorded history, the island of Taiwan has provided an environment highly
conducive to accelerated change, probably more so than most other regions
of East Asia. This makes the island a fascinating case example for students
of religious life, who by the very nature of their object of study must always
be students of religious change.
As Charles B. Jones outlines in his essay, significant immigration to
Taiwan from the Chinese mainland began only in the seventeenth century,
leading to a gradual pushing back of the aboriginal population from the
plains into the mountains and the expulsion of Dutch traders from their
fortified positions. Coming under the formal political control of the Qing
dynasty only in , Taiwan remained a frontier region whose particular
geographic and political conditions led to the formation of social structures
quite distinct from those of the immigrants’ home districts on the mainland,
principally in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Never fully integrated cul-
turally into the Qing empire, Taiwan came under Japanese rule in ,
launching it again into a new direction of development, whose main features
are analyzed by Jones. The year  saw the island’s retrocession to the
Republic of China, followed by the Nationalist government’s  relocation
from the mainland to Taipei in the wake of its defeat in the Chinese civil war.
With Chiang Kai-shek’s government came up to two million refugees,
among them many religious activists—learned Buddhist monks, the Daoist
Celestial Master, Christian missionaries of many denominations, prosely-
tizers of popular sects such as the Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao). This period
also saw the imposition of martial law and restrictions on the formation of
4
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nongovernment organizations, a situation that lasted until the late s.
The combination of new government policies and this influx of religious
personnel and their expertise had profound e¥ects on the religious life of the
Taiwanese, stimulating both nativist resistance and religious diversification.
By the s, Taiwan’s economic miracle set in and led to a thorough reor-
ganization of existing social structures. Industrialization and urbanization
went hand in hand, bringing about a huge transformation that a¥ected all
areas of social life, including Taiwanese religions.
The present volume includes eleven essays dealing with di¥erent aspects
of the religious process in Taiwan. All except Jones’ focus on developments
since , each singling out a particular tradition or aspect thereof. Together
they provide pieces for the mosaic of Taiwanese religions. They do not pro-
vide the whole picture—something that is impossible, not just because of
the necessarily limited scope of a collection such as this one, but also because
the mosaic’s design is constantly changing even as we are laying these pieces.
What these essays give us are glimpses of religious construction as viewed by
dedicated scholars in their respective fields of inquiry. Let us take a look at
the contributions of each before presenting a few tentative conclusions, sug-
gestions for “lessons to be learned” from this e¥ort.
. . .
I N  T H E  O P E N I N G  C H A P T E R , Charles B. Jones describes the state of religion
in Taiwan prior to the end of World War II and the return of Taiwan to Chi-
nese sovereignty. Like Pas’ essay, it does not confine its remarks to any single
religious tradition but aims to give a comprehensive overview of the pre-
religious situation. This accomplishes two tasks: First, it gives readers some
idea of what actually changed on the religious scene in the postwar period
(which the other contributors cover in depth) by letting them know what it
changed from. Second, it alerts readers to the fact that some of the changes
reported in other essays had their beginnings during the Japanese period or
even before, in particular those changes that are based in social processes
such as modernization and urbanization or in technological advances.
Julian Pas’ essay takes up where Jones’ leaves o¥, detailing transfor-
mations in the general religious scene in Taiwan as temples and religious
organizations responded to the political and economic situation as it
unfolded after . Pas focuses primarily on the e¥ects of the “economic
miracle” of the s and s, a boom time to which religions responded
with increased activities in a number of arenas: temple construction; more
elaborate and media-driven rituals; entrepreneurship; competition; and
5
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even a little chicanery. Both Jones’ and Pas’ essays provide a historical
overview and help contextualize the remaining essays, which concentrate on
developments within specific religious traditions.
The remaining essays probe aspects of religious change within indi-
vidual religious traditions. With a certain degree of overlap from one essay
to the next, the order is roughly Confucianism, popular religion, Daoism,
Buddhism, Christianity, and aboriginal traditions.
The essay by Christian Jochim looks at developments in Confucianism,
a religion (or moral worldview) that pervades Chinese thought and history,
and asks: Who are the carriers of this tradition in the modern period? What
persons or associations have taken it on themselves to bring the Confucian
tradition into the modern world, and by what strategies have they sought to
adapt it to the exigencies of modern urban life? Jochim thus demonstrates
the vitality and flexibility of an ancient tradition as it found its place in the
last half of the twentieth century.
Next, Philip Clart explores similar processes in a group that straddles the
line between Confucianism and popular religion. In discussing the phenom-
enon of shanshu, morality books dictated by deities to mediums in ritual
settings in order to transmit their instructions and teachings, Clart shows
one way in which a fundamentally Confucian mode of morality has been
carried forward into modern times by processes very di¥erent from the
more “rationalist” agencies reported by Jochim. At the same time, he demon-
strates how the contents of these books vary between the s and the s
in response to clear di¥erences in the local economic and social structuring
of family life, both in the content of the morality and in the style in which
the books argue for the acceptance of their vision.
Paul R. Katz stays with the topic of popular religion, focusing on the cult
of the Royal Lords (wangye). He provides additional material on the
development of popular religion in Taiwan prior to  as a way of con-
textualizing postwar developments and heightening the contrast between
pre- and post- features. Katz’ essay will give the reader an idea of the
ways in which such forces as government involvement, the rise of a tourist
industry, and modern media coverage have all a¥ected local temple festivals.
The following essay, by the noted Taiwanese scholar Lee Fong-mao,
bridges the line between popular religion and Daoism. Focusing on case
examples of Daoist priestly families in central Taiwan, Lee demonstrates that
the symbiotic relation of popular religion and Orthodox One Daoism has
been little a¥ected by postwar social change or by deliberate attempts at
restructuring Taiwanese Daoism triggered by the relocation of the Celestial
Master from the mainland to Taiwan. Orthodox One Daoism continues to
6
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play a key role in the religious life of local, subethnically defined commu-
nities and to serve as a viable and vital cultural repository within a rapidly
modernizing society. In this way, Lee’s essay serves to alert the reader that,
academic preoccupation with issues of modernization notwithstanding, key
aspects of pre- religion have endured.
The following two essays, by André Laliberté and Barbara E. Reed, shift
the focus to Buddhism in the postwar period—but from two very di¥erent
angles. Laliberté focuses exclusively on political issues and traces the evo-
lution of the relations that three prominent Buddhist organizations (the
Buddhist Association of the Republic of China, Foguangshan, and the Tzu
Chi Foundation) have had with the government since . Reed, on the
other hand, looks at the devotional life of modern Buddhist laypeople,
showing how a specific form of literature, one that gives testimony to the
ways in which the bodhisattva Guanyin has granted prayers and changed
lives, has changed in response to modernization and new social conditions.
The next two essays, by Murray A. Rubinstein and Huang Shiun-wey,
round out the collection with a consideration of the politically active Pres-
byterian Church on Taiwan and of changes in the religious life of Taiwan’s
aboriginal Ami tribe. While taking as their point of departure very di¥erent
religious contexts, both share one theme in common: the part played by
Christianity in forming the identity of a group of people on the island over
against a perceived and threatening other. In each case, Christianity, a
religion long considered foreign to the Chinese scene, is taken up as a
component of a group’s cultural identity in order to distinguish it from a
dominant other. In the case of the Presbyterians, it forms part of their self-
identification as “Taiwanese” as opposed to the “mainlanders” who arrived
with Chiang Kai-shek after  and proceeded to dominate the island’s
political life, to the detriment of the previous Chinese immigrant groups. In
Huang’s essay, aboriginal tribes, which predate even the earliest Chinese
settlers, take up both Protestant and Catholic Christianity as a component
of their identity over against all the Han Chinese, whether “Taiwanese” or
“mainlander.”
However, these two essays also touch on several other themes of their
own. Rubinstein recaps the history of Presbyterian missions in Taiwan both
before and after  and traces the evolution of the church from a mission
field dominated by Canadian and American missionaries to a fully indige-
nized church representing the interests of both Taiwanese selfhood and the
gospel. Huang reports changes in the forms of Ami social rituals, concen-
trating mainly on weddings, as a way of exploring the processes by which a
people form their identity in a dynamic manner, one that takes in, adapts,
7
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and, finally, assimilates elements of an outside culture, ultimately coming to
understand the new elements as integral parts of their own culture.
The final essay, by Randall Nadeau and Chang Hsun, takes an approach
that is di¥erent from that of the preceding essays, focusing attention, not on
changes in the religious scene per se, but on changes in the scholarly inter-
pretation of religion on the island. Nadeau and Chang call attention to the
phases through which the study of religion has gone, on the part of both
Western and Chinese/Taiwanese scholars, detailing the political exigencies
and ideological commitments that colored their methods and conclusions.
Along the way, Nadeau and Chang also provide much useful information on
religion itself, in terms of settlement and kinship patterns that are peculiar
to Taiwan as well as the development (or disintegration) of the “worship
circle” as a way of understanding popular religion. In this way, they show
that changes have occurred since World War II both on the side of the
observer and on the side of the observed.
. . .
A  W O R D  W I L L  B E in order at this point about some of the things that this
volume does not do. As a collection of essays by specialists rather than a
general history, it necessarily omits many phenomena, not because they are
unimportant, but because this particular collection of authors lacks special-
ists in these areas of study. Even where a particular religion is covered in one
of these essays, it should be understood that the particular strand presented
does not stand metonymically for the tradition as a whole. For instance,
while Rubinstein’s essay covers the Presbyterian Church in depth, the reader
should understand that other mainstream Christian groups, such as Roman
Catholics, or even other Protestant groups, such as Methodists and Episco-
palians, have their own histories and concerns.
It should, therefore, be apparent that the sum of material omitted sig-
nificantly outweighs the sum of material included. We would like to remind
the reader of the image of the mosaic mentioned earlier. What this volume
o¥ers are pieces of an ever-changing picture. The purpose of those pieces is
not only to give a view of significant sections of the picture at a particular
point in time but also to illuminate the nature of the picture as a whole. To
put it in less metaphoric terms, this volume is meant to provide glimpses of
important aspects of religious life in Taiwan and their development in the
modern period while, at the same time, contributing to our overall knowl-
edge of religion in Taiwan—and of religion in general. Its underlying con-
cerns with religion(s) and modernization(s) are not specific to Taiwan but
8
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are central issues in the study of religion anywhere. The data and findings
o¥ered in the present collection should, therefore, be useful in comparative
approaches to an understanding of religion in the modern world.
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M O S T  O F  T H E  E S S A Y S in this collection deal primarily with developments
in the religious sphere on the island of Taiwan since , but, since our con-
cern is with the modernization process as it has expressed itself throughout
the twentieth century, this essay will deal with events prior to that time. By
, Taiwan had already been inhabited for several centuries, first by people
of Polynesian stock who migrated northward from the South Pacific islands,
subsequently by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Dutch, and the Spanish.
Thus, religion in Taiwan had been undergoing continuous change even
before the modern period, change sparked by the arrival of successive waves
of immigrants. The act of emigration itself places the immigrant into new
circumstances that call forth new religious responses. Aside from this, how-
ever, religious change continued in Taiwan owing to two further factors:
political dislocation and social change.
“Political dislocation” refers to the repeated changes in sovereignty that
took place as Taiwan went from an independent island peopled by indige-
nous tribes, to a Dutch and Spanish trade entrept, to an independent state
under the Chinese rebel Zheng Chenggong (also frequently called Koxinga
in Western sources), to a part of the Qing empire, to a Japanese colonial
territory, and, finally, to a politically autonomous but not formally inde-
pendent part of China. Each of these shifts meant changes for two distinct
groups of people: those who arrived in Taiwan as part of the new ruling
minority, who had to cope with living in a new and strange, often hostile and
10
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forbidding land, and those already there, who found themselves living under
a new regime and having to cope with sweeping changes in their political
circumstances.
“Social change” refers to those developments—modernization, urban-
ization, and economic and industrial development—that most likely would
have taken place regardless of any changes in the political environment. To
give but one example, the construction of railways to all parts of the island
during the Japanese period linked cultural and economic zones that had pre-
viously been separated by the many east-west rivers that cut across the island
laterally and the central north-south massif that divides the island longi-
tudinally. This development enabled temples and deities that had previously
been only locally prominent to enlarge their spheres of influence and the
deity images or Buddha images from temples with a reputation for spiritual
e≤cacy to go on tours to other parts of Taiwan. Every political regime since
the nineteenth century contributed to the construction of this system, so it
serves as an instance of modernization that took place independently of
changes in government.
Because political dislocation and social change constituted the two main
forces impelling religious change, I have structured this essay around the
chronological progress of these changes as they a¥ected popular religion,
Daoism, Buddhism, and the sects of popular Buddhism that came to be
known collectively as Zhaijiao (vegetarian religion). The first factor, political
dislocation, will be explored primarily through an examination of policies
aimed explicitly at religion that the new regimes adopted in their e¥orts to
consolidate control and govern. The second factor, social change, will be
explored through an examination of changes in social conditions, whether
these were caused by social movements, technological advances, economic
developments, or government policies that, while not specifically targeting
religion, still had an indirect e¥ect on it.
RELIGION IN THE ZHENG CHENGGONG AND QING PERIODS
Because the religion of the indigenous peoples will be treated elsewhere in
this volume (see Huang, chapter ), I take as my point of departure the
arrival of large numbers of Chinese immigrants from Fujian and Guang-
dong provinces. No one knows when the first Chinese settlers arrived; it
appears that, before the seventeenth century, there existed small settlements
and bases for Chinese and Japanese maritime traders and pirates. However,
since the Taiwan strait is treacherous to cross and the island had a reputation
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as a land of hardship, disease, and head-hunting natives, the Chinese popu-
lation was never great.
However, during the s, the Ming dynasty had been driven from
power, and the Manchus were consolidating their hold on the empire,
causing many Ming loyalists to flee south. One of the staunchest and most
powerful of these holdouts, Zheng Chenggong, attempted to force the Qing
government to overextend itself by attacking Nanjing in September  but
su¥ered a disastrous defeat. Finding it too dangerous to keep his forces on
the Fujian coast, he sailed into Taiwan in  with a fleet carrying several
thousand troops and, in a brief military campaign, drove out the Dutch
soldiers and traders from their two main garrisons in present-day Tamsui
(Danshui), where they had been since , and Tainan (Jones , –;
Mote and Twitchett , –). This marked the first large-scale influx
of Chinese settlers into Taiwan.
This first wave of immigrants set up a pattern of immigration that
would hold through most of the the Zheng and the early Qing periods. The
settlers came from southern Fujian and Guangdong provinces, meaning
that, for the most part, they spoke southern Fujianese (also referred to as
“Minnanhua,” “Hokkien,” “Holo,” “Hoklo,” or “Taiwanese”), Hakka, and
Cantonese. In addition, they were almost all men who came without their
families. Even after Taiwan came under the political control of the Qing
dynasty in , the authorities continued to restrict immigration to the
island, and, for the most part, men could not bring their wives and children
with them (Shepherd , –).1 With a few brief interludes, this re-
striction remained in force until  (Sung , –).
As with any migration, the settlers experienced both continuities and
discontinuities with their previous lifestyle, in religion no less than in any
other aspect. I examine the continuities and discontinuities in the settlers’
religious experience in terms of what Winston Davis (, –) calls the
“locative” and the “adventitious” religions of this time. “Locative” refers to
religions that serve to integrate and unify hometown, kinship, and occu-
pation groups and draw members on the basis of their social and familial
relationships rather than acceptance of creeds. Hence, these religions neither
recruit nor accept “converts.” Thus, in this essay, “locative” will refer to
ancestral cults, temples controlled by trade guilds, and the like. “Adventi-
tious,” on the other hand, refers to religions that do not draw members on
the basis of their place of birth, trade, family or clan a≤liation, or other
markers of social location. Rather, members join these religions voluntarily
by undergoing a period of training and initiation after accepting a certain set
of doctrines. They then find themselves in an organization with a ranked
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hierarchy through which they may rise by means of further training, aspira-
tion, and initiation and that transcends ethnic and clan identifications to
include (theoretically at least) all of humanity. For our purposes, this cate-
gory will include Buddhism, Daoism, and Zhaijiao.2
As an example of the continuity in the realm of locative religion, we can
look at the case of the Longshan (Dragon Mountain) temple in Taipei,
founded in  in what was then the port settlement of Mengjia. The
founders of this temple all came from the same three counties in Quanzhou
prefecture, Fujian province: Jinjiang, Nan’an, and Hui’an. Immigrants from
these three counties made common cause to promote their interests against
immigrants from other regions and came to be known as the Sanyi (Three
County) faction. The temple was founded as an o¥shoot of a temple in
Quanzhou prefecture, also called the Longshan temple, and the founders
installed the bodhisattva Guanyin, the main object of worship in the origi-
nal Longshan temple, in the new temple as well (Editorial Committee ,
). The residents maintained their connection to the original temple by
periodically taking the Guanyin image back to the original temple on the
mainland to “renew her power” (Buddhism in Taiwan, n.d., –).
This case is by no means unique. In reporting on settlement patterns in
the area around the modern village of Shulin, Wang (, –) records in
some detail the importation of deities by specific family groups from specific
areas of the mainland: Mazu from Zhangzhou; Qingshui Zushi Gong by the
Lan family (provenance not given); Xing Fu Wangye by the Lin family from
Quanzhou; and Baosheng Dadi by the Lai family from Zhangzhou (Wang
, –). In these cases, temple upkeep and the organization of proces-
sions, festivals, and other events were the responsibility of an organization
called a shenminghui, or “religious association.” In all these instances, we see
continuity in terms of sustained identification with hometown or family
gods and religious practices and the establishment of religious associations
by and for people of the same subethnic group.
However, the very data given above show sources of discontinuity as
well. The Qing government regulations, which prohibited men from immi-
grating with their families, forced the development of new forms of non-
familial social structure in Taiwan, including temples with new constituencies
and societal roles. Prior to immigrating, most of these men came from rural
agricultural villages that were dominated by a single surname and in which
the extended clan was the main form of social organization. The ancestral
temple served, therefore, as their primary symbolic focus and source of
local unity and political authority. Because these émigrés came to Taiwan
alone, however, they had to find new ways of organizing themselves for
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mutual aid, protection, and political cooperation. Two of the most common
ways of doing this were to organize by common regional provenance and to
organize by trade guild, although often groups organized by both. It was not
until  and afterward that su≤cient generations of Chinese families had
lived in an area for ancestral temples to appear in appreciable numbers,
partially resuming the old patterns of religious a≤liation found on the
mainland, primarily among landlord families (Chen , –).
As already noted, immigrants to Taiwan tended to cluster in settlements
populated by other people from their hometowns or regions. While the
importation of familiar deities and the establishment of new temples as
branches of old temples back home provided some sense of continuity, the
strong sense of identification with other people according to home region
was something new and specific to the situation of the immigrants in
Taiwan. For example, in the area now covered by the city of Taipei, people
from the Sanyi area settled in Mengjia (now the Wanhua district of Taipei),
people from Tong’an in Dadaocheng, and people from Anxi in various
pockets (Feuchtwang , , table ). Even though these groups came
from counties within the same prefecture, they identified strongly along
subethnic lines and often went to war with other groups that they thought
were encroaching on their territories or trade. Wang (, ) documented
settlements similarly divided along subethnic lines in Shulin (see also Shep-
herd , ).
Living in close proximity, people from the same home region also tended
to pursue common trades and organized themselves into trade guilds in
order to pursue commerce with their own compatriots back home. For
example, the Sanyi people of Mengjia built the area into a major port for
trading ships and traded almost exclusively with merchants in the Sanyi
region of Quanzhou prefecture. As the dominant organizations in their
areas, these guilds often wielded more political power than the local Qing
government establishment did. What makes all this interesting for a study of
religion in Taiwan is that the guild o≤ces usually occupied a back room in
the temples dominating particular settlements and that influential members
of the guilds also served on the temples’ governing boards. As an example of
how temples exercised political authority, the Taiwanese historian Lin Heng-
dao recounts the following episode in the history of the Longshan temple of
Mengjia:
During the Qing, Taipei’s Longshan temple was a central meet-
ing place for trade guilds from the Sanyi of Jinjiang, Hui’an, and
Nan’an. It had a great deal of economic muscle and military
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strength. It collected a  percent sales tax on anything imported
from Quanzhou. At that time, the Longshan temple not only took
responsibility for Mengjia’s municipal government, self-defense,
and external relations, but it also provided a center for socializing,
education, and entertainment. In this respect, its power was second
only to the medieval European trade guilds. It could bring a lot of
influence to bear on government policy. Once, during the Guangxu
reign period [–], the Taiwanese provincial governor planned
to build a railroad, putting a large bridge across Mengjia. But,
because the authorities at the Longshan temple opposed it, it was
moved to another site across a rice paddy as a compromise.
—Lin , 
Thus, the situation of the dominant form of the locative religion of the
Zheng and Qing periods can be summarized as follows: As people migrated
into Taiwan, they brought with them an image (or some incense ashes) from
a particular temple in their home region and installed it, first in their homes
or in a temporary thatched hut, and later in a proper temple, as economic
circumstances permitted. As the immigrants settled into groups on the basis
of common hometown provenance, a few dominant temples became the
foci of religious, political, and social life, often eclipsing Qing o≤cials and
state-sponsored temples in their influence. As people identified themselves
primarily with these small, highly localized, usually geographically isolated
enclaves, these dominant temples provided a multitude of services to meet
a multitude of needs: entertainment (in the form of opera performances);
religious processions and jiao (renewal rituals) in the event of plagues,
natural disasters, and economic downturns; o≤ce space for local trade
guilds; self-defense forces to ward o¥ attacks from rival ethnic and subethnic
groups; and a center for worship and informal socializing.
As for the adventitious religions (i.e., Buddhism and Daoism), there is
little evidence that they were very active during these periods or that, where
they were active, they functioned di¥erently from the locative religion.
Taiwan was a frontier province and not attractive as a destination for
eminent Buddhist and Daoist figures. During the Zheng era, many Ming
loyalists fled to Taiwan disguised as monks and maintained this pretense
even after arriving.3 A few true monks did arrive, but their numbers were not
great, and not all possessed a genuine piety. The 1971 Gazetteer of Taiwan
Province (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission , b) gives few
names, most prominent among them the Venerable Canche, the first monk
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to make the trip across the strait (in , at the invitation of one of Zheng
Chenggong’s military sta¥ o≤cers) and renowned for his spirituality (see
also Jones , –). Other monks were remembered more for their artis-
tic and literary accomplishments, leading to the suspicion that they might
have been former scholar-o≤cials masquerading as monks (Jones , ,
). Be that as it may, most scholars agree that the average monk in Taiwan
was uneducated, probably had not received the full monastic ordination,4
and functioned as a temple caretaker or funeral specialist for paying clients
(Kubo , , ). According to Hubert Seiwert (, ), most monks
received ordination simply to obtain the credentials needed to make their
living in this way, most were married, and most failed to observe the Bud-
dhist vegetarian diet. Chen Ruitang, the jurist and legal historian, reports
that, because of Qing restrictions on women’s ordination and the harsh
conditions of Taiwan, there were no Buddhist nuns at all in Taiwan by the
end of the Qing period (see Chen , ).
During the mid-Qing period, several sects of popular Buddhism, which
Japanese o≤cials later lumped together under the rubric “Zhaijiao,” began
sending missionaries into Taiwan. Zhaijiao had considerably more success
attracting followers and support than did either Buddhism or Daoism.
Although Japanese researchers of the early colonial period accepted at face
value these groups’ self-identification as part of the Linji line of Chan Bud-
dhism originally transmitted specifically to laypeople during a period when
the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Chan, Huineng (–), had to hide among
laity in a fishing village (Marui [] , –), scholars now know that
this was actually a millenarian faith centered on a female creator deity called
the Unborn Venerable Mother (Wusheng Laomu) and derived more from
Luojiao than from Linji Chan.5 I have written extensively on the histories,
sectarian ramifications, and doctrines of Zhaijiao as well as on its trans-
mission into Taiwan elsewhere, so I will not go too deeply into these matters
here (for details on the Longhua and Jinchuang [Jintong in Seiwert’s
reading] sects, see Jones , –; or Seiwert , –, –).6 At this
point, I will give only a brief indication of Zhaijiao’s defining characteristics
to orient the reader, focusing on three main features of Zhaijiao 
faith: independence from Buddhist clerical authority; vegetarianism; and
millenarianism.
As for independence from clerical authority, Zhaijiao defines itself as a
form of Buddhism that exists apart from the ordained clergy. This leads
adherents to redefine the meaning of the traditional “three jewels” of
Buddhism (the Buddha, his teachings, and the saΩgha, the last generally
understood as the body of monastic believers), as may be seen from this
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extract from a Zhaijiao ritual text for taking the “three refuges” (translated
by J. J. M. de Groot early in the twentieth century), which o¥ers its own
interpretation of the third refuge: “The Third Refuge! Bow down your heads
to the earth and take refuge in the Sangha! This Sangha is not the tonsured
clergy who collect subscriptions from house to house; it is composed of all
disciples who o¥er incense and keep temples in the country-hills, and to
whose care our Old Patriarch [i.e., Luo Qing (–), the founder of
Luojiao on the mainland] has entrusted the religious books he left” (de
Groot [–] , ). Contemporary Zhaijiao adherents go so far as
to contend that theirs is a truer form of Buddhism, superior to the practice
of the clergy for three reasons (Lin and Zu , –): First, it represents
the true, esoteric transmission of the Southern School of Chinese Chan Bud-
dhism, whereas the clergy all stand either in the line of the Northern School
or in the exoteric transmission of the Southern School.7 Second, its adher-
ents may work toward salvation while remaining engaged in family and
social life since they are free of the necessity of ordination. Third, they can
pass the teachings on to their posterity, whereas the celibate clergy cannot.8
As for vegetarianism, which gives Zhaijiao its name, this is a form of
vegetarianism that eschews, not only meat, but also the five types of pungent
roots (onions, chives, leeks, scallions, and garlic), according to East Asian
Buddhist custom. It is not necessarily the case that all members observe a
vegetarian diet at all times; Lin and Zu (, –) report that, at least
in the Zhaijiao hall that they observed, there were two levels of initiation.
The first was changzhai (permanent vegetarianism), the permanent absten-
tion from meat, which entitled the member to learn the secret mantras and
teachings of the sect. The second was huazhai (flower vegetarianism), a
lower level of initiation that only obliged the member to take vegetarian
meals either once a day or on certain days of the month, perhaps analogous
to the catechumenate in ancient Christianity. Zheng (, –) also
reports that, during the Japanese period, there was even a Longhua Zhaijiao
splinter group that dispensed with permanent vegetarianism altogether as
antimodern, observing only the partial vegetarianism of the lower initiation.
As for millenarianism, this puts us into the realm of Zhaijiao doctrine,
which can be a very tricky area of inquiry. As Zheng (, , –) points
out (see also Jones , –), Zhaijiao doctrine was very volatile and
subject to new currents and emphases depending on local leaders and indi-
vidual authors. However, all three Zhaijiao sects generally posit the follow-
ing picture of humanity’s predicament and the soteriology that provides a
way out. Behind all reality there is the creator deity Unborn Venerable
Mother (she has many other names as well). In the beginning, the Unborn
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Venerable Mother created . billion living beings, who eventually became
separated from her through entrancement by material pleasures and found
their way into the present world of su¥ering. In her mercy, the Unborn
Venerable Mother decided to send a series of three emissaries to call her lost
children back. While lists of these three vary, most schemes agree that the
first two saviors have already come and gone and that they succeeded in sav-
ing only a small fraction of those originally lost. In the near future, a third
emissary will arrive in the form of Maitreya, the traditional buddha who is
to come in the next age. Alternatively, some say that the third savior has
already come: Luo Qing, the founder of Luojiao. Thus, while claiming to be
Buddhists, Zhaijiao adherents clearly a≤rm a scheme of fall and redemption
vastly di¥erent from any soteriology found in traditional Buddhism.
This millenarian outlook often translated into an apocalyptic view of
history. The advent of the third emissary would bring the present world to
an end in a massive battle in which good would triumph over evil. Both in
mainland China and in Taiwan under the Japanese, charismatic individuals
claiming to represent or even to be the coming savior led bands of rebels into
war, sometimes dispensing amulets purported to render the wearer imper-
vious to bullets. The 1971 Gazetteer (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commis-
sion , a) lists fourteen rebellions against the Japanese between  and
, culminating with the Xilai Hermitage incident in . The leader of this
revolt, Yu Qingfang, used a Zhaijiao hall as his base, couched his plans in
religious rhetoric, and distributed amulets to his followers to wear in battle
(Cai , –). I will return to this incident in the next section.
The three major sects of Zhaijiao began to filter into Taiwan during the
Qing dynasty period. The Jinchuang sect was the first to arrive, sometime
after the Qing court subdued the island in , although the sect’s own
documents maintain that it had a presence on the island even during the
Dutch period, – (Huang , ). Missionaries from the Longhua
sect may have come to Taiwan as early as , but certainly by the late s
(the earlier date is given in Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission [,
b–a], the latter in Zheng [, –]). The Xiantian sect was the last
to arrive, in the mid-nineteenth century, and, because its discipline was par-
ticularly strict and entailed celibacy for all members, it was always the small-
est (Huang , ). During the Qing period, these three main sects felt no
sense of connection, and, indeed, only the Longhua sect had any claim to the
name “Zhaijiao” (Overmyer , ). However, during the Japanese period,
researchers working for the Japanese governor-general classed all three sects
together under the name “Zhaijiao” for statistical purposes (see Marui []
, –), and scholars have regarded them as aspects of the same basic
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religious phenomenon ever since. (Readers wanting a more detailed over-
view of Zhaijiao in Taiwan should consult Seiwert [, ].)
This, then, is a general picture of the state of religion in Taiwan up to
, the year in which the Manchu government ceded Taiwan to Japan as
part of the terms of surrender following the Sino-Japanese War. With this
event, the inhabitants of Taiwan, both the incoming Japanese and the Han
Taiwanese and indigenous tribes who already lived there, experienced the
second great dislocation of their history.
RELIGION DURING THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD
During the fifty-one years of Japanese colonial rule, two main factors
a¥ected the condition of religion in Taiwan, as noted in the introductory
section. The first was, of course, the policies that the series of governors-
general enacted for the regulation of religious activities, which varied in their
scope and intent during the early, middle, and late decades of the Japanese
Occupation. The second falls under the broad rubric “modernization,” refer-
ring to the religious side e¥ects of such social changes as improved sani-
tation, communication, and transportation.
The Japanese Government’s Religious Policies
Most scholars who have studied Japan’s religious policies during its rule over
Taiwan agree that they evolved through three distinct periods, at least in
their treatment of “native religions.”9 (The Japanese government’s treatment
of Buddhism proceeded along di¥erent lines than did its treatment of other
religions and will, therefore, be treated separately, although Buddhism’s rel-
atively favored status was to have repercussions on popular religion, Daoism,
and Zhaijiao, as we shall see.) The first period, roughly from  to , was
marked by a paternalistic and laissez-faire attitude toward native religion.
The second period, from about  to , made a clear break with the
earlier attitude as the government tried more vigorously to investigate and
regulate local religious institutions and practices. The third period, which
coincides with the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and mainland
China, saw the government expending great e¥orts to do away with native
religions altogether in an attempt to “Japanize” the local population. Here,
the most salient policies were the “Japanization movement” (Jpn.: Kôminka
undô) and one of that movement’s specifically religious manifestations, the
“temple-restructuring movement” (Jpn: jibyô seiri undô).
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The First Period, 1895–1915
During the first twenty years or so of Japanese rule on Taiwan, the governor-
general had many other things on his mind than investigating or regulating
the religious life of the people. The government had to put down armed
resistance on the part of Taiwanese independence fighters and assemble the
entire infrastructure of government from the ground up as quickly as
possible (Lamley , –). Therefore, during this time, the govern-
ment promulgated very few measures specifically aimed at religion (Cai
, –).
Uno≤cially, however, many Japanese bureaucrats actually encouraged
popular religion to the point of attending temple celebrations and granting
people time o¥ to plan and attend local festivals and holidays. Scholars have
imputed both good and bad motives to these o≤cials. Some believe that this
was simply a prudent policy on the part of the government at a time when
it was trying to win the trust of the local population. However, some Chinese
journalists of that time saw a more sinister agenda at work. According to
them, Japanese o≤cials reasoned that the people would have less energy and
fewer resources for rebellion and resistance if those were squandered both
on lavish feasts and on festivals (both points of view are recorded in Cai
[, –]).
Whatever the motivations might have been, the net e¥ect was the same:
the Japanese government took a benign, “live-and-let-live” attitude toward
local religion. It needed the people’s trust and cooperation for economic
development so that the new colony could begin generating revenue for the
homeland. In addition, it saw native religion (especially Buddhism) as a
possible bridge to its projected expansion into Fujian and Guangdong
provinces, the hometown regions of most Taiwanese. Thus, it saw no need
to impose State Shintô or to repress native religious practices and institu-
tions during this period (Cai , –). At most, it contented itself with
requiring all temples, shrines, and religious associations to register with the
appropriate government o≤ce.
Buddhism fared somewhat di¥erently than popular religion and Daoism
during this time. Unlike these two, Buddhism represented a shared Sino-
Japanese heritage that, while di¥ering in very significant ways, still provided
some common ground.10 This had two important consequences for the
development of Buddhism in Taiwan throughout the Japanese period. First,
Buddhists were among the first to recognize the advantages of going beyond
the simple “live-and-let-live” arrangement into active cooperation with the
Japanese government. Japanese Buddhist missionaries found it easier to
gain an audience in Taiwan’s temples and had more success in gaining adher-
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ents among the natives than either Shintô or Christian missionaries (Chen
, ). Second, several of the most prominent Buddhists of the period,
such as Jueli, Shanhui, and Benyuan, founded new temples and subordinated
them administratively to the lineages of Japanese Buddhism, the first two to
the Sôtôshû, the third to the Rinzaishû (Jones , –). Even some
Zhaijiao halls began regularly inviting Japanese Buddhist missionaries to
their meetings to observe and to preach (Taiwan Provincial Historical Com-
mission , a).
However, one must be careful not to overstate the amount of influence
that the Japanese wielded over Buddhism during this time. As mentioned
above, Chinese Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism di¥er in significant ways:
Japanese Buddhist priests marry, eat meat, and drink wine, all of which
Chinese Buddhist monastics find repugnant. Furthermore, Japanese Bud-
dhists take only the bodhisattva vows upon ordination, having long ago
ceased taking the traditional  precepts of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya
(Chn: sifenlü). Not only does this open them to charges of laxity from the
Chinese side, but it also casts doubt on the very validity of their ordinations.
Therefore, even as the Chinese Buddhists of Taiwan were entering into
cooperative arrangements with Japanese Buddhists, they also worked hard
to limit the influence of Japanese Buddhist practices and customs. As one
example of this countervailing tendency, we see during this period the first
monastic ordinations ever held in Taiwan, all performed scrupulously
according to the traditional Chinese model.
The Second Period, 1915–1937
The year  marked a watershed as far as Japanese religious policies were
concerned. This was the year in which the Xilai Hermitage incident (Xilai an
shijian) almost erupted into a major anti-Japanese uprising. This uprising,
led by one Yu Qingfang, had its inception in the Xilai Hermitage, a Zhaijiao
hall, and in spirit-writing halls (luantang) (for further information on spirit
writing, see Clart, chapter  in this volume). In addition, Yu and his followers
took up religious practices and rhetoric in preparing for their uprising. For
example, they all adopted a vegetarian diet, performed rituals to rally the
Daoist Celestial Generals and their spirit armies to their cause, wore bullet-
deflecting talismans, and so on (Cai , ). The Japanese government dis-
covered the plot before the rebels had a chance to put it into operation, and
Yu Qingfang was executed along with ninety-four others after a speedy trial,
while hundreds of others went to prison to serve long sentences, bringing to
an end the last major uprising in Taiwan.
This incident, which, like others before it, was rooted in the millenarian
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fanaticism of some of Taiwan’s “old religious customs” (kyûkan shûkyô),
brought suspicion on all religious groups in Taiwan, with the exception of
orthodox, monastic Buddhism (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission
, b). The sudden realization that supposedly benign old customs could
serve as the rallying point for open rebellion had e¥ects both on the gov-
ernment and on the religious groups themselves. On the government’s side,
o≤cials realized the urgency of the need to carry out more detailed investi-
gations into the nature of religion in Taiwan, while, on the side of Taiwanese
religions themselves, adherents felt the need to find ways to distance them-
selves from seditious movements in order to avert possible government
persecution.
Immediately after the uprising, the governor-general issued orders
directing that each public school in Taiwan conduct a survey of all shrines
and temples in its jurisdiction. However, this first e¥ort at investigation,
fueled by fear and hastily implemented, proved ine¥ectual, and the e¥ort
was canceled in March . A second round, directed by Marui Keijirô, then
head of the Interior Ministry’s Shrine Bureau (Shajika), begin shortly
thereafter. This e¥ort met with much greater success. Marui prepared and
distributed standard forms and involved not only local schools, but also
police stations (Cai , –).
The results, published in  (see Marui [] ), promised to be a
comprehensive account of the nature of traditional religion in Taiwan, from
popular religion through Daoism, Zhaijiao, Buddhism, and non-temple-
based devotional and ancestral societies. While Marui’s report represents an
important resource for research in Taiwanese religion, one must use its
results carefully. The research, carried out by schoolteachers and police in
addition to their primary responsibilities and without training in field
research methods, uncritically reproduces data supplied by informants and,
thus, reports their idealized self-image rather than their reality. For example,
the section on Zhaijiao reproduces without comment or criticism the sect’s
claim that it stands in a direct lineage from Huineng (–), the Sixth
Patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism (Marui [] , ¥.). Thus, the
Japanese governor-general based his religious policies at this time on sec-
tarian ideology, not on the real derivations, beliefs, and practices of Taiwan’s
traditional religious groups.
However, the investigations did bring Marui into contact with many of
Taiwan’s religious leaders, who were at the time also coping with the after-
e¥ects of the Xilai Hermitage incident. Ever since the plot was uncovered
and the connection with religion noted, many of the ethnic Han people of
Taiwan who wished to pursue their religions in peace sought ways to deflect
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the suspicion that fell on them as a result of the incident. One of the main
methods employed was the formation of islandwide religious associations
whose charters included specific requirements of good citizenship and
pledges that members would not engage in seditious activities. Several such
organizations, such as the Patriotic Buddhist Association (Aiguo Fojiao
Hui), the Buddhist Youth Association (Taiwan Fojiao Qingnian Hui), and
the Taiwan Friends of the Buddhist Way (Taiwan Fojiao Daoyou Hui), came
into being in the years following . In setting up these organizations, the
people of Taiwan hoped to establish organizations membership in which
would avert any possible suspicion of rebellious intent (for details on all
these organizations, see Jones [, –]).
Although these groups were islandwide in scope, they also tended to be
aligned with one Japanese Buddhist school or another and, thus, became
sectarian in character, making them more competitive than cooperative. In
carrying out his investigations, Marui saw the need for a religious society
that would be truly ecumenical, so, in , he brought together all the
leaders of Taiwan Buddhism and Zhaijiao to form the South Seas Buddhist
Association (Chn.: Nan Ying Fojiao Hui; Jpn.: Nan’e Bukkyôkai; SSBA).
This organization endured for the remainder of Japanese rule in Taiwan and
provided its members with direct government supervision and credentials,
on the basis of which they could remain above suspicion and free from fear
of suppression.
In , the government transferred Marui back to Japan, and responsi-
bility for oversight of the SSBA devolved onto the Bureau of Education’s
Social A¥airs O≤ce. For the remainder of the SSBA’s existence, its president
was always the head of the Bureau of Education and its vice president the
head of the Social A¥airs O≤ce. In this way, the adverse e¥ects of the Xilai
Hermitage incident on both the government and the people were amelio-
rated by a single strategy. In pursuing its investigations, the government
gained increased contact with and more active supervision over Taiwan’s
religious groups, and these groups in turn developed organizations and
relations with the government that protected them from crackdowns and
reprisals.
The SSBA was also significant insofar as it represents the only instance
in Chinese history in which monastic Buddhism has actively cooperated
with what it considered a White-Lotus form of popular Buddhism. However,
there was one other organization that formed for similar purposes (protec-
tion from suspicion and persecution) but was open only to members of
Zhaijiao. This was the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association (Taiwan Fojiao
Longhua Hui), founded in  by prominent zhaiyou (i.e., Zhaijiao
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adherents) from central Taiwan. Although this organization was strongest in
the belt from Chiayi (Jiayi) to Tainan, never rivaled the SSBA in size and
influence, and shared many of its leaders with the SSBA, it was still a signifi-
cant religious organization that lasted until the end of the Japanese period
and provided a way for members to establish good credentials with the gov-
ernment. (On the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association, see Wang [].)
The Third Period, 1937–1945
The year  marked another watershed in the Japanese government’s rela-
tionship with the people of Taiwan. This was the year of the Marco Polo
Bridge incident and the outbreak of the War of Resistance on the mainland.
Japan had always been of two minds in its attitude toward its colonial
subjects, never really knowing whether and to what extent they could be
assimilated into Japanese culture, and, thus, vacillating in its approach over
the years leading up to  (Chen , –). The onset of war made the
problem urgent, and directives from Tokyo ordering the rapid acculturation
of peoples in all Japan’s colonial territories (Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria)
replaced local initiatives (Chen , –). The people of Taiwan were Japa-
nese citizens, and Japan needed their sons for their military service and their
labor (to maintain wartime production). However, they were also ethnically
Chinese, and the government could not be sure that, even after forty-two
years of Japanese domination, they might not harbor covert sympathy for
their (not so) distant cousins on the mainland and defect on the field of
battle. A solution to this quandary was urgently needed.
The plan that carried the day—the “Japanization movement”—tried,
insofar as such a project was even possible, to turn the Han people of Taiwan
into ethnic Japanese. In the secular sphere, this entailed a ban on any Chinese
dialect in print or public discourse, the enforcement of Japanese-style dress,
pressure to renovate homes in accordance with customary Japanese design,
inviting loyal families to apply for new Japanese names, and a ban on Chi-
nese cultural activities such as Taiwanese opera (Chen , –). In the
religious sphere, this involved e¥orts to wean people away from traditional
Chinese religion and into the nexus of State Shintô.
One example of e¥ort to lure people to State Shintô is the e¥ort on the
part of the Japanese government to induce citizens to remove traditional
family altars from their homes and replace them with Japanese-style deity
altars (kamidana) and Buddha altars (butsudan). In addition, the govern-
ment distributed paper amulets (taima) consecrated at the Ise branch shrine
in Taipei and instituted a unified calendar of religious festivals based on the
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Japanese model (Cai , –). However, measures such as these are
easier to promulgate than to enforce, and I suspect that they a¥ected few
people outside large urban areas.
The so-called temple-restructuring movement, in which many tradi-
tional temples were razed and their religious images burned, caused much
more consternation among the populace and had more far-reaching e¥ects.
The historical progress of this movement is very complicated and would
constitute an essay in itself; hence, only a very truncated account can be
given here.
As people gave thought to appropriate methods of promoting the Japa-
nization movement, some groups turned their attention to the situation of
Daoist and folk temples in the island. The first call for reform came from the
“Conference on Improving Popular Customs” held in Taiwan in July .
At this early stage, far from calling for the razing and consolidation of
temples, conference participants merely voted on a series of recommenda-
tions for reforming the bad image of popular temple culture then current
among the Japanese in general as well as Chinese intellectuals. These reforms
included rationalizing the finances and governance of temples; excluding
fortune-tellers, geomancers, and their ilk from temple grounds; improving
the manner of worshiping deities and the life-cycle rituals; and so on (Cai
, –).
The outbreak of open war between China and Japan in  made the
task of temple reform more pressing. The authorities immediately moved to
proscribe practices deemed wasteful of resources needed for the war, such
as burning large quantities of ghost money, which was expensive either to
manufacture locally or to import from China (Cai , ). However,
some local o≤cials wanted to take stronger measures. They felt that temples,
and the religious culture centered on them, constituted such an intractable
obstacle to Japanization as to be unredeemable. Any remaining symbol of
the Taiwanese population’s Chineseness, however residual, was an impedi-
ment to full assimilation. Ideological considerations aside, many local
o≤cials also noted that the temples’ often considerable holdings in cash and
and real estate would serve the nation better if confiscated and put to use in
educational endeavors and the war e¥ort.
Consequently, some local o≤cials began taking the more drastic steps of
closing and demolishing temples and burning their religious images, a
process that they called “sending the gods to Heaven.” The governor-general
made no response to these extreme measures, leaving local governments to
decide for themselves whether and to what extent to promulgate and enforce
them. One o≤cial in particular, Miyazaki Naokatsu, the head of Zhongli
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(Chung-li) gun (subprefecture), prosecuted these measures with the greatest
zeal, destroying almost all Daoist temples, folk temples, and zhaitang
(Zhaijiao halls) in his jurisdiction. In other areas, o≤cials took no measures
at all, or passed measures but failed to enforce them, or enforced them only
partially (Cai , –).
However erratically the measures were promulgated and carried out, an
outcry nevertheless ensued, both in Taiwan and in the Japanese homeland.
In the years –, many local Chinese and Japanese leaders in Taiwan
itself complained both to the governor-general’s o≤ce and to representatives
in the national Diet. Twice the Diet made o≤cial inquiries to determine
whether the temple-restructuring movement violated the Japanese consti-
tution’s freedom-of-religious-belief clause. Journalists and social critics
assailed the movement relentlessly. The pressure at last forced the governor-
general to become involved in an attempt to bring some order and uni-
formity to a heretofore disparate and idiosyncratic policy instituted solely at
the local level.
Fortunately for all concerned, a new governor-general took o≤ce in
November , and the change provided a means to bring the movement
under control without a loss of face. The new governor-general ordered a
halt to all temple-restructuring activities and put together a commission of
academics to study the religious situation and determine the best possible
course. The commission worked diligently for a year, but, by the time it sub-
mitted its report, the war was winding down, and the controversy over
temple restructuring had subsided. So the report was quietly shelved, and no
further action was taken (Cai , –).
Because the Japanization movement was so unevenly introduced and
prosecuted, the outcome in terms of temples closed looks unimpressive.
According to Japanese government statistics, between  and  the
number of temples had fallen from , to ,, zhaitang from  to ,
and religious and ancestral associations from , to , (Chen , ).
One could hardly make a case that Taiwan’s religious scene had been e¥ec-
tively “Japanized.”
However, I believe that the real significance of the Japanization move-
ment and the attendant temple-restructuring movement lay not so much in
its concrete results as in the atmosphere of uncertainty that it created and the
countermeasures that it provoked on the part of the population at large.
While the movement was at its height, temples, zhaitang, and religious asso-
ciations stood to lose all the property they had accumulated, all the money
they had saved, indeed, their entire religious way of life. Many of these
groups found ways to adapt in order to ensure their survival.
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The Buddhists of Taiwan had long since learned the value of a≤liating
themselves with the schools of Japanese Buddhism. Now Zhaijiao tried 
this strategy, and, sensing an opportunity to increase their memberships,
the Japanese Buddhist organizations were glad to go along. For example, the
Fengtian Gong, a zhaitang in Yangmei village, appealed to the head of the
Rinzai mission in Taiwan, Takabayashi Gentaka, for protection, promising
to subordinate itself administratively to the Rinzai school in return. Taka-
bayashi accepted the o¥er and interceded with the government at all levels
(Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission , b). Cai (, ) reports
that, indeed, membership in Japanese Buddhist schools went up dramati-
cally during the Japanization movement.
The movement also strengthened the membership of the South Seas
Buddhist Association and the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association. Since
the leadership of these organizations enjoyed good relations with the
governor-general’s o≤ce, temples and zhaitang frequently found that mem-
bership in one or the other of these organizations was enough to forestall
confiscation or demolition. Folk and Daoist temples, on the other hand,
were isolated from such support networks and su¥ered the brunt of the
movement (Cai , ).
One interesting e¥ect that lasted beyond the life of the movement and
probably well into the postwar period was an increase in skepticism in
matters of religion. When temples were razed or remodeled into Shintô
shrines, the people greatly feared the anger of the deities and braced them-
selves for earthquakes, floods, and plagues. For the most part, these divine
scourges failed to appear, causing many to lose faith in the whole system of
Chinese folk beliefs (Cai , –). The police even reported a decline
in public morals as a result of the people’s loss of faith in the gods’ ability to
punish wrongdoing!
Another way to interpret this movement, however, is to see it as a dis-
traction from the deeper, more general concern that gave rise to it. The
outbreak of war in  introduced exigencies into the situation that
impelled drastic action on the part of the government, action that, by its
draconian nature, obscured the trends that were already under way and can
be understood as instances of modernization. Remember that, before the
war, conferences were already being held in Taipei that brought together
both Japanese and Taiwanese urban intellectuals for discussions about
pernicious “old customs.” As was revealed in these conferences, the primary
problem with these old customs was, not that they cast doubt on the loyalty
of the Taiwanese to the imperial throne (the colonial government’s chief
concern), but that they were “superstitious” and “wasteful” (a more general-
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ized concern harbored by modernizers both inside and outside the govern-
ment). In a word, they were backward and not modern.
The Effects of Modernization on Taiwanese Religion
The preceding discussion has led us to a consideration of the second major
factor in religious change prior to  besides Japanese government policy:
modernization. If the people lost faith in the gods when temple restruc-
turing failed to provoke divine vengeance, it may be that prior currents of
modernization had already prepared the way for the loss.
Scholars of Taiwanese history have often remarked that the Qing court
took little or no interest in Taiwan, holding it only so that pirates and other
national powers could not use it as a base from which to attack the main-
land (Wills , ). Chinese government o≤cials generally considered
assignment to Taiwan a form of internal exile and, therefore, the turnover
rate among them was high, and the imperial government’s reach did not
extend to bureaucratic levels below that of the county (Sung , ). Only
one Chinese governor, Liu Mingchuan (–), attempted to make any
improvements in public works, building the first railroad in the island (the
very one to which the Longshan temple objected, as noted above). However,
he rotated out very soon after, and the railroad quickly fell into disrepair.
When the Chinese ceded the island to Japan in , the head negotiator on
the Chinese side made clear that the Chinese government would not miss
Taiwan at all (Jones , ).
After the Japanese took over Taiwan in , they quickly set about
building up the island’s material infrastructure in order to facilitate indus-
trialization and begin making money for the Japanese government. E¥orts
at modernization under the Japanese had e¥ects in the world of religion, of
which I examine two in this section: the connection of all areas of the island
by railroad and the introduction of modern medicine and sanitation.
As we saw above, prior to the arrival of the Japanese, Taiwanese society
naturally fell into subgroups based on common provenance or trade guilds
and centered geographically on temples. Taiwan lacked a temple or deity of
islandwide prominence; the cult of a particular deity or temple tended to be
connected in the popular imagination with a cult or a temple back on the
mainland, not to one elsewhere on the island. Aside from the intense in-
group cohesion common at that time that made temples significant only for
members of the local community, the geography of Taiwan itself also pre-
vented any temple from attaining greater than local patronage. Taiwan
naturally breaks into several discrete geographic zones because of the high
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mountain ranges that run all the way from the south to the north and the
rivers that cut across the western alluvial plain, where most of the people live.
Hemmed in by mountains and rivers, people found it very di≤cult to travel
to other parts of the island, and few had any motivation even to try.
After the Japanese took over the government of the island, however, they
set to work almost immediately building railroads, connecting all parts of
Taiwan and creating a single transportation network. The main trunk line
connecting the northern and southern ends of the island was completed as
early as  (Lamley , ). The governors-general also gave high
priority to building and improving roads and bridges. Their intention was
merely to make it easier to get raw materials to factories and export com-
modities to port, but they also made it easier for people to travel about the
island. It is no coincidence, therefore, that this period also saw the develop-
ment of certain temples as islandwide pilgrimage sites. In the world of Bud-
dhism, this is the period in which we first find temples rising to prominence
as ordination sites and drawing enough visitors to rely on them as a
significant source of income (Jones , –). In Daoism and popular
religion, too, we see temples that grow beyond their local boundaries and
begin serving an islandwide clientele. In some cases, the deity enshrined in
a temple’s precincts gained such a reputation for e≤cacy that the image itself
went abroad to take part in processions in order to bestow its blessings in
other localities for other subethnic groups. Thus, during this time, religion
in Taiwan lost a great deal of its localized, in-group character.
This trend was especially apparent in temples founded during the early
colonial period in and around urban areas. For instance, Katz (, –
) notes that several temples founded in the first two decades of the twen-
tieth century—the Zhinan Gong, the Xingtian Gong, and the Juexiu Gong,
for example—were not built as traditional, community-based temples.
Rather, they were large, eclectic in the variety of gods enshrined, had access
to transportation networks built into their design, and drew devotees and
leadership from very wide geographic zones. At the same time, their
practices from the outset excluded elements that would connect them to
their local communities, such as ritual processions through the neighbor-
hood or the levying of ritual taxes. In other words, these new temples were
designed to be pilgrimage sites, their founders favoring features typical of an
adventitious religion over features typical of a locative religious cult.
As for medical advances, the Japanese began to introduce Western medi-
cine and more modern public-health and sanitation measures shortly after
they gained control of the island. Such measures were taken in response to
the outbreaks of the plague, typhus, malaria, and cholera that a≥icted the
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occupying Japanese army in the years after  (Lamley , ). Such
outbreaks—especially of the plague—were nothing new in Taiwan; the
native population had endured them regularly ever since the Chinese first
arrived. Traditionally, the Chinese population conceived of the plague as a
gang of ghostly bandits terrorizing the area, so they responded to it by call-
ing on a spiritual defense in the form of Celestial Generals and their forces.
The people would take the image of the deity from the local temple and
parade it as a way of calling the troops in. If the power of the local deity
proved insu≤cient, they might go farther afield to find a more powerful god
to come to their aid. Often, the imported god proved more successful than
local deities, primarily because, by the time the local gods had been tried and
found wanting and a new god transported in, the plague had already had
time to run its course naturally and was beginning to abate. In this way, the
image of Mazu from the Guandu temple became renowned for its e≤cacy
all over the northern end of Taiwan (Sung , –).
Gotô Shimpei, the civil administrator under the fourth governor-general
and a doctor himself with Western medical training, worked especially hard
at introducing modern medical and sanitation practices, and, as early as
, his e¥orts paid o¥ in markedly lower rates of cholera, smallpox, and
bubonic plague (Lamley , ). As time went on, the e¥ect of modern-
ization on religion in Taiwan became increasingly profound. At first, as
individuals found that treatment by modern methods had a better chance
of curing cases of plague and other diseases, they turned to it rather than
participating in religious processions. Later, as improved sanitation resulted
in a decreased incidence of disease outbreak, the number of processions
themselves correspondingly decreased. By , the end of the Japanese
period, most of the population, especially in urban areas, had become 
used to turning to medicine rather than the gods to alleviate the ravages of
epidemics (Sung , –).
However, as Katz (chapter  in this volume) points out, one must be
careful in interpreting such data. In this connection, the Taiwanese scholar
Chang Hsun has noted that folk religion has endured in Taiwan alongside
the two elite practices of Western medicine and “orthodox” Chinese med-
icine (Chn.: zhengtong zhongyi). Unlike the latter two, folk and religious
rituals do not seek merely to deal with illness technically by providing a cure;
they also deal with it socially and ritually, providing a context within which
to understand what illness means within the community. Thus, modern and
“orthodox Chinese” medical practices have proved themselves better at
curing disease and, thus, have pushed religious practice to the margins in 
the technical arena. However, they have not succeeded in giving meaning to
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the experience of disease or in aiding individuals in dealing with treatment
failures and death. Thus, Chang notes, these religious and ritual methods
persist even in modern, industrial, democratic, and capitalist Taiwan, often
functioning as the last resort after Western medicine and orthodox Chinese
medicine have been tried and have failed. In the Taiwanese context, ritual
works by construing illness as a breakdown in relationships, whether
between living members of a family or community or between the living and
their ancestors. Precisely because it helps people come to grips with
questions of the meaning of illness, it still has a role to play, even if modern
practices have forced it to yield its place as a treatment option (see Chang
, –).
From these two examples, we can see that the e¥ects of Japanese rule on
the religious life of Taiwan extended beyond those engendered by policies
aimed specifically at religion. Other such examples could be adduced. For
instance, the Japanese police force put an end to the feuding and warfare that
had long gone on between subethnic groups and instituted new ways of
organizing the population that supplanted the old clan, guild, and home-
town associations. In addition, the installation of telephone and telegraph
systems, facilitating communication, and the imposition of uniform cur-
rency, weights, and measures very likely served both to reduce the likelihood
that individual identity would be based on locality, clan, and dialect and, to
a certain extent, to facilitate a broader, pan-Taiwanese consciousness, one
made even sharper by the presence of the Japanese “other.” Thus, these
developments, coupled with the improvements in transportation and sani-
tation detailed above, could well have contributed to the formation of pan-
Taiwanese religious groupings. The very measures taken to modernize the
island had the unintended side e¥ect of breaking the cults of individual gods
and the clientele of individual temples out of their previously narrow
parochial bounds while at the same time making people less reliant on them
for such worldly goals as ending plagues.
However, purely local or subethnic groupings were not eradicated
entirely. Lee (chapter  in this volume), for example, demonstrates that the
“professional domains” of Daoist priestly families are almost completely
coextensive with local linguistic groupings even today. It seems that, at least
for the most intimate and emotional life-cycle rituals (e.g., funerals), the
people of Taiwan still feel most comfortable with neighbors who understand
them and speak their language. Nevertheless, Lee also shows that, in most
other domains of their religious life, the Taiwanese place themselves readily
into broader groupings that transcend subethnic boundaries, and this trend
began under the Japanese.
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CONCLUSIONS
By the time Japanese rule in Taiwan came to an end and the island reverted
to Chinese sovereignty, many changes had already taken place in the reli-
gious sphere. New rail links across the island made it possible for religion to
transcend its local character and allowed for the establishment of prominent
Buddhist and Daoist temples whose reputations drew visitors from around
the island. The failure of the gods to avenge the destruction of their temples
during the Japanization movement, along with evidence that modern sani-
tation worked better than religious processions to ameliorate epidemics,
engendered a new level of skepticism that inaugurated the secularization of
society. In order, therefore, to reach a proper understanding of the post-
religious developments reported on in the remainder of this volume, the
reader must be aware that many of these had been under way since the turn
of the century.
NOTES
1. This and other measures were intended to prevent Taiwan from becoming too
autonomous by maintaining an incentive for émigrés to return to the mainland to
marry. Shepherd (, ) reports that many men crossed over twice each year, going
to Taiwan in the spring for planting and returning to Fujian in the autumn after the
harvest.
2. Davis’ distinction between “adventitious” and “locative” religions corresponds roughly
to Yang’s () distinction between “institutional” and “di¥use” religions. I prefer
Davis’ terminology because it is more precise. As should be evident, locative religions
can be highly institutionalized as well as di¥use. Likewise, adventitious religions can
be di¥use as well as institutionalized, as is the case with religions organized, not into
congregations, but into lineages of individual masters and students. Naquin (,
–) has labeled this latter type “meditation sects,” as opposed to the more con-
gregationally oriented “sutra-recitation sects.”
3. Brook (, ) reports that, during this period, members of the literati who
remained loyal to the Ming court commonly disguised themselves as monks (shaving
their heads and wearing monastic robes). However, they never took formal religious
vows and so cannot be considered genuine.
4. Ordination as a Buddhist monk or nun involves two separate steps: the novice’s ordi-
nation, which may take place as early as age seven and requires the observance of only
ten precepts, and the full ordination, which is restricted to those age twenty or older
and involves the observance of  precepts.
5. “Luojiao” (Luo teachings) is the name generally given to the religious movements that
derived from the teachings of Luo Qing (–). For more information, see ter
Haar ([] ) and Overmyer (). Seiwert (, –) cautions that neither 
32
01Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:39 AM  Page 32
Rel ig ion in  Taiwan at  the End of  the Japanese Colonia l  Per iod
claiming Luo as a patriarch nor even keeping a copy of his scriptural writings implies
actual assent to his teachings. Such claims may be e¥orts to establish credibility and
prestige through association with a well-known name rather than a humble submis-
sion to his faith.
6. “Jinchuang” is frequently romanized as “Jintong” owing to the influence of the Hok-
kien pronunciation.
For more information on the genesis of Unborn Venerable Mother mythology
on the mainland during the Ming dynasty, see ter Haar ([] , – and pas-
sim). On other of her devotees in Taiwan, see Jordan and Overmyer (, –,
–, and passim).
7. One must understand that, in the context of early Chan history, the identification
of any group with the so-called Northern School casts aspersions on its understand-
ing of Buddhist doctrine and the e≤cacy of its practice.
8. This independence from the clergy, in particular the government-approved clerical
establishment, marked these sects as “unorthodox” (xiejiao) in imperial eyes, and
this imprecation is sometimes carried forward into a certain type of scholarly inter-
pretation that equates “monastic” Buddhism with “orthodox” Buddhism. To this,
Seiwert (, ) pungently observes that, judged objectively on the basis of sin-
cerity of belief, zeal in practice, and moral rigor, these popular sects come out more
orthodox than the monks.
9. In recent years, there have been two monograph studies on Japanese religious
policies in Taiwan from  to : Chen () and Cai (). Both adopt this
three-part scheme in their analysis.
10. It is, of course, well-known that both Daoism and Confucianism entered Japan as
well, but the Japanese did not seem to take these as sources of commonality that
could be exploited. For instance, in his  report on religion in Taiwan, Marui Kei-
jirô points out the common heritage of Chan Buddhism but makes no such refer-
ence in the section on Daoism and Confucianism (see Marui [] , ).
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A L L  S O C I E T I E S go through processes of change owing to a variety of either
internal or external causes. Changes may be gradual, almost imperceptible;
they can also be sudden and profound. Yet, within these changes, there are
usually a number of elements that remain stable and provide continuity.
Modern developments in Taiwan provide a clear example of a society in
transformation. Taiwan was under Japanese rule from  until , when
it was returned to Chinese control. With the Communist takeover of the
Chinese mainland in , Taiwan became the seat of the Nationalist govern-
ment and the scene first of major political and social changes, then of eco-
nomic and cultural changes. In a period of fifty years, these transformations
have profoundly altered the landscape of Taiwanese society. In this essay, I
will focus on changes that have occurred in the religious life of the Taiwanese
people,1 but, since the other transformations mentioned had a great impact
on religious life, they must be studied in conjunction.
From my own observation, enriched by media information plus a
limited study of relevant contemporary literature, I wish to state briefly and
then analyze the various areas of change in religious culture in Taiwan. I refer
here especially to observable religious activities or religious behavior
patterns of groups and individuals.2 Four areas of activity are singled out:
temple-construction projects; religious rituals; religious organizations; and
religious entrepreneurship (see Pas ).
Temple construction is one of the most visible expressions of a renewed
religious vitality, but other building projects are equally impressive: hospitals,
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schools, temple dormitories, temple parks and gardens, and, more recently,
museums. Obviously, this boom in the religious construction industry, with
the minor industries that it spins o¥, is an expression of the general eco-
nomic prosperity of today and reveals a particular mentality: If the people
prosper, it is at least in part due to the protection of the deities. Therefore,
they deserve better treatment—more grandiose dwellings (temples), better
o¥erings, better services (rituals).
The boom in temple construction is clearly seen when one compares
government statistics past and present. According to a Japanese census taken
in , there were , temples in Taiwan (Lin , ).3 In , there
were , (Lin , ).4 If nonregistered temples and Tudi Gong (local
earth god) shrines are included, the estimated  total rises to about ,.
In , the total number of temples is given as , (Lin , ). (This fig-
ure does not include Christian churches.) By , the number had increased
to , (Quanguo Focha Daoguan zonglan, n.d., ). (For the first time,
Christian churches are included:  Roman Catholic and , Protestant.)
If home shrines are added, the total comes to about ,. But a di¥erent
source claims that there are over , “small Daoist temples” in Taiwan
(see Taiwan Daomiao zhi , :). According to statistics compiled by the
Ministry of the Interior, in the year  Taiwan was home to a total of ,
“Buddhist” and “Daoist” temples that had registered with the state (see Katz,
in press).5
Besides the numbers involved, other aspects of temple building are
worth examining. First, the motivation: I assume that, in many cases, there
is true religious concern, but the spirit of entrepreneurship seems to be of
equal importance (see below).
What is new in this temple-building boom is the grandiose scale of
some projects. Quite a few well-endowed temples have been rebuilt where
they formerly stood but on a larger scale: examples are the Sanfeng Gong in
Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong), and the Ziwei Gong in Taichung (Taizhong). Others
have relocated, usually to mountain areas, since urban planning and road
construction necessitated the relinquishing of some temple grounds in the
city. The new buildings and grounds are sometimes ten times larger than the
original. An example is the Shengshou Gong originally in Taichung city, now
rebuilt in the Dakeng hills northeast of the city.
The rebuilding of old temples in situ and their relocation outside the city
boundaries are new phenomena. On the one hand, land available in the
cities is limited, and its price has skyrocketed. On the other hand, the people
have become more mobile: the increase in the number of privately owned
cars is very significant. Also, as Jones (chapter  in this volume) points out,
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the problem of distance, which had been partly addressed during the Japa-
nese period by the colonial government’s ambitious transportation infra-
structure improvements, has been definitively solved in the post- period
with the construction of more and better access roads. Some larger temples
have regular bus services, and, for the convenience of occasional travelers,
touring cars can also be hired. Pilgrimage to larger temples is, indeed, a very
common feature of religious life today (see below).
What is probably the most impressive aspect of modern temple con-
struction is the grand scale of the new buildings, the spacious grounds
around them (for parking and sometimes for business activities), and the
lavish style of traditional architecture. This is possible only in remote areas,
where land prices are low, and is conditioned by the economic prosperity of
the island: to build a large new temple today costs a fortune. Among the
examples of grandiose temple buildings one can think of the Mazu temple
at Lu’ermen near Tainan city, the monastic and cultural complex of
Foguangshan (Buddha Light Mountain), near Kaohsiung city, and the huge,
only partially completed project of Kaitian Gong on a mountain slope in the
suburbs of Taichung. At the latter site, a seven-story building has already
been completed and serves as a shrine, attracting devotees on Sundays; their
donations will make further building possible. Four more major halls are
planned, all situated one above the other on the mountain slope. To make
access easier, a minibus service runs between a bus stop at the foot of the
mountain and the temple. On Sundays, the crowd of devotees is impressive;
they are attracted by the healing services performed by entranced mediums
and by the more scientific medical facilities in another part of the building.
A huge kitchen prepares a free lunch for the hundreds of devotees.
The Kaitian Gong is just one instance of grand-scale temple building.
There are many other examples of large temples o¥ering services to visitors
that range from faith healing, to consultation of the gods through spirit
writing, to rituals intended to improve one’s fate.
Some famous temples attract huge crowds of worshipers and generate
large amounts of revenue. One naturally wonders whether there is any e¥ec-
tive government regulation to oversee the inflow of funds. Since most such
revenue takes the form of cash donations, control must be di≤cult. It is
occasionally announced in the media that temples have donated large sums
to charity. Some temples o¥er scholarships to students. Others invest in new
enterprises, for example, building schools, hospitals, orphanages, or old-age
homes.6 To erect colleges and universities is, of course, one of the supreme
ideals. Possibly in imitation of the Catholic Church and the various Protes-
tant denominations, which founded universities long ago, Buddhist institu-
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tions have followed suit, and it is said that the Daoist Association is working
toward the establishment of a Daoist university.
Mentioning charity evokes the worldwide Buddhist organization
centered in Hualien (Hualian): Fojiao Ciji Gongde Hui (or the Buddhist
Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, as it refers to itself in its English-
language literature), which promotes “charity, medicine, education, and
culture” (see http: //www.tzuchi.org/global /about/missions.html). It has
branches in most continents, while, in Taiwan, it has built a grand modern
hospital and a medical university in Hualien. André Laliberté (chapter  in
this volume) o¥ers more information on this organization.
Other large-scale projects include the planning of a museum of world
religions. A small community of Buddhist nuns took this initiative under the
leadership of their abbot, the Venerable Xindao. Their monastery is located
atop Lingjiushan, near Fulong in the hills northeast of Taipei, but their
center of planning and fund-raising is in Taipei. This ambitious enterprise
was brought to completion, and the museum opened its doors to visitors on
 November .
This enormous development in religious construction is, of course, par-
tially the result of the economic prosperity of Taiwan, but it is not a totally
new phenomenon, just a quantitative increase. What appears to be an added
characteristic is the spirit of competition between various temples. More
than before, temples try to outdo each other in the splendor, not only of the
buildings, but also of the furnishings and ritual celebrations (see below). The
economic well-being and generosity of the people enable temple builders
and managers to realize their dreams of grandeur.
Not only do temples serve the community in a variety of ways,7 but they
are also, and even foremost, centers of communal ritual activity. In this
regard, the situation has also changed during the last decades, once again
mostly quantitatively, but also qualitatively.8
Temple ritual activity can be either individual or communal. The latter
expresses itself in the celebration of temple festivals, of which community
renewals, group chanting, birthday celebrations, pilgrimages, and medium-
istic séances are the most important. In all these ritual events, visible changes
have occurred in recent times. In general, one can say that an externalization
has taken place, a shift toward external pomp and splendor (an aspect
further examined in Katz [chapter  in this volume]). This phenomenon
could be described in great detail, but two examples should be su≤cient to
illustrate the point: pilgrimages and rituals of cosmic renewal (jiao). Temple
pilgrimage (jinxiang, o¥ering incense) has become an islandwide organized
system. Temples, great and small, organize pilgrimage tours to a≤liated
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temples on the island. Participants are not just devotees living within the
community’s confines but are recruited from all over. (In February , I
myself took part in a two-day tour, visiting eleven temples altogether.) These
pilgrimage temples are among the most famous in Taiwan, temples where
the deity is reputed to exert extraordinary ling (spiritual power). To serve the
jinxiang groups, several temples have built large dormitories or guest houses
where pilgrims are o¥ered free accommodations and meals (but, in fact,
generous donations are routine practice). The groups can be extremely
numerous: from ten touring buses up to a hundred (with  to ,
participants).
Pilgrimage is a traditional way of expressing one’s faith in the deity, but
its enhanced frequency—the result of surplus spending money and the
availability of opportunities—is a new development. The resulting financial
gains realized by the temples on the circuit are another new phenomenon.
Some famous temples generate large fortunes as they are visited by hundreds
of thousands of pilgrims every year.
The celebration of the cosmic or community renewal festival ( jiao) is an
ancient Daoist ritual, nowadays performed whenever a new temple is con-
secrated or an old one renovated. What is new is the frequency and the
splendor of the events. A jiao causes a serious strain on temple funds, which
in the economic climate of the s was not an insurmountable obstacle.
Temples are able to organize a jiao more often than ever before: sometimes
once every twelve rather than every sixty years, as was the norm in the past.
The splendor of the celebration is dazzling: the building of a special sacred
tan (altar or dais, together with the consecrated space around it) within the
community boundaries, the decorations inside and around the temple area,
processions, visits by neighboring temple groups (including troupes of
martial-arts performers), fattest-animal contests, banquets on the last day of
the jiao, all are impressive, a feast for the senses. As Katz (chapter  in this
volume) points out, the jiao has, in recent decades, also become a media
event, bringing in news cameras and sponsorship from the major television
networks.
Once again, the jiao is an old custom, but the quality of today’s perfor-
mance is totally new. The funds involved are staggering. Looking at the
figures, made public in several temple memorial volumes, one is amazed by
the flow of New Taiwan dollars. Revenues are generated through voluntary
(or not so voluntary) donations by community members, who purchase
honorary titles from among an established hierarchy. For the highest title of
the  jiao in Xinzhuangzi (near Kaohsiung), a donation of US$,
was made to the temple. The temple booklet lists the names of  individual
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donors, presumably families, their contributions ranging as high as
US$,. A small group (ten to fifteen) of these donors received o≤cial
garments (blue tunic, black jacket, black hat), which they wore during the
rituals inside the sacred area of the temple (where other laypeople were not
allowed to enter). They represented the community while the Daoist priests
performed their esoteric liturgy.9
Another source of temple revenue generated on the occasion of a jiao is
the leasing of “shelving space” inside the temple: special temporary shelves
are set up in areas near the inner tan where the statues of visiting deities are
placed during the whole period of the festival. It is believed that, being so
near the center of activity, the statues will share in the ling of the divine
blessings descending from the heavens.10 Once the festival is over, they are
returned to their home temples or private homes, where their ling will now
be more e¥ective. For this privilege, temples and individuals pay a fee to the
organizing temple.11 Since the numbers of visiting deities can run into the
thousands, this is a new and e¥ective form of fund-raising.
Among the major expenditures involved on the occasion of a jiao—after
the building or renovation costs have been paid—are the erection of tan and
the honoraria paid to the Daoist priests. These aspects of the renewal rituals
as well as the Daoist liturgy itself need more study.12 Although temples
today include financial reports in their publications, these are usually incom-
plete. I presume that accurate accounts are not easy to obtain.
Both pilgrimage trips and renewal festivals are per se expressions of
deep religious spirit. But what one observes on the outside does not neces-
sarily always strike one as an act of faith. Entertainment and external show
appear to su¥ocate the spirit of worship. This may be an indication of secu-
larization setting in or a sign of the externalization of religious faith. Yet, at
the same time, true devotion can still be found, at least among a minority of
worshipers.
The degree and sincerity of true faith cannot be measured, only assumed.
Whereas community celebrations tend to be visibly superficial (seen as
merriment, entertainment, or vainglory), private devotional acts are more
often earnest and pious. Even in the middle of noisy conversations and
exploding firecrackers, people kneel in the temple, concentrating fully on
prayer, or they sit in a hidden corner and meditate, oblivious to their sur-
roundings. Such occurrences are not rare and may be an indication that, for
a number of people, a spiritual elite, religion holds an important place in
their lives.
Confirmation of an elite revival of spiritual awareness comes from con-
tacts with a number of groups and individuals who make great e¥orts in
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spreading their religious convictions. Such groups are found within and yet
outside the community religion. It is di≤cult to classify them or to assess
their relationship with the religious establishment. Some of these groups
have been called “sectarian movements”: examples are the Compassion
Society (Cihui Tang) and the Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao), which are spread
all over Taiwan (see Jordan and Overmyer ). But there are a large
number of smaller organizations of a local nature centered in one particular
temple (often designated as luantang, or “phoenix halls”).13 Membership in
these organizations is open to everyone, but participants are drawn mostly
from the lower middle class. The major activity of these local groups is to
engage in spirit-writing (fuji) divination: both for the benefit of individuals
and as a form of public instruction. When the deities descend “into the pen,”
the messages are recorded—and often published in monthly or biweekly
magazines and occasionally in books (shanshu or “morality books”). The
implication is that the instruction or moral edification of the masses is the
primary goal of these associations, although the personal spiritual growth of
the members and their future salvation are important as well.14
There exists as yet no umbrella organization for these divination groups,
but one does exist for mediums, the Zhonghua Minguo Lingji Xiehui
(Republic of China Association of Mediums, established in ) (see Paper
, ). This organization serves all mediums, whether a≤liated with a
temple or not; its goal is to discourage the sensational behavior and self-
torture that so impresses the common people and emphasize the spiritual
aspects of counseling. By developing and implementing a completely new
training program, it also hopes to raise the intellectual level of its member-
ship. Once again, this is an old phenomenon in a new guise.
This mediums’ association is not the only one of its kind. Such organi-
zations as the China Divination Association (Zhonghua Zhanyan Xiehui),
the International Society for Daoism (Zhonghua Lao-Zhuang Xiehui), and
the International I-ching Association have recently appeared on the scene.
What these associations all have in common is a concern for the spiritual and
ethical awareness of their own members and of society at large. All also
sponsor programs meant actively to promote such awareness. A side e¥ect,
not consciously intended but real nevertheless, is a decrease in the influence
of the local community temples. Yet the communal worldviews and the tra-
ditional ways of worshiping are not discarded. These voluntary associations
retain the basic tenets of the communal worldviews while adding their own
visions and concepts. Worship paraphernalia have remained largely the
same across groups.
This discussion of what I have called an “elite revival” of religious cul-
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ture in Taiwan has been only a general and incomplete survey of a topic that
deserves much more attention than it can be given here. (Some of the details
are fleshed out in the other essays in this collection.) What deserves par-
ticular attention is the incredible outpouring of religious literature, the so-
called shanshu. Larger temples have stands or shelves displaying hundreds of
small pamphlets and periodicals, but even small temples provide them to
visitors free of charge. However, the increase in quantity as well as the
improved quality—better paper, nicer fonts, more attractive overall appear-
ance—are recent developments that show the economic prosperity and
generosity of the donors. This phenomenon deserves careful study.
In many of the partially new, partially old phenomena described so far,
there hides a new mentality: “religious entrepreneurship.” Generally, what 
is meant by this term is the use of religion—especially the taking advantage
of believers’ generosity and gullibility—to raise funds for nonreligious pur-
poses. This is perhaps not a brand-new phenomenon either, but its degree
of sophistication and the considerable amount of money involved set it o¥
from earlier practices. Given the economic prosperity of Taiwanese society
(the money is there) and the spirit of generosity of believers (they are will-
ing to donate it), it is almost to be expected that unscrupulous individuals
will emerge to take advantage of these resources for their own personal
profit. This does not mean that religion generally has become a business; it
means simply that some have made it their business.
Religious entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon. It manifests itself
sometimes in the motivation for building a temple. Some temples are owned
by individuals or small corporations and were originally built to generate
income. Some temples do, in fact, generate considerable wealth. A great
number of smaller shrines, in particular home shrines operated by trance
mediums, fall in this category. The true intention of trance mediums is not
easy to discover, but it is believed that many enter the trade because of the
good living that can be made. Religious entrepreneurship on a large scale is
more exceptional: it is found among talented, charismatic individuals who
exploit religious belief for personal gain and power. Such exploitation is, of
course, not an exclusively Taiwanese phenomenon. Religious leaders of this
kind are found everywhere and especially in a≥uent societies (e.g., the tel-
evangelists of North America).
Recent years have seen the fraudulent practices of some religious leaders
exposed. One example is Song Qili, who “defrauded followers of some
US$ million through shams such as doctoring of photos to give himself the
supernatural and haloed aura of a miracle worker. Song reportedly charged
thousands of U.S. dollars for a photo of himself, and hundreds of thousands
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to meet him in person” (Chiu , ).15 One result of this and similar scan-
dals has been that the government has stepped in to examine the situation
and will eventually draw up new directives regulating religious activities.
Another result has been a decline in trust of religious organizations. It
remains to be seen how these events will a¥ect believers’ faith and, particu-
larly, their giving practices.
My examination of four types of religious expression (temple construc-
tion, temple rituals, religious organizations, and religious entrepreneur-
ship) would seem to indicate that the scenario of Taiwanese religion has
changed during the last fifty years or more. But are the changes substantive
or only superficial? That question is not easily answered. David Jordan is of
the opinion that the changes are not substantive: “It is my provisional guess
that there has been little significant transformation in the moral or ‘theo-
logical’ basis of religious experience in Taiwan” (, ). There may, of
course, be di¥erences of opinion, depending on what one considers to be
“significant” in this case. Substantive changes would include the conversion
of a majority to another religion, such as the conversion to Christianity in
early medieval Europe. In Taiwan, the closest example is the great progress
made by Buddhism since ,16 but popular religion still remains strong.
Another instance of substantive change would be a rise in secularism.
Has Taiwan become a secular society? If the analysis that I present above is
correct, the answer is that, so far, it has not. But secularism does seem to be
on the rise. In major cities, especially Taipei, religious life does not seem to
have a strong presence: probably because its e¥ect on the process of indus-
trial and economic development is minimal. Moreover, the modern educa-
tion system discourages the influence of religion and “superstition.”17 Even
the apparent flourishing of popular religious customs, especially in the
smaller townships and rural areas, may be questioned. Does this really prove
an increase in true religious commitment? The thesis that a “religious
revitalization” is taking place in Taiwan and that “the spiritual and material
developments of major civilizations and countries always go hand in hand”
(Chiu , ) is questionable and needs careful research. The counter-
argument that some of the most industrialized countries today (Western
Europe and Japan) are also the most secularized can easily be made. (I
would add that the decline of organized religion does not mean a decline in
spiritual culture; this latter is not per se religious culture!)
Those who maintain that religious life in Taiwan is as strong as ever must
be careful. There is, as far as I know, no clear evidence either way, except what
I stated earlier: a deepening of the religious spirit of an elite. The external
splendor of temple festivals is not proof of stronger religious belief: it can be
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easily explained as adherence to tradition and folk customs (showing an
upsurge of nationalism), at least for a number of participants, who no
longer necessarily share the underlying belief system. But this is all guess-
work. Only through careful study is it possible to arrive at well-founded con-
clusions about the actual state of religious beliefs today. Religious behavior
in and of itself is no proof of religious faith and commitment.
In conclusion, the basic question concerning changes in the religious
culture of Taiwan since  can be answered in two ways, both justifiable.
One is that there has, indeed, been change; the other is that there has been
no significant change. What changes there have been can be attributed to
several factors: political, economic, sociological, and spiritual. But one must
keep in mind that the process is still ongoing and that fifty years is probably
too short a period from which to draw any valid conclusions. If lasting
changes do occur, it will be in spite of the strong traditional and conserva-
tive bent of the Taiwanese people.
NOTES
1. The term “Taiwanese people” refers mainly to the descendants of the colonizers of
Taiwan, who immigrated from the mainland in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. The majority came from Fujian province ( percent), most of the rest from
Guangdong province (. percent).
2. My interest in this area dates back more than forty years: I lived in Taiwan from Sep-
tember  to February , returning for one year in –, then for shorter
periods: December –January ; September–December ; six weeks in ;
six weeks in ; six weeks in ; one month each in  and ; and seven
months in –.
3. Actually, Lin gives the figure as , temples, but this must be an error since the sum
total of various groups is ,.
4. Lin’s figures are actually based on research conducted by Liu Zhiwan.
5. During my – stay at the Academia Sinica, I discovered a few dozen smaller
shrines, privately owned and administered, all within walking distance of my
residence. Many of these were only ten to twenty years old, some even more recent. If
this sample is representative, the number of such shrines throughout Taiwan must be
staggering.
6. Editors’ note: Jordan (, –) notes that many temples in postwar Taiwan
undertook construction projects simply to preserve their landholdings. By enlarging
their “footprint,” that is, the amount of land actually occupied by buildings, temples,
and monasteries, they could stave o¥ government confiscation of undeveloped land
under the authority of land-reform measures passed not long after the Nationalist
government arrived in Taiwan in . Jordan also analyzes the influence of increas-
ing wealth and education levels on Taiwan’s religious life.
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7. Quanguo Focha Daoguan zonglan (n.d., , pt. , chap. :–) discusses the many
functions of temples in the life of the community: educational, social, psychologi-
cal, economic, artistic, recreational, and historical. See also Jordan ().
8. The discussion that follows refers only to my observation of external religious behav-
ior, that of both individuals and communities. The inner factor (belief, sincerity, etc.)
cannot be derived from external behavior; only careful and modest assumptions are
allowed. These will, therefore, be presented at the end of this analysis. As the Taiwan
scholar Chu Ron-Guey remarks: “Taiwanese folk religion is a community-based
religion. Even in metropolitan cities with a population of several millions, there are
communities that are centered around temples” (, ).
9. Editors’ note: For more on the role of major donors as community representatives in
the jiao ritual, see Schipper (, ).
10. Editors’ note: A diagram of the altar arrangement can be found in Schipper (, ).
Katz (chapter  in this volume) o¥ers a detailed description of these community
rituals.
11. The Shengshou Gong in Taichung charged US$ per statue in .
12. Some initial studies of the jiao festival have been published. The most detailed of
these is Lagerwey (), but Saso () and Schipper (, chap. ) should also be
consulted.
13. Examples are the active Taichung groups of the Shengxian Tang (publisher of the
Shengxian magazine), Chongsheng Tang (publisher of the Chongsheng magazine),
and Wumiao Mingzheng Tang (publisher of the Luanyou magazine).
14. The specific content of the shanshu and the manner in which they have evolved since
 are discussed in Clart (chapter  in this volume).
15. The case of Song Qili is discussed in Nickerson (, –).
16. According to a special report published in the Free China Journal (Lin , ), Bud-
dhism “has become increasingly popular over the last decade, a period that some are
calling a Buddhist renaissance.” The report goes on to state that, over the period
–, the Buddhist population of Taiwan has grown from , to .
million, the number of registered Buddhist temples has grown from , to ,,
and the number of Buddhist monks and nuns has grown from , to over ,.
(These figures are based on statistics from the Interior Ministry.) If the number of
Buddhists is about  million, that means that Buddhism represents about  percent
of the Taiwanese population.
17. Jordan (, ) mentions “anti-religious and anti-traditionalist teaching in public
schools.” Jones (, ) mentions an “active hostility” in the school system’s text-
books and curricula.
WORKS CITED
Chiu, Ken. . “Scholars Link the Decline of Confucian Ideals to the Rise of Cult
Rivalry.” Free China Journal,  November , .
Chu Ron-Guey [Zhu Ronggui]. . “Modern Transformation of Temple Festivals in
Taiwan: Secularization and Extravagance.” Paper presented at the International Con-
ference on the Urban Festival, Seoul, Korea, – December.
46
02Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:39 AM  Page 46
Stabi l i ty  and Change in  Taiwan’s  Rel ig ious Cul ture
Jones, Charles B. .“Relations between the Nationalist Government and the Buddhist
Association of the Republic of China since .” Journal of Chinese Religion
:–.
Jordan, David K. . “Changes in Postwar Taiwan and Their Impact on the Popular
Practice of Religion.” In Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, ed. Stevan Harrell and
Huang Chün-chieh, –. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Jordan, David K., and Daniel Overmyer. . The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese
Sectarianism in Taiwan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Katz, Paul R. In press. “Religion and the State in Postwar Taiwan.” China Quarterly.
Lagerwey, John. . Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and History. New York: Macmillan.
Lin, Diana. . “As Buddhism Grows, So Does Its Impact.” Free China Journal,  June
, .
Lin Hengdao. . Taiwan simiao daquan (A compendium of Taiwanese temples). Taipei:
Qingwen.
———. . Taiwan simiao gailan (An overview of Taiwanese temples). Taichung:
Taiwan Sheng Wenxianhui.
Nickerson, Peter. . “A Poetics and Politics of Possession: Taiwanese Spirit-Medium
Cults and Autonomous Cultural Space.” Positions , no. :–.
Paper, Jordan. . “Mediums and Modernity: The Institutionalization of Ecstatic Reli-
gious Functionaries in Taiwan.” Journal of Chinese Religion :–.
Pas, Julian. . “Religious Life in Present Day Taiwan: A Field Observations Report,
–.” Journal of Chinese Religion :–.
Quanguo Focha Daoguan zonglan: General survey of Buddhist temples and Daoist monas-
teries of the whole country. N.d. [ca. ].  vols. Taipei.
Saso, Michael. [] . Taoism and the Rite of Cosmic Renewal. Reprint. Pullman:
Washington State University Press.
Schipper, Kristofer. . The Taoist Body. Translated by Karen C. Duval. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Taiwan Daomiao zhi (The Daoist temples of Taiwan). .  vols. Taipei: Zhonghua Dao-
jiao Wenhua Fuwushe.
47
02Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:39 AM  Page 47
T H E  A L L E G E D  R O L E  of Confucianism in Taiwan’s postwar economic growth
has been the topic of many studies. By contrast, very little has been done to
determine what kind of change the tradition itself has experienced or even
to describe the nature of the tradition in its present forms. It may seem odd
that scholars would be willing to speculate on the social and economic
e¥ects of a system of meaning that has not been clearly defined, let alone
researched in detail. However, according to Cli¥ord Geertz, this error has
often been committed by those in his field, social anthropology. In his words:
“The anthropological study of religion is therefore a two-stage operation:
first, an analysis of the system of meanings embodied in the symbols which
make up the religion proper, and, second, the relating of these systems to
socio-structural and psychological processes. My dissatisfaction with so
much of contemporary social anthropological work in religion is not that it
concerns itself with the second stage, but that it neglects the first, and in so
doing takes for granted what most needs to be elucidated” (Geertz , ).
This essay does not take for granted a knowledge of Confucianism as a
preexistent meaning system that permeates Taiwanese society or the Chinese
subconscious. My assumptions are, in fact, quite contrary to this. I assume
that each of the world’s “religious” traditions is continually reinterpreted,
that, at any given time, its protean form can be understood only by studying
its current interpreters, and that the researcher’s first task is to identify and
understand these interpreters.1 This essay is also shaped by the hypothesis
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that, in today’s world, each tradition is to some degree changing in accor-
dance with cross-cultural trends that a¥ect all modernizing traditions.
This essay is structured as follows. First, I present relevant cross-cultural
trends. Next, I make some general comments on Confucianism as a modern-
izing tradition. Then, I conduct a detailed analysis of Confucian interpreters
and interpretations in postwar Taiwan. Finally, I o¥er concluding comments
on how Confucianism has changed in postwar Taiwan. The essay aims to
incorporate forty-five years of postwar history, saying little about develop-
ments after .
MEGATRENDS AMONG MODERNIZING RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
All the trends that I present below can be grouped under four megatrends,
each represented by a pair of concepts, namely: globalism and nationalism;
individualism and democratization; rationality and progress; and this-
worldliness and economic encompassment. Among the four pairings, the
first di¥ers from the others in that it serves to incorporate related but
opposing trends.
Globalism and Nationalism
Globalism brings the embrace of cultural pluralism, the relativizing of one’s
own moral-spiritual tradition, broadened awareness of traditions other than
one’s own, and enhanced interaction between traditions (which can lead to
syntheses as well as to so-called interreligious dialogues). According to
Ninian Smart, these changes are ushering in an era of worldwide religious
“federalism” that parallels the trend toward denominationalism within
certain major traditions. Yet, as Smart also points out, this is challenged by
religion in the service of nationalism (see Smart , –, , ).
To develop the idea of nationality and ethnicity in tension with global-
ism and pluralism, let me refer to the work of a leading secularization
theorist, Steve Bruce. Bruce claims that “modernity undermines religion
except when it [religion] finds some major role to play other than mediating
the natural and supernatural worlds.” He continues: “Most of these social
roles can be grouped under the two headings of cultural defense and cultural
transition” (Bruce , ). With a growing body of evidence supporting his
claims, Bruce argues that, even in the most modern societies, social support
for a religious tradition can grow rather than decline when that tradition is
needed as a defender of the culture and identity of a people. Even if Bruce
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is wrong in characterizing the staying power of religion in certain modern
societies as due merely to its temporary social functions, he is surely right in
leading us to see that, under the right circumstances, globalism, pluralism,
and indi¥erence in religious matters easily give way to religious nationalism
and related phenomena.
Individualism and Democratization
Regardless of where they stand in the secularization debate, most students
of modernizing traditions agree that individualism is first and foremost
among the trends of modernity. They disagree, however, over whether indi-
vidualism is a unique feature of modernity in the West or a shared feature
of modernity wherever it evolves.2 Thus, let us begin with the alleged inter-
relations between religion, modernization, and individualism in the West.
Bruce nicely summarizes the standard view as follows:
The individualism of the Reformation was the assertion of indi-
vidual responsibility to do the will of God through learning and
living the one true faith. That there could not be consensus about
just what was God’s will caused a shift, so that, by the second half of
the nineteenth century, individualism meant the right to do what
we wanted provided it did not harm others. For three centuries
competing convictions really competed; di¥erences of opinion
about God’s will had to be argued because there was only one God.
I am suggesting that the late-modern period (by which I mean
post-) has seen a further fundamental shift. Many people have
resolved the competition of convictions by changing the rules of the
game. Individualism has encroached on the definition of reality,
what philosophers call “epistemology.” We claim not only the right
to do what is right in our own eyes but to assert that the world is
as we variously see it. Religious evolution has moved through three
phases: from the substantial one God, through an era of argument
and competing Gods, to an immaterial and di¥use one God, a cos-
mic consciousness which can be claimed as the underlying “reality”
beneath whatever deviant and divergent visions one may have.
(, )
Sociologically, this development has a parallel in the type of social structure
associated with each stage of modern religious evolution. Bruce (, )
calls the four types “church,” “sect,” “denomination,” and “cult.” He argues
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that, once the cult stage has been reached, religion is so much a matter of
personal experience and individual taste that it has almost no social influ-
ence. Hence, secularization is almost complete.
Although Robert Bellah rejects the secularization thesis, he looks at the
evolution of Western religions and also sees the emergence of a direct rela-
tion between the individual and God as a watershed. More important, he
stresses that a key result of the belief in this relation has been the rejection
of belief in a hierarchical structuring of either this world or the other. This
egalitarian turn in religious beliefs led, he says, to a pluralistic, but not nec-
essarily a secularized, cultural situation. As he explains: “In the worldview
which has emerged from the tremendous intellectual advances of the last
two centuries there is simply no room for a hierarchic dualistic religious
symbol system of the classical historic type” (Bellah , ). Rejection of
hierarchy in the spiritual realm has meant new theologies. Rejection of
hierarchy in this world has meant democratization for most European and
American religious groups. To be specific, it has meant a larger role for
women vis-à-vis men and for lay persons vis-à-vis clerics.
Rationality and Progress
In discussing religion and modernity, Wilson (, ) defines “rationality”
as “a conviction that logically consistent and universalizable principles ought
to be the basis for change.” This definition ties rationality to the notion of
progress, which involves a new way of thinking, not only about change, but
even about time. Cyclic notions of time are discarded in favor of linear ones,
with the result that only measurable and forward-moving change is
validated. Rationality can, on Wilson’s view, also be seen as entwined with
individualism and democratization. For Max Weber (, –), the
rationally disciplined individual, operating first within Protestant sects and
later throughout the world of commerce, was the harbinger of modernity.
With others, he claimed that rationality lay behind the modern rule of law,
in all its liberating as well as su¥ocating guises. Rationality a¥ects modern-
izing religions in multiple and complex ways.
To decide on one course of action over others according to rational cri-
teria means, above all, to predict the measurable e¥ects of all available
courses of action so as to determine quantitatively which will be the best.
Progress is deemed to have occurred when there are quantitative measures
of improvement: increases in average income, gross national product, out-
put of watts of electrical power, church membership, numbers of hungry
children fed, etc. We see the e¥ects of this on modernizing religions in their
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increasing tendency to explain their worth in terms of the principle of
utility. Rather than justifying themselves on the grounds, for example, that
they preach God’s truth, they do so by making reference to the social needs
they serve.
This-Worldliness and Economic Encompassment
Under “this-worldliness” I group the modern interest in human material life,
the modern preference for mundane comfort over ascetic denial, and the
modern penchant for solving worldly problems rather than seeking a bliss-
ful afterlife. Materialism and individualism come together as consumerism,
a trend as important for the early twenty-first century as utilitarianism was
for the progress-intoxicated twentieth century. Religion is no more able to
resist consumerist commodification than are other realms of modern
culture. Another, perhaps more positive result of this-worldliness is the
increasing interest of modern religions in charitable activities.
This modern turn toward this-worldliness is seen most clearly in a shift
that has occurred in the dominant discourse used by ruling elites from that
of “cosmic encompassment” to that of “economic encompassment.” Romeyn
Taylor () uses the concept of cosmic encompassment as an aid to under-
standing the mechanism whereby imperial power in China once penetrated
various realms of a unitary “state-society” (as opposed to a state existing
alongside civil society). In Taylor’s view, imperial ideologues shared the
assumption that the cosmos constituted the largest and most significant
realm of value, within which the state-society existed as a subordinate realm
of value that had to be maintained in accord with cosmic structures and
forces (see also Cox ). Other traditional empires operated similarly,
although their cosmological views were di¥erent.
In my view, this is no longer the case today, not primarily because
scientific cosmologies have replaced traditional ones, but because cosmic
concerns have been supplanted by economic concerns. The most basic
conceptual scheme within which modern leaders discuss political, social,
and even individual life is economic. Even when the cosmos impinges on 
our lives in the most striking ways—through earthquakes, floods, or torna-
does—our understanding of these natural disasters is immediately recast in
the economic discourse of financial loss, drain on state revenues, e¥ects on
overall economic performance, and so forth. Moreover, religions are more
likely to respond by raising funds for relief projects than by trying to iden-
tify and appease the divine beings responsible. All forms of discourse, even
moral and spiritual ones, have become encompassed by economic discourse.
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CONFUCIANISM: A GREAT TRADITION MODERNIZES
In postwar Taiwan, the state has provided Confucianism with an institu-
tional base for such practices as annual rites at Master Kong temples and for
the propagation of such Confucian teachings as loyalty to the state. Is this all
that remains of the tradition? What, after all, is Confucianism today? Where
will we look in Taiwanese society and culture in order to find it?
The Confucian tradition today consists of those groups of people who
are involved in interpreting the Confucian heritage in order to keep it alive,
along with their interpretations. And what is the Confucian heritage? The
Confucian heritage consists essentially of the Chinese classics known as the
Five Scriptures (wujing) and the Four Books (sishu) and the historical figures
who, having a special allegiance to the teachings in these texts, became
famous for manifesting these teachings in their actions and expounding on
them in their words. Where will we look for those who now interpret the
Confucian heritage? We will look among three groups in Taiwan: govern-
ment o≤cials; intellectuals; and leaders of social institutions that are located
outside the government and academe. The logic of this three-part division
of the Confucian tradition will become clear as we proceed.3 Yet, before I
present the details concerning these three faces of Confucianism in Taiwan,
let me suggest where in all this we can expect to find expressions of the pre-
viously identified megatrends among modernizing traditions.
Globalism and Nationalism
The world’s traditions are often divided into categories of ethnic-cultural
traditions, such as Judaism and traditional Hinduism, and universal tradi-
tions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Tu Wei-ming has correctly
pointed out that Confucianism bridges these categories (see Tu , ).
Without a message of universal salvation that might enable it to traverse
ethnic or cultural boundaries, Confucianism nonetheless spread into Korea,
Japan, and Vietnam. Moreover, as revealed by the work of Martina Deuchler,
it e¥ectively “Confucianized” both o≤cial and popular culture in Korea
with missionary zeal (see Deuchler ).
Some modern Confucians have become interested in this issue because
they wish to see the tradition as essentially Chinese but also as having
universal relevance. For example, as Chang Hao argues, from the very begin-
ning, thinkers of the contemporary Neo-Confucian school (Dangdai Xin-
rujia) di¥ered from conservatives of the “national essence” (guocui) school
precisely because they presented the Confucian tradition as having moral
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and spiritual value for all humans (see Chang , ). Recently, these Neo-
Confucians have begun to export their views to the West and to engage in
dialogue with other world religions (contemporary Neo-Confucians are
covered later in this essay as well as in Jochim [a]).
In fact, e¥orts to make Confucianism one of the world’s great traditions
reminds one of similar developments in modern Hinduism. The develop-
ment of a tradition-based identity among those who now present themselves
as Hindus and Confucians needs more study, but the role of Hindus and
Confucians in the struggle to create a national identity for India and China,
respectively, has been the object of much scholarly attention. There is at least
one fine work covering this struggle in a comparative way: Prasenjit Duara’s
Rescuing History from the Nation, which includes an engaging treatment of
the role played by Confucian and Hindu critics of modernity (see Duara
, –). In both India and China, but to a greater degree in the latter,
traditionalist intellectuals came under attack from modernists, who blamed
past traditions for many of society’s present ills.
As for postwar Taiwan, it inherited a government that as early as the
s had begun to promote traditional Chinese culture as an antidote to
communism. Ironically, as this government sought to replace Taiwanese
traditions, which it considered superstitions, with a wider allegiance to a
Chinese identity, it pushed its own parochial nationalism and its own ver-
sion of Confucianism as a central feature of national identity. This reveals
the tension between globalist and nationalist trends.
Individualism and Democratization
Despite government e¥orts in postwar Taiwan, it has not been possible to
control all discourse concerning Confucianism. Chinese scholars in Taiwan
have hotly debated whether the tradition is hostile or open to individualism
and democratization. Recently, the government has shown increasingly less
interest in controlling this and other aspects of intellectual discourse, contin-
uing the century-old trend away from state involvement with Confucianism.
Likewise, there is a continuation of the trend away from dominance of dis-
course by a kind of Confucian clergy, the Qing dynasty o≤cials who once
exerted influence over Confucian discourse through such mechanisms as
state examinations, Confucian academies, the system of temples for Confu-
cius, and the promulgation of clan rules. The role of popular lay sects in
interpreting Confucianism is an increasingly important factor, and now one
sees more women-friendly interpretations of Confucianism emerging in
Taiwan. This essay says little about this realm of interpretation; for an under-
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standing of popular interpretations, especially as they concern Confucian
views on women’s roles, the interested reader should consult Clart (chapter
 in this volume).
Rationality and Progress
Premodern Confucianism was correctly seen by Max Weber (, –)
as a case of Wertrationalität (traditional “value rationality”), not Zweckra-
tionalität (modern “utilitarian rationality”). What can we say about Confu-
cianism today, especially in postwar Taiwan? It is increasingly defining itself
by reference to utilitarian criteria: it is good for economic development; it is
compatible with developments in democracy and science; and so forth.
Confucian-leaning social scientists claim to have quantitative evidence of its
role in economic development. Claims of concrete evidence that it has
encouraged Taiwan’s democratization will not be far behind. Confucian-
leaning humanists downplay possibly supernatural elements of past tradi-
tion, such as Tian (Heaven), and stress its anthropocentric or so-called
anthropocosmic nature.4
This-Worldliness and Economic Encompassment
That Confucianism is now justifying itself in terms of worldly values and
material modernization is testimony to the pervasive nature of economic
encompassment. It has been only a generation since Joseph Levenson (–
) made his grim predictions about the fate of Confucianism as a tradi-
tion lacking modern qualities, such as specialization and utilitarianism, and
in full possession of traditional ones, such as well-roundedness, aestheti-
cism, and gentlemanliness.
However, this-worldliness in other modernizing traditions has often
meant more than asserting that a tradition can play a role in, say, economic
development. Thus, one must ask: Will Confucians get beyond talking about
values that are compatible with modernization and develop more tangible
expressions of modern concerns, such as charitable organizations, progres-
sive social movements, or self-cultivation practices to help individuals face
the negative side of economic development? For them to do so, Confucianism
must develop new institutional forms. The state, kinship organizations, and
traditional Confucian academies no longer serve as adequate vehicles for the
maintenance and transmission of the tradition. The social institutions that
still seem to serve this role are groups of intellectuals, such as the Contem-
porary Neo-Confucians and harmonizing lay sects, such as the Way of Unity
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(Yiguan Dao). Neither of these carriers of tradition, to use a Weberian
metaphor, constitutes a Confucian “church.” Are these the only social forms
that this tradition can produce under present circumstances, or will more
distinctly Confucian organizations emerge in the future? We may have a better
chance to answer this question after looking at the three areas of society in
postwar Taiwan in which we find interpreters of Confucian discourse.
THREE FACES OF CONFUCIANISM IN TAIWAN
Government-Supported Interpretations of the Confucian Heritage
In postwar Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) government has been especially
active in interpreting the Chinese cultural heritage, including Confucianism,
and in promulgating its interpretations. This was especially true during the
period after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC) in . Key activities involved were those connected with
the Council for Chinese Cultural Renaissance (Zhongguo Wenhua Fuxing
Weiyuanhui), the network of Master Kong temples, and the Ministry of
Education. Let us look at each of these areas in turn.
The Council for Chinese Cultural Renaissance
As part of its response to the Cultural Revolution, the government of the
Republic of China (ROC) founded the Council for Chinese Cultural Renais-
sance in July , with President Chiang Kai-shek as its chairman. (Since
, the council has been assisted by the Council for Cultural Planning and
Development [Wenhua Jianshe Weiyuanhui—renamed the Council for Cul-
tural A¥airs in —an organization whose interests are not nearly as
political [see Katz ].) Although Chiang continued to hold the title of
chairman, over the years the council came under the leadership of a key vice
chairman, the presidential adviser Chen Lifu. Chen was clearly a committed
Confucian, having published a lengthy commentary on the Four Books (see
Chen ), and he valued his role as the longest-serving vice chairman of
and the guiding force behind the council (see Chen ). President Chiang
also appointed others to the council who were famous for their commitment
to the Confucian tradition, such as the historian-philosopher Qian Mu and
the lineal descendent of Master Kong, Kong Decheng.5
In a  retrospective article that he wrote on the development and
accomplishments of the Council for Chinese Cultural Renaissance, Chen
Lifu groups the activities of the council under five headings: “general coun-
cil a¥airs”; “ethics and democracy”; “science and technology”; “scholarly
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research”; and “literature and art.” Under the first heading, he reports on the
council’s general e¥orts to revive traditional culture, especially the many
scholarly conferences and “friendship activities” that it has sponsored. He
gives three examples: the Conference on Editing and Compilation of Col-
lected Works of Chinese Culture, the Conference on Traditional Culture and
Modern Life, and the Conference on Life and Ceremonial Customs. Under
the second heading, he reports on the establishment of a related council, the
Council for Assistance with Civic Life (Guomin Shenghuo Budao Weiyuan-
hui), which was established to see that cultural renaissance would actually
translate into a “rational civic lifestyle” (Chen , ). Related to this were
e¥orts to instill traditional morality, democracy, and scientific methodology
into the lives of ordinary citizens. Under the last three headings, Chen dis-
cusses activities less directly involved with the promotion of Confucian
values. He also reports that the council has published its own journal,
Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yuekan (Chinese cultural renaissance monthly),
and the biographies of more than ninety famous Chinese thinkers, begin-
ning with the Duke of Zhou, the exemplary statesman of Confucian tradi-
tion (Chen , ).
Chen takes the position that the activities of the Council for Chinese
Cultural Renaissance are directed largely toward improving the moral and
social lives of the Chinese people. Others, such as the anthropologist Li Yih-
yuan, have been more explicit about as well as more critical in analyzing past
government e¥orts to revive Chinese culture. Li’s views on the council are
expressed in an article on the work of cultural reconstruction. He states that
the council’s “political significance was greater than its cultural significance”
in his comments on cultural reconstruction in Taiwan since World War II
(see Li , ). He divides the postwar era into four periods: the return
from Japanese to Chinese cultural influence (–); the separation
from Chinese mainland culture and the development of Taiwan’s own
cultural identity (–); the planning of government-sponsored cul-
tural movements, especially under the council (–); and further
government-sponsored cultural stimulation, with a shift in emphasis
marked by the establishment of the Executive Yuan’s Cultural Development
Council (–present). In Li’s view, the new council was established know-
ing that the older one had stressed the ethical dimension of culture at the
expense of its intellectual and aesthetic dimensions. Remember that the
older council had been established at the time of the Cultural Revolution on
the mainland and, as Li points out, just as the government was shifting its
emphasis from sheer economic survival to other interests. The fourth period
followed major economic successes that allowed even greater government
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expenditures to advance culture, with the aim of bringing the level of
intellectual and aesthetic awareness more in line with the increased standard
of living.
The key question is this: What “culture” will the new council advance?
Anthropologists like Li Yih-yuan and Chen Qilu, who was appointed chair-
man of the new council, have been happy to see that the government is will-
ing to support the revival of existing local culture as well as the mythicized
national culture. Overall, the trend clearly leads away from the traditional
model of a Confucian church-state seeking to control the moral-spiritual
dimension of culture. Evidence also exists that, while the government
initially behaved like the premodern Chinese state, it has increasingly
abandoned that role.
Taiwan’s Temples for Master Kong
According to a  survey, of the fifteen Master Kong temples recognized 
by the Taiwanese provincial government, only two were constructed after
World War II. All these temples are an important part of local culture, yet at
the same time they are part of government e¥orts to revive or invent a
national culture. They are also an important expression—institutionally,
aesthetically, sociologically, etc.—of the Confucian tradition. While all
Master Kong temples are, thus, important for my survey of Confucianism in
Taiwan, for current purposes the most interesting ones are the two
constructed after World War II (in Taichung [Taizhong] and Kaohsiung
[Gaoxiong]) because these most clearly reveal the government’s involvement
in the promotion of the Confucian tradition (see Huang ).6
In the main hall of the Tainan temple, Taiwan’s oldest Master Kong
temple (established in ), there hangs a placard displaying perhaps the
favorite words of Confucians today—you jiao wu lei (Lunyu [Analects]
:)—which they usually interpret to mean, “In education there are no
class distinctions.” The words were personally inscribed by Chiang Kai-shek,
who presented the placard to the temple in , shortly after his arrival in
Taiwan. Only two years later, Chiang confirmed the modern calendar date
for Master Kong’s birthday as  September, the date that continues to be
used for the annual rites of commemoration at Master Kong temples in
Taiwan. Subsequently, this day also became a national holiday called
“Teacher’s Day.” In , Chiang formed a committee to conduct research on
Confucian ritual, which led to action by the Executive Yuan establishing a
standard method for the annual rites on Master Kong’s birthday. In , the
year after Chiang’s death, the new Master Kong temples in Taichung and
Kaohsiung were completed. Chiang’s successor, President Yan Jiagan, pre-
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sented the Taichung temple with a placard for its main hall at some point
during his term, and Yan’s successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, presented the
Kaohsiung temple with a placard for its main hall in .7
Were these acts part of a strategy to revive or invent a national culture
centered around Confucianism? The construction of the Taichung and
Kaohsiung temples also raises this question. After Taipei, Taichung and
Kaohsiung are the two largest cities in Taiwan, and each has a mark of polit-
ical distinction: Taichung is close to the seat of the provincial government,
while Kaohsiung is one of only two “special municipalities” (cities under
their own rather than provincial jurisdiction). It is, therefore, natural that,
if lesser cities have Master Kong temples, these cities should want them as
well. Also, comparable cities in imperial China would surely have had Master
Kong temples. Therefore, from one point of view, we cannot deny that local
cultural forces were at work in both instances. From another point of view,
especially if we look at the timing of the temples’ construction, it seems as
though we have a development that is linked with central-government
e¥orts to support Confucianism as a manifestation of national culture.
As early as , Taichung city began to make plans for a temple, but the
needed funding was not forthcoming. Twenty years later, after the provincial
government had moved into the area and the cultural-renaissance move-
ment was in full swing, a successful e¥ort to build a temple was finally
mounted. This e¥ort, moreover, required substantial financial support from
the provincial government and the involvement of high-ranking provincial
o≤cials (Wang , –). A temple-construction committee was formed
in , and the temple was built during –. The planning and con-
struction of the Kaohsiung temple took place during the same period, also
against a background of previously unmet local need: the Master Kong
temple serving that area, a Fengshan county temple, had been converted into
an elementary school under Japanese rule and all but destroyed by termites
by the s (Yin , ; Huang , ).
Would new Master Kong temples have been built in Taiwan solely
through local civic e¥orts, without the strong interest of the national and
provincial governments? Probably not. Traditionally, such temples were sup-
ported by the government rather than by the local populace. Even today,
there is an acknowledged distinction between o≤cial Master Kong temples
and other temples. Interestingly, a book on Taiwan’s Master Kong temples
published by the provincial government indicates that, in addition to the
o≤cial temples discussed here, twenty-three others have registered them-
selves as Confucian temples. The book goes on to emphasize that, although
it is acceptable for such temples to register with the Ministry of Internal
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A¥airs as Confucian temples, they must be kept clearly distinct from o≤cial
Master Kong temples. The book’s author/editor, Huang Deshi, further
recommends that Master Kong temples be given the exclusive right to come
under the jurisdiction of the educational authorities of the central and local
governments, so as “firmly to establish Master Kong’s authoritativeness”
(Huang , ).
In sum, e¥orts to construct, restore, and maintain Master Kong temples
were often top-down e¥orts. There are many good reasons to see them as
part of government e¥orts to advance the Confucian tradition and few
reasons to see them as part of recent popular religious trends, such as the
islandwide surge in temple-construction activity (see Pas, chapter  in this
volume). Moreover, other research on the religious situation in Taiwan indi-
cates that pre- and postwar government o≤cials have favored temples and
deities that have national rather than local significance (see Feuchtwang 
; and Seiwert ). My own study of the Religion of the Yellow Emperor
(Xuanyuan Jiao), a group founded in  by a member of the Legislative
Yuan, Wang Hansheng, provided evidence of a government-favored strategy
to subsume worship of all local deities under reverence for one national
deity, the Yellow Emperor (see Jochim , –). In line with these trends,
although Taiwan’s Master Kong temples were run by local temple commit-
tees, the government viewed them as a network of temples representing the
national culture that it sought to revive. This is a key element in the gov-
ernment’s interpretation (in actions as well as in words) of the Confucian
tradition as the essence of China’s national culture.
Confucianism in the Schools
Despite Huang Deshi’s recommendation, Taiwan’s Master Kong temples are
not under the jurisdiction of the ROC government’s Ministry of Education.
However, all public education, including Confucian-style moral and civic
education, is controlled by this ministry of the central government. For all
schools, public and private, not only the curriculum standards but also the
textbooks used to implement those standards must be approved by the min-
istry. In addition, the ministry plays a strong role in teacher training and in
the actual administration of schools.
The interpretation of the Confucian tradition produced by educators in
Taiwan is important because of the number of people it influences. The
influence of the Council for Chinese Cultural Renaissance and of Master
Kong temples pales by comparison. What is the nature of educators’
interpretation as it reaches students—in the texts they read and in the expla-
nations their teachers present?
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The government’s stress on moral and civic education is linked to some-
thing that has already been discussed in this essay: government e¥orts to
promote traditional Chinese culture that came in the wake of both economic
and social modernization in Taiwan and the Cultural Revolution in the
PRC. Thus, in , when the number of years of compulsory education was
increased from six to nine, moral and civic education in Taiwan’s schools was
enhanced (Huang and Chiu , ). Moreover, believing that traditional
morality was best, leaders assumed that moral and civic education should
have more Confucian content. Why did they assume that the content of
moral and civic education should be derived from the Confucian rather than
from, say, the Buddhist, Daoist, or Christian traditions? There are two key
reasons: the view that Confucian values are the essence of Chinese culture
and the idea that Confucianism is not a religion and that propagating it in
the schools does not, therefore, violate the principle of freedom of religion.
Around the time of the  education reforms, Richard Wilson was in
Taiwan researching his Learning to Be Chinese (), in which he reports on
the views of a key Ministry of Education o≤cial as follows: “In an interview
with Professor Wu Ting, chairman of the committee in charge of compiling
textbooks for elementary education in the Ministry of Education, he said
that the goals of education, beset though they had been by the disorders of
thirty years of strife, were still Confucian in nature and emphasized a pro-
gression from rule-the-family to govern-the-state to peace-in-the-world”
(). Moreover, Wilson reports, citing a newspaper article by Minister Yen
Cheng-hsin, the minister of education stressed the importance of moral
training as the mechanism for shifting loyalty from the family to the state
(). This reveals two themes that will emerge again in what follows: first,
the perceived importance of the idea of expansion of moral interests from
the individual outward, as outlined in the first chapter of the Confucian
classic Daxue (The great learning), and, second, the interpretation of this
idea so as to stress the individual’s loyalty to the state.
Two more recent studies of moral education are Je¥rey Meyer’s “Teach-
ing Morality in Taiwan Schools” () and Huang-ping Huang and Lian-
hwang Chiu’s “Moral and Civic Education” (). Regarding moral
development, both sources stress the centrality of the aforementioned model
from chapter  of the Daxue. Meyer’s reference to this ancient passage is
meant, in fact, to show that moral education is “dynamic,” that is, develop-
mental in nature. He states:
The overall framework for Chinese thinking about morality is in
fact dynamic and its direction can be seen in a single sentence, con-
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stantly referred to in the textbooks, taken from the Confucian
classic Daxue: “If one can cultivate his person, then he can manage
his household, if he can manage his household, then he can bring
order to the entire country, if he can bring order to the entire
country, then there will be peace in the whole world.” Follow-
ing this framework of expanding horizons, the various Confucian
virtues can be seen as () those applicable to personal cultivation;
() those applicable to family life; () those which guide social
groups beyond the immediate family, such as neighborhood,
school, and village: and () those which shape the person’s attitude
toward the nation, Chinese culture, and the world as a whole.
—Meyer , 
The work of Huang and Chiu allows us to see another interesting aspect of
this, which is the influence of Western developmental psychologists, such as
Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Educators in Taiwan are quite aware of
this aspect of the Western liberal tradition in moral development and con-
sider it to be fully compatible with the teaching of the Daxue. In their eval-
uation of Ministry of Education guidelines for national middle schools,
Huang and Chiu make the following comment: “The objectives of Civics
and Morality begin with self-cultivation and end with building ‘brotherhood
throughout the world.’ This kind of ‘gradual expansion and progression’ is
not only commensurate with the nature of psychological development in the
early adolescent, but also in accordance with the principle of Confucius’
moral teaching” (Huang and Chiu , ). Huang and Chiu believe this,
not only because of an apparent similarity at the level of principle, but also
because research has indicated that students in Taiwan are able to develop a
high level of moral maturity as measured by Western psychological criteria.8
These two studies also concur on the extent to which moral education
in Taiwan has a nondynamic emphasis on lists of Confucian virtues. In fact,
one of the key criticisms made by Huang and Chiu is that “the most fre-
quently used methods of instruction for moral and civic education in Tai-
wan’s schools are an idealistic ‘list-of-virtues’ approach (or what Kohlberg
calls the ‘bag of virtues’ approach) and a rote approach” (, ).
What are the virtues that are emphasized in the texts? Meyer sought to
determine this by examining all the relevant elementary texts in the follow-
ing series: Life and Human Relationships (Shenghuo yu Lunli), Language
(Guoyu), and Social Studies (Shehui). The middle school texts that Meyer
examined were in four series: Civics and Morality (Gongmin yu Daode),
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Literature (Guowen), Geography (Dili), and History (Lishi). Most spe-
cifically, he identified the chapters in certain textbooks covering specific
virtues and then computed the number of chapters related to each virtue.
The elementary school texts that he read for this purpose were in the Lan-
guage series, while the middle school texts were in the Literature and the
Civics and Morality series. The first twelve of the twenty-eight virtues that
Meyer identified are the following (the number of chapters is given in paren-
theses): patriotism (); filial piety (); diligent study (); cooperation/
neighborliness (); ritual, deference, obedience (); scientific spirit ();
service to others (); right ambition (); civic virtue (); benevolence/
love (); bravery (); and diligent work (). To this, Meyer adds that the
two leading virtues, patriotism and filial piety, were linked in the textbooks;
loyalty to the state was presented as a higher-level manifestation of loyalty
within the family (Meyer , –).
In the case of Huang and Chiu, we can learn about educational content
from their recommendations for improving moral and civic education in
Taiwan. As already indicated, first, they criticize the “list-of-virtues”
approach. Second, they criticize the exemplars used in moral tales—ancient
scholars and soldiers (Master Kong and Yue Fei) or recent political figures
(Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek)— recommending the use of female as
well as male exemplars and ones who are less removed from students’ expe-
rience. Third, they lament the relative lack of coverage of the social sciences
and of the contribution to morality made by the various religions. Finally,
they suggest that conflict and individual rights should be covered along with
the values of harmony, loyalty, and obedience to society (see Huang and
Chiu , –).
Notwithstanding the criticisms of Huang and Chiu, educators in Taiwan
have clearly made an e¥ort to o¥er interpretations of the Confucian heritage
that they consider relevant to modern life. Whether or not these educators
belong to a Confucian community of faith, they seem to believe that Con-
fucian virtues and principles of self-cultivation can fit into modern life. In
turning to the world of intellectuals in Taiwan, we will, perhaps, see an even
deeper manifestation of this belief among those intellectuals who profess
allegiance to the Confucian heritage.
Intellectuals’ Interpretations
Interpretations of Confucianism by intellectuals in postwar Taiwan cannot
be separated from o≤cial interpretations for at least two reasons. First, some
government interpretations were produced under the leadership or influ-
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ence of self-identified Confucian intellectuals. Second, the government
limited other interpretations, whether intentionally or not, through its
e¥orts to suppress thought that was not in conformity with its anti-
Communist e¥orts. In an article on modernism in postwar Taiwan, Lü
Zhenghui argues that such government e¥orts had a profound e¥ect on
intellectual life. They discouraged scholars who might elaborate on the ideas
of the May Fourth movement, with its humanist, socialist, pragmatist, anti-
imperialist, and democratic elements. In response, scholars retreated into
their ivory towers and embraced safer Western modernist trends as well as
the material comforts and urban lifestyle of social modernization, becoming
an elite group distanced from ordinary citizens (Lü ).
However, the government did not discourage a group of scholars who
sought to develop the ideas of thinkers who opposed the May Fourth move-
ment in the name of Confucianism. These scholars have come to be known
as Contemporary Neo-Confucians, and there is good reason to focus on
them here. Not only are these interpreters self-identified Confucians, but
they also constitute a close-knit social group. After looking at them, I will
examine a less avowedly Confucian and even more loosely organized group
of interpreters, Chinese social scientists in Taiwan who have presented
positive evaluations of Confucianism since the early s.
The Contemporary Neo-Confucians
There are di¥ering views about who the Contemporary Neo-Confucians are.
In an article surveying their publications over the last several decades, Cai
Renhou identifies three generations of Contemporary Neo-Confucians (see
Cai ). In the earliest generation he places Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming,
Ma Yifu, and Carsun Chang. In the second generation he identifies Tang
Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan, adding that, between these first two
generations, we find Qian Mu, Fang Dongmei, and Feng Youlan. Among the
current generation, he focuses on examples from Taiwan. Making no claim
to be exhaustive, he lists himself, Zhou Xiangzhen, Chen Wenmei, Dai
Lianzhang, Wang Bangxiong, Zeng Shaoxu, Xie Zhongming, Yang Zuhan,
Cen Yicheng, Zhu Jianmin, He Shujing, Lin Anwu, Li Minghui, Gao Boyuan,
Yuan Baoxin, and Wan Jinchuan. Those outside Taiwan whose works are
listed as having a strong influence there are Liu Shu-hsien (Liu Shuxian), Tu
Wei-ming (Du Weiming), and Yü Ying-shih (Yu Yingshi).
In comparison to others, Cai errs on the side of inclusiveness in making
his list. As Liu Shu-hsien indicates, “Neo-Confucian” (Xinrujia) is often
used narrowly to identify a line of thinkers that can be traced back to Xiong
Shili. The key disciples in this line of transmission are the aforementioned
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second generation of Tang, Mou, and Xu, who also have in common their
signing, with Carsun Chang, of the famous  “Manifesto on the Reap-
praisal of Chinese Culture” (Chang et al. ).9 Because my aim in this
section is to look at views of self-identified Confucians, I will err on the side
of exclusiveness in my brief summary. In other words, I will cover only the
Contemporary Neo-Confucians in the lineage just described, focusing
mostly on the e¥orts of Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and their students.10
In the optimistic assessment of Tu Wei-ming, Confucian thought is
poised on the brink of the third epochal transformation in its history. The
first occurred in response to other ancient Chinese schools of thought and
broadened the Confucian project to include social and political practices not
present in classical Confucianism. The second occurred, in part, in response
to the importation of Buddhism from India and included the momentous
spread of Confucianism to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. The contemporary
transformation of the Confucian heritage is marked by reaction to the chal-
lenge of Western thought (Tu , ). First, the life as well as the thought
of Contemporary Neo-Confucians has been a¥ected by Communism in its
Chinese guise. Those, such as Mou and Tang, who spread their interpreta-
tions in Taiwan were living in exile from Communist rule, against which
they spoke frequently and vehemently. They also reacted to certain forms of
Western liberalism, which, for them, are associated with the May Fourth
movement. They also developed their thought in quite conscious reaction to
certain Western moral and theological trends, especially German idealism
and modern Christian theology. Here, I will simply present an overview of
the interpretations of the Confucian heritage at which they arrived through
struggling with three key questions: What is the essence of Chinese culture?
How can harmony be found between the Confucian tradition and Western
thought? How can the relevance to modernity of the Confucian tradition be
demonstrated?
It has been extremely important for Contemporary Neo-Confucians to
have a sense of the uniqueness of Chinese culture, of something to which
they often refer as the “spirit” (jingshen) of Chinese culture. In this regard,
they seem to agree that Chinese thought, especially Confucian thought, is
distinguished by its all-consuming emphasis on the nature of moral life. This
feature of their thought is often identified by reference to “pan-moralism”
(fandaode zhuyi), indicating that they mean something more than just a
Chinese penchant for moral philosophy. In fact, although they often deny
that Confucianism is a religion per se, they feel that, in China, it has played
the role that religion has played elsewhere, for example, Christianity in the
West.
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In di¥erentiating Confucian spirituality from religion in the West, Con-
temporary Neo-Confucians refer to the inner quest for ever-deepening
moral subjectivity. They present the Confucian tradition as a form of spiri-
tual humanism but do not deny the existence of something transcendent to
the material world, as do many modern humanists in the West. In fact,
having strong tendencies toward philosophical idealism, they insist on the
transcendental nature of their most important moral categories: xin (moral
mind) and xing (moral reason). In their “Manifesto on the Reappraisal of
Chinese Culture,” the section “The ‘Doctrine of Transcendental Mind’ in
Moral Practice” criticizes Western sinologists for failing to recognize the im-
portance of these transcendental categories (see Chang et al. , –).
While praising China for its stress on practical reason in creating moral-
spiritual traditions like Confucianism, Contemporary Neo-Confucians
acknowledge the West’s superiority in handling theoretical reason. This is,
then, a key area in which China and the West can learn from one another.
The superiority of Western science and legal institutions shows the value of
abstraction and logic as characteristics of conceptual knowledge. But the
valued characteristics of Western thought become dangerous if taken too far.
They need to be balanced by China’s stress on concrete moral existence. The
Confucian tradition is seen to hold a certain advantage by staying in touch
with the substance of human life rather than being too dependent on theo-
retical reason.
The most important case of acknowledged need for borrowing from the
West concerns democratic legal institutions. Indeed, it is with a spirit of
grateful optimism that Contemporary Neo-Confucians, Mou Zongsan in
particular, have spoken of the Western contribution toward the renewal of
the Confucian ideal of combining inner sagehood (neisheng) and outer
kingship (waiwang). In Mou’s view, traditional China had traditions of gov-
ernment lacking, not in democratic principles or moral cultivation methods,
but in institutions whereby moral individuals could express their collective
will in government. The Confucian tradition, thus, anticipates the moral
expansion of individuals made possible by Western institutions that let
people realize their desire to participate in the process of governance. In
other words, the Confucian tradition is not simply compatible with democ-
racy; it has been awaiting it. A tradition that holds that all people can become
sages has been awaiting the democratic institutions that will make it possible
for more than a privileged minority to combine inner sagehood and outer
kingship. Indeed, modern democratic institutions make the development of
outer kingship possible for all who participate in these institutions.
In sum, Contemporary Neo-Confucians have dealt with the full range of
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intellectual issues that concern modern Chinese in confronting the challenge
of Western culture and the problems of modernization. What has made
them unusual is their tenacity in assuming that the Confucian tradition has
the resources for dealing with these issues and in continuing to identify with
the tradition through times when doing so was very unpopular. At the pres-
ent time, in Taiwan at least, the label “Confucian” is worn with greater pride
than before, and the ranks of those willing to wear that label are increasing.
This is indicated, not only by Cai’s long list of younger scholars, but also by
these scholars’ success in staging large-scale, well-attended conferences, such
as the International Conference on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in
December , which resulted in the publication of three large volumes of
proceedings (Mou ; Liu ; and Zhou ) and was followed by other
conferences in , , and beyond. This community of scholars and its
interpretations of the Confucian heritage constitute a relatively organized
and influential manifestation of the Confucian tradition in Taiwan today.
Moreover, their representatives, such as Liu Shu-hsien and Tu Wei-ming,
have been involved in interreligious dialogues with other traditions, includ-
ing four international Confucian-Christian conferences (in , , ,
and ) (see Jochim a).
But what do the Contemporary Neo-Confucians’ interpretations tell us
about Confucianism as a modernizing tradition? In interesting ways, their
interpretations exhibit some of the cross-cultural trends listed above. Con-
sider two examples. First, their insistence on Confucianism’s compatibility
with democratic institutions seems to be a self-conscious and, for some
observers, self-serving e¥ort to modernize the tradition. Observers express-
ing the most skepticism have been those deeply concerned with issues of
democratization and Taiwanese identity, such as the sociologist Chen
Zhongxin, who has written what he calls an “epistemological critique” of
Mou Zongsan’s theory of deriving democracy from Confucianism (minzhu
kaichulun) (see Chen ). At the same time, there have also been critical
observers, such as Huang Chün-chieh and Wu Kuang-ming, who have their
own view of a Confucian-rooted democracy (Huang and Wu ).
Second, while there is evidence of a this-worldly turn in today’s Con-
fucian metaphysics, it is hard to find articulation of a “social gospel” or advo-
cacy for social-welfare activities in today’s Confucian social ethics. Of course,
there are certain situational factors that explain the Confucian tradition’s
atypical profile in this area of modern moral-spiritual life. First, a tradition
without distinct social forms is not in a position to engage in acts of social
welfare. Second, as noted above, during the first half of the twentieth century
this tradition’s modernizing e¥orts were left in the hands of conservative
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intellectuals. Third, the tradition may have a relatively weak ideological
basis for social-welfare activities beyond those of family and state. Unlike
universal faiths, such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, Confucianism
has not often promoted outreach virtues, such as charity, focusing instead
on within-group solidarity virtues.11 Finally, as Lü Zhenghui has told us (see
Lü ), because conditions in postwar Taiwan were not conducive to the
free expression of critical social-political views, intellectuals in general
retreated to their ivory towers. Now that they can emerge, will they develop
Confucianism’s liberal potential and take it in progressive directions? Per-
haps not. It is instructive that the most important development of the s
was the strong interest in Confucianism among a group of social scientists
in Taiwan whose main concern was to show how well it has served the pur-
poses of global capitalism. Just as it sought to throw o¥ the yoke of political
imperialism, it appeared to be donning the cloak of economic imperialism.
Let us have a look at the details.
Social Scientists
The appearance during the s of positive evaluations of the Confucian
heritage from among Taiwan’s social scientists was surprising, for they were
heirs to the May Fourth intellectual trends that had been inhospitable to
Confucianism. Chinese social scientists speaking favorably of Confucianism
is, thus, a phenomenon requiring explanation. Here, I will not examine the
causes and development of this phenomenon. I will limit myself to some
remarks on the nature of the views of Confucianism produced by this group
of intellectuals: social scientists who have tried to demonstrate that Confu-
cian values have played a key role in Taiwan’s economic development.12 For
several reasons, we can characterize this group as a Confucian community
of interpretation—despite its presumed value-neutral stance. First, its
members’ writings have influenced current reevaluations of the Confucian
heritage, perhaps even more so than have those of the Contemporary Neo-
Confucians. Second, their interpretative choices in determining which values
and ideas are Confucian have played a key role in shaping what people con-
sider the Confucian tradition to be. Third, some of their writings contain
actual e¥orts to interpret the messages of the Confucian classics.
As for the interpretive context shared by the social scientists in question,
its features can also be enumerated: They assumed that basic Chinese values
are Confucian, although they now believe that such values are responsible
for Chinese developmental success rather than for failure. Their evaluations
were rooted in sociological, psychological, and economic theories, which
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were sometimes supported by statistical surveys. In contrast to Contempo-
rary Neo-Confucians, the measures of value that informed their judgments
were social and economic, not moral and metaphysical. They did not debate
the truth or intrinsic value of Confucian ethics or cosmology. Their concern
was with extrinsic value: the allegedly measurable contribution of Confucian
values to modernization.
What were the values that they identified as Confucian? The economist
Hou Jiaju listed diligence and thrift, the tendency to save, respect for work,
honesty, and harmony (see Hou ). The psychologists Yang Guoshu 
and Zheng Boxun identified five value clusters: “familism”; “modesty-
contentment”;“face consciousness and relationship orientation”;“solidarity-
harmony”; and “hardship-overcoming and hardworking” (Yang and Zheng
, passim). These scholars simply assumed the association between Con-
fucianism and Chineseness; they did not make any specific e¥ort to ground
the values listed in the Confucian heritage. But other scholars were willing
to engage in creative exegesis of Confucian texts in order to identify the Con-
fucian value orientation. These included the psychologist Huang Guangguo
and the sociologist Zhang Desheng, each of whom wrote a key book for
Taiwan’s intellectual market on Confucianism and economic development
(see Huang ; and Zhang ).
Huang sought to reconstruct the ethical system of Confucianism from
late-Zhou texts (Lunyu [Analects], Mengzi [Book of Mencius], and Xunzi),
believing that this had “become part of the deep psychological structure of
the collective consciousness of the Chinese race” (, ). He reconstructed
this ethical system in a way that allegedly showed its actual implications for
social behavior. The result was a model for interpersonal relationships whose
e¥ects on the behavior of Chinese today can be measured. In other words,
the roots of today’s achievement-oriented, face-conscious, reciprocity-based
social relations are, on the one hand, rooted in classical Confucian ethics
and, on the other hand, responsible for the economic success experienced in
recent times.
Zhang was similarly disposed to doing his own exegesis, or, more spe-
cifically,“sociological interpretation,” of classical Chinese thought, although
the range of his interests was much narrower than Huang’s. A single thread
ran through his interpretation: fear of disorder, born of the chaos of social
life in the late-Zhou era, determined the form and substance of Confucian
thought. Although this analysis involved a somewhat unfavorable portrait of
Confucian thought, it positively evaluated the contribution of Confucianism
to economic development by reference to “achievement motivation.” The
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need to achieve is rooted in fear of shame, desire to glorify one’s ancestors,
and other elements of a way of thinking obsessed with order.
The exegetical e¥orts of Huang and Zhang did not produce a picture of
the Confucian value orientation remarkably di¥erent from that of other
social scientists, but their example shows most clearly that these intellectuals
constituted a community of interpretation helping to define the nature of
the Confucian tradition for Taiwan’s reading public. Moreover, like other
social-science interpreters, they claimed to have verified the persistence of
Confucian values through scientific research (e.g., interviewing, administer-
ing questionnaires, and the like). This gave their interpretations a special
kind of legitimacy. Regardless of their intention to conduct value-neutral
research, their works had the e¥ect of defining “Confucianism” in a certain
way. And, whether or not they identified values that were previously Con-
fucian, their e¥orts may lead people to adopt these values in the future. For
these reasons, it is necessary to rank Huang and Zhang among the key con-
temporary interpreters of the Confucian heritage as well as to see their work
as a clear example of the tendency to interpret that heritage in line with
trends toward this-worldliness and economic encompassment.
Confucian Societies and Harmonizing Sects
Compared to leading social scientists or Neo-Confucian philosophers, indi-
vidual interpreters of the Confucian heritage found in the meeting halls of
Confucian societies or the spirit-writing halls of religious sects are relatively
unknown. However, their influence is greater in terms of the sheer number
of people exposed to their interpretations. The interpretations that they
present have more influence than other interpretations covered herein, with
the possible exception of those presented in Taiwan’s schools. Moreover,
these interpreters are part of organized groups that exist for the specific
purpose of disseminating moral-spiritual teachings. They are forms of
“institutional religion,” as opposed to “di¥used religion,” using C. K. Yang’s
categories (see Yang ).
Confucian Societies
Few of the organizations that I survey are specifically Confucian institutions.
The most specifically Confucian organization is the Confucius-Mencius
Society (to use the o≤cial English name of the Kong Meng Xuehui). The
Confucius-Mencius Society considers itself an academic and ethical society
rather than a religious organization, it publishes materials in Confucian
studies, and it has cosponsored academic conferences, such as the  Inter-
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national Symposium on Confucianism and the Modern World. It has good
relations with the government and presents the Confucian heritage in the
same way the government does. In fact, it has had close connections with the
o≤cial interpreters of Confucianism covered elsewhere in this essay.13
A similar type of group is the Society for the Sacred Way of Kong and
Meng (i.e., Confucius and Mencius) (Kong Meng Shengdao Hui), which is
somewhat more spiritual and syncretic in nature than the Confucius-
Mencius Society. The Society for the Sacred Way of Kong and Meng began
publishing a monthly periodical bearing its name, Kong Meng Shengdao
(The sacred way of Kong and Meng), in . Its chief aims are very much
in line with its status as a nonprofit social organization: “to study the origi-
nal Confucian Sacred Way; to further the culture of the orthodox [Sacred]
Way; to promote ethics and morality; to establish correct beliefs and ideals;
and to encourage ‘great harmony’ [datong] in the world” (Kong Meng Sheng-
dao, no.  []: ). Its spiritual and syncretic tendencies have been seen
in activities that it cosponsors with other religious organizations, such as the
 World Peace Prayer Meeting at Sun Moon Lake, Taiwan.
A third group, which calls itself the New Confucian Church (Xinru Jiao-
hui), was formed through the e¥orts of Chen Jianfu, the author of Xinrujia,
a popular new interpretation of the Confucian heritage (see Chen ). This
book went through as least six editions (Metzger , ). It was supple-
mented after  by a periodical with the same title, known in English as
The New Confucian (Glüer , ). Although the group aimed for the
Confucian tradition to fulfill a spiritual mission in modern Chinese society,
it saw the tradition more as a system of ethics than as a Western-style
religion. In his book, Chen wrote extensively about the di¥erence between
Confucianism and Western religion (Glüer , , –). Of the five
basic elements of the “new Confucianism” that he listed, the first one,“given
priority above all others,” was the ethical element. He stated: “A system of
ethics is to be defined and to be brought to general acceptance in a country
where traditional values have been dismissed as impractical and out-dated”
(Glüer , ).
The three Confucian societies just covered are alike in their role as ethical-
reform organizations but di¥er from one another in the degree to which
they see themselves as having a religious function. They are also alike in that
they aim to reach people primarily through their publication activities. All
three have been unable to increase their membership over the years, a fact
which significantly hampers their ability to influence many people. It is in
this regard, above all, that they di¥er from the religious sects to be discussed
below.
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Harmonizing Sects
The sects to be discussed in this section also have a penchant for producing
edifying publications, especially so-called morality books (shanshu), but this
is not all they do. They have ritual activities, notably spirit-writing sessions
in which the contents of morality books are produced; they serve as social
organizations that can be surrogates for traditional family and village units;
and their members work together to plan and conduct charitable, recre-
ational, and other social activities. In other words, they are congregational-
style religions fulfilling many of the functions performed by Protestant sects
in the modern West and by so-called new religions in other parts of the
world. They represent the fastest-growing religious movements in Taiwan,
challenged only by resurgent Buddhism.14 Membership in the largest among
them, the Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao), has been conservatively estimated at
, (Chiu ). Several of them bear a strong resemblance to the spirit-
writing groups whose morality books are analyzed in Clart (chapter  in this
volume).
Many such groups are new in that they were established after the end of
World War II, but they have historical counterparts in China going back at
least to the Yuan dynasty. Like their historical counterparts, they are harmo-
nizing sects in the sense that they are willing to combine the teachings of
Confucianism with those of Buddhism, Daoism, and other religious tradi-
tions. Also continuing a revered past practice, they produce most of their
texts through the vehicle of spirit writing. (Of course, from their point of
view, these texts are “revealed.”) Cai Maotang estimated that, by the early
s, seven to eight hundred such titles were in existence (see Cai , ).
And Zheng Zhiming estimated that, by the late s, there were over three
hundred spirit-writing halls in Taiwan producing texts (Zheng , ).
Not all sects practice spirit writing, and some large sects, such as the Way of
Unity, have within them groups that do this as well as groups that do not.
Interesting for our purposes is the fact that many sects that do practice
spirit writing are precisely the ones that like to use the term ru (Confucian)
in their names. This is natural enough since ru, perhaps best rendered in
English as “literati,” connects one with the literary style of religious activity
in which these groups specialize. Among “ru-ist” names of these groups
listed by Zheng, we have Rumen (Gate of Ru), Ruzong Shenjiao (Holy Reli-
gion of Ru Ancestry), Ruzong Shengjiao (Sacred Religion of Ru Ancestry),
and Ruzong Luanjiao (Luan Religion of Ru Ancestry). (In the last, “luan”
refers both to a great mythical bird and to spirit writing.)
Other sects that should be mentioned in this context are the Compas-
sion Society (Cihui Tang), the Sacred Religion of Heavenly Virtue (Tiande
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Shengjiao), the Sacred Truth Society (Shengli She), and the Religion of the
Yellow Emperor. Like the Way of Unity, each of these brings Confucianism
into its eclectic teachings at the level of ethics. In some instances, this is
justified explicitly, but, more often, it is just assumed that the ethical compo-
nent of a religion should be Confucian. Much indicates that this is even the
case for Taiwanese Buddhism, despite the distinctly Indian origins of its
ethics. The Religion of the Yellow Emperor provides an explicit explanation,
saying that ethical, social, and spiritual philosophies are provided by combin-
ing the Confucian “Way of Humanity” (rendao), the Mo-ist “Way of Earth”
(didao), and the Daoist “Way of Heaven” (tiandao) (Jochim , ).15
In addition to documenting that religious sects incorporate Confucian
ethics, we must examine the interpretive context within which they present
Confucian ethics, for it is precisely the di¥erent interpretive context that
makes their presentation of Confucian ethics di¥erent from that of Con-
temporary Neo-Confucians or Ministry of Education o≤cials. An under-
standing of the di¥erence in interpretive context involves discussing, first,
the method by which most morality books are produced and, second, the
content of the books. The method is spirit writing. This means, first, that
revelation is not closed; for example, Master Kong can speak to us, not only
intermediately through his ancient sayings, but also immediately through
spirit writing. It also means that Master Kong is only one among various
sages, many outside the Confucian tradition, who provide ongoing revela-
tions, or “instructions” (zhiyi), for people’s moral edification. The doctrinal
purity desired by more orthodox Confucians is, thus, lost. In premodern
times, the fact that Master Kong was only one among various sages usually
meant that he was placed within the framework of three-teachings syncre-
tism. Now it often means that he is placed within a broader context of, for
example, the five teachings (Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, Christian, and
Islamic). This is true of the ideology of the largest sect, the Way of Unity, as
well as of many smaller ones. Cai Maotang reports on a text from a small
spirit-writing hall in the Taipei area called “Great Evidences of the Unity of
the Five Teachings” (Wujiao heyi da zheng). He states: “The content includes
the revealed instructions, along with facts explaining the unity of the five
teachings, from Sagely Primordial Master Kong, Daoist Patriarch Tai Shang,
World Revered Shakyamuni, Supremely Revered Jehovah, Founder of Islam
[Muhammad], Great Scholar Manjusri, [Daoist] Patriarch Chunyang,
Avalokiteúvara Mahasattva, K∂itigarbha Bodhisattva, and other deities,
immortals, and buddhas” (, ). As this example indicates, the context
within which Master Kong is presented is the polytheistic and anthropo-
morphic system of Chinese popular religion.
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Furthermore, sectarian interpretations stress the divine sanction of
morality, which is based on the belief that moral rules have a divine source
and are enforced by divine powers. And the content of the moral system
within which Confucian ethics is presented contains key elements from
other traditions, especially Buddhism. Indeed, the most fundamental
principle of the whole system, the karmic law of cause and e¥ect, has been
borrowed directly from Buddhism. Morality books continually stress stories
as well as personal testimonials about the mysterious but unfailing operation
of the law of karma (Cai , ; Zheng , –).
While the interpretive framework used by these sects has unique fea-
tures—the penchant for harmonizing varied teachings, the need for divine
sanction of moral principles, and the stress on divine retribution—there is
one thing that they have in common with the government o≤cials and
intellectuals discussed previously. They also stress that people need Con-
fucian values today, as they face the onslaught of modernization, Western-
ization, and other forces that are believed to undermine traditional Chinese
culture.
CONCLUSION
How has Confucianism in postwar Taiwan changed? I approached this
question from two angles. On the one hand, assuming that Confucianism in
Taiwan is subject to some of the trends evident among modernizing tradi-
tions in general, I categorized and reviewed those trends. On the other hand,
assuming that the historical background of Confucianism distinguishes it
among modernizing traditions, I adopted certain strategies to determine the
specific nature of Confucianism today. It would have made little sense to ask
typical questions: How many churches and church members has it gained or
lost recently? What are the latest pronouncements of its church councils or
saΩgha leaders? Instead, I had to ask questions more suited to a tradition that
has been more di¥use than institutional in nature: Who are the interpreters
defining Confucian discourse today? What are their new interpretations?
Where do we find them? How are the social institutions in which we find
them changing?
In looking at three areas of society in which we find Confucian inter-
pretive communities, I initially found that, in the light of cross-cultural
trends toward more globalism, more individualism, and more democratic
political arrangements (including church-state separation), the government
played a surprisingly large role in defining Confucianism in postwar Taiwan.
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Despite some universalistic tendencies within Confucianism today, o≤cial
interpretations presented Confucian beliefs and practices as the basis for
nationalistic sentiments and, moreover, stressed Confucian values that
would result in enhanced loyalty to the state. This also meant that there was
little exploration of liberal and reformist tendencies that, according to some,
are latent in Confucian teachings. The government also seemed to maintain
traditional uses of Confucianism, for example, presenting it as preferable to
local folk traditions. The government’s rationalizing and modernizing
policies, which led it to consider Taiwanese folk religion as wasteful and
superstitious, also remind us of the traditional situation.
However, in recent years, the government has increasingly abdicated
the role that traditional Chinese governments played in determining the
nature of and promulgating Confucianism. We saw this in the successor
organizations to the government’s Council for Chinese Cultural Renais-
sance. Those studying the growth of civil society in Taiwan have also
observed this development, although from a di¥erent angle (see Gold ;
and King ). With the government increasingly less involved in the a¥airs
of Confucianism, we must ask these questions: What institutional carriers
of the tradition, if any, will emerge to replace the Ministry of Education, the
Council for Chinese Cultural Renaissance, and so forth? Will the void be
filled by new institutions, or will existing ones, such as harmonizing sects
and groups of intellectuals (e.g., the Contemporary Neo-Confucians), fill
the void? What direction will interpreters take after they are more fully free
of government guidance?
First, it is possible that distinctly Confucian organizations, comparable
to Chen Jianfu’s New Confucian Church, will emerge and help fill the void
left by the government’s retreat. But, so far, there have not been su≤cient
social or ideological forces in postwar Taiwan to create this kind of major
transformation of Confucianism from a di¥used tradition to one with dis-
tinct institutional forms outside state and family. Second, it is possible that
groups of Confucian intellectuals will become stronger, more organized, and
more influential, both as interpreters of the tradition and as figures in
Chinese intellectual life in general. At the very least, it is clear that the situ-
ation in postwar Taiwan has allowed them an unprecedented opportunity to
enhance the reputation of a tradition that had been severely damaged by the
May Fourth movement. Finally, in my view, it is likely that harmonizing lay
sects will have the largest role in interpreting the Confucian tradition in Tai-
wan. With the past history of similar sects as our guide, we can say that the
long-term trends, both ideological and sociological, favor this development.
Ideologically, the harmonization of teachings from di¥erent traditions,
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rather than the exclusive adherence to those of one tradition, has for
centuries been the tendency among religions in China. Sociologically, these
organizations have been important because they have played the role of
congregational-style religions everywhere, whether of Hindu sampradaya in
early-modern India, new religions in postwar Japan, or Protestant sects in
contemporary Latin America. In this role, they o¥er people surrogate family
or village groups as well as providing lifestyles better suited for individuals
in voluntary associations than for persons embedded in the traditional
ritual-social networks of family and village life.
Moreover, average interpreters of Confucianism are no longer Con-
fucian clergy found in the Ministry of Rites of imperial China; they are now
individual citizens found in the halls of academe (now relatively free of
government influence) and in the suburban meeting places of sectarian lay
groups (now legalized). As we know, when the social locations of a tradi-
tion’s carriers are di¥erent, then their interpretations will be di¥erent. Are
interpretations of the Confucian heritage di¥erent today? Are they more
globalized, in any sense? Are they less hierarchical in general and less patri-
archal in particular? Do they bear the imprint of economic encompassment?
Do they betray concerns with rationality and progress?
We have seen that, in postwar Taiwan, views of Confucianism have been
increasingly universalistic and less nationalistic. Whether we look at inter-
preters from the Way of Unity or at younger-generation Contemporary
Neo-Confucian intellectuals, they generally accept the kind of federalism of
which Ninian Smart spoke. Confucianism is accepted as one of the world’s
major traditions, possessing a message for all humanity. It is rarely presented
as having the one true message for all humanity, although, for some, it con-
tains a message superior to various alternatives and, for others, a superior
version of the one universal truth.
In addition to believing in the universal value of Confucianism, its
recent interpreters in Taiwan show more interest in the value of its teachings
for personal cultivation than in the usefulness of those teachings as a social
or national ideology. Of course, I am not saying that this is a new element
in the tradition. Cultivation of one’s person (xiushen) has always been
among its central features. I am saying only that, by virtue of their social
location, recent interpreters have naturally had a more abiding interest in
this element of the Confucian heritage. However, their expression of this
modern interest lags behind that of their counterparts in other modernizing
traditions. For example, feminism has had little impact on Confucianism.
Confucian personhood is still implicitly male personhood, perhaps because
there have been no feminist reinterpretations of the heritage. Confucian
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models of human relationships are still hierarchical, although men sympa-
thetic to women’s perspectives now advocate a new interpretation of the
husband-wife relationship.16 According to Clart (chapter  in this volume),
there has been a parallel development in the popular Confucianism of cer-
tain morality books: the shift from a view of marriage based on the needs of
the lineage system to one based on those of the husband-wife relationship.
Moreover, we still await the Confucian counterpart of the Christian
“social gospel” or “engaged” Buddhism. Younger-generation Contemporary
Neo-Confucians are perhaps less likely than their forebears solely to stress
anti-Communist views rather than to develop critical views of capitalist
exploiters of labor, industrial polluters of the environment, or authoritarian
rulers. But the e¥ort to develop liberal and reformist elements of the Con-
fucian heritage has not become a major trend among Confucian thinkers
read in Taiwan today. By contrast, a major trend that has emerged places
Confucianism at the service of global capitalism: namely, the development
of a social-scientific discourse praising Confucian values for their role in
economic development. Interestingly, leading thinkers rooted in Taiwan’s
Contemporary Neo-Confucian tradition, such as Tu Wei-ming, have joined
this discourse by presenting their own supportive theories. Only a few
Confucian-oriented thinkers have raised dissenting voices in this discourse,
taking the position that Confucian thought should be developed in a direc-
tion that is potentially more critical of the nature of East Asian economic
development. They include, for example, two scholars who emigrated from
Taiwan to North America, Harry Hsiao (Xiao Xinyi) and Charles Wei-hsun
Fu (see Xiao ; and Fu ).
Turning to lay sectarians in postwar Taiwan, there is much evidence that
they are sociologically well adapted to modernity. There is less evidence that
their core moral values have changed much over the last several decades,
although, as Clart (chapter  in this volume) shows, their interpretations of
these values can vary dramatically. This is understandable in terms of factors
to which Steve Bruce has drawn our attention. First, we must remember the
tendency of traditionalist teachings to persevere unchallenged, or even rein-
forced, where they serve to strengthen social identity in an environment of
rapid cultural transition. Second, we must remember that, although harmo-
nizing lay groups are usually called “sects,” by late-imperial times they had
already begun to develop the features of the “denomination” and “cult”
stages of Bruce’s theory of socioreligious evolution.
This does not mean that these lay groups have no role to play in the
development of new beliefs and practices a¥ecting Confucianism. In fact,
they do—in the development of lay meditation (jingzuo), lay preaching
77
03Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:40 AM  Page 77
C H R I S T I A N  J O C H I M
(jiangjing), and lay study rooted in the Confucian heritage. Moreover, by
Bruce’s standards (as cited above), their view of the divine is increasingly like
that of the late-modern, cult-stage view in the West: “an immaterial and
di¥use one God, a cosmic consciousness which can be claimed as the under-
lying ‘reality’ beneath whatever deviant visions one may have.” It is also
important for them to conceive of the individual as standing directly in
relation to the divine so conceived, not as relating to it through priestly
intermediaries, such as Daoist priests or Buddhist clerics. Finally, they
interpret the moral-spiritual life, within which Confucian values have a
central role, increasingly as a life involving individual choices rather than
conformity to social norms. This means that adopting Confucian values will
lead to worldly success, not only for the guojia (the “nation-family”), but also
for the entrepreneurial modern individual in Taiwan. Perhaps more impor-
tant, living by these values and practicing meditation will help an individ-
ual in his or her struggle to become fully human (zuoren) at a time when this
is probably more di≤cult than it was in prewar Taiwan.
NOTES
I wish to express my gratitude for help at both the start and the conclusion of this
research and writing project. In , Wei-an Chang made me his partner in research
funded by the National Science Council (NSC) of the Republic of China; my role was to
collect and analyze materials related to Confucianism in contemporary Taiwan. He did
much to aid me in collecting materials, hiring research assistants, analyzing trends, and
so forth. I thank both him and the NSC for much-needed assistance. In its penultimate
form, as a conference paper (presented at the  annual meeting of the Association for
Asian Studies, Chicago, – March), this essay was critiqued by Charles Jones in his role
as discussant. Many of his helpful comments, oral and written, have been incorporated
into the present version of the essay.
1. I follow standard practice in describing the world’s “great traditions” as “religious,”
although my personal preference would be to replace the Eurocentric concept “reli-
gion” with the concept “moral-spiritual tradition” or some similar concept that does
not carry with it the baggage of Western theistic assumptions. Especially in the case
of Confucianism, this would help minimize objections from the emic viewpoint of the
tradition’s interpreters.
2. Peter Berger, who has become well-known for proposing that East Asia has provided
a second, unique case of modernization outside the West, argues that individualism
may not be a major feature of East Asian modernization (see Berger ).
3. A di¥erent division of realms of discourse—that between o≤cial and popular—is
used in Huang ().
4. “Anthropocosmic,” a term popularized by Wei-ming Tu in particular, is meant to 
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indicate that Confucians see the need for humans to find their place in a sacred
cosmos and, therefore, are not mere secular humanists (see Tu ).
5. For a detailed treatment of the history of the Council for Chinese Cultural Renais-
sance, see Shi ().
6. A more recent survey provides information on temples constructed after  (see
Liao a, b). However, none of the new locations has the stature of Taichung
or Kaohsiung.
7. On the case of President Yan, see Huang (, ). On that of President Chiang, see
Yin (, ).
8. Huang and Chiu (, ) summarize Kohlberg’s six stages of moral reasoning as
follows: punishment and obedience orientation; instrumental relativist orientation;
good boy–nice girl orientation; law and order orientation; social-contract legalistic
orientation; and universal ethical-principle orientation. They report extensively on
the results of research on moral development in Taiwan (see –).
9. An abridged version appears as an appendix in Chang (). The Chinese text was
first published in Minzhu pinglun ( January ).
10. For other brief treatments in English, see Chang (), Fu (), Huang (),
Metzger (), and Wu ().
11. Charles Jones suggested this di¥erence between Confucian ideology and that of the
universal faiths mentioned. Philip Clart, on the other hand, reminded me of the
range of activities in which Confucian-oriented charitable societies in late-imperial
China engaged. Thus, while Confucian ideology does not feature universal charity,
it does not preclude it either.
12. For a more detailed analysis, see Jochim (, b).
13. For a presentation of strong evidence of the connections between this organization’s
journal, Kong-Meng yuekan, and o≤cial Confucianism, see Huang ().
14. For a good general overview of this and related changes in popular religious life, see
Jordan ().
15. For more detailed information on the use of the term ru in Taiwanese popular Con-
fucianism as well as an analysis of the use of the concept “popular Confucianism”
itself, see Clart ().
16. For example, a main thrust of Wang Bangxiong’s  presentation at an annual
schoolteachers’ conference on Chinese culture at Tunghai University was the idea
that an egalitarian husband-wife relationship, rather than the traditional father-son
relationship, should be at the center of the Confucian system of family relationships
(see also Reed ).
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T R A D I T I O N  I S that part of a culture that connects it to its past and preserves
that past within the present. Although the notion of tradition implies conti-
nuity, stability, the absence of change, the dialectics of continuity and
change, the choice between preserving the old and embracing the new, are
constants of the human condition. They are part of any human society, even
those that used to be characterized as “static” or “without history.” Of course,
the intensity with which the new and the old are negotiated and the relative
importance assigned to each vary greatly among societies and among dif-
ferent historical periods within the same society. However, in a global
perspective, a converging trend is discernible in the history of the last two
hundred years, an age of rapid and profound change emanating from West-
ern Europe and North America that eventually came to a¥ect practically
every human society. The resulting clash of “tradition” and “modernity”
raised the stakes dramatically and ushered in a period of intense renegotia-
tion of cultural identities that continues unabated to the present day.
China is no exception to this trend. Ever since the violent encroachment
of Western imperialism on China began in the early nineteenth century,
China has had to deal head-on with the forces of modernity, and its subse-
quent history has, therefore, been characterized by the continuous search for
a place of its own within this modernity. As the turbulent intellectual history
of this period has been well researched, we are aware of the di¥erent answers
that have been proposed, ranging from extreme traditionalism and a total
84
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rejection of modernity, over various compromise positions, to the extreme
antitraditionalism of the May Fourth movement. However, while we are well
informed about the proposals and responses developed by the national elite,
we know much less about the processes of renegotiation at the local level,
about the ways in which peasants, merchants, workers, and local gentry
rebuilt their life worlds in an age of rapid change.
One hitherto underutilized window into this local arena is provided by
the so-called morality books (shanshu). The role of this genre of religious
literature as a contribution to a local negotiation of the relation of tradition
and modernity is the topic of the present essay. I shall focus on two morality
books concerned with the moral exhortation of women, one produced in
the southwestern province of Yunnan in , the other in Taiwan in .
While the attitudes of both would be classified as strongly traditionalist, a
direct comparison of their approaches will show a distinct variance in their
understanding of what tradition is and how it relates to contemporary
society. This variance will then be tied back to the specific temporal and
geographic contexts in which these two books were composed. In keeping
with the overall theme of this collection, I will focus here on the Taiwanese
work as an adaptation of tradition for and a commentary on the specifically
Taiwanese social experience of the postwar period.1
MORALITY BOOKS
Morality books are a genre of Chinese religious literature concerned with
admonishing the general public to moral reform. The morality advocated in
these books is predominantly Confucian in nature, stressing filial piety,
loyalty, chastity, righteousness, and the other virtues that are generally
associated with Confucianism but that have become part of the Chinese
worldview transcending all denominational boundaries. Still, I am going to
use the term “Confucian” for the moral stance represented in shanshu, if only
because that is very much the emic view: shanshu authors themselves
explicitly associate the morality that they propagate with China’s Confucian
tradition. The Taiwanese scholar Sung Kwang-yu (Song Guangyu) views the
moralistic outlook found in the morality-book literature and among a
number of Chinese religious sects as part and parcel of what he calls “reli-
gionized Confucianism” (zongjiaohua Ruxue), a Confucianism that, in his
definition, “is completely enmeshed with and arising out of religious activ-
ities” (Sung , ). As “religionized” does not work very well in English,
I propose to call the outlook in question “popular Confucianism.”2
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The history of morality books goes back to the Song dynasty (the tenth
to the thirteenth centuries), when a new society developed that broke with
the encrusted aristocratic structures of the medieval period; it was a society
characterized by unprecedented social mobility, the growth of a powerful
merchant class, and the broadening of literacy and education. The class-
bound di¥erential ethics of medieval society was replaced by generalized
norms of moral conduct applicable to all classes within society. The homog-
enization of values was accelerated by the invention of printing, which made
knowledge more widely accessible than ever before. Although forms of
morally exhortative literature of course existed throughout Chinese history,
morality books proper are a product of this new era when the lines between
social classes became more permeable and a new kind of society appeared
that required new moral norms equally applicable to all classes.
This literature was produced in an uninterrupted tradition from the
Song dynasty to the present day, surging and ebbing with social and politi-
cal conditions. Typically, shanshu production rose in response to social (and,
thus, moral) disorder. One such significant “shanshu movement” began
around the middle of the nineteenth century in response to the political,
social, and cultural crisis into which China was thrown by its confrontation
with the modern age, in the form of the Western imperialist powers. As the
negotiation of a Chinese identity in the modern world is still going on
today, this shanshu movement continues to perpetuate itself in Chinese
societies outside the People’s Republic of China. Institutionally, it is carried
by religious groups—the so-called halls of goodness (shantang) or phoenix
halls (luantang)—that devote themselves to the printing and distribution of
morality books and frequently to their actual writing by means of the
mediumistic technique of spirit writing (fuluan). While shanshu can be
written by human authors, a significant portion of the shanshu literature has
been produced by spirit writing. In the nineteenth- and twentieth-century
shanshu movement, such spirit-written shanshu constitute the majority.3
Because of the preoccupation of shanshu with the perceived moral and
social ills of their times, it is tempting to use these texts as mirrors of the
customs and social conditions of their age. However, their reflection of these
conditions is distorted by their normative intent: shanshu do not describe
social conditions; they evaluate them according to explicit moral standards.
Their aim is to reform decadence and disorder by means of a popular
Confucian program of moralism. Thus, shanshu are not mirrors but com-
mentaries on and critiques of their times. As such, they still tell us something
about changing norms and social conditions, but what they reveal
principally is their authors’ understanding and evaluation of these changes.
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As bulwarks of popular Confucianism, shanshu document one mode of
response of Chinese cultural conservatism to the forces of change that have
gripped China over the last  years or so.
However, it would be wrong to see shanshu merely as bastions of an
inflexible, backward-looking reaction, futilely trying to stem the inexorable
tides of change. True, there are those that can be characterized in this way,
especially among the older products of this tradition, books written in the
late Qing and the early Republican period (I introduce one such work
below). By contrast, while more recent shanshu share their predecessors’
defense of the virtues and basic patterns of social relationships propagated
by Confucianism, they do not do so inflexibly. As a rule, present-day shanshu
authors take into account the reality of social change and adapt their
response accordingly; they try to realize their moral ideals in a way that is
compatible with the social conditions of their times and, thus, at least theo-
retically feasible. They do not usually try to squeeze the toothpaste of change
back into the tube of the good old order but instead attempt to reformulate
a model of moral practice that allows the spirit of their popular Confucian
ethics to survive within the new order.
A TALE OF TWO BOOKS
I illustrate this point by comparing two morality books concerned with the
moral exhortation of women. The earlier of the two, the Precious Admoni-
tions for the Instruction of Women (see Xunnü baozhen ), was written by
a spirit-writing cult (the Seventh Shrine for Praising Goodness [Qingshan
Qi Tan]) in Eryuan county (Western Yunnan province) in the year .4 The
other text, the Instructions in the Womanly Way (see Xun fudao ), was
composed by a spirit-writing cult (the Temple of the Martial Sage, Hall of
Enlightened Orthodoxy [Wumiao Mingzheng Tang]) in the Taiwanese city
of Taichung (Taizhong) in .5 Both books share the same general pur-
pose, namely, to admonish women to follow the precepts of female virtue in
a society that increasingly fails to practice and enforce these moral standards.
Both deliver their sermons through the mouths of female deities descend-
ing into the planchette to exhort their fellow women (He Xiangu in the case
of the Instructions and a large host of female immortals under the direction
of the bodhisattva Guanyin in the case of the Admonitions). However, the
two books di¥er strongly in terms of tone, in terms of the particular
elements of the traditional ethical norms applicable to women that they
choose to stress, and in terms of literary style.
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The most easily discernible of these di¥erences is style. The Admonitions
are written principally in semiclassical parallel rhyme-prose, while the
Instructions use a vernacular discursive idiom with only minimal classical
admixtures. This points to a di¥erence in intended use: as books, both were,
of course, to be read by women, but the stylistic format of the Admonitions
suggests that the text was also intended for recitation and memorization.
Bear in mind that the Admonitions were written in an age and a place in
which the majority of women would have been illiterate. Therefore, it is
explicitly stated that the text was deliberately written in simple language “so
that when others read it to illiterate women, the words can penetrate their
ears and minds” (Xunnü baozhen , Lü Yuanjun’s preface, p. ). The text
was to be proclaimed in public lecturing sessions (xuanjiang) and
expounded (jianglun) at home by the family head to the family members “in
leisure periods mornings and evenings” (Xunnü baozhen , Fanli, p. ).
Literate women are not totally absent from the scene, but, even for them,
simple language is deemed more appropriate, as their literacy is usually
rather limited. Thus, one of the reasons given for the writing of this work is
that the traditional canons of womanly virtue, such as the Lienü zhuan, the
Nü’er jing, and the Nü sishu, are too di≤cult to read for all but a few highly
educated women in scholarly families: “For those women who have attended
school and have a limited understanding of literature, it is hoped that they
will be able to grasp this book’s meaning at the first reading” (Xunnü bao-
zhen , Lü Yuanjun’s preface, p. ). By contrast, the Instructions are the
product of an age and a society in which the vast majority of women are
literate, and, thus, the book is clearly written for reading, with no indication
that it was to be used for lecturing.
These stylistic di¥erences carry over into the tone of the books. The
Admonitions speak down to women, preaching, admonishing, castigating,
while the Instructions speak to women, arguing, explaining, and rationaliz-
ing. The central values overlap to a significant degree, but the way in which
those values are interpreted and presented di¥ers drastically. I will illustrate
this with reference to the treatment accorded the husband-wife relationship
in the two texts.
Both the Admonitions and the Instructions share a belief in male domi-
nance among married couples, but this concept is interpreted and brought
across quite di¥erently in the two texts. The Admonitions a≤rm:
Your husband is your small Heaven,
How could you neglect respecting him?
Husbands may be ugly or handsome,
In character they may be clear or turbid,
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They may be of high or low station, worthy or stupid,
Poor or rich, weak or strong—
All this has been prepared in a previous existence.
Each one should know contentment.
You must not envy others,
Or bear grudges in your heart,
But serve and listen to your husband,
And with lowered head comply with his wishes.
. . .
Alas, the women of today
Destroy the rules of human relationships and ruin customs.
To their husbands they talk of equal rights,
To freely do as they please.
Frequently they engage in illicit a¥airs,
And their conduct is di≤cult to restrain,
Claiming that today things are liberalized.
These habits are spreading everywhere on the mainland.
[Women] detest the low status of their husbands,
And are ashamed of their in-laws.
When they are just a little displeased,
They will reject their husbands,
Abandoning them halfway [through their marriage].
Just like a good bird choosing a high tree [for itself]
They are pleased only
When they have found a handsome youth.
Once the divorce is completed,
They right away go looking for another partner.
Such recklessness has already become customary—
I am hurt to tears by talking about it! 
—Xunnü baozhen , juan shang, p. 
Compare this in tone, style, and content to the following passage from the
Instructions:
A household’s harmony and happiness are closely tied to how hus-
band and wife get along with each other. If they are patient, forgiv-
ing, and sympathetic to each other, how will trouble be able to arise
in the household? However, [although] in the household the wife
occupies the most important position, the old saying “men rule
outside, women inside” does not at all fit modern conditions any
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more. Why do I say this? Because nowadays it is very common that
wives also have professional employment. Thus we can say that
men and women both rule in the outside world.
Problems of disharmony in the household therefore arise
mainly from the fact that today’s women do not as in the former
agricultural society depend on their husbands for their livelihood
but can earn their living independently. Wives who do not under-
stand the principles of things begin to walk with a swagger and all
the time treat their husbands as their equals, unwilling to stand
back. It seems as if there were those who are as powerful as their
husbands, but in fact this is a state of the family brought about by
social change; women are not really more powerful than men.
From ancient times until today, no matter how society changed,
husband and wife have always been di¥erentiated. One must not
through one’s ignorance of principles cause misfortune in the
household. For example, there are women who look down on their
husbands because their own income is higher or despise them
because they themselves work outside [the home] or have a more
important job. Or worse, they may even demand divorce—this is
really too unfortunate. Every person has their fate and karmic pre-
destination; not everybody can forever pass their days in content-
ment. It is really very di≤cult to endure when, because a husband
happens to su¥er a bad turn of fate, the wife out of her ignorance
of principles bears grudges against him and blames him. A wise
wife will always recognize her husband’s dominance, no matter
what her own profession is. [Husband and wife] should work hand
in hand, building a beautiful and happy future together. Only in
this way will [the wife] not violate the innate goodness of her
mind. . . .
There is nothing to be said against a wife working in an out-
side job so as to help the husband resolve financial di≤culties and
to increase one’s standard of living. However, a household still has
to be completely ruled by the husband; only then will it conform
to the ethics and ancient teachings of our nation. Only in this way
can womanly virtue be really achieved in modern life.
—Xun fudao , –
The Admonitions are really just that: more or less peremptory injunc-
tions to be obedient to one’s husband, not criticize, and in general be content
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with one’s lot. There is no attempt to analyze the interpersonal dynamics of
the husband-wife relationship; indeed, such a consideration would seem
irrelevant to the author, as marriage is clearly seen, not as centering on the
intimate relationship of two individuals, but as serving principally the inter-
ests of the husband’s lineage. This point is driven home by the book’s abhor-
rence of “free marriage” and the explicit a≤rmation of the traditional “seven
reasons for divorcing a wife” (qichu), to each of which one chapter is devoted
in the second juan.6 The book represents the reactionary worldview of the
local gentry in a distant corner of the Chinese empire, of men still rooted in
the Qing dynasty, which after all had been toppled only ten years earlier.
These men face the new era with incomprehension and react to it by stub-
bornly rea≤rming the old order. To them the new China does not represent
a new order, an alternative model that threatens the old one: that they could
understand and argue against. No, to them the new China represents the
absence of any order whatsoever; it is the end of civilization. As a preface has
it: “The hearts of humans are not as of old. The common people everywhere
turn against the Way and ruin virtue. The Teaching of Names, the principles
of human relationships, and the constant virtues are all abandoned. Men
engage in willful perversity, and women imitate it, contracting the habits of
equality and freedom. . . . Within a few years, China, the country of the
teaching of rites, of trustworthiness and righteousness, will have become
ruled by barbarian customs” (Xunnü baozhen , Guanyin’s preface, p. ).
For the author of the Admonitions, the modern age is equivalent to the
barbarization of China. The morality books are dikes to stem the floods of
barbarity by a forceful and wholesale insistence on and rea≤rmation of the
old order.
The Instructions are also clearly a morality book produced by a cult
group similar to the one that wrote the Admonitions. The two books share
a popular Confucian view of morality and gender relations, including the
assumption of male dominance as part of the natural order. In both, we find
traditional concepts of female virtue, such as the three obediences and four
virtues (sancong side) invoked, but, in their application of this morality, they
could not di¥er more. The Instructions were written in and for a society very
di¥erent from that of s Yunnan. In late s Taiwan, the question is, not
how to preserve the old moral order in the face of barbarity, but how to
preserve and realize the spirit of the old within the new society. This new
society is accepted, not just as a necessary evil, but as a simple fact of life. In
the excerpt given above, women’s employment outside the home is neither
condemned nor grudgingly conceded but a≤rmed as a feature of present-
day Taiwanese society. The question raised is not, Should women work out-
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side the home? but, How is female virtue to be realized under social condi-
tions characterized by widespread female involvement in the economy? This
question is approached with an acute sociological awareness, realizing that
employment makes wives less dependent on their husbands and, thus, better
able to speak up for themselves. The main argument is that the fact that
wives can earn as much or even more money than their husbands should not
lead to the assumption that they are equal to or even better than their hus-
bands. In fact, the roles of man and woman are still distinct; it is the man
who must lead, the woman who must acknowledge male authority. While,
in the old society, this was easily enforced through the male monopoly on
economic resources, in modern society women’s compliance becomes a
matter of conscious moral choice. In the absence of economic control,
humility becomes a pure expression of female virtue, a sign of a woman’s
“understanding of principles.” For women to be induced to make this choice,
it must be justified to them. Thus, in contrast to the Admonitions, the
Instructions do not talk down to women; rather, they address them as think-
ing individuals who must be convinced to make the right choice.
The consequences of their choices are analyzed at length in a discussion
of the married state as a relationship between two fated individuals. This in
itself is another big di¥erence from the worldview of the Admonitions, in
which marriage was seen principally from the viewpoint of its functions for
the lineage. The Instructions, by contrast, take the modern decline of lineage
or even extended-family ties into account, and, consequently, the book
addresses itself principally to the nuclear or stem family and its concerns.7
The husband-wife relationship has moved to the center of attention, and
with this change comes a shift in perspective: where the Admonitions treat
the husband-wife dyad in terms of subordination, the Instructions are a dis-
course of coordination. While never abandoning the principle of male
leadership, the Instructions take account of the increasingly gender-balanced
distribution of economic power in modern Taiwanese society by embedding
this principle in an ideal pattern of married life characterized in the first
place by mutuality, with hierarchy playing the role of a secondary theme.
One practical consequence of shifting the focus of attention from the lineage
to the husband-wife dyad is the di¥erent treatment of divorce in the Admo-
nitions and the Instructions. For the Admonitions, divorce on the initiative of
the wife is highly reprehensible, a selfish escape from the lower position of
a hierarchy that threatens that very hierarchy. On the other hand, divorce
initiated by the husband’s lineage for the protection of its interests, using the
“seven reasons,” is justified. In the absence of a lineage structure, the Instruc-
tions focus all attention on the nuclear family. Divorce in general, whether
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on the wife’s or on the husband’s initiative, is rejected as a threat to the pre-
destined and, therefore, to a certain extent sacred institution of marriage.
The seven reasons are never mentioned in the book and have been e¥ectively
erased from the ideal moral order.
A sample of only two morality books would seem to provide a thin
empirical basis on which to make broad claims concerning pervasive changes
in role expectations and the interpretation of traditional values within the
family. However, my extensive readings in the morality literature of the
twentieth century lead me to view the two case examples examined here as
fairly representative of the genre in their particular temporal and geographic
contexts. For the Taiwanese text, we can, in addition, draw on wider-ranging
studies of changes in the Taiwanese value system that provide support for the
findings of the present case study.
For example, in his study of the relative weighting of specific social and
moral issues in the modern Taiwanese morality literature, Sung Kwang-yu
discovered that modern Taiwanese shanshu give relatively less attention to
issues of family ethics than do their early-modern predecessors. He attrib-
utes this change to the declining social significance of the extended family
in modern life (Sung ). This illustrates an e¥ect of changes in the family
and household structure on moral values that runs parallel to the one
described in the present study: while Sung finds the importance of the
family in the traditional understanding diminishing overall, the example of
the Instructions shows how the focus shifts to the moral implications of the
emerging new social forms of family life.
Another source of supporting data is Zhuang Yaoxi and Yang Guoshu’s
study of changes in the understanding of filial piety (Zhuang and Yang
). Among their findings in this large-scale questionnaire study are two
features relevant for our present purposes. First is a trend toward under-
standing filial piety less as an externally imposed duty than as an internally
defined and regulated moral obligation. Second is respondents’ tendency to
stress the mutuality of the parent-child relationship over its hierarchical
characteristics, a development similar to that of the understanding of the
husband-wife relationship sketched above.
The tendency of the Instructions to expound popular Confucian values
as objects of autonomous moral choice and to emphasize the husband-wife
dyad within a nuclear-family setting as a combination of mutual and hier-
archical relations is, thus, validated by trends found in other, more broadly
based studies. My study adds to these other studies by demonstrating the
e¥ect of these trends even in the self-consciously traditionalist context of the
morality literature, where tradition is subjected to a constant process of rein-
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terpretation so as to reconcile it with the changing conditions of modern
society. In their study of the development of Taiwanese family organization
in the twentieth century, Thornton and Lin have noted a general pattern of
negotiating an altered social environment by recourse to a traditional reper-
toire of values and concepts. As a result of this pattern, they note,“it has not
been surprising to find that many of the central historical values of Chinese
culture have persisted in the new environment, even as their manifestations
have been modified by the new forces. The result in Taiwan has been an
intricate mixing of continuity and change in family life” (Thornton, Lin, et
al. , ). Shanshu such as the Instructions exemplify one way in which
tradition is modified by modernity so as to better survive within it. They are
concrete and unsolicited articulations of and comments on the general but
faceless trends that emerge from the sociologist’s statistical charts.
CONCLUSIONS
I a≤rmed at the beginning that all shanshu adopt a moral stance best
characterized as “popular Confucianism.” One conclusion to be drawn from
my comparison of these two morality books is that I must qualify this state-
ment by making it clear that this “popular Confucianism” is not a static
concept. Rather, ideas of what constitutes the proper moral order of society
di¥er within di¥erent social contexts. Thus, popular Confucianism in early-
Republican Yunnan meant a reactionary insistence on the old social order.
Sixty years later, and in a di¥erent corner of the former Chinese empire,
morality books champion a flexible conservatism that tries to preserve the
spirit of tradition even while resolutely abandoning the traditional institu-
tions. No tear is shed for the extended-family structure that got lost some-
where on Taiwan’s way toward becoming an urbanized industrial society.
The nuclear family is accepted as a fact of life; the new morality books’ con-
cern is with extracting abstract principles of morality from the now-defunct
traditional structures, discarding those elements of the old moral order that
are too closely enmeshed with the obsolete social structures (such as the
“seven reasons for divorce”), and reinterpreting the surviving principles in
such a way that they can be infused into the new family structures. In simple
terms: where the Admonitions tried to save a fading yet still present social-
moral traditional order, the Instructions face the task of reinfusing a non-
traditional social order with the essence of traditional values. Thus, while we
must not lose sight of the lines of ideological continuity between shanshu
from the Song dynasty down to the present day, we must be aware that the
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mode of interpretation of their shared corpus of core values may di¥er
significantly over time and space. While based on the same set of core values,
shanshu from di¥erent geographic and historical contexts thus employ very
di¥erent modes of interpretation and commentary. The comparison of the
Admonitions and the Instructions shows that the “Taiwan Experience” of the
postwar years has produced a form of religious traditionalism that reinter-
prets tradition in a highly flexible manner and constructs new identities, not
against, but within and for a modern Taiwanese society.
NOTES
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the annual meeting of the Association for
Asian Studies (Chicago, April ) and at the British Columbia China Scholars Collo-
quium (University of Victoria, November ). I would like to thank all participants in
these meetings who o¥ered helpful suggestions for improvements. This essay would not
have been written if, in –, I had not been given the opportunity to spend eight
months doing field research in central Taiwan. This opportunity was made possible
through the financial and institutional support provided by Foreign A¥airs and Inter-
national Trade Canada, the University of British Columbia, the Center for Chinese Studies
(Taipei), the Lin Pen-yüan Foundation (Taipei), and the Institute of Ethnology of the
Academia Sinica (Taipei).
1. This endeavor is inspired in part by earlier e¥orts to use shanshu as sources for study-
ing change and its interpretation in Taiwanese society (see, in particular, Thompson
; Sung , ; and Pas ).
2. I am currently exploring the contentious issue of the existence of a “popular” Confu-
cianism with reference to Taiwanese spirit-writing cults, which claim to represent the
“Divine Teachings of the Confucian Tradition” (Ruzong Shenjiao) (see Clart , in
press). On the manifestations of Confucianism in modern Taiwanese society, see
Jochim (chapter  in this volume).
3. This is merely a very rough outline of the history and basic nature of the shanshu
genre. The present state of this field of study is far from satisfactory (see the overviews
in Sung [] and Zheng []), and a good (or even a bad) general history is still
lacking. However, there do exist good individual studies that throw strong spotlights
on sections of this history. The most important pioneering e¥ort is Sakai Tadao’s
Chûgoku zensho no kenkyû (Sakai ), a work that has influenced all subsequent
research. Recommendable examples of subsequent research are Mair (), Brokaw
(), and Chard (), to name just a few English-language works that are easily
accessible to the interested reader. Among the recent Chinese-language literature, You
() has the most comprehensive approach to the history of the genre.
4. A photocopy of this work was kindly made available to me by Mr. Wang Chien Chuan
(Wang Jianchuan) of Taipei. One of the anonymous readers for the University of
Hawai‘i Press pointed out that Eryuan county is dominated by the Bai nationality, so
there is a good chance that part or even all of the membership of the cult group that
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produced this book was Bai rather than Han. However, the Bai are considered highly
sinified, indeed, so much so that, for example, Francis L. K. Hsu based his classic study
of Chinese ancestor worship on data collected in a Yunnan Bai community (Hsu ).
Given the complete absence of non-Han ethnic markers in the Admonitions, any
specifically Bai influence on the orthodox tenets propounded therein is likely to be
negligible.
5. This cult group was the subject of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of British
Columbia (Clart ). I collected the Instructions, along with a large number of
other morality books, during an eight-month period of field research at the Hall of
Enlightened Orthodoxy between  and .
6. The seven reasons are unfiliality, barrenness, lewdness, jealousy, loquacity, illness, and
thievery.
7. Government statistics show a steady decline since the s in the number of house-
hold members. The dissolution of traditional extended family and lineage structures
during the shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy has been widely noted
by sociologists and has been interpreted as a key factor in the transformation of the
Taiwanese value system (see, e.g., Cai , –; Zhuang and Yang ; and
Thornton, Lin, et al. ).
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as the “Taiwan Experience” (Taiwan jingyan) or the “Taiwan Miracle” (Tai-
wan qiji) (Gold ), and the consequences of that growth have been the
subject of intensive research during the past decades. While a large body of
early scholarship focused on the political and socioeconomic e¥ects of Tai-
wan’s postwar development (e.g., Galenson ; Ho ; Hsiao et al. ;
Winckler and Greenhalgh ), increasingly scholarship has begun to focus
on the ways in which the political and socioeconomic changes have influ-
enced Taiwan’s local culture (e.g., Chiu and Zhang ; Harrell and Huang
; Rubinstein ). Of all the realms of cultural activity in Taiwan, that
of popular religion has attracted particular attention on the part of scholars,
the mass media, and the general public (see, e.g., Clart –; Chiu
; Jordan ; Jordan and Overmyer ; Li ; Sung , b; and
Weller ). This may be due to religion’s clear and continuing e¥ect on
various aspects of local life, from the growing popularity of sectarian and
Tibetan Buddhist movements in urban areas to the key roles played by
major temples in local charity, politics, and elections.1
Research conducted over the past two decades has centered on the prob-
lem of determining the degree to which political and socioeconomic changes
have influenced the development of popular religion in postwar Taiwan. For
example, in an important article published in , David Jordan cites four
major transformations in postwar Taiwan that have a¥ected popular
religion: increasing wealth; changes in government policy; more widespread
education; and increasing geographic mobility. As Pas (chapter  in this vol-
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ume) indicates, Jordan shows that greater wealth has led to the construction
of ever more ornate temples but that, in urban areas, exorbitant real-estate
prices may be inhibiting the building of new temples.2 In terms of govern-
ment policy, Pas notes a trend away from suppression and control toward
tolerance combined with gentler attempts to “reform” practices deemed to
be wasteful or otherwise undesirable (see also Winckler ). Jordan claims
that education may be prompting a greater degree of “standardization” in
popular religion and that greater geographic mobility has transformed
traditional ideas of regionalism and may even be contributing to the for-
mation of a pan-Taiwanese identity (Jordan ). Rubinstein (chapter  in
this volume) also makes the important observation that, after , the
Nationalist government actively attempted to discourage pan-Taiwanese
cults, a policy that began to change during the s and has been completely
abandoned during the past decade, with leading presidential candidates
such as Chen Shuibian (the winner of the  election), Lian Zhan, and
James Soong (Song Chuyu) actively campaigning at temples to local deities
such as Mazu.
This research has identified a number of important trends that have
shaped the development of popular religion in postwar Taiwan. At the same
time, however, most scholars have paid relatively little attention to the prob-
lem of how the political and socioeconomic changes of recent decades have
shaped specific cults and festivals at the local level or to the problem of how
Taiwanese scholars choose to interpret the significance of such changes. In
this essay, I explore the problem of religious change through a detailed case
study of one of Taiwan’s most popular local cults, that of the Royal Lords,
or wangye.3 What follows represents the result of my research on the history
and development of the Royal Lords in China and Taiwan (Katz , a,
b, ). Cults to these deities arose in southeastern China during the
Song dynasty (–) and from there spread throughout much of the
Chinese mainland and Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese communities in
Southeast Asia. Deities like the Royal Lords were originally considered e¥ec-
tive in combating contagious diseases, but today they are worshiped as pro-
tective spirits capable of preventing all manner of calamities. Many Royal
Lords cults also feature periodic plague-expulsion festivals, during which
plague demons captured by the Royal Lords are imprisoned on a boat (usu-
ally referred to as a “Royal Lords boat,” or wangchuan), which could be
either floated away or burned.
While the bulk of research on Royal Lords cults in Taiwan has centered
on the growth of specific temples and festival systems as well as the rituals
performed during plague-expulsion festivals (Huang ; Katz ; Lee
a, b, c, ; Liu ; Schipper ; Cai ; Wilkerson ,
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), little has been done on the problem of how these cults have been
a¥ected by the changes sweeping the island since . In Katz (c), I
attempted to gauge the e¥ects of modernization and secularization (shisu-
hua) on the growth of Royal Lords cults in postwar Taiwan, specifically one
private temple in northern Taiwan and one public temple in southern Tai-
wan. In this essay, I adopt a somewhat di¥erent approach, one that attempts
to deal with both actual change and perceived change. In attempting to
determine how cults like those to the Royal Lords have actually changed, a
key question involves the historical uniqueness of what we see happening in
Taiwan today. In other words, do current developments in the Royal Lords
cults represent an unprecedented response to modernization and secular-
ization, or are they linked to processes of cult growth that also occurred in
China and Taiwan during earlier periods? In order to address this issue, I
briefly discuss the history of the Royal Lords cults in Taiwan and China as
this may allow us to better evaluate the supposed novelty of the changes that
these cults have been experiencing in postwar Taiwan. As for the issue of per-
ceived change, I discuss discourse about the Royal Lords and other local cults
on the part of members of Taiwan’s elites, particularly in the context of
ongoing debates about the extent of Taiwan’s indigenization (bentuhua)
and the formation of local identity.
The essay is structured as follows: In the first section, I briefly discuss the
history of Royal Lords cults and festivals in order to provide an overview of
the ways in which these cults have changed over time, particularly in post-
war Taiwan. In particular, I focus on the growing importance of plague-
expulsion festivals in the postwar era as well as changing government
attitudes toward such rites. The second section draws mainly on historical
and field data from the port of East Haven (Donggang) in southwestern
Taiwan, where I have been conducting research since . This section de-
scribes the growth of this famous Royal Lord cult site during the postwar era
as well as the degree to which the changes experienced by this particular cult
conform to those generalizations made by scholars studying religion in post-
war Taiwan. Finally, I analyze the agendas of those scholars who have chosen
to study the Royal Lords cults in Taiwan as well as how such research has
become intertwined with other issues, such as the debate over local identity.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL LORDS
The evidence available today indicates that the Han Chinese worshiped
deities to ward o¥ contagious diseases as early as the Han dynasty ( ..–
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 ..), if not before.4 However, such cults appear to have grown in popu-
larity during the Song dynasty. This period also marked the appearance of
three types of deities currently worshiped as Royal Lords in Taiwan.
The first type of Royal Lord is a group of plague spirits known as the Five
Commissioners of Epidemics (Wuwen Shizhe). This group belongs to the
Ministry of Epidemics (Wenbu), serving under the control of the Jade
Emperor. Mention of their cult dates back to medieval times in China,
although the cult does not seem to have gained popularity until the Song
dynasty. The Five Commissioners of Epidemics were national deities, with
temples scattered throughout China. They were also worshiped in Fujian,
their most famous cult site being in the city of Fuzhou. Their cult did not
achieve great popularity in Taiwan, however, their most important temple
being built in Tainan city by Fuzhou merchants and soldiers who settled
there during the Qing dynasty (Katz ; Lee b, c; Szonyi ).
The second type of Royal Lord is a group of deities known as the Twelve
Year-Controlling Kings of Epidemics (Shi’er Zhinian Wenwang). These
deities also belong to the Ministry of Epidemics, but their history appears to
be more recent than that of the Five Commissioners, the earliest source
mentioning the Twelve Kings that I have found being a Song dynasty Daoist
liturgical text. The Twelve Kings may be considered national deities in 
the sense of being featured in Daoist plague-expulsion rituals performed
throughout China, but they appear to have been worshiped as temple deities
only in Fujian and Taiwan (Katz ; Lee b, c; Szonyi ).
The third type of Royal Lord is more complex, including all manner of
vengeful ghosts (ligui) awarded the title “king” (wang) who were seen as
being able to control the ravages of epidemics. These spirits included
unknown souls or historical figures like the Tang dynasty (–) general
Zhang Xun and the pirate and Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga)
(–). As a result, many such spirits are known only by their surnames,
and only a few have given names (in some cases, worshipers have added
given names many years after the cult’s creation in an attempt to enhance its
legitimacy). What these spirits have in common is their premature or violent
deaths and the fact that many became transformed from ghosts to gods over
time (Harrell ; Lin , b). While the nature of their deaths allows
them to be classified as vengeful ghosts, most worshipers today do not view
them as such but rather as martial heroes or benevolent o≤cials. The
worship of plague-fighting ghosts has been prevalent throughout China for
centuries. However, the tendency to refer to such spirits as “Royal Lords”
appears to be peculiar to Fujian and Taiwan (Katz a).
The deity whose cult appears to have had the greatest e¥ect on Royal
101
05Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:42 AM  Page 101
P A U L  R .  K A T Z
Lords cults in Fujian and Taiwan is the one known as Marshal Wen (Wen
Yuanshuai) or the Loyal and Defending King (Zhongjing Wang). Marshal
Wen’s cult arose in Zhejiang during the Song dynasty but quickly spread
throughout China in subsequent centuries. Hagiographic accounts from
late-imperial Zhejiang portray Wen as either a scholar or a martial figure
who proved especially adept at driving o¥ those demons considered respon-
sible for causing epidemics (Katz a, –). This ability attracted a
significant following, most likely because Zhejiang and other areas of south-
eastern China su¥ered greatly from epidemics during this period. The cult
of Marshal Wen appears to have originated in and around the port of Wen-
zhou in southern Zhejiang, but temples to this deity were soon established
in other port cities like Hangzhou. The Song dynasty also witnessed the
appearance of rituals during which Marshal Wen was invoked to expel
plague demons by trapping them on a boat that was subsequently floated
out to sea or burned (Katz b). The rise of Marshal Wen’s cult during the
Song dynasty clearly represents a popular response to the threat of con-
tagious disease. However, it is important to note that the spread of his cult
can also be attributed to the e¥ects of the socioeconomic and religious
changes that Zhejiang experienced at that time, particularly widespread
commercialization and urbanization and the growth of new Daoist ritual
movements (Katz a, –).
New temples continued to be founded for Marshal Wen in Zhejiang
during the Yuan dynasty (–) as well as the early years of the Ming
(–). However, the most significant period of his cult’s development
in Zhejiang occurred during the late-imperial era, this time sparked less by
the ravages of epidemics than by a new phase of commercialization and
urbanization in the province. Merchants from cities and market towns in
Zhejiang built (or in many cases rebuilt) temples to Wen in commercial
centers, often next to markets or near bridges and dockyards (Katz a,
–). These merchants, as well as other members of the local elite, were
also responsible for the creation and maintenance of massive plague-
expulsion festivals very similar to those performed in Taiwan today, festivals
that often culminated in the torching of a massive wooden plague boat. As
China entered the modern era, Marshal Wen’s cult and Marshal Wen festi-
vals in Zhejiang su¥ered greatly during decades of civil war as well as the
devastation wrought by the Cultural Revolution (–). However, his
cult now appears to be making a comeback in some parts of the province
(Katz a, –).
In addition to developing into one of Zhejiang’s most popular cults, the
cult of Marshal Wen soon spread beyond the province’s borders to cover
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much of the Chinese mainland (Katz a, –). However, only the
cult’s spread to Fujian and Taiwan will be treated here. Marshal Wen’s cult
entered Fujian during the Song dynasty, with a large temple both to him and
a deity named Marshal Kang (Kang Yuanshuai) being erected near Fuzhou
next to the Temple of the Eastern Peak (Dongyue Miao). This temple was
said to have been founded during the Song dynasty, although the exact date
of its construction is unclear. Both Wen and Kang served the Emperor of the
Eastern Peak (Dongyue Dadi) and had probably started out as subsidiary
deities in the Temple of the Eastern Peak. It appears that local worshipers
built a separate temple for them as their cult became increasingly popular.
These two deities are said to have performed a number of miracles, partic-
ularly helping the locals fend o¥ a series of pirate incursions during the late
Ming.
Marshal Wen’s cult subsequently spread along the southern coast of
Fujian, attaining greatest prominence in Tong’an county of Quanzhou pre-
fecture (Mio ). However, by the time the cult had begun to flourish in
that area, people had apparently begun to worship him as a Royal Lord, with
his identity changing from Marshal Wen to Lord Chi (Chi Wangye).5 Lord
Chi’s temple in Tong’an was built in Wujia. The county gazetteer states that
his cult spread to Tong’an after he revealed himself to members of the local
community and caused a statue of himself to mysteriously appear (see
Tong’an xianzhi , .b).
Despite the di¥erences in surname and title, Marshal Wen and Lord Chi
should probably be considered as two manifestations of the same deity,
especially because their hagiographies, iconographies, and ritual traditions
are nearly identical (Katz a, –). Like Marshal Wen, Lord Chi was
also represented as a scholarly and martial figure who specialized in curing
diseases. Folktales collected from Zhejiang, Fujian, and Taiwan reveal that
both Wen and Chi died while attempting to stop plague spirits from poison-
ing local wells, while descriptions of local rituals indicate that both deities
were worshiped during boat-expulsion festivals. The change in surname
from Wen to Chi was probably due to the influence of spirit mediums, who,
according to the Republican edition of the Tong’an County Gazetteer, were
frequently possessed by Lord Chi (see Tong’an xianzhi , .b–a,
.b).6
One important factor that may have led to the overlap between Marshal
Wen and Lord Chi is that, by late-imperial times, Wen was commonly
known only by his title, Loyal and Defending King (Zhongjing Wang), not
as Marshal Wen (Wen Yuanshuai). As the former ends with the character
wang, people might have addressed him using the honorific “Royal Lord”
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(wangye). For example, during the Wenzhou plague-expulsion festival, he
was referred to as the “great king” (dawang) (see Katz a, ), a form of
address also used for the Royal Lords of Fujian and Taiwan.
We do not know exactly when Marshal Wen’s cult spread to southern
Fujian and transformed into the cult of Lord Chi, but, by the late-imperial
era, it had become the most popular of many Royal Lords cults throughout
the province. Recent work on the history of local cults in Fujian, including
the Royal Lords cults, reveals that, like Marshal Wen’s cult in Zhejiang, the
Royal Lords cults of Fujian attained their greatest popularity during the late-
imperial era, particularly the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.7 Many
early Royal Lords temples were rebuilt, and boat-expulsion rituals grew into
large-scale festivals. The nature of the boat-expulsion rites varied from site
to site: some temples burned their boats, while others floated them away.
Some even floated them away and then set them afire. Local gazetteers are
full of o≤cial complaints about the excessive expenditures incurred by such
festivals, but, until the twentieth century, the state appears to have made no
attempt to outlaw or reform these events.
The Royal Lords cults of Fujian, and in particular the cult of Lord Chi,
spread to Taiwan via Quemoy (Jinmen) and the Pescadores (Penghu), both
of which were settled by large numbers of Tong’an natives during the early
years of the Qing dynasty (–). Natives of the Pescadores later brought
these cults with them to Tainan, and from there they spread to cover most
of the island, in particular its southwestern coastal region. According to
research conducted by Liu Zhiwan, a total of seventy-four Royal Lords
temples were founded in Taiwan during the Qing dynasty. Of these, the
majority were located in Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, and the Pescadores,
and most of these were constructed during Taiwan’s economic expansion in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Liu , –; see also Maejime
). Massive boat-expulsion festivals were staged in these areas during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well. As in Fujian, many di¥erent
forms of the ritual were practiced, and, again as in Fujian, the state tended
to criticize these events without actually suppressing them (Liu , –
).
Royal Lords cults continued to grow in Taiwan during the period of
Japanese Occupation (–). A  survey listed a total of  Royal
Lords temples (see Yu ), a dramatic increase, but one that does not
necessarily reflect an increase in the popularity of the Royal Lords after
; rather, it could simply reflect better record keeping on the part of the
colonial authorities. Like other local cults, those of the Royal Lords were
essentially left undisturbed by the Japanese until the Japanization movement
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(–; Jpn.: Kôminka undô), when some temples or the statues therein
were destroyed (Miyamoto ; Cai ; see also Jones , –; and
Jones, chapter  in this volume). However, the e¥ects of this repression do
not appear to have been too severe, as the number of registered Royal Lords
temples actually increased from  to  between  and . Today,
Lord Chi is the most popular of all the Royal Lords worshiped in Taiwan. Of
the more than  Royal Lords temples registered in Taiwan today, at least
 (including  in Tainan county) enshrine Lord Chi as their main deity,
while hundreds more include him as one of their subsidiary deities. There
is also a deity named Lord Wen (Wen Wangye) whose cult appears to be
related to that of Marshal Wen. He is the main deity of over  Royal Lords
temples in Taiwan, one of which will be discussed in detail below (Katz ,
–; Liu , –).
The only scholar to have focused on the problem of how the changes
occurring in postwar Taiwan have influenced Royal Lords cults in Taiwan is
Yu Guanghong. In a  article, Yu attempts to trace the growth of Royal
Lords cults in Taiwan during the Japanese Occupation and postwar eras. The
data collected by Yu indicate that, by ,  Royal Lords temples had regis-
tered with the Japanese colonial government. These sacred sites constituted
. percent of all temples in Taiwan, second only to Earth God temples
(; . percent). A  survey lists  Royal Lords temples (. per-
cent), again second to Earth God temples (; . percent). Four temple
surveys conducted during the postwar era indicate that, among registered
temples, those dedicated to Royal Lords have attained a position of supreme
popularity, with  Royal Lords temples (. percent) in ,  (.
percent) in ,  (. percent) in , and  (. percent) in 
(Yu , –; Chongxiu Taiwan sheng tongzhi , –).
On the basis of such statistical data as well as research reports by Tai-
wanese ethnographers such as Liu Zhiwan, Yu claims that the Royal Lords
appear to be experiencing a drop in popularity, which may be seen by the
declining number of new temples built for them. He attributes this decline
to the fact that Royal Lords were traditionally worshiped for their ability to
prevent or control outbreaks of contagious diseases and that recent medical
advances have made such a function increasingly unnecessary (Yu ,
–; Chongxiu Taiwan sheng tongzhi , –). In Katz (c), I
questioned Yu’s conclusions on the following grounds: the statistical data are
highly problematic; while fewer new Royal Lords temples are being built,
many are being restored and greatly expanded;8 and, even though Royal
Lords no longer serve as plague-fighting spirits, they are now worshiped for
their ability to prevent other calamities, such as shipwrecks and car acci-
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dents. My own conclusions tend to correspond with Jordan’s () obser-
vations (particularly as regards the e¥ect of increasing wealth), although, in
Katz (c), I also noted that, in urban areas, private Royal Lords temples
and household altars known as shentan appear to be attracting additional
worshipers. Some view the Royal Lords as deities who can help them succeed
in commercial ventures and other mundane matters, while others use their
cults as vehicles to express—through morality books (shanshu) (see Clart,
chapter  in this volume)—dissatisfaction with the e¥ects of Taiwan’s post-
war development. In some ways, then, these new developments in Royal
Lords cults may resemble changes a¥ecting urban cults during the late-
imperial era and perhaps even earlier (this point is discussed further below;
see also von Glahn ).
The historical account presented above is admittedly highly sketchy,
being based on a limited body of relevant sources. Despite this problem,
however, a number of potentially significant trends can be seen to emerge.
First, we see that the cults of Marshal Wen, Lord Chi, and other Royal Lords
have developed in roughly parallel patterns and that each growth phase
appears to have been in part due to socioeconomic changes a¥ecting the
region in which the cult in question arose. We also see that the period of peak
popularity of a cult is marked, not by the construction of new temples, but
by the rebuilding of already established ones and that such a reconstruction
process often coincides with the creation of large-scale festival systems. It is
also clear that the Chinese state could, at times, be highly critical of Royal
Lords cults and their practices and did not consider them orthodox enough
to be included in the Register of Sacrifices (sidian). At the same time, how-
ever, the state was usually able to tolerate their presence and only rarely
labeled them “licentious sacrifices” (yinsi ).9 Only the Japanese colonial gov-
ernment attempted a widespread and systematic campaign against Royal
Lords and other local cults. While this campaign appears to have been less a
result of Confucian concerns than a desire to support ongoing Japanization
policies, it proved equally unsuccessful.10
One other point must be mentioned. A considerable body of research
indicates that the social and cultural dislocations brought about by the
commercial expansions of the Song and late-imperial eras helped spark the
creation of numerous sectarian and spirit-writing movements in China’s
southern provinces, including Fujian (Jordan and Overmyer ; Ma and
Han ; ter Haar ). Research on these religious movements in Taiwan
reveals that their growth also coincided with similar socioeconomic
phenomena, although one must also keep in mind the political e¥ects of
Japanese Occupation and Retrocession (Sung b; Wang ; see also
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Wang and Li , , ). However, the growth of sectarian, spirit-
writing, and even Christian movements in Fujian and Taiwan appears to
have had little influence on the popularity of Royal Lords cults in these
regions. This may indicate that, despite occasional rhetorical antagonism,
these two forms of Chinese religion can generally coexist peacefully.
While the statements presented above must be considered tentative
hypotheses in need of further supporting evidence, the data presented do
suggest that any conclusions about changes in Taiwanese popular religion
must be evaluated in the light of what we know about long-term patterns of
social and religious history in China and Taiwan, not just trends observed
in the postwar era. This is far from saying that the various processes of
change described above are identical, but it is clear that certain phenomena
associated with modernization in postwar Taiwan, such as commercializa-
tion and urbanization, have occurred in China before. The key problem
involves ascertaining the extent to which such phenomena varied at di¥erent
times and in di¥erent regions and the extent to which changes in popular
religion may have been a result of these phenomena. However, no convinc-
ing conclusions can be drawn prior to the completion of case studies dealing
with specific cults and cult sites. One such case study is presented below,
centering on one of Taiwan’s oldest and most popular Royal Lords temples.
THE PALACE OF EASTERN PROSPERITY AND ITS FESTIVAL
The town of East Haven (Donggang) in Pingtung (Pingdong) county is one
of Taiwan’s oldest and until recently most important fishing ports. Owing to
historical factors described in detail elsewhere (see Katz b, )—in
particular frequent natural and man-made calamities that threatened local
well-being as well as the dangers inherent in ocean fishing—the people of
East Haven have actively engaged in the worship of such deities as they
believe can provide protection and succor. As a result, the town is dotted
with over eighty temples of varying age and size, and the inhabitants say
(only half jokingly),“Every three steps you come across a small temple, every
five paces a large one.” Of these temples, thirty-two are dedicated to various
Royal Lords, as opposed to a mere six for Mazu. The Palace of Eastern Pros-
perity (Donglong Gong) is reputed to be East Haven’s oldest temple, and it
is certainly among its largest. Situated near the center of town, it lies only a
few minutes’ walk from a number of important sites, including the port, the
marketplace, and the town hall.
Despite the size and prestige of the Palace of Eastern Prosperity, its
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origins remain largely a mystery. No Qing dynasty stelae survive (if, in fact,
any were erected), probably because the temple was moved at least once after
being destroyed during floods (see below). Of those placards that hang
throughout the temple, the earliest dates only to ; most date from the
period of Japanese Occupation or later. The only Qing source to mention 
the temple dates from the late nineteenth century. This account claims that
the Palace of Eastern Prosperity was the largest Royal Lords temple in all of
Fengshan county (comprising roughly today’s Kaohsiung and Pingtung
counties), having been rebuilt during the s after a flood. No data are
given as to the date of its founding (Lu [] , –).
Temple records are also of little help as they have been composed by
members of the temple committee during the s and s largely on the
basis of the recollections of local elders. The current temple gazetteer avail-
able to visitors states that the palace was founded in  in one of East
Haven’s coastal neighborhoods and was moved to its current location in 
following a major flood (the Chinese text has been reproduced in Katz
[, ]). A local account composed by one of East Haven’s amateur his-
torians claims that the temple was founded in  in the fishing village of
Yanpu (located across the Donggang river from East Haven), moved to East
Haven during the reign of the Qianlong emperor (–) after one flood,
and moved to its current site in the mid-nineteenth century after a second
flood (Katz , –). Therefore, in Katz (, –), I speculated
that a small shrine probably existed by the early eighteenth century, grow-
ing into a temple only during the late eighteenth century when East Haven
began to prosper. I also reasoned that the largest Royal Lords temple in Feng-
shan county during the s was probably not founded at that time but
must have been built much earlier and that it must have been reconstructed
many times.
These conclusions been confirmed by a recently discovered source, the
results of a field study of East Haven’s temples conducted by the Japanese in
 (reproduced in Miyamoto ). According to this source, the Palace of
Eastern Prosperity started out as a household shrine located in Yanpu but
was moved to the town of East Haven in  because many of Yanpu’s in-
habitants had left the village following a devastating flood a few years earlier.
The temple was enlarged in , but this enlarged temple was destroyed by
a flood in . Reconstruction work at the current site began in  and was
completed in . This portion of the account given in the Japanese field
study is close to the Qing account mentioned above, and the name of one
man who played a key role in reconstruction e¥orts, Hong Chaohui, appears
in both works. The Japanese account is particularly valuable because it lists
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the Palace of Eastern Prosperity’s landholdings and finances, names the
temple manager, lists all deities worshiped in it, and indicates that the local
triennial plague-expulsion festival (until  known as “The Sacrifice of
Peace and Tranquility for Welcoming the Lords” [Yingwang Ping’an Jidian],
or “Welcoming the Lords” [Yingwang] for short [see below]) used to be cele-
brated during the Dragon Boat festival, the traditional date for expelling
various pestilential forces. If events really took place as described above, this
would explain why the oldest placard in such an important cult site dates
only from , seven years after the temple had been rebuilt (see Katz ,
–).
Apart from the Japanese field report and amateur local histories, there
are no records of the Palace of Eastern Prosperity for the entire period of
Japanese Occupation. The two temple managers whose family histories I
have been able to trace include Xiao Jie, who came from a working-class
family, and Wang Kuo, who was a rice merchant. The only evidence that we
have for a member of East Haven’s political elite running the temple is the
case of Cai Fen, a cousin of Cai Chaoqu (–), East Haven’s renowned
mayor during the Japanese Occupation. Cai Fen served as an elected rep-
resentative to the Kaohsiung prefectural assembly and was also the last man-
ager of the Palace of Eastern Prosperity during the Japanese Occupation. I
have not yet determined what Cai’s motives were in assuming the position.
Perhaps he did so because, during the Japanization movement, it was con-
sidered necessary to have a man of his stature in charge to discourage the
Japanese authorities from destroying the temple or the sacred objects in it.
Cai’s successor after World War II was Lin Gengshen, whose family
made fishing equipment. Lin was chosen to head the temple by Cai Chaoqu
and other members of the local elite because he was deemed a man capable
and well connected enough to take charge of reconstruction e¥orts. Cai
Chaoqu and other members of East Haven’s political elite took a great
interest in Lin’s e¥orts and made donations to support them. However, it
was Lin who did the actual managing of the building project and who went
door-to-door soliciting contributions.
The temple thrived under Lin’s able management, growing into a major
pilgrimage center and beginning to establish links with other temples in
southern Taiwan during the s and s. In addition, many East Haven
natives who from the s through the s moved away to do business in
cities like Taipei and Kaohsiung established thirty-five branch temples of the
Palace of Eastern Prosperity by means of the ritual known as “division of
incense” (fenxiang).11 The temple’s development continued under Lin’s son
Lin Yunteng, the current chairman of the board. A major reconstruction
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project was undertaken from  to , which resulted in the addition of
second and third stories atop the original temple, housing a library as well
as a hall to the Jade Emperor and other Daoist stellar deities. A new pil-
grimage hostel was also completed in . These projects put a great strain
on the temple’s budget, and the resulting deficits were repaid only in the
early s following the sale of some temple lands in Yanpu (which had not 
been confiscated during the postwar land-reform movement) for real-estate
development.
An important development in the palace’s history occurred in ,
when the government approved the temple committee’s  application to
change its registration from “association” (hui) to “nonprofit corporation”
(caituan faren).12 Such a step allowed the Palace of Eastern Prosperity to gain
tax-exempt status and o≤cial sanction for the activities that it sponsored,
although it also had to allow the authorities to supervise elections to temple
committees and inspect its account books.13 The temple also began at this
time to sponsor a number of charitable activities, including providing free
rice to the poor and o¥ering scholarships for deserving local students. It cur-
rently contributes an average of US$, a year for such activities (Katz
, ; see also Donggang Donglong Gong yange zhi , ).
One interesting development in the Palace of Eastern Prosperity’s post-
war history involves the attempt to find its roots in Fujian province, a trend
common among many Taiwanese temples after the government started to
allow people to visit mainland China during the late s. During the fall
of , Lin Yunteng led members of the temple committee on a visit to
Fujian and, with the help of the local authorities, located a temple now
claimed to be the ancestral temple (zumiao) of the Palace of Eastern Pros-
perity. The group located five temples in southern Fujian in which Lord Wen
is worshiped: four in and around Quanzhou city (one of which no longer
exists) and one in Shenhu town of Jinjiang county. Of these, the Western
Palace (Xigong) of Shenhu is considered to be the likely point of origin of
Lord Wen’s cult in East Haven. The date of this temple’s founding is unclear.
Destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, it was restored in  but still
contains stone pillars from the reign of the Daoguang emperor (–)
and a placard from the reign of the Tongzhi emperor (–).
Temple committee members have also attempted to link the cult of Lord
Wen with that of Marshal Wen. For example, the Western Palace’s main
deity, Stellar Lord Wen (Wen Xingjun), seems more like the Marshal Wen of
Zhejiang than the Lord Wen of East Haven, especially in terms of iconogra-
phy and date of birth. For example, Stellar Lord Wen’s birthday falls on the
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date of the Dragon Boat festival, as does Marshal Wen’s; Lord Wen is said to
have been born on the first day of the tenth lunar month. In addition, Stellar
Lord Wen and Marshal Wen both have wives, while East Haven’s Lord Wen
remains a bachelor. The Western Palace also followed the Zhejiang and
Fujian tradition of performing a boat-burning rite on or around the date of
the Dragon Boat festival, sometimes using a wooden boat floated out to sea
and other times a paper boat that is burned. Despite these di¥erences, some
members of the East Haven community now go on pilgrimage to the Western
Palace, although a formal fenxiang relationship has not been established.14
The history of the Welcoming the Lords festival at East Haven is as
murky as the history of the Palace of Eastern Prosperity (Hiraki ; Katz
, –). We do know that East Haven and its environs were reputed
to be places where epidemics flourished and that, of the ten customs inspec-
tors sent there during the late seventeenth century, eight died of disease
before completing their terms of o≤ce. However, we have no clue as to when
the people of East Haven started to perform the rituals described below.15 A
number of local folktales recount events associated with the festival held
during the period of Japanese Occupation, mostly having to do with Lord
Wen’s ability to help the authorities catch robbers and pickpockets, but
these accounts give no indication of what the early festival may have been
like. As a result of the Japanization movement, the festival was forbidden for
the remainder of the Japanese Occupation, the last time it was held until
after World War II being in  (Katz , –, –).
Detailed temple records about the festival do not appear until two dec-
ades into the postwar era, particularly beginning in the late s, when the
temple began to publish a detailed handbook during each triennial festival.
As Lord Wen’s cult spread and its fame increased throughout Taiwan, the
number of troupes participating in the three-day procession held during the
festival has increased to the point that over a hundred from all over Taiwan
now regularly take part in the East Haven festival. Like the plague festival of
West Haven (Xigang) in Tainan county described by David Jordan (see
Jordan , ), the festival of East Haven has benefited from media
coverage; in fact, the entire  festival was broadcast live over local cable
television. However, like the West Haven festival, the East Haven festival
su¥ers from manpower shortages as, owing to the depletion of local stocks,
more and more area fishermen are forced to cast their nets further away
from Taiwan and, therefore, find it increasingly di≤cult to make the trip
back in time for the festival. Unlike West Haven, however, East Haven has yet
to hire professional troupes from outside to march in the procession.
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As the festival of East Haven has gained increasing fame, so has it
attained an aura of legitimacy in the eyes of the Pingtung county govern-
ment, which, in turn, is following the more tolerant central-government
policy described above. When the festival was staged in October , the
county government went so far as to provide a small grant to help support
it. However, as a condition of government support, the temple committee
had to agree to change the name of the festival to “Sacrifice of the Lords
Boat” (Wangchuan Ji). During the  festival, banners bearing these words
were hung throughout the town, and the Palace of Eastern Prosperity sold
T-shirts emblazoned with them as well. By the  festival, the temple and
the county government had awarded a grant of NT$ million to two local
scholars to study the history of the festival and prepare an exhibition of
temple artifacts, while postcards and other souvenirs commemorating the
festival were sold in the plaza in front of the temple. The  festival was
staged in a similar fashion. Despite these changes, however, almost all resi-
dents of East Haven continue to refer to the festival by its traditional name,
“Welcoming the Lords.” The temple committee also forbade spirit mediums
from riding atop deity palanquins, but it still allows them to march in the
procession. Whether these specialists will be banned outright, as they have
been at other local festivals with close links to the state, remains to be seen.
As we can see from this brief history of the Palace of Eastern Prosperity
and its plague-expulsion festival, its pattern of postwar development in
some ways conforms to the pattern of postwar cultural changes outlined ini-
tially and in other ways varies. The overall increase in wealth brought about
by the Taiwan Miracle has contributed to the growth of the palace and its fes-
tival, but overly ambitious construction projects caused budget deficits that
could be remedied only by selling land. The rapid rise to prominence of East
Haven’s plague-expulsion festival has also caused some logistic problems in
terms of staging, but the temple committee seems capable of dealing with
them, at least for the moment. The temple has also achieved greater legiti-
macy in the eyes of the government without sacrificing key ritual aspects.
Like other Taiwanese temples, it has also turned toward Fujian in a search for
its roots but has yet to establish a fenxiang relationship. It should be noted,
however, that all these trends (growth accompanied by tension, attempts at
legitimization, searches for cult origins) have occurred before in Chinese
religious history (see, e.g., Hansen ; Watson ). Therefore, the extent
to which these changes in East Haven represent historically unique responses
to the Taiwan Miracle or processes of cult growth similar to those of earlier
eras has yet to be determined.
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THE ROYAL LORDS AND TAIWANESE IDENTITY
The arguments presented in the pages above have revolved around the prob-
lem of how the development of popular religion (in this case, cults devoted
to the Royal Lords) has been shaped by the political and socioeconomic
changes taking place in postwar Taiwan. Research on this and related topics
has occupied a central place in academic discourse about Taiwanese popu-
lar religion during the past few decades. However, in recent years, a new form
of discourse has arisen in academic and other elite circles, one that centers
on issues such as indigenization and local identity. As Thomas Gold has
shown, the appearance of this type of discourse is linked to the emergence
of a new, largely urban elite as well as the strengthening and politicization
of Taiwanese civil society (see Gold ). Alan Wachman treats the debate
over local identity as a competition for power among competing Taiwanese
and mainland Chinese elites (to which we may now add Hakka and
aboriginal elites) while also pointing out that such a debate represents an
unanticipated result of Kuomintang (KMT) policies designed to promote
pan-Chinese identity while trivializing and even denying that of the Taiwan-
ese (see Wachman a, b). Like other debates about identity the world
over, this one has centered less on discernible and objective distinctions
between two groups of people (in this case mainlanders and Taiwanese) and
more on perceived di¥erences that are the result of prejudice and unfounded
popular opinion (Anderson ; see also Holcombe ). The debate over
identity in Taiwan has been carried out in the local artistic and literary
community as well as in the scholarly community. It is this latter, scholarly
discourse, and its e¥ect on the study of popular religion in Taiwan, that is of
interest here.
The political liberalization that began in the s has allowed Taiwan-
ese scholars to tap into an increasing interest in Taiwan’s own history and
culture, a growing number of them turning their attention to the study of
local religion. This has resulted in the collection and publication of a sizable
body of valuable historical and ethnographic data (Chang ; Lin ).
At the same time, however, research on Taiwanese popular religion has
become enmeshed in the increasingly lively (and sometimes bitter) debate
concerning the “Taiwaneseness” (or “Chineseness”) of the island’s culture.
Some scholars now combine the study of popular beliefs and practices with
a more political agenda—portraying these traits as representing one facet of
a cultural tradition unique to Taiwan, or at least di¥erent from that in main-
land China. The result has been a heated exchange of verbal salvos. Scholars
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who view Taiwanese popular religion as being linked to China’s cultural
heritage have been accused of legitimizing KMT ideology, while those who
emphasize the uniqueness of Taiwan’s historical development have been
scolded for kowtowing to local “politically correct” tenets.16
The debate over identity has also a¥ected the study of a highly impor-
tant problem: the extent to which the beliefs and practices brought to Tai-
wan by mainland Chinese immigrants have changed over time. Beginning
in the s, two groups of scholars, one led by Li Guoqi and the other by
Chen Qi’nan, claimed, respectively, that the growth of Taiwanese culture was
marked either by “inlandization” (neidihua), that is, development similar to
that in mainland China, or by “indigenization” (tuzhuhua), that is, develop-
ment unique to Taiwan (see Li , ; and Chen , , ).17
Papers presented at academic conferences over the past few years, including
two to be discussed below, are noteworthy in drawing on indigenization
discourse to define Taiwanese popular religion as a cultural phenomenon
unique to Taiwan. These papers also view popular religion in Taiwan as
being based on a sense of identity that excludes mainland China as a source
of cultural tradition. Whether this new sense of identity has gained wide-
spread acceptance among the people of Taiwan or has been embraced only
by some of the island’s intellectuals and politicians remains to be determined
(Gold ). It should also be noted that such arguments are di¥erent from
those of some American anthropologists working in postwar Taiwan who
noted the importance of popular rituals as a form of resistance to KMT rule
but did not attempt to prove that the contents of such rituals were di¥erent
from the contents of similar rituals in China (Ahern ; Weller , ,
). The e¥ect of the current debate over identity on academic discourse
has been considerable, with an increasing number of scholars attempting to
find ways in which popular religion in China’s southeastern coastal regions
adapted to Taiwan’s unique historical conditions.
Most research on the problem of the indigenization of popular religion
in Taiwan has centered on the cult of Mazu (see, e.g., Rubinstein , ;
Sangren ). However, two papers—one by Dong Fangyuan (see Dong
) and one by Lee Fong-mao (see Lee )—have attempted to demon-
strate that indigenization also shaped the development of the cult of the
Royal Lords. Dong’s paper, which deals with Taiwanese popular religion as
a whole, represents the work of a scholar motivated by a strong commitment
to determining where the lines of legitimate cultural (not to mention politi-
cal) identity must be drawn. For his part, Lee also discusses what he sees as
unique developments in Taiwanese religion, including the cult of the Royal
Lords, while also stressing how popular religion and local culture as a whole
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have the potential to provide a stable foundation for modern Taiwanese
society.
In discussing how cults dedicated to the Royal Lords have changed fol-
lowing their transmission to Taiwan, Dong and Lee share one common
article of faith: that such changes did not occur in China. For example, Dong
maintains that the transformation of the Royal Lords into more benevolent
deities is a result of Taiwan’s unique history (Dong , ; see also Lee
, ). Similarly, Lee claims that the current festive atmosphere at Royal
Lords rituals in Taiwan contrasts markedly from that at earlier rites in China
(Lee , ). Both scholars also argue that the shift in Taiwan from float-
ing boats to burning them reflects the e¥ect of processes of indigenization.
There are a number of problems with such arguments. For one thing,
while cultural change in postwar Taiwan has received much attention dur-
ing the past decade, the issue of how di¥erent such changes were from those
that took place in China or among overseas Chinese communities in South-
east Asia during the modern era has yet to be adequately addressed. The
political histories of each of these regions were, of course, very di¥erent, but
we must learn more about the degree to which such di¥erences may also
have influenced processes of cultural change. For example, while Japanese
public-health policies may have a¥ected popular religion in Taiwan during
the early twentieth century (as Jones [chapter  in this volume] argues), we
do not yet know how public-health e¥orts in China and Southeast Asia
during the same time period influenced religious activities in these areas.
Fortunately, a growing body of research on the modern forms of Chinese
religion in these areas (Cheu ; Dean b, ; Pas ; Tan ) may
provide the basis for more systematic comparisons.
I do not, of course, mean to deny that changes took place in the cult of
the Royal Lords following its transmission to Taiwan. It is the extent to which
such changes reflect or helped foster the formation of Taiwanese identity
that is at issue. While the changes described above may indicate the develop-
ment of indigenization, it is also possible that they reflect processes a¥ect-
ing popular cults throughout China. Take, for example, the transformation
of the Royal Lords from malevolent plague deities to benevolent protective
deities, a development that Dong and Lee assume to be a result of processes
of indigenization in Taiwan. Such a development also characterized the
growth of many cults throughout China, particularly those dedicated to
plague spirits and vengeful ghosts. This is not to deny that certain changes
may, in fact, be unique to Taiwan, but further data must be collected and
analyzed before definitive conclusions can be reached. One such change may
involve the type of boat used in plague-expulsion rituals. Throughout China,
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plague boats were frequently shaped like dragon boats. This was the case in
Fujian as well, from the northern city of Fuzhou to the southern hub at
Amoy. However, I have yet to find any evidence to indicate that dragon boats
were used in Taiwanese rites, with the exception of those conducted by the
White Dragon Abbey in Tainan, which was constructed by Fuzhou immi-
grants and adhered to that area’s ritual traditions (Kataoka , ). The
exact timing and cultural significance of such a change must remain a topic
for future research.
The evidence presented in this essay indicates that, in the case of the
Royal Lords cults at least, the influence of indigenization may have been
overly exaggerated (whether this is the case for all Taiwan’s local cults is, of
course, another matter entirely). It also indicates that the links between
local cults and the formation of Taiwanese identity may be more complex
than many academics have recognized. While some scholars (e.g., Dong
; Lee ) have seen Taiwanese popular religion as contributing to the
formation of an emerging Taiwanese identity, one that distances itself from
mainland China, others (e.g., Bosco , , ) claim that religion and
other facets of Taiwanese popular culture serve to transcend such divisions.
Sangren () presents an even more complex picture, arguing that Taiwan-
ese tourists and pilgrims journeying to Fujian may be unaware of any con-
tradiction between a popular deity’s role as a symbol of Taiwanese identity
and its links to a broader definition of identity that includes Fujian, Taiwan,
and some overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Further research
must be conducted before definitive conclusions can be reached, and it
remains to be seen how local conceptions of identity will change in the light
of political events, such as former president Lee Teng-hui’s announcement
of “two states” (liangguo) and the mainland Chinese response as well as the
election of Chen Shuibian as president in March .
Perhaps what the evidence presented in this essay reveals above all is that
the use of such dichotomies as inlandization/indigenization as frameworks
for the analysis of cultural change can be unproductive, particularly if one
argues that the phenomena in question are mutually exclusive. As a substi-
tute, one could turn to a more “holistic” approach to the study of popular
culture, such as that proposed in Bell (), an important review article on
Chinese popular religion. As Bell shows, such an approach arose in research
covering first Western and then Chinese culture as a response to arguments
over whether popular religion contributed to cultural unity or cultural
diversity. The holistic approach allows for the presence of both unity and
diversity, but it places even greater emphasis on how ideas, beliefs, and
values are created and transmitted. Such an approach would enable us to
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study how local cults arose in China, how they spread to Taiwan, and how
they changed (or did not change) over time, thus showing us that neither
Taiwan nor any other region should be viewed as a typical Chinese culture.
However, while China’s cultural regions have yet to be clearly defined, it
appears that Taiwan may belong to a region that includes Fujian and parts
of other southeastern coastal provinces. Systematic comparisons between
popular religion in Taiwan and these parts of China should provide new
perspectives on these regions’ common points and di¥erences, thus con-
tributing to our understanding of how cultural traditions arise and develop
on local, regional, and national levels.
NOTES
1. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Pas (chapter  in this volume).
2. I also made this point in Katz (c), my study of Royal Lords temples in East Haven
and Taipei (portions of Katz , a, c, and b were published in Katz
). See also Katz (b).
3. “Royal Lord” does not refer to a specific deity or even to one type of deity. Rather, it
is an honorific form of address, used in late-imperial times to address figures as
di¥erent as imperial princes (qinwang) and local ru≤ans or bandit leaders (e.g.,
shanzhai dawang) (see Katz ). Generally speaking, the term “Royal Lord” as used
in Taiwan, Fujian, and other parts of south China describes three di¥erent types of
deities, whose cults will be discussed below.
4. See, for example, the study of the cult of Jiang Ziwen in south China by Lin Fu-shih
(Lin a).
5. For more on Lord Chi’s cult in Quanzhou, see Cai (, –) and Chen and Wu
(, –).
6. The surname had changed from Wen to Lin or Ling in parts of southern Zhejiang,
again apparently due to the influence of spirit mediums (Katz a).
7. For recent work on the history of local cults in Fujian, see, for example, Dean (,
, b, ), Lagerwey (, ), Lagerwey and Lü (), Lin and Peng
(), Liu (), Shi (), Cai (), and Xu (). See also the numerous
article and books on Fujian rituals and ritual dramas published in the journal Minsu
quyi as well as the journal’s related eighty-volume series on Chinese ritual dramas,
Minsu quyi congshu.
8. Rubinstein (chapter  in this volume) draws similar conclusions about measuring
church growth.
9. An exception can be found in the case of the cult of the Five Commissioners of Epi-
demics in Fuzhou, but repeated attempts to eradicate this cult have proved ine¥ec-
tive, even under Communist rule (see Szonyi ).
10. While the governments of late-Qing and early-Republican China also attempted to
suppress local cults (Duara ), we know little of the e¥ects of these campaigns on
cults on the Royal Lords.
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11. For more on this ritual and its significance, see Schipper (). For more on the
Palace of Eastern Prosperity’s branch temples, see Katz ().
12. The most recent edition of the temple gazetteer contains a list of the corporation’s
members as well as its bylaws (see Donggang Donglong Gong yange zhi , –).
13. For more on the significance of temples acquiring the status of nonprofit corpora-
tion in Taiwan, see Feuchtwang ().
14. My account of the temple’s attempt to find its roots is based on interviews with Lin
Yunteng conducted at the Palace of Guidance in the fall of  as well as a hand-
written draft report composed by a member of the Quanzhou City Gazetteer edito-
rial committee.
15. The Fengshan County Gazetteer of  (see Wang [] ) contains a description
of boat-expulsion rituals held in southern Taiwan as well as a passage about
Fengshan rituals in particular. The description of the Fengshan festival notes that it
was held for three Royal Lords with the surnames Chi, Wen, and Zhu, whose images
were floated out to sea in a boat at the conclusion of the festival (Wang [] ,
). The name of the temple associated with this Fengshan festival is not given, but,
while it is clearly not the Palace of Eastern Prosperity, it may well be the Phoenix
Ritual Palace (Fengyi Gong), founded in Fengshan city by the early eighteenth
century, whose deities bear these surnames (Lu [] , ).
16. For detailed discussions of this problem, see Bosco (), Cohen (), Dean
(a), Hong and Murray (), Rubinstein (, ), Sangren (), Cai
(), and Wachman (a, b). See also Katz () and Katz and Rubinstein
().
17. In discussing processes of indigenization, the terms bentuhua and Taiwanhua (Tai-
wanization) are also used.
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I N  T H E  M O R E  T H A N fifty years since the end of World War II, Taiwan has
faced an unprecedented transformation from an agricultural to an industrial
society, a transformation that fostered fundamental and drastic changes in
the political and economic spheres. After taking over Taiwan from the Japa-
nese colonial regime, the Kuomintang government adopted cultural and
religious policies that provided a relatively free and unfettered space for
Daoism outside the Chinese mainland. The Zhengyi (Orthodox One) school
preserved a complete tradition of Chinese Daoism, but it also adapted locally
to the changes of that time period. Its priesthood is characterized by a non-
monastic lifestyle, which allows priests to marry and live as members of local
communities. The present essay will utilize C. K. Yang’s twin concepts of
“institutional” and “diffused” religions to show that this form of Daoism
combines both of these structural features (see Yang , ; Yang ). It
covers both the prewar and the postwar periods and focuses geographically
on central Taiwan, the intermixing of subethnic groups in this area making
it easier to profile the nonmonastic character of Zhengyi shrines. On the one
hand, the Daoist shrines transmitted internally the systematic attributes of
the Daoist tradition, such as doctrines, myths, and rituals, attributes that
formed a stable and unchanging core that has sustained the tradition
throughout the process of its relocation from Fujian to Taiwan. On the
other hand, since the Daoists shared in the social life of the immigrant
groups and Daoist shrines and local temples to Daoist deities were closely
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integrated into the networks of local communities, Daoist shrines became a
permanent part of immigrant society and were influenced by it.
The established procedures for consecrating shrines and ordaining priests
demonstrate the stability and conservatism of the priesthood’s professional
identity as divinely appointed ritual specialists. The practical demands of
their nonmonastic lifestyle caused the priests to maintain firm control over
the structures of internal transmission because only on this basis could they
stake out stable catchment areas in which to offer their ritual services. Over
time, this led to the formation of fixed professional domains (hangyequan)
within the territories of the various subethnic factions among the immigrant
population. In central Taiwan, Quanzhou, Hoklo-Hakka, and Zhangzhou
areas happen to be equally represented and, with them, the Daoist shrines
of those affiliated with these places of origin. The relations between Daoist
shrines of the same subethnic affiliation are characterized by a subtle com-
bination of competition and cooperation.
The intense changes wrought by modernization, the continuing inner
needs of the people for meaning and order, and the dislocation caused by the
flow of the population from the countryside to the cities together guaran-
tee that the religious services of the Daoist priest continue to be in demand
for the social and psychological needs of the Taiwanese, even while the
Daoists remain firmly rooted in the life of the local community. The need
to respond to the new challenges of postwar society caused the Daoist priest-
hood to map out a path of self-adaptation that clearly distinguished between
elements that could be changed and those that must remain untouched.
Their success in doing so shows that—in spite of its essentially conservative
character—ancient Zhengyi Daoism can be a religious tradition within
modern society that combines preservation with innovation.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION
Daoist practitioners fall into two types—monastic and nonmonastic—with
the latter being the more ancient form. Nonmonastic Daoism is transmit-
ted through the parish system of Zhengyi Daoism, under which the priest
in charge of a shrine establishes an oratory and parish in a local community,
marries, and produces sons, to some of whom he transmits the charms, reg-
isters (i.e., a list of deities at the master’s disposal), and Daoist techniques
that have been passed down generation after generation. Functioning as
ritual specialists in the local community, this “shrine Daoist priesthood”
(daotan daoshi) is called the “charms and register school” (fulupai) or the
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“fire-dwelling path” (huojudao). The other type is the “monastic Daoist
priesthood” (daoguan daoshi) of the Maoshan (Mount Mao) or Quanzhen
(Complete Perfection) traditions, who reside in monasteries, focus on the
dual cultivation of nature and life force and on inner alchemy, and are
referred to as the “Elixir Tripod school” (dandingpai) or “the path outside
the family” (chujiadao). The Daoist ritual specialists who work in Taiwan are
shrine priests of Zhengyi lineages stemming from Fujian and, to a lesser
degree, from eastern Guangdong. While ultimately derived from the Zhengyi
center on Dragon-Tiger Mountain (Longhushan) in Jiangxi province, they
have also incorporated elements of the local culture of Quanzhou and
Zhangzhou counties (in southern Fujian province) and of Hakka settlement
areas, forming regional lineages with distinct religious functions and ritual
styles. In the counties and cities of central Taiwan, the shrine Daoists like-
wise attached themselves to Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, or Hakka immigrant
groups, becoming ritual specialists for subethnically defined clienteles.
As mentioned above, the Taiwanese shrine Daoists’ practice is often
referred to as the “fire-dwelling path.” The term “fire dwelling” has rich
sociological and religious connotations. The oratories and parishes of the
early Zhengyi school were established in local communities, and the priests
lived in close “partnership” (huo) with the people. The founder, Zhang Ling,
passed his religious tradition on to his son Zhang Heng, who in turn trans-
mitted it to his son Zhang Lu. Among them these three established the
system of twenty-four parishes in which the tradition was transmitted
among the libationers from master to disciple (Chen , –). As the
later shrine Daoists transmitted their charms, registers, and techniques along
the family line or from master to disciple, they always gave attention to
caution and secrecy. Only for the performance of solemn religious rites did
the priest have to observe religious fasting and restrictions, while, in ordi-
nary times, his way of life was very similar to that of the surrounding com-
munity. Because these priests do not follow a monastic way of life, some
scholars have taken “fire dwelling” to mean “living in a burning house”
(huozhai) rather than “living in partnership (with the common people)”
(Liu , –). This Buddhist interpretation emphasizes that those who
do not enter monastic life are caught in the confusions and hassles of the
secular world, where they suffer as if burning in fire. However, this is a not
a proper representation of the Zhengyi position because shrine Daoists
choose to cultivate and transmit the Dao within secular society, thereby
forming a unique class of religious professionals within Chinese society and
expressing in a very concrete way the distinctive religious style of Zhengyi
Daoism.
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In his study of Chinese religion, C. K. Yang once distinguished between
the two orientations of “institutional” and “diffused” religions (see Yang ,
). If we use these concepts to examine the nonmonastic path of Zhengyi
Daoism, we discover that, on the one hand, Taiwan’s well-preserved shrine
Daoist tradition transmits the teachings and rituals of institutional Daoism
and that, on the other hand, it reveals its diffused characteristics in its non-
monastic mode, which allows it to forge a very close union of Daoist myth,
ritual, and worldview with the religious aspects of local community life, such
as community temple cults, ancestor worship, and seasonal festivals. After
 the new Kuomintang government instituted an official policy toward the
religions, which reduced the pressure exerted previously by the Japanese colo-
nial regime and was much less interfering than the Communist policies on
the mainland were. Owing to the favorable conditions thus created, Zhengyi
Daoism was able to preserve a nonmonastic religious tradition in Taiwan
that has become a religious model for Chinese communities everywhere.
From its earliest times, Daoism employed a system of master-disciple
transmission within Daoist parishes. The scriptures, spells, charms, and
charts transmitted by way of this system together constitute a stable complex
of doctrine and myth and support the purification (zhai) and offering (jiao)
rituals performed by the priest publicly (for the nation or the village) or pri-
vately (for families and individuals). Owing to the unsettled social condi-
tions during the early stages of Daoist history (the second to the sixth
centuries), we find apocalyptic notions in the early Daoist scriptures and a
corresponding emphasis on avoiding cosmic disaster, saving people, and
escaping this world. Fasting, scripture recitation, meditation, and cultivation
all were rituals of salvation and escape (Lee , a). As these methods
were believed to have been bestowed by Heaven or the gods, their proper and
solemn transmission had to be performed in strict accordance with the
covenantal regulations, thus assuring the stable and reliable transmission of
charms, registers, and scriptures (Lee b). The Daoist priest’s professional
function required him to preserve his standing as a divinely appointed offi-
cial by adhering strictly to the internal prohibitions and regulations, thereby
setting himself somewhat apart from the common people. These demands
of secrecy for the transmission of scriptures and methods and sacred purity
for the person of the priest within the context of an institutional framework
of liturgical procedures enabled the religious tradition of Zhengyi Daoism
to perpetuate itself to the present day despite its nonmonastic way of life.
Shrine Daoists moved to Taiwan during the Ming and Qing dynasties
from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. In order to preserve the lineage
traditions of the Zhengyi school, some priests traveled personally to
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Dragon-Tiger Mountain to receive registers, while others returned to their
home districts on the mainland to receive ordination there. These journeys
back to the mainland for investiture purposes were regarded as a sacred pro-
cedure of procuring patriarchal authorization. However, the problems of
travel between the two shores of the Taiwan strait gradually led Daoist
priests to seek ordination in Taiwan. This trend became stronger during the
Japanese period and culminated in complete autonomy after the withdrawal
of the Kuomintang government to Taiwan in  and the severance of all
communication links with the mainland. Another crucial factor in the estab-
lishment of an autonomous Taiwanese ordination system was the arrival of
the sixty-third Celestial Master, Zhang Enpu, from Dragon-Tiger Mountain,
who had followed the Kuomintang forces to Taiwan. Before , the Celes-
tial Master had only very occasionally been invited to attend at Daoist ritual
occasions in Taiwan, and his presence was a major event in Daoist circles (see
Lee b). His long-term relocation to Taiwan occasioned major changes in
Taiwanese Daoism.
After procuring official support, the Celestial Master Zhang Enpu pro-
ceeded to establish the Daoist Association of the Province of Taiwan (Taiwan
Sheng Daojiao Xiehui) and the Daoist Assembly of the Republic of China
(Zhonghua Minguo Daojiaohui). These new bodies were meant to rival 
the Communist-controlled Chinese Daoist Association on the mainland
and to affirm the orthodoxy of Taiwanese Daoism. In the early stages, their
membership consisted mostly of shrine Daoists, with a minority of monas-
tic Daoists; in response to government administrative regulations for local
temples, they later broadened their registration criteria to acknowledge the
legal status of the Daoist ones among these local temples (Neizhengbu ;
Lee a). At a time when, on the mainland, the Cultural Revolution had
launched an all-out attack on religion, these organizations served to adver-
tise the Kuomintang government’s policy of religious freedom. Therefore,
the Zhengyi shrine Daoists and the local Daoist temples continued their
cooperation, seeking to preserve the historical tradition of Daoism in a
popular form. At the same time as the Zhengyi center at Dragon-Tiger
Mountain and the Chinese Daoist Association were forced to discontinue
their activities under the onslaught of a persecution unprecedented in
Chinese history, the Zhengyi Daoist shrines in Taiwan were actually
strengthening their institutional structures.
In the course of his efforts properly to establish the Celestial Masters’
ordination system in Taiwan, the sixty-third Celestial Master sought to
restructure the autonomous and scattered Daoist shrines. As part of this
effort, he tried to bring newly ordained as well as established priests into the
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fold of Zhengyi orthodoxy by bestowing on them ordination names that all
shared one common element: the character ding (tripod). They thus became
members of the same generation of Zhengyi priests and assumed a position
in the priestly hierarchy of Zhengyi Daoism that was defined by the ding
character’s place in a poem from which a different character is used for the
ordination names of each successive generation. As a result, some shrines,
such as that of the old priestly Shi family in Lugang, received from the
Celestial Master the ding character in addition to their original generational
marker. It was intended that these new designations would unify Taiwanese
Daoism by superseding the older ones, which had been derived through
individual master-disciple relationships. Although this endeavor was not
completely successful, it was still probably the boldest attempt at insti-
tutional reform in the two- or three-hundred-year history of Daoism in
Taiwan. The coexistence of the old system and the new showed that it was
possible to integrate the local shrines of Taiwanese nonmonastic Daoism
into the oratory/parish system of the Zhengyi tradition. Although it later
came to a break between the Daoist Assembly of the Republic of China and
Sixty-fourth Celestial Master Zhang Yuanxian, the latter still played a cen-
tral role in the ordination system, thus continuing his predecessor’s efforts
to maintain the orthodox system of transmission of the Zhengyi school.
When, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, religious policies on the
mainland gradually became more liberal, the Chinese Daoist Association
there was revived, and the Celestial Master Office at Dragon-Tiger Mountain
reinstated the ordination system so as to reclaim its orthodox position
within the Zhengyi tradition.
After his escape to Taiwan, the Celestial Master tried to re-create his reli-
gious organization on a smaller scale and, time and again, tried effectively
to draw all shrine Daoists into it. However, for three centuries, the Daoist
shrines had been passed along in families and master-disciple relationships,
and transmission systems for their professional skills had been worked out
within the limits of their subethnic groups. Opinions among the priesthood
were divided on whether the benefit to one’s professional standing and
authority justified the considerable expense involved in the official ordi-
nation ritual or whether one should just stick with the old way of private
transmission and study of liturgy. At present, the main criteria for registra-
tion of a Daoist shrine are the priest’s ability to perform purification rites
and offerings and, in accordance with government regulations, membership
in a local Daoist association. Whether to receive the Celestial Master Office’s
official ordination is left to the discretion of each individual shrine.
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Generally speaking, therefore, the Celestial Master’s attempts at restruc-
turing Taiwanese Daoism have not met with great success. This failure has
its roots in the transmission of priestly lineages of Cantonese and Fujianese
background where financial problems and local custom often militated
against making the trip to Dragon-Tiger Mountain for an official ordina-
tion. Nevertheless, the journey to the headquarters of the Zhengyi school
and the personal ordination by the Celestial Master are still cherished ideals
among shrine Daoists. Two pieces of evidence illustrate this. First, in south-
ern Taiwan, the ordination ceremony for a Daoist priest used to include the
Lüshan ritual of “scaling the ladder of knives” (pa daoti) as part of making
the application for ordination. Whether the Celestial Master was personally
present or not, the candidate had, after having climbed the ladder, to face in
the direction of Dragon-Tiger Mountain and make his petition while kneel-
ing, his petition then being decided on by throwing a pair of oracle blocks.
Second, since the beginning of the reform policies on the mainland and the
easing of travel restrictions, some Daoists have made the trip to Dragon-
Tiger Mountain to receive ordination there (Lee a; Zhang ). These
symbolic activities show the importance of Dragon-Tiger Mountain as a
sacred place and the continuing strength of the institutional structures of the
Zhengyi tradition.
From the early centralized parish system to the later localized Daoist
shrines, the main factor in the continuity of nonmonastic Daoism was 
the stability of its transmission system. In its Taiwanese form, this system
appears to support nothing more than a set of local traditions from Guang-
dong and Fujian, but, in fact, it transmits the religious tradition of the insti-
tutional Zhengyi school. Taiwanese Daoism completely retains this school’s
scriptures, doctrines, pantheon, myths, and rituals, and it is with these that
the Daoist priest makes his living within secular society. The careful trans-
mission of this professional knowledge has preserved the professional role
of the priest to the present day. Without the financial support of a central-
ized religious institution, such as is received by monastic Daoists, the shrine
Daoist has to use his ritual knowledge as a means of making a living under
the difficult conditions of a secularizing society. However, beyond a simple
livelihood, the Daoist priest must see it as a calling to spread his religion and
to assure that its transmission will not be interrupted. In this context,
“institutionalization” refers to the structural arrangements that allow this
form of Daoism to perpetuate itself over time and across geographic divides.
These arrangements of stable internal transmission explain why this group
of religious professionals survives in the face of social changes brought on
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by modernization and secularization and continues to hand on its two-
thousand-year-old tradition.
DIFFUSION AND SECULAR LIFE
Unlike their monastic counterparts, shrine Daoists live in the secular world,
their lifestyle very close to that of ordinary society. For this reason, they are
ideally placed to provide ritual services for laypeople. They combine special-
ized knowledge of Zhengyi scriptures and rituals with an intimate under-
standing of popular beliefs and customs as well as human relationships.
These characteristics mark the diffused aspect of nonmonastic Daoism.
Under the relatively stable social conditions of traditional agricultural soci-
ety, Daoist ritual was closely linked to the life and needs of the surrounding
society, whose slow rate of change allowed the Daoist ritual traditions to be
preserved largely unaltered. When, after World War II, Taiwan was trans-
formed into an industrial society, modernization triggered changes in the
way of life and the value system of the people, forcing the Daoist priesthood
to adapt itself to the new situation. Among a nonmonastic priesthood, it was
unavoidable that certain phenomena of secularization should appear, but a
closer look reveals that, underneath the surface changes, the basics have
remained untouched: the stability of its rituals and doctrines continues to
mark this tradition out as an ancient religion.
The ritual services provided by Daoists to laypeople are of two types:
public and private. Generally speaking, they cover four great areas: temple
festivals; seasonal feasts; rites of passage; and destiny-correcting rituals.
Because the Daoist priest shares the layperson’s views of the cosmos, ghosts,
and gods, he can function as a mediator between humans and spirits, as a
communicator who is said to be able “to reach the gods and the sages.”
Whenever certain specialized ritual procedures are required that cannot be
performed by Confucian scholars, mediums, or Buddhist monks, the Daoist
priest is called in to function as an intermediary by virtue of his mastery of
ancient ritual techniques. Daoism and popular religion are rooted in the
same belief system, one common to Chinese culture that includes ghosts,
gods, and a netherworld with which one may communicate by means of
both simple and complex ritual techniques. Owing to this shared ground,
Daoist ritual and Daoist knowledge of the gods are widely accepted by
laypeople, and the technical expertise of the Daoist is, therefore, frequently
called on for the performance of rites of passage that guarantee the con-
tinuity of local communities and of families. Within popular ritual life, the
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nonmonastic character of the Zhengyi school underlines the Daoist’s basic
congruity with the common people in terms of belief and knowledge. This
allows Daoism to penetrate even deeper into the religious life of local society
than popular Buddhism does and to assume a peculiarly diffuse quality.
Taiwan’s urbanized society still preserves a type of traditional Chinese
religious life found neither on the mainland after the ravages of the Cultural
Revolution nor in overseas Chinese societies such as Hong Kong, Macao, and
Singapore that had previously been under the culturally alien domination of
Britain and Portugal. In Taiwan, local temple and seasonal festivals still fol-
low the same general patterns as they did in the Ming and Qing periods, and
participation in them is still looked on by the local people as a public duty.
Among these feasts, the religious rituals that express the people’s collective
needs are shared symbols of social life as a whole. Because they are widely
regarded as vital to the collective destiny of the locality, these rites have
attracted the attention of both sociologists and scholars of religion. As the
Zuozhuan has it: “The great affairs of a state are sacrifice and war” (quoted
from Legge , :). From this perspective, it is seen as vital for the exis-
tence of a local community to gain protection for the visible world through
sacrifices to the invisible world of spirits—as important as the locality’s
military defense. Public rituals are, therefore, not to be trifled with. Even
under the prewar Japanese regime, when political pressure was high and
financial resources few, local communities still steadfastly performed their
public rituals as before. While, after the war, the Kuomintang government
instituted some restrictive regulations, overall a large degree of religious
freedom was regained while at the same time economic strength increased
greatly. The resulting exuberant celebrations of public rituals are concrete
evidence of the prosperity of society and have not been negatively affected
in the least by the forces of modernization and the spread of scientific
knowledge.
After the war, the Kuomintang government continued the general
direction of the Japanese colonial regime in pushing for a modern education
system, using science, rationalism, and Western standards to reform the
nation’s life habits. The temple cults and seasonal festivals of popular religion
were not vigorously attacked, but the government sought to keep them off
the school campuses, leading to a separation between community temples
and Daoist shrines, on the one hand, and the school system, on the other. In
the practical application of this policy over the course of fifty years, the new
education promoted by the modern schools and the attendant cultural
activities have helped improve the nation’s living standards, but they have
not succeeded to any significant degree in superseding traditional beliefs and
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customs. The local population continued to participate in collective ritual
activities focused on community temples and street-corner shrines, and
Daoist priests continued to be active in local society as ritual specialists.
While science and modern education could change the people’s way of life,
they could not alter their traditional understanding of the cosmos and the
spirits. Daoism did not enjoy Confucianism’s advantage of having its teach-
ings officially promoted within the public school system as so-called “basic
teaching resources in Chinese culture,” but it was able to flourish without
interference within local society. As the Daoist priest’s specialized knowledge
could not be learned in the schools, laypeople continued to depend on the
priesthood for the proper performance of complex rituals.
Throughout both the prewar and the postwar periods, in traditional and
modern society, local temples have always fulfilled the important social
function of bringing together the masses in collective ritual activities staged
by religious associations. While it is true that a large number of secular asso-
ciations have also appeared, it is only the local temple rites that really draw
together the community as a whole. If important religious events—such as
the threefold offering at the annual birthday celebration of the local deity or
the seasonal celebration of the “Ghost festival”—are to be performed in the
traditional manner, the services of a presiding Daoist priest are required.
While there may exist associations of other religious specialists, for the most
part these major rites are beyond their competence. This applies in partic-
ular to the highly complex rite of cosmic renewal, the inauguration rites at
the completion of temples, and the apotropaic ritual of “Welcoming the
Lords,” all of which allow the Daoist to display his ancient liturgical proce-
dures. To the present day, these great rituals provide a stage for the Daoist’s
religious performance, on which the laypeople believe they must rely to
assure the peace and stability of their community (Lee et al. a, b).
These events are ritual efforts to reestablish social and religious order based
on China’s ancient religious culture. This culture continues to exist without
serious conflict alongside the new culture fostered by the modern education
system.
The exclusion of the old religious culture from the modern education
system followed the government’s demands for a modern, scientific ration-
ality. However, the mainlander-dominated Kuomintang in addition pursued
a policy of cultural assimilation. Viewed from the cultural perspective of the
“Central Plains” of northern China, the Taiwanese beliefs and customs
shaped by immigrants from Guangdong and Fujian appeared as a margin-
alized local culture. Local religion suffered the same kind of official neglect
and discouragement as the local dialects under the government’s language
134
06Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:53 AM  Page 134
Daoist  Pr iesthood and Secular  Society
policy. Its role in the integration of society was overlooked, and public ritual
activities were relegated to the status of mere folkloric displays. It was only
with the gradual rise of Taiwanese consciousness in the years after the lifting
of martial law that the Council for Cultural Planning and Development,
which is mandated to promote culture, has begun to propose policies involv-
ing “localization” and “the holistic construction of local communities.” In
this context, the social and cultural importance of temples in the local
community became particularly apparent, and temple activities were again
recognized as a local cultural resource. Temple festivals that integrate a
locality and express its cultural identity were promoted as cultural activities
representative of the whole local community. Successful examples of such
official support are events such as the Keelung (Jilong) Ghost festival and the
Wangchuan festival of Donggang (Lee ).
As a necessary part of the ritual activities staged by community temples,
the shrine Daoist’s rituals and myths serve as carriers of Daoist teachings,
which thus become diffused into popular religious life and penetrate it deeply
without the local population necessarily being aware of it. For example, at
the inauguration of a new temple, the whole community participates in the
fast to seek purification. The jiao shrine is set up in the middle of the temple,
where it creates a sacred space into which immortals and sages descend and
in which the Daoist priest is able to perform his rituals and seek blessings for
the common people. This emphasis on sacredness and purity is rooted in the
Daoist tradition of fasting and purification, which rejects bloody offerings,
but it also characterizes the stress on fasting and purification in traditional
Chinese sacrifices in general. Such congruence between Daoism and popu-
lar religion often causes local people to confuse the two, but it also expresses
the fact that they share a common religious background within the same
national culture. Shared participation by Daoists and laypeople in jiao and
sacrificial rites emerges again and again in the universal salvation rituals of
the Ghost festival and the rituals of Welcoming the Lords. The Daoist zhai
(zhongyuanzhai) and jiao (wenjiao, wangjiao) rites performed on these occa-
sions are based on traditional religious teachings whose basic meaning is
familiar to laypeople. As a result, they are able to fulfill their part in the ritual
performance so as to bring it to a harmonious conclusion. Only in the
absence of a great gap in cultural knowledge can the two parties cooperate
in this way to carry out important local ritual events. It is in this combined
performance of a shared tradition that Daoism’s diffuse characteristics find
their most profound and most concrete expression.
One area where modernization had a clear impact on social life is 
the life-cycle rituals of the family. The anxieties and insecurities associated
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with pregnancy, childbirth, and the gender of the newborn that used to be
addressed by religious rituals are now mostly within the reach of medical
science. Coming-of-age or marriage rituals have been deeply affected by
modern education and have been gradually simplified under the Interior
Ministry’s drive for modern and simple versions of these rites of passage.
While losing ground in this area, shrine Daoists at present still retain control
of the rite of “worshiping Lord Heaven” (bai Tiangong), which expresses
gratitude for Heaven’s help in mastering the numerous crises in the course
of one’s life.
However, while the privately performed life-cycle rituals have been
largely divested of Daoist supervision, when it comes to dealing with the
unknowable netherworld, a much more conservative attitude prevails. This
is apparent in funeral rituals and ancestral worship. The reason why a class
of Daoist priests is called “black-head priests” is because they have special
expertise in rituals for the salvation of souls. Beliefs and myths about death
and the netherworld are preserved in rituals that seek to erase the deceased’s
sins and to raise him or her to the realm of the immortals through the Daoist
priest’s intercession with the Heavenly Venerable Who Saves from Suffering
(Jiuku Tianzun). The soteriological aspect of Daoism shows itself in its
handling of individual life-cycle and family rituals (Lee b). In ancestral
rites, priests act to submit memorials and pray for blessings on behalf of the
family. These rites survive to the present day because they are founded on a
view of death and salvation that is shared between the Daoist priesthood and
laypeople. Salvation, whether of self or others, whether of the living or the
dead, must be actualized through the symbolic actions of Daoist ritual so as
to integrate the family and the collective destiny of its members. Among the
life-cycle rituals, it is the rites for ancestors and the dead that share with the
auspicious rituals directed at deities a high level of continuity, a continuity
that can be attributed to the relatively stable nature of beliefs concerning
spirits and the netherworld.
The diffused nature of Daoism explains why it is often called China’s
“national religion” or “native religion”: Daoism and popular religion share
a common view of the cosmos and the spirits. This cultural identity finds
concrete expression in the rituals presided over by the Daoist priest; the
sacred images hung in the shrine area represent a Daoist pantheon, and at
the same time they are recognized by the common people as a cosmic chart
of the “three powers” (sancai) of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity. The Daoist
priest functions through his liturgical actions as an intermediary for com-
munication and supplication. Many laypeople have only a limited outsider’s
understanding of the true meaning of the details of the rituals and symbolic
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movements, but their continuing use of traditional Daoist ritual shows that
their religious behavior is backed up by a solemn religious faith. This is
rooted in a shared cultural ethos on which both Daoist scriptures and teach-
ings and the concepts of popular religion are based, an ethos that, over the
course of the long history of Chinese civilization, has become generalized
and integrated into the daily life of the Chinese to the extent that they live
it all the time without being aware of it. The diffusion and penetration of
Daoist concepts, together with the nonmonastic lifestyle of shrine Daoists,
enable the esoteric knowledge of these religious professionals to become
generalized throughout secular society. The merging of their social life and
modes of thought with those of secular society is the prime factor explain-
ing the degree of integration within local society that nonmonastic Daoism
has achieved—a degree unattainable by monastic Daoists and especially by
Buddhist clerics.
Nonmonastic Daoism takes concrete shape in the secular world in the
form of ritual specialists. Under the cultural conditions of modernization in
postwar Taiwan, the training of religious professionals such as Daoist priests
was strictly separated from the modern education system. Nevertheless,
under the democratic policy of universal education, the new generation of
priests had the same opportunities for attending school as everyone else.
Therefore, they combine their internally transmitted religious knowledge
with a modern education, and, with this combination, they can continue to
play their specialized professional role in the local community. The ongoing
link between secular society and nonmonastic lifestyle is, in effect, a continu-
ation of Daoism’s integrated position in traditional society and is not likely
to experience drastic changes as a result of modernization. The persistence
of Daoism in this diffuse state can be attributed to its “institutionalized”
tradition: its systematized teachings; the stable transmission of its scriptural
heritage; and the standardization of its ritual procedures. In this “national
religion,” institutionality and diffusion do not conflict with each other; quite
the contrary, in the close links formed by nonmonastic Daoist shrines with
their subethnic groups, their local community, and their kinship groups, a
close cohesion is achieved that allows Daoism to exist in cultural union with
the popular religion of which it is widely felt to be an inalienable part. The
transmission of nonmonastic Daoism within the domain of the Zhengyi
school and the transmission of professional abilities through family or
master-disciple links are acknowledged by the common people of the
locality. It is on the basis of their shared beliefs and customs that the Daoist
priest enjoys his religious prestige. Thus, to the present day, a sacred and
spiritual power is preserved in the secular world of everyday life, a power
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that is perhaps unconsciously created in the religious interaction between
Daoist priest and laypeople.
PROFESSIONAL IMAGE AND PROFESSIONAL DOMAIN
For more than three hundred years, immigrants to Taiwan have undergone
a process of historical change that affected them differently according to
whether they stemmed from Guangdong or Fujian, when they arrived on the
island, and what the way of life in their mainland home districts had been
like. The accelerated social changes during the decades since the war and the
great increase in population mobility have occasioned great changes on Tai-
wan’s demographic map, which used to be determined by territorial, kin-
ship, and cultural bonds (Shi ). Compared with other professionals,
shrine Daoists have much closer ties to their subethnic group, and, therefore,
even in the midst of greatly increased mobility, they locate most of their
shrines in areas dominated by their own subethnic group, with little cross-
over into the territories of other groups. This is due to the specific nature of
the Daoist priest’s profession and the professional image created thereby.
Whether his professional duties involve rituals for the living or rituals for the
dead, the Daoist priest must always deal with aspects of life beyond people’s
control, such as the afterlife and destiny. The Daoist may choose to reside as
a private individual in a community of the same subethnic affiliation, or to
set up a shrine in his home, or permanently to inhabit a temple; occasion-
ally he will follow an invitation to perform religious services outside his
community. Always he will be catering to the habitual needs and require-
ments of the local community as formed by long-standing customs. Even in
an urban area characterized by high instability and open-mindedness, as
soon as people face an important ritual occasion of either auspicious or
inauspicious character, they will still evince a conservative tendency to put
their trust in a Daoist priest of their own subethnic affiliation. This habit of
choosing a priest of one’s own cultural background to take care of one’s
affairs leads to the formation of a shrine Daoist’s “professional domain,”
from which he draws his livelihood.
Taiwanese Zhengyi Daoism is commonly divided into the two categories
of “black-head” and “red-head” Daoist priests, with the two colors symbol-
izing their professional image and marking their occupational specialization.
These specializations differ regionally and are directly related to local cus-
toms and sectarian divisions in the areas of origin of the different subethnic
groups. Generally speaking, Daoist priests from the Quanzhou and the
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neighboring Zhangzhou groups stress salvational rituals for the dead. If
occasion demands, they will also preside over temple and seasonal rites that
celebrate auspicious occasions or pray for blessings. Thus, their liturgical
repertoire contains rites both for the living and for the dead, but the
emphasis lies on the salvation of the deceased. Because they are perceived as
having special expertise in the impure (and hence “dark”) affairs of the
dead, they are called “black-heads.” The coastal areas of Taiwan settled by
Quanzhou people and the adjacent hinterland inhabited by the descendants
of Zhangzhou settlers are dominated by these specialists in rituals for the
dead. Numerically, they are the strongest group among the Daoist priest-
hood in Taiwan; their presence is very noticeable, for example, in the coastal
area around the central Taiwanese township of Lugang. Quite close to the
Quanzhou/Zhangzhou faction among the priesthood are the shrines of
the Amoy (Xiamen) system, which are distributed across the mountains and
the foothills of central Taiwan. Examples are the Daoist shrines of the Li
family of Ershui and the Chen family of Zhushan. Their liturgical manuals
are very similar to those of the Quanzhou priests, although, in addition, they
use some scriptures and liturgical texts of different origin for mortuary rit-
uals.1 The Zhangzhou priests often call this faction the “Lingbao (Numinous
Treasure) school” because its liturgical manuals often use “golden register”
or “numinous treasure” in their titles. Among the Tainan shrines in partic-
ular, the jiao liturgy still preserves a ritual and talisman for the Emplacement
of the Perfect Script of the Numinous Treasure (An lingbao zhenwen).
The red-head Daoist tradition originates from the southern regions of
Zhangzhou and the adjacent Hakka areas in Guangdong. Red-head priests’
subethnic affiliation is split between Zhangzhou, Hoklo-Hakka, and pure
Hakka; their tradition combines expertise in Zhengyi and exorcistic rituals
(hence the name Daofa ermen, “Dual School”) (see Lagerwey , –
). The priests from this area are red-head ritual masters who perform
offerings and corrections of destiny. They belong to the Sannai school and
worship its three female deities—Chen Jinggu, Lin Shaniang, and Li Jiu-
niang. The distinguishing mark of their dress is the red headcloth, from
which their name is derived. In their rituals, they usually employ the ver-
nacular language, except in major rites that celebrate auspicious occasions
or pray for blessings, when their ritual texts and ritual music make use of
formal language. (This language, however, differs in accent from that of the
Quanzhou priesthood.) Their scriptures often include the characters
“Orthodox One” (Zhengyi) in their titles. Early Taiwanese gazetteers (such
as Chen Menglin’s Zhuluo xianzhi [Gazetteer of Zhuluo county]) record that
Hakka in central Taiwanese areas such as Changhua (Zhanghua), Taichung
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(Taizhong), Yunlin, and Chiayi (Jiayi) employed “Hakka masters” (kezaishi)
or “red-head masters” for rituals aimed at bringing about prosperity and
patching one’s destiny (Lee ). The red color of their headdress indicates
that they perform only auspicious rites for the living, including destiny-
correcting and exorcistic rituals. For this reason, in these regions the
salvation of the dead is left to members of vegetarian sects (Zhaijiao), called
locally “incense flower monks” (xianghua heshang). Such was the division of
labor in their areas of origin in Fujian and Guangdong, and such it con-
tinued to be in Taiwan. Why this specialization first arose on the mainland
is still unclear.
An important change among the Daoist priesthood in the postwar
period was occasioned by the influx around the year  of a significant
number of refugees from the Fuzhou area, among them ritual masters of a
separate school new to Taiwan. Their manuals contain morning, noon, and
evening liturgies and numerous scriptures that were borrowed from Quan-
zhen Daoist practice by Fuzhou officials stationed in the capital, Beijing. In
addition, they use some Buddhist scriptures, and their school is, therefore,
called the “Chanhe school” (Chan Harmonized school). After their arrival in
Taiwan, the Fuzhou priests established many halls, among which a fairly
sizable one is the Hall of Preserving Peace (Bao’an Tang), derived from the
Jixuan Heyi shrine.2 Because they hold monthly Dipper offerings (to the
deities residing in the Big Dipper constellation), these halls are also called
“Dipper shrines” (doutan). They are “auspicious arenas” (jichang) because
these are rituals designed to invoke blessings. Fuzhou priests also perform
salvational rituals for the dead on behalf of their compatriots. Most practi-
tioners in this school play their religious role in a part-time fashion, that is,
while holding other occupations. Their liturgies emphasize the chanting of
scriptures and musical performance. Because the language used is the formal
language of Fuzhou and the music is rooted in Fuzhou regional traditions,
this tradition was at first limited to the Fuzhou immigrant community.
Through their activities in the Daoist Assembly of the Republic of China and
the local Daoist associations, Fuzhou priests later began to play a role in
Daoist temples outside the Fuzhou community, and Hokkien elements grad-
ually began to appear in their liturgical language. The Chanhe school is the
only successful new Daoist group to establish itself in Taiwan in the postwar
period. While its adherents have managed to reach somewhat beyond the
scattered Fuzhou immigrant community, the fact that they have not made
significant inroads in Quanzhou-, Zhangzhou-, and Hakka-dominated areas
shows that the close cultural link between Daoist shrines and a subethnically
defined local community continues to hold.
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The reasons why this link has not been fundamentally weakened since
the war are the deep territorial roots of beliefs and customs and their vari-
ation between regions. When it comes to ultimate concerns such as the
afterlife and the family’s destiny, laypeople continue to turn to Daoist priests
whose subethnic background guarantees a shared religious understanding
with his clients. That they share a common worldview and a repertoire of
specific beliefs and practices creates a mutual dependence between Daoist
priests and their clientele. The cultural specificity of the Daoist priest’s
professional domain bars him from accessing other subethnic communities,
but it also allows his Daoist tradition to penetrate local religious life within
his domain deeply. This penetration takes different forms in different
communities.
An example would be attitudes toward death rituals. Traditional culture
had always distinguished between auspicious and inauspicious affairs in
terms of purity and pollution. The Confucian ritual tradition has preserved
many taboo regulations that stem from attitudes toward death prevalent in
ancient society. Such taboos continue to be observed by both popular reli-
gious practitioners and Daoists. As a result, in areas dominated by red-head
masters, laypeople regard black-head priests who perform rituals both for
the living and for the dead as impure and will not invite them to perform jiao
offerings, while, in areas served by black-head Daoists, there exists no such
taboo. Such examples show the close fit in a subethnic community between
popular religious notions and form of Daoist practice. In central Taiwan,
such interactions can be observed particularly well as three subethnic groups
live there in close proximity.
Because of the strong roots of shrine Daoists in their respective regions,
naturally the development of shrine networks also happens within that
region. This has not changed in the last fifty years. Important shrines and
famous priests continue to draw their disciples exclusively from their own
subethnic group. Figures of renown in the postwar period are, for example,
Shi Duanhui of the Lugang Shi family for the Quanzhou community, Chen
Qingbiao of the Zhushan Chen family for the Amoy community, and Huang
Qi’nan for the Hakka community. These three men attest to the continuing
vitality of Daoism in their respective subethnic groups. The uncontested
respect that they receive from the other priests in their regions helps bind all
the shrines of that region together into a stable hierarchical network. Such
leading personages have always tended to be located in easily accessible eco-
nomic and cultural centers. In Taiwan’s early period, such centers were port
cities such as Tainan, whose past glories are today still attested by the priestly
Zeng and Chen families (Ding ), and Lugang, where the Shi family’s
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shrine continues to be located (Lee ). In the twentieth century, impor-
tant cities like Taipei and Kaohsiung each can boast several important Daoist
shrines of long standing.3 By contrast, in the sparsely populated and poorer
rural areas, often several villages must share one shrine, or a large village may
support only a handful of small shrines to meet its ritual needs. Thus,
society’s overall economic strength, cultural level, and infrastructural devel-
opment are all intimately related to the training and distribution patterns of
Daoist priests, with a clear difference in density and size of professional
domains between urban and rural areas.
Whatever their subethnic affiliation, Daoist shrines are passed on within
hereditary priestly families. Some of these had already been priestly families
in their mainland districts. Many Taiwanese Daoist families have produced
priests for ten or twenty generations; examples are the Zeng and Chen fami-
lies in Tainan. Important and representative families in central Taiwan, such
as the Shi in Lugang and the Chen in Zhushan, had already opened their
shrines during the Japanese period and can now show a priestly line of five
or six generations. All hereditary priestly families observe very strict rules of
succession and transmission that guarantee their proper qualifications as
much sought after ritual specialists.
A priest’s training takes a long time and must progress in stages. Before
he can understand and chant Daoist scriptures, he must first master the liter-
ary language needed to read and use scriptures and memorials. He must be
familiar with music (of the nanguan or beiguan style) and will, as an acolyte,
be expected to accompany the liturgy offstage and to participate in the local
temple’s music troupe. Thus, he acquires and demonstrates his mastery of
folklore, art, and literature. It is for this reason that Japanese-period scholars
studying occupation groups placed Daoist priests among the nine high-
ranking professions (shang jiuliu) (Suzuki , –). In the postwar edu-
cation system, the new generation of Daoist priests usually obtained senior
high school or senior vocational school degrees so as to be able to master the
classical language of the scriptures. Thus, in modern as in traditional times,
an elevated intellectual standard is applied to candidates for the Daoist
priesthood, giving the priesthood a scholarly reputation and justifying their
appellation as “xiansheng” (Master). This respectful term of address
expresses the priest’s professional identity and his social status. Standing in
an ancient tradition of sacrificial officials and religious functionaries to the
present day, the Daoist priest commands a certain respect in local society
and maintains his special religious status.
The priest’s training had always been a private endeavor outside the for-
mal education system, but, in , the Daoist Assembly of the Republic of
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China established the Daoist Academy (Daojiao Xueyuan) in an attempt to
adapt Protestant, Catholic, and Buddhist methods of advanced training for
Daoists. Such a seminary-style education system has so far not exerted a
significant attraction among Daoist priests and provides mainly basic
instruction for managers of local temples affiliated with the Daoist associa-
tions. The priesthood continues to hold on to its master-disciple system,
where, in a religious tradition requiring respect for the teacher and the Dao,
they accept disciples for training in accordance with the actual needs of
society. Some priests even still maintain the prohibition against teaching
anyone not of their own surname, stretching that rule at most for affinal
relatives, if at all. The Huang family is an example of such a strict attitude.
Such selectiveness is traditional in Daoism. Over the centuries, it hindered
the wide spread of the Daoist teachings through society while helping sup-
port the priesthood’s image and standing as ritual specialists. After the war,
this secretive and selective attitude on the part of the Daoist priesthood
ceded a large space on Taiwan’s religious landscape to the Buddhist clergy
and new religious movements from the mainland, which occupied it with
their congregational-style religious associations. However, in areas where the
structures of subethnic territorial organization are still intact, the Daoist
shrine remains a center in relation to which the community defines its
religious territory. In these religious territories, a reciprocal relationship
continues to exist between the Daoist priests, on the one hand, and the local
temples and the common people, on the other.
Among each other, the priests must observe rules of professional conduct
that require them to delimit their catchment area among their subethnic and
territorial community. As they maintain a certain distance from the areas of
their colleagues, distinct “professional domains” come into being. With the
economic boom in postwar Taiwan, it was unavoidable that these traditional
rules of conduct should, on occasion, be challenged, and conflicts over
encroachments on the domains of others erupted. However, if we look at the
distribution of domains in central Taiwan, we find that, generally speaking,
the coastal, mountain, and Hakka regions still represent distinct Daoist
areas and that the hierarchical relations defined by family tradition and
teacher-disciple relationships continue to be respected. In the midst of a
mobile society, the Daoist priesthood remains a stable occupation group
whose territorial organization continues to function along traditional lines.
In sum, the close mutual relationship between shrine Daoists and settler
communities, the highly regulated nature of the internal transmission of
professional knowledge, and the increase in the number of shrines and
priests all have a mutually stabilizing effect. Social change has not destroyed
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these cultural conditions, and the priesthood has, therefore, preserved its
traditional characteristics to the present day. Given its dependence on
hereditary succession, the priestly profession has been affected to a certain
extent by the general pluralization of society and the diversification of career
options, but the great majority of shrines are still able to produce a new
generation of priests in accordance with the needs of their professional
domains. It is a traditional and stable calling within a world of rapidly
changing professions. The stability of professional domains and identity
indicates that Daoist teachings and rituals still have a function to fulfill in
contemporary society and will not be simply replaced by new religious
movements. Whereas the changes experienced by Daoism on the mainland
were the result of active suppression, the changes in Taiwanese Daoism after
 represented active adaptations to rapid social change, designed to assure
that Daoism will continue to play its social role on the religious stage in the
new century.
PRIESTLY PROFESSIONAL DOMAINS AND 
SUBETHNIC GROUPS IN CENTRAL TAIWAN
Scholars customarily divide the ritual styles of Taiwanese Daoists into a
northern and a southern type (Liu ), and relatively detailed case studies
have been produced for each of these styles. It might be expected that one
would find in central Taiwan a mixture of these two styles, but, in reality, no
such mixture takes place. There exist three ritual traditions linked to the
Quanzhou, Amoy, and Hoklo-Hakka communities, and each of these pre-
serves its own traditions in a fairly conservative manner. The explanation for
this phenomenon lies in the roles played by competition and cooperation in
the formation of the priesthood’s professional domains as, under conditions
of economic pressure, Daoist priests widened their catchment areas and kept
caps on the numbers of Daoist shrines. If, in addition, one takes into account
the historical processes of the formation of subethnic communities in
central Taiwan, one discovers that the priests’ professional domains are com-
pletely coextensive with the settlers’ territories—concrete evidence for the
close connectedness of Daoist shrines and subethnic groups.
Central Taiwan’s subethnic distribution pattern differs from that of
the north and the south, but here too it is the cultural characteristics of the
mainland places of origin that give an area its subethnic specificity. The
coastal culture of Quanzhou is found in Taiwan in the “maritime band”
stretching over the three coastal counties of Taichung, Changhua, and
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Yunlin. In this area, Lugang was once an important harbor, along with
Beigang (formerly called Ben’gang), situated to the south—proving the rule
that harbors are distributed evenly at fairly regular distances from each
other along the Taiwanese coast (Dai , ). As a result of a number of
factors—for example, the cultural background of Quanzhou inhabitants,
the early time of their migration to Taiwan, and such historical events as the
activities of Shi Lang— percent of Lugang’s population consists of Quan-
zhou descendants, a condition that is favorable to the establishment of
Quanzhou-affiliated Daoist shrines. The Quanzhou ritual traditions were
introduced by Zhuang Yi, Yang Caiyuan, and Yang Tongbao and were trans-
mitted to the Shi family, which made the priesthood its hereditary profes-
sion. At present, Shi Duanhui (Shi Dingsheng) represents the family’s
tradition in the fifth generation. His life illustrates the traditional nature of
the teacher-disciple system in the time of transition from Japanese to Kuo-
mintang rule.
According to family genealogical records, the Shi had not been a priestly
family in their mainland home district of Qianjiang (modern Shishi) but
received the Daoist ritual methods from priests called Zhuang (unknown
origin) and Yang (of Anxi county). Among the Yang family, Yang Yixian
(–) in the third generation was the most famous, attracting disciples
from the Quanzhou immigrant–settled areas of Wuqi (Li Yi), Hemei (Chen
Jun, Hong Ji), Fu’an village in Xiushui district (Lin Benlian), and Baozhong
in Yunlin (Cai Yushi). All these priests were of Quanzhou background, but
their shrines were all separated by a certain distance. Li Yi, for example, later
transmitted his teachings to Liao Zhonglian of Qingshui in Taichung county,
while Cai Yushi developed his work in the Yunlin area. Each was careful to
develop his own professional domain in such a way that their territories
would not overlap. Yang Yixian allowed overlap with his own domain in the
case of the Shi family. Having married Shi Yue, the daughter of the third-
generation Shi Xueli (–), Yang passed on his teachings to the Shi
family on the strength of this affinal relation and because his own children
chose other lines of work. As a result, four outstanding priests emerged in the
fifth generation of the Shi family: in addition to Shi Jinsang, who inherited
his father Shi Jiaomiao’s Hunyuan shrine, there were now Shi Duanhui, who
established the Dazhen shrine, Shi Jinluan (Daoist name: Dingjiong), who
established the Shouzhen shrine, and Shi Yiwan, who established the
Baozhen shrine. It is highly unusual for a family to produce four priests in
one generation. In this case, it was made possible by the stable and prosper-
ous social conditions that developed in Taiwan after the war.
These fifth-generation priests continued to transmit their knowledge
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within the family, a line of transmission that has now reached the seventh
generation. In addition, they extended their teaching beyond the family so
as to broaden their influence. This generation became active during the time
that the Celestial Master Zhang Enpu made strong efforts to reorganize the
Zhengyi school; they all received their investiture from him and, thus, carry
the generational name “ding.” Shi Duanhui was publicly recognized as high
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priest (daozhang) and, at one point, organized the shrines of his family and
others into a hierarchical network. These were prosperous years in which
Daoists actively developed their professional domains. Shi Duanhui took
two disciples outside his own family: Chen Wuchang of Xiushui district and
He Jian of Lugang. Chen’s native Xiushui district is outside Lugang and con-
forms to the rule of an appropriate distance from one’s master’s domain. He
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Jian, however, came from within Shi Duanhui’s own domain of Lugang; the
fact that Shi accepted He as a disciple is evidence of the great public demand
for the priests’ ritual services in the decades after the war, which required and
allowed an increase in the number of priests in Lugang. During this period
of expansion, the Shi family still limited itself principally to the coastal
regions settled by the descendants of Quanzhou immigrants, with whom
they shared linguistic, religious, and cultural ties.
Two other case examples of the postwar development of Daoist pro-
fessional domains are provided by the Chen family’s Gongzhao shrine in
Zhushan and the Li family’s Puzhao shrine in Ershui, both of which are part
of the mountain shrines, as against coastal shrines such as the Shi family’s.
Just like the Shis, the Chens had not followed a Daoist calling in their main-
land home district. Their priestly tradition goes back to their ancestor Chen
Shang, who during the Qing period traveled to the mainland to take the
civil-service examination, failed, and, instead, studied Daoist ritual at Amoy.
After Chen Shang, the succession was interrupted under the pressures of the
Japanese Occupation, until, in the third generation, Chen Qingbiao went to
Beidou to study and receive ordination from Chen Liangjin. Just as his con-
temporary Shi Duanhui, Chen Qingbiao profited from the favorable condi-
tions that emerged after the war, developing his considerable talents, and
establishing a domain for himself in the villages along the mountain ranges.
And, just like Shi Duanhui, he is widely acknowledged both within and with-
out the priesthood as an accomplished high priest. His Daoist name is
Faben, which he received, not from the Celestial Master, but from his master
at Beidou, illustrating the importance of regional networks of shrines in the
transmission of the priesthood in addition to succession within hereditary
families. The Beidou region is divided up between the eastern school of
Chen Liangjin and the western school of Xu Dong, both of them accom-
plished practitioners whose professional domains have, however, remained
limited to their locality. One reason for this is their selectiveness in choosing
students; another is the fact that the Beidou area is hemmed in between the
mountain and the coastal regions and, thus, relatively difficult to develop,
with the result that they could not achieve the high profile that Chen Qing-
biao attained.
Zhushan is inhabited by Zhangzhou immigrants, who settled in the
plains and foothills close to the mountain ranges (Chuang , ). The
main religious influences in Nantou county, of which Zhushan is a part, are
the Daoist ritual tradition of the Amoy system and a lay Buddhist tradition,
which is represented, for example, in the township of Caotun. There are sev-
eral reasons for Chen Qingbiao’s enormous influence in Daoist circles of the
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region. The first factor is family tradition. Three of the four sons from his
main wife and two sons by concubines followed in his footsteps. At present,
the tradition is being carried on among his grandsons (Lee c). The sec-
ond factor is that he took a large number of students from outside the family,
eight altogether, some from Zhushan, others from Ershui, Erlin, Tianwei,
and Mingjian. Most of these have established their domains at the required
distance from Chen’s. Zhushan itself is large and prosperous enough to
accommodate several Daoist shrines whose domains extend out from the
town to the surrounding mountain regions. The present-day Zhushan high
priest, Chen Dongcheng, has also trained seven or eight disciples, indicating
the prosperous state of the Daoist priesthood in this geographically self-
enclosed area, which has developed its own network of shrines.
Among Chen Qingbiao’s disciples, Li Junqing of Ershui and Li Jun-
zhong of Zhushan are related to him by marriage. The Li family originates
from Tong’an county in Quanzhou prefecture, which is today part of Amoy
and, hence, close in background to the Chen family’s Amoy ritual tradition.
The distance between Zhushan township in Nantou county and the Ershui
district in Changhua county is just right: close enough to build a teacher-
disciple link, yet distant enough that the teacher’s and student’s domains will
not conflict. The Li family’s Daoist history goes back to Li Jie, who first estab-
lished the Puzhao shrine. By the third generation, three sons practiced as
priests, and marriage links with the Chen family had been established. In the
fourth generation, Li Jinwu married Chen Qingbiao’s younger sister. Inter-
marriage among Daoist families is partly due to their shared background of
occupational culture, but considerations of the possibility of exchange of
professional secrets by way of the affinal relationship always also play a
major role. When, in the Li family’s third generation, the oldest son, Li
Chuanshou, moved to Zhushan to set up his Tongxuan shrine, he already
had a close relationship with the Chen family. The Li family’s genealogical
records are not clear on whether it already followed the priestly calling back
in its home county of Tong’an, but it is clear that its Puzhao shrine was estab-
lished earlier than Chen Shang’s shrine and that, therefore, the Li family’s
Daoist expertise was transmitted separately from that of the Chens. Thus,
the affinal relationship between the Lis and the Chens as it developed in the
third and fourth generations was an alliance between equals that was reaf-
firmed and strengthened by the fifth-generation Li Junzhong and Li Jun-
qing’s apprenticeship under Chen Qingbiao.
The Li family of Ershui and the Chen family of Zhushan both have their
domains along the foothills of the mountain range, separated only by the
Zhuoshui river. Chen Qingbiao’s students from Tianwei and Erlin extended
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his area of influence to the north and the west. Chen Dongcheng also has
two disciples from Tianwei, while two others are from Zhushan and the
neighboring Lugu, all areas within the Nantou mountain region. Li Junqing
has extended his sphere of influence westward by teaching eight disciples,
four of whom come from places west of Ershui (Pitou district, Xihu district,
Erlin township, and Dacheng district), all fairly sparsely populated areas of
Changhua county. Among the students of the Li and Chen families, only two
came from within the mountains, where sparsely populated communities
such as Lugu and Xitou cannot support full-fledged Daoist shrines. These
two students came, however, only to learn the mortuary liturgy, which is in
greater practical demand. In this way, a distinctive pattern emerges: shrines
are found in smaller, concentrated domains in population centers and are
much more thinly spread in sparsely populated areas.
Interspersed throughout the domains of the mountain Daoists are vil-
lages inhabited by Hoklo-Hakka. In the early settlement period, Hakka
immigrants participated in the opening up of the Changhua plain and,
later, gradually settled in homogeneous village communities in districts
such as Puxin, Pitou, and Zhutang (Shi ; Xu ). These villages were
small and were surrounded by Zhangzhou communities; they formed
“dialect islands” in which the Hakka language gradually adopted more and
more Hokkien or, more precisely, Zhangzhou dialect elements.4 Although
dialect and culture are linked, the religious life in these Hoklo-Hakka areas
still follows a traditional Hakka pattern, with temples to the Hakka patrons,
the Kings of the Three Mountains (Sanshan Guowang), being the most
numerous (Liu ). The same specificity is also apparent among the
priesthood in these Hakka areas, where a red-head Daoist priesthood prac-
tices a combination of the Zhengyi and Sannai schools (the so-called Dual
School). Present-day representatives of this Daoist tradition are the Cai and
Huang families of Pitou district. The Cai family’s Daoist tradition likely has
been transmitted within the family for many generations. Early gazetteers
speak of the activities of “Hakka masters” and “red-head masters” in this
area, and the Cai family’s Daoist techniques stand squarely in this red-head
tradition.
Wherever it appears in Taiwan, the Dual School can be traced back to the
south of Zhangzhou prefecture and the east of Guangdong province. Areas
in Taiwan where this tradition can be found include Taipei (county and city),
Ilan (Yilan) county, and the Hakka areas of Taoyuan, Hsinchu (Xinzhu), and
Miaoli in the north. In central Taiwan, in addition to the areas of Changhua
county already mentioned, there is the Taichung region, represented by the
Zeng family of Fengyuan. On the other side of the Zhuoshui river, there are
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the Hakka areas of Xiluo, Erlun, and Lunbei of Yunlin county, with the Tian
family’s shrine located in Erlun. The Hakka shrine Daoists in central Taiwan
specialize mainly in the red-head rituals of destiny correction and never
perform rituals for the dead. As a fairly large-scale ritual they perform the
jiao. Their liturgies are in the style of the “Hakka masters,” clearly setting
them apart from the surrounding Zhangzhou communities, which mostly
employ black-head Daoists. The Hakka red-head tradition is fairly self-
contained, and the domains of their priests tend to be limited to Hoklo-
Hakka areas, resulting again in a close fit between subethnic identity and
shrine distribution.
During the Japanese period, the red-head masters’ healing rituals suf-
fered considerable repression from the colonial authorities and flourished
again only after the war. The current priestly families can trace their Daoist
history back to the end of the Qing period, when the second-generation
scion of the Pitou Cai family, Cai Yangliu, instructed Huang Guoxing. Zeng
Hezhou, a fourth-generation member of the Zeng family in Fengyuan,
taught numerous disciples, including Huang Zanchen of the Xitun area in
Taichung city and Xu Qingxian of Beitun in Taichung. After the war, the
fifth-generation Zeng Rongjie also was a famous master, who took Zeng
Ziyu, Lai Yunta of Taichung, and others as disciples, again broadening the
domain of the Dual School in Taichung. He also acted as an innovator by
using Hokkien in his ritual performances, thus dropping the clear subethnic
identification of his tradition, an example that shows the development possi-
bilities in an urban environment. Representative examples of the rural red-
head tradition are the brothers Huang Qi’nan and Huang Qikun. Huang
Qi’nan’s accomplishments are widely recognized among the priesthood,
but, owing to the remoteness of his native Pitou district, he did not have as
much of an influence on the many Taichung shrines as the Zeng family of
Fengyuan did. It seems clear that, under the social and economic conditions
of postwar Taiwan, urban shrines found it relatively easier to expand their
domains.
The transmission methods of the Zengs of Fengyuan and of the Cais and
Huangs of Pitou exemplify the differences between an urban and a rural
context, with economic and social potential within the respective profes-
sional domains playing a key role. Both groups belong to the Dual School
tradition and maintain secrecy in their transmission. The Zeng family has
produced outstanding priests through two generations and, owing to its
location, was able to adopt a fairly open policy in selecting disciples. Origi-
nally, the Zeng family limited its domain to the Hakka areas of Dongshi and
Fengyuan. Later, the Hakka population of Fengyuan decreased while the
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Hokkien population increased, a development to which the Hakka shrines
reacted by starting to use Hokkien in their liturgies. The Zeng family also
actively participated in the activities of the local temples, adapting them-
selves successfully to the new environment. After two generations of trans-
mission outside their family, the Zengs’ domain has now expanded to include
Taichung city and neighboring areas. By comparison, the Cai and Huang
families cooperate with each other and rarely transmit their methods to
others. If a student from another family is accepted, there usually exists an
affinal link to the Cais or the Huangs, as in the case of Huang Yuanqi of Zhu-
tang, who received instruction after marrying Huang Qi’nan’s daughter. As
a result, the professional domain of the Huangs and Cais remains restricted
to the traditional Hakka villages of Pitou, Zhutang, and some adjacent areas.
This overview of the three shrine networks, coastal, mountain, and
Hoklo-Hakka, shows their close overlap with the distribution of subethnic
groups in central Taiwan. Daoist priests and local communities continue to
exist in a reciprocal relationship, where the local population will turn to a
priest of the same subethnic background for its ritual needs. A priest’s terri-
tory may grow or diminish over time, but it will rarely cross the borderlines
between subethnic communities. The concept “professional domain”
describes the results of the historical process of the priesthood’s professional
transmission and development and also reveals the unbreakable link in the
secular existence of nonmonastic Daoism between Daoist shrines, commu-
nity temples, and local communities, a link that is based on a religious
culture united by a shared belief system. As the rich ethnographic data from
central Taiwan show, shrine Daoists adapt to the conditions of their locality
and use family transmission and transmission through master-disciple rela-
tionships to form their own professional domains. In this way, an implicit
system of religious territories is created. Although the ancient parish system
of the Zhengyi school has long since vanished, the domains staked out by
shrine Daoists continue to provide a comparable framework for Daoist
practice. The distribution of Zhengyi shrines reveals a structural order in
religious culture without which the complex settlement history of central
Taiwan, and, indeed, Chinese society, cannot be properly understood.
CONCLUSION
Its nonmonastic way of life has allowed the Zhengyi school to form its own
sectarian identity in Fujian and Guangdong and has enabled it to develop an
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autonomous domain for itself in the settler society of Taiwan. The examples
from central Taiwan are good evidence for this. The shrine priesthood is a
religious profession in a category of its own. Whereas clerics of other world
religions—Christian priests or ministers, for example—draw a salary that
enables them to devote themselves full-time to their ministry, Daoist priests
do not. They also do not have the existential security enjoyed by Buddhist
clergy, who, thanks to lay support, can give their undivided attention to
working for the salvation of sentient beings. Because Zhengyi priests must
live among the lay population, they must take extra care to transmit their
professional knowledge in a secret manner and to maintain their liturgical
skills. As another consequence of their nonmonastic way of life, they must
maintain a delicate balance of competition and cooperation with their col-
leagues. For these reasons, shrine Daoists as a rule deliberately restrict the
transmission of their professional knowledge and skills either to sons and
other male blood and affinal relatives or to selected nonrelated disciples. The
priest’s function as an intermediary between humans and spirits is solidly
based on his religious and cultural identification with his subethnic group.
As a result, even the postwar modernization and rationalization of the
people’s way of life has not rendered the Daoist priest obsolete. Under con-
ditions of economic prosperity and the spread of education, shrine Daoists
have engaged modernity by cultivating and maintaining a refined tradition
even while responding to modern knowledge.
Taiwanese society is undergoing a process of rapid modernization that
already has produced fundamental changes, for example, raising living
standards dramatically. In the midst of these changes, nonmonastic Daoism
continues to transmit a traditional spiritual and religious culture. Under the
strong pressures exerted by the modernizing policies of both the Japanese
colonial and the Kuomintang governments, Daoists have preserved their
scriptures, teachings, myths, and rituals completely intact. This power to
resist change is founded on the continuity of the views of cosmos and spirits
in the national culture, essential cultural structures that have not been
fundamentally altered by the modern technological civilization. Because
religious beliefs deal with the afterlife and destiny, tradition here has a
considerable staying power that causes people, and especially local commu-
nities as a whole, to turn to it whenever they face these ultimate concerns.
The impact of science and technology, rationalism and empiricism, on the
spiritual and religious culture represented by Daoism has, therefore, not
been as great as expected by scholars during the early-Republican period.
After fifty years of official propagation of science and Western culture, it is
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time to encourage the modern individual to refamiliarize himself or herself
with nonmonastic Daoism. In the socially integrative functions of its teach-
ings and their realization in ritual, or in the physical and mental experiences
of personal cultivation, one may discover a religious experience that modern
consciousness lacks.
Daoist beliefs and customs and the social life of local communities are
closely linked. The rituals performed by shrine Daoists are concrete expres-
sions of the local people’s religious life. They had an important sociocultural
function to fulfill in traditional society, and they continue to wield the
authority to solve life problems for people in modern society. Whether they
operate from their own shrines or cooperate with a local temple, shrine
Daoists have always been and continue to be a force of social integration.
Studies conducted by sociologists and anthropologists show that, to the
present day, there exists no substitute for the priesthood’s sociocultural
function of symbolically uniting the local community by means of its rituals.
With his authority to conduct and interpret ritual for the common people
undiminished, the Daoist priest can provide a system of meanings based on
the traditional national culture that helps alleviate the experience of alien-
ation accompanying modernization, thus becoming a provider of spiritual
healing. The people’s religious attitudes are not to be considered “super-
stitious” because they are based in a deep-seated cultural ethos whose
religious spirit endows these beliefs with authentic meaning for the masses.
In postwar Taiwanese society, the waves of modernization and the
emphasis on science, technology, and democratic culture imported from the
West have brought about vast changes in political, economic, and social life.
Amid this ground swell of change, the national and religious culture repre-
sented by Daoism has proved its adaptability, showing that this ancient reli-
gion possesses the cultural resources to innovate and change, that it has the
tenacity and vitality needed to survive, and that it can do so while preserving
its essential values intact. Every nation has its own religious traditions, and
China’s national religion is Daoism. Must nonmonastic Daoism eventually
compromise with the modern way of life in order to survive? For a highly
conservative tradition such as Daoism, it will take further study in order
truly to understand its specific religious and cultural nature. The reason why
shrine Daoists have been able to preserve their teachings to the present day
surely is that this ancient nation seeks to employ the symbolism of religious
ritual to stabilize and transmit its worldview and spiritual values. This truly
is a traditional religious culture within a modern society.
154
06Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:53 AM  Page 154
Daoist  Pr iesthood and Secular  Society
NOTES
1. I have recently concluded a three-year research project (–) at the Academia
Sinica on “The Transmission of Daoist Shrines and Local Beliefs and Customs.” In
connection with this project, I have authored papers on Lugang (Lee ), the Hakka
priesthood (Lee ), and the Chen and Li families (Lee c).
2. I will treat the origins of the Fuzhou Chanhe school and its development in Taiwan
in a separate paper.
3. On Taipei shrines, see Liu () and Lee ().
4. Huang Xuanfan drew attention to the issue of “dialect islands” (fangyandao) and their
relation to Hakka communities in his work on the disappearance of the Hakka dialect
islands in central Taiwan (see Huang , –).
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role in processes of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Inter-
ventions by the Catholic Church in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, the Philippines
(Casper ), South Korea, and Poland, and by various Protestant denomi-
nations from South Africa to East Asia, have raised new questions about the
role played by religious organizations in regime change (Smith ). In
Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church stood at the forefront of the struggle for
democratization during the s and s (see Rubinstein, chapter  in this
volume). However, despite their remarkable achievements in the areas of
education, welfare provision, and charity—not to mention proselytizing—
and despite the fact that they are far more numerous than their Christian
compatriots (Zhong , –),1 Buddhists did not play a comparable
role in the process of transition to democracy in Taiwan. One is left with the
impression that Buddhists were at best indi¥erent to politics and at worst
hostile to democratization. The present essay questions these propositions
by documenting the political beliefs and behaviors adopted by Chinese Bud-
dhist organizations in Taiwan since .
This discussion concentrates on the relation between the Kuomintang
(or Guomindang; hereafter KMT), the ruling party in Taiwan until Chen
Shuibian’s election to the presidency in March , and three prominent
organizations a≤liated with the Chinese school of Mahayana Buddhism.
These organizations represent three of the most important Buddhist orga-
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nizations in Taiwan. The first, the Buddhist Association of the Republic of
China (Zhongguo Fojiaohui; hereafter BAROC), benefited from its status as
the sole representative of Buddhists in Taiwan until the s. Although it
sought to avoid conflict with the government, it nonetheless forcefully
lobbied for the defense of Buddhist interests. The two other organizations,
the monastic order Foguangshan (Buddha Light Mountain) and the charity
organization Ciji Gongdehui (Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foun-
dation; hereafter Ciji), have grown since their foundation in  to become
the two largest Buddhist organizations in Taiwan. Notably, their strategies
for promoting political participation and democratic consolidation are
strikingly di¥erent. While Foguangshan supported the candidacy of the lay
Buddhist Chen Lü’an—a former member of the KMT and ex-defense
minister—for the presidency of the Republic of China (ROC) in , Ciji
maintained a position of strict neutrality. However, before moving to a
detailed examination of these three organizations’ political views and
behavior, I first outline their shared background.
CHINESE BUDDHIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE
The perceived indi¥erence of Taiwanese Buddhists toward politics stems
from a widespread perception that the Buddhist tradition rejects worldly
a¥airs.2 However, Buddhist practices in China, from which Taiwanese
traditions are derived, suggest otherwise. The Chinese Buddhist monastic
community has developed a close relationship with political authorities
since at least the Three Kingdoms era (–), when it rendered services
to rulers in north China in the form of military and diplomatic counsel
(Ch’en , –). Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty (–) went the fur-
thest by relying on Buddhism as an ideology to unify the empire (Ch’en ,
). Although Buddhism did not benefit from the same treatment during
the Tang dynasty (–), the saΩgha remained close to the imperial
household, the nobility, and wealthy great families (Ch’en , ). Inti-
mate connections between the saΩgha and some factions in the imperial
court, however, made Buddhists vulnerable to persecution during struggles
for power. From the Song dynasty (–) onward, the political influence
of the saΩgha on secular rulers diminished (Ch’en , ). In contrast to
the deferential attitude adopted by the orthodox clergy, heterodox Buddhist
sects with lay memberships became politically active during the Yuan
dynasty (–), and some were even involved in antidynastic rebellions
(Yang [] , ; Chesneaux , –).
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The political involvement of these Buddhist associations was, however,
limited. Overmyer () has demonstrated that most Buddhist syncretic
sects were distinct from secret societies and “triads” that used religion as a
cover for political, and often subversive, activities. Harrell and Perry ()
have indicated that a majority of the syncretic religious groups—including
heterodox Buddhist organizations—were strictly pietistic. When these
groups pursued political activities, it was often for purely religious reasons,
such as ensuring their survival in the face of government persecution. Put
di¥erently, even when the o≤cial saΩgha subordinated itself to secular rulers,
Buddhist devotees in traditional China were occasionally compelled to
participate in antidynastic political activities.
From the second half of the nineteenth century until the s, Chinese
Buddhists faced a series of challenges that compelled members of the saΩgha
and lay devotees to become involved politically (Welch , ). In reaction
to land confiscation, requisition of their property by bureaucrats, and use of
their temples as barracks by warlords, the KMT, or the Japanese, many Bud-
dhists adopted a three-tiered strategy. They attempted to create a series of
associations that would serve as a lobby for the saΩgha, establish a strong lay
movement on which the saΩgha could rely for support, and set up an
education system that would train monks to spread the faith (Welch ,
–). One of these monks, the Venerable Taixu (–), would later
exercise a considerable influence on the development of Buddhism in
Taiwan. He proposed both a greater role for the laity and other reforms that
generated opposition on the part of a majority within the saΩgha.3 The
influence of Taixu during his lifetime was, notes Welch (, ), limited.
However, his legacy has marked the development of Buddhism in Taiwan for
decades through the activism of his disciples.
Contemporary Buddhism in Taiwan has also been influenced to varying
degrees by the successive legacies of the precolonial era on the island, the
period of Japanese rule (–), and post-Retrocession times. Before
Japanese rule, religious activity in Taiwan di¥ered from that on mainland
China because of the status of the island as a frontier territory. Sung Kwang-
yu has emphasized that there were no orthodox Chinese Buddhist organi-
zations in Taiwan during the Qing era and that only a few monks from
southern Fujian came to administer Taiwanese temples (see Sung , ).
Jordan and Overmyer (, –) have noted the presence of voluntary
organizations rather than kin groups in Qing Taiwan and pointed to the
existence of lay Buddhist organizations known as Zhaijiao characterized by
their vegetarian diets and strict morality. These movements di¥ered from
subsequent mass Buddhist organizations, even though, until the onset of
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Japanese administration, one of the major sects, the Dragon Flower sect
(Longhua Jiao), possessed thirteen temples and sixty-eight “vegetarian halls”
located in the counties of Taichung (Taizhong), Hsinchu (Xinzhu), and
Taoyuan (Sung , –). Seaman (, ) has observed that these
religious organizations created networks and associations involved in local
political activity.
Although the Japanese administration in Taiwan adopted a policy of
cultural assimilation through the Japanization and the temple-restructuring
movements (documented by Jones and by Katz [chapters  and  in this
volume]), Chinese Buddhist institutions in Taiwan managed to retain their
identity (Jones , ). Far more important for the future of Buddhism
in Taiwan was the  February incident (er er ba shijian) of , which pitted
those Taiwanese born on the island before the  retrocession of Taiwan
to China against those who came from the mainland after that date.4 Since
Rubinstein (chapter  in this volume) discusses this tragedy in detail, I
simply note the consequences of it for the Buddhist community. In the
wake of the repression against native Taiwanese elites, local monastic and lay
Buddhists felt that it was more prudent to join the pan-Chinese BAROC,
which had just been reconstituted on the mainland. Taiwanese Buddhists
were aware of the dangers that they faced if they appeared to support greater
autonomy for Taiwanese institutions and felt the need to convince the
authorities of their loyalty in order to ensure their own survival (Jones
a, –). Taiwanese Buddhist institutions would become completely
superseded by the BAROC as a result of this decision, when, in the wake of
the KMT retreat to Taiwan, the latter relocated its headquarters in Taipei.
In the confusion following the exodus of the defeated KMT government
to the island in , relations between Buddhist monks and the KMT were
tense. Members of the saΩgha seeking refuge in Taiwan were suspected of
espionage activities and arrested. After local authorities found out that many
monks lacked proper household registration on the mainland, General Chen
Cheng, the governor of Taiwan province, ordered their arrest under the
provision of a decree concerning homeless people (Jones a, chap. ; see
also Jiang ). The ruling party also harassed and criticized the Venerable
Yinshun (–), the most prominent disciple of Taixu to relocate to Taiwan.
According to Jiang Canteng, a historian of Buddhism in Taiwan, military
authorities believed that a text written by Yinshun, “Fofa gailun” (A broad-
ranging discussion on the dharma), was pro-Communist (Jiang , ).
The government, however, had overreacted: Yinshun’s intentions were
purely religious and his views more conservative than Taixu’s reformism.
Yinshun advocated the propagation of early Mahayana teachings because, in
161
07Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:55 AM  Page 161
A N D R É  L A L I B E R T É
his mind, they constituted the best of the tradition of Renjian Fojiao (This-
Worldly Buddhism).5 Yinshun thus promoted a return to what he saw as the
fundamentals of the Buddhist tradition and never went as far as Taixu, who
had supported radical political trends. Authorities’ suspicions about Bud-
dhists eventually disappeared as they came to realize that monks from the
continent shared their anti-Communist leanings and could be a useful
instrument in the e¥ort to eliminate Taiwanese nativist sentiments. During
the two decades following the arrival of the KMT on the island, therefore,
the saΩgha could quietly pursue its activities under the—theoretically, as we
will see later—unchallenged guidance of the BAROC.
From the mid-s, however, several developments within the saΩgha
overturned this quiet state of a¥airs and simultaneously heightened the
profile of Buddhism in Taiwan. As the corporatist structure of the govern-
ment gradually loosened under the rule of Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jing-
guo), monks and nuns claiming a spiritual a≤liation with Taixu or Yinshun
undertook several endeavors in areas that were hitherto the preserve of the
BAROC. Among the most famous of these activists were the Venerable
Xingyun, the founding abbot of Foguangshan and its lay o¥shoot, the Guoji
Foguanghui (Buddha Light International Association); the Venerable
Zhengyan, the nun who established Ciji; and the Venerable Shengyan, the
founder of Fagushan (Dharma Drum Mountain). Today, the leaders of these
organizations, and those of many smaller ones, are involved in higher edu-
cation as well as in such charitable e¥orts as raising money for rehabilitation
programs (Yun ) and providing support to victims of natural disasters
(such as the deadly earthquake of September ). A few, such as the
Venerable Zhaohui, are even involved in environmental-protection and anti-
nuclear protest movements.
In conjunction with these changes in the saΩgha, the number of lay
Buddhist devotees has increased rapidly since the mid-s. In , the
National Science Council of the ROC sponsored an islandwide survey the
results of which suggested that Buddhist followers represented . percent
of the population (GIO , ). By , according to statistics issued by
the Interior Ministry,  percent of the population identified themselves as
Buddhists. Data collected from scientific surveys, however, suggest that less
than  percent of the population could be considered devout practitioners
(Zhang and Lin , ). The enormous discrepancy between these num-
bers suggests that the label “Buddhism” is becoming prestigious in Taiwan
(“Religions in Taiwan Today” ). This expansion of Buddhist financial
wealth and social activism, the increase in the number of adherents, and
growing prestige at home and abroad, in particular in the last three decades,
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known as the “Taiwan Miracle,” represent some of the most important
aspects of religious change in Taiwan since World War II. In many respects,
it embodies the phenomenon of “economic encompassment” described by
Jochim (chapter  in this volume).
The transformations within the Buddhist community during the s
have made the saΩgha a much sought after constituency among politicians
in Taiwan. In particular, members of the KMT governing elite have courted
many famous monks for reasons that go beyond mere electoral considera-
tions, as will be documented below. Genuine concern for moral renewal,
pragmatic foreign-policy objectives, as well as the search for alternatives to
state-run social welfare have all played their part in the calculations of
government o≤cials. One characteristic of the Buddhist community that has
especially endeared it to established politicians is its perceived moderating
influence. As such, the saΩgha represented an important ally for the KMT
regime in its e¥ort to complete a democratic transition without being dis-
placed from power. However, the putative influence exercised by Buddhist
organizations notwithstanding, the saΩgha could not prevent the decline of
the ruling party, which culminated in  when the KMT candidate for the
ROC presidency, Lian Zhan, came in third and the candidate of the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) won. Although the DPP was founded as early
as , most Buddhists have interacted with the KMT. Although many
politicians have left the KMT to establish other parties—the pro-
reunification New Party (NP) in , the People’s First Party (PFP) in ,
and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in —two factors justify the
focus on Taiwanese Buddhist organizations’ relations with KMT politicians
in this discussion about Buddhist political leanings during the late s and
the s. First, Buddhists and NP politicians have yet to develop close rela-
tions, and, second, the creation of the PFP and the TSU is too recent.
The Growth of Pluralism within the KMT
Until the lifting of martial law in , the KMT had maintained an authori-
tarian corporatist control structure in Taiwan. For every sector of society,
only one representative organization was recognized, licensed, or even, in
some cases, established by the ruling party itself. In exchange for exclusive
representation within its respective sector, each organization had to exercise
certain controls on the selection of its leaders and on the articulation of its
demands to the regime. The main function of this structure was to prevent
any challenge to KMT rule or policies (Chu , ). However, with the
adoption in  of a new law on civic organizations, the foundations for a
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pluralist system were put in place. Since that period, Taiwan has experienced
a rapid growth in the number of representative organizations (Gold ,
–). These developments have been facilitated by pressures from within
Taiwanese society and abroad as well as from factional divisions within the
KMT.
Because they had plagued the KMT during its rule on the mainland, the
party had sought to eradicate factions after its arrival in Taiwan. Despite
these attempts to suppress them, however, factions continued to play a role
within the party’s Central Standing Committee (CSC), in local politics, and
in the Legislative Yuan. Between  and , in the immediate aftermath
of the KMT defeat on the continent, Chiang Kai-shek launched a reorgani-
zation campaign to eliminate them within the CSC (Huang , –).
The Taiwanese scholar Chen Mingtong, however, has demonstrated that,
even if the phenomenon could not be acknowledged publicly, factions have
continued to exist during the rule of both Chiang Kai-shek and his son
Chiang Ching-kuo (Chen , –). In local politics, factions were not
only tolerated but actually seen as necessary for the KMT to retain the favor
of local voters (Chen , ). Factionalism over policy issues emerged at
the central level in , when for the first time voters were able to elect their
representatives to the Legislative Yuan. In the run-up to the presidential elec-
tion of , the most significant cleavage within the ruling party pitted a
mainstream faction led by Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui), who advocated a
more Taiwanese-centered policy, against a nonmainstream, conservative
faction led by former governor Lin Yanggang and former premier Hao
Bocun (Cheng and Hsu , –).
The result was a split in the  presidential election, when James
Soong (Song Chuyu), also a former governor, set up his own party, the PFP,
and a second split in the run-up to the legislative election of , when
politicians supporting the mainstream faction of former president Lee quit
the KMT and established the TSU. Even though they led to the creation of
new parties, these intraparty divisions were primarily defined by personal
rivalries among individual leaders rather than by ideological disagreements.
Such cleavages, noted in Gold (, –), a study of the KMT during
earlier stages of party unity, had always made it di≤cult for the ruling party
to impose its views and policies unilaterally. This situation has, in turn,
presented Buddhist organizations with many opportunities to exercise
influence, politicians from all parties and factions competing to receive the
“blessings” of spiritual leaders. Such solicitude has since the s found the
KMT targeting Foguangshan and Ciji over other Buddhist groups because
of their large membership, the prestige of their leaders, and their resources.
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These attempts to cajole Buddhists represented the continuation of an estab-
lished policy of co-opting Buddhists that had been carried on in Taiwan,
through the BAROC, since .
THE BAROC
Until the government voted in the Law on Civic Organizations in , the
BAROC was the o≤cial representative for Buddhists on the island. Since
then, the standing of the association has diminished. In a vain attempt to
stem its continuing decline, the BAROC has since the mid-s tried to
pressure the government into passing legislation that would help it reassert
its authority over Taiwanese Buddhists, but it has met with almost unani-
mous opposition from most other Buddhist organizations. The BAROC dis-
played its preference for the status quo in –, when the association
chose not to support the lay Buddhist candidate Chen Lü’an’s run for the
ROC presidency—despite the fact that Xingyun, Chen’s spiritual mentor
and the founder of Foguangshan, was a member of the association. The
BAROC runs the risk of becoming irrelevant to Taiwanese Buddhists if it
continues to express its loyalty to a diminished KMT.
The Political Behavior of the BAROC
From  to , the fortunes of the BAROC were di¥erent. Then, the
organization benefited from KMT corporatist structures prevailing in the
ROC. The BAROC was expected to follow guidelines dictated by the ruling
party, receiving in exchange the privilege of being the exclusive represen-
tative of Buddhism in Taiwan. The Buddhist association was then required
to transmit instructions from the KMT to members of the saΩgha and lay
devotees and was, in return, mandated to relay the concerns of the whole
Buddhist community to the ruling party. Keeping in mind this legacy, it is
no wonder that the public has long perceived the BAROC as a creation of pre-
vious governments. The association’s charter, which states that the BAROC
must “endorse state policy [yonghu guoce],” both foreign and domestic, has
further confirmed this impression over the years (Zhong , ).
The BAROC has, over the years, expressed its support for the KMT
explicitly, if symbolically, during its performance of an annual ceremony: the
Benevolent Kings Dharma Meeting for the Protection of the Nation and the
Averting of Disaster (Huguo Renwang Xizai Fahui, or Fahui) (Jones a,
). High-ranking members of the executive Yuan—as the executive branch
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of government is known in Taiwan—as well as cadres from the ruling party
have usually attended this highly visible public event, lending legitimacy to
the government.6 In , the BAROC used its legal—if theoretical—status
as the representative of Chinese Buddhists to welcome the Dalai Lama dur-
ing his visit to Taiwan (Zhongfohui kan, no.  [ March ]: ). Although
the friendly exchange of views between President Lee and the Dalai Lama
considerably benefited the government’s e¥ort to court public opinion at
home and overseas, the BAROC gained nothing by its pains.
The BAROC tacitly supports the authorities by avoiding intervention in
controversial issues, which could put it at loggerheads with the KMT. The
BAROC demonstrated such prudence in  when it refused to intervene
in a dispute caused by the attempts of the Taipei city administration—then
still controlled by the KMT—to remove a statue of the Buddhist deity
Guanyin, the Goddess of Mercy, from an area designated as a public park.
While Xingyun, the founder of Foguangshan, and other monks and nuns,
such as Zhaohui, encouraged devotees to fast in protest against the removal
of the statue, the BAROC chose to remain silent on the issue. The dissident
Buddhists won their point in the end, and the statue remains in the park.
Critics saw the episode as proof that the BAROC was overtaken by events
and incapable of representing Buddhists’ true interests (“Buddhist Master
Encourages Strikers” ).7
The BAROC again refused to take a stand on a potentially embarrassing
issue when, in late  and early , it declined to sponsor the candidacy
of Chen Lü’an for the ROC presidency against Lee Teng-hui. This was sur-
prising considering that, a year before, Chen had attended the  Fahui as
a high-ranking member of the KMT and as the president of a central
government body, the Control Yuan (Zhongfohui kan, no.  [ March
]: ).8 Admittedly, the BAROC maintained a position of neutrality by
not o≤cially endorsing any other candidate for the presidency, but it did
welcome President Lee during the  Fahui (Zhongfohui kan, no.  [
March ]: ). Although that event could be construed as a greeting to the
head of state rather than a demonstration of support for a specific candidate,
it should be noted that President Lee attended no other Fahui.
With respect to the external a¥airs of the ROC, the behavior of the
BAROC reinforces the public perception that the association supports the
KMT. For many years, for instance, the BAROC stood behind the anti-
Communist stance of the KMT, joining such international organizations as
the Taipei-based Asian Anti-Communist League (Yazhou Renmin Fangong
Tongmeng). One could argue that the stand taken by the BAROC results
from beliefs genuinely held by members of the saΩgha rather than from
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KMT pressure; the BAROC and the KMT do, after all, see eye to eye as far
as opposition to the Communist regime in the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) is concerned. The BAROC’s agreement with KMT policies has, how-
ever, meant far more than shared opposition to communism. In the inter-
national forums in which it has participated, the BAROC has never criticized
human-rights violations committed by the KMT (against advocates of
Taiwanese self-determination and liberal activists), the way the Presbyterian
Church of Taiwan did during the s.
The assertion that the BAROC serves the interests of the KMT can be
confirmed by the rewards that the Buddhist association has received over the
years in exchange for its cooperation. In the early years of KMT rule in
Taiwan, the BAROC relied on its contacts with members of the government
to ensure that temple property would not be used to house soldiers, would
not be subject to taxation, and would not be a¥ected by land reform (Jones
a, –). In , the BAROC obtained from the central government
the repeal of the Taiwan sheng simiao jizi banli gongyi cishan shiye banfa
(Procedure for handling of funds raised by the public work and charity
undertakings of temples in Taiwan), a bill that implicitly questioned the
honesty of the clergy.9 Finally, in , the BAROC made significant progress
in its e¥orts to get government accreditation of graduate schools set up by
Buddhist organizations, obtaining relevant modifications to the legislation
regulating higher education (Jones a, –).
During the s, however, evidence began to emerge that cooperation
with the government has not always benefited the BAROC, and the existence
of some unresolved issues between the state and the Buddhist association
suggests that the BAROC cannot be considered an organ of the ruling party
(Jones b). This became especially clear in the late s, as the BAROC
found it increasingly di≤cult to obtain positive results from its entreaties to
state o≤cials. In particular, the Buddhist association failed to have the KMT
pass a new law on religion that would have maintained substantial govern-
ment involvement in religious a¥airs and restored its previous privileges as
arbiter among Buddhist organizations (Zhongfohui kan, no.  [ April
]: –). The BAROC has also floundered in its attempt to have the state
adopt another draft law (Fojiaofa cao’an [Draft law on Buddhism]), more
modest in its scope, a¥ecting only Buddhists, but protecting the BAROC’s
interests (see Zhongfohui kan, no.  [ May ]: ;  [ June ]: ).
The government has, rather, sided with other Buddhist organizations, which
have argued that the protection of their tradition does not require inter-
vention from outside the saΩgha (“Zhiding Fojiaofa” ). The indi¥erence
of the KMT in the s toward state supervision of religion contrasted with
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the position it had taken on this issue in previous decades. This change
reflected factional shifts within the KMT brought about by Lee Teng-hui and
a new generation of Taiwan-born members, who found the BAROC’s claims
to represent all Chinese Buddhists (like the claims of the KMT old guard to
represent all of China) irrelevant to contemporary realities.
The Views of BAROC Leaders
The leaders of the BAROC approved the conservative policies upheld by the
KMT before  and still prefer government supervision to self-rule in the
Buddhist community because they adhere to a theology that sustains such
an approach. They see themselves as the keepers of the orthodox faith and
believe that the Buddhist tradition can be transmitted most e¥ectively—
even in today’s environment—if it maintains the traditional orthodox def-
erence to the secular leader. The BAROC leaders have reached this view
because of their relationship with state o≤cials. Despite a few reversals,
cooperation with the government appears to them to be, in the final analy-
sis, the most e≤cient way in which to protect the (conservative) tradition
that they want to uphold. In that particular respect, the BAROC’s leaders
stand apart from most other members of the saΩgha in Taiwan. Under Lee
Teng-hui, the KMT was certainly less amenable to the BAROC’s views, but,
with the return of more conservative politicians to the helm of the former
ruling party, this may change.
The di¥erences between the BAROC and other Buddhist organizations
mirror the disagreements that divided the association until the s. Dur-
ing the Republican era in China, the allegiance of the saΩgha was divided
between the disciples of the reformist Taixu and those of his conservative
opponent, the Venerable Yuanying. The two groups disagreed for decades
about the strategies that Buddhists should use to overcome the threats that
they faced, and their disputes remained unsettled when the BAROC relo-
cated to Taiwan. The reformers led the association until , but, since
then, the traditionalists’ main figure, Baisheng, and his disciples, the Vener-
able Daoyuan, the Venerable Wuming, and the Venerable Jingxin, have
always headed the association (Jones a, –). As Jones (a, )
argued, it should not come as a surprise that, frustrated by the control of the
BAROC by a small group of traditionalist monks, more energetic clerics 
and laypeople, identified with the disciples of Taixu, have decided to work
outside the association.
As long as its leadership remains unable to reflect the current dynamism
of Taiwanese Buddhism, the BAROC’s decline is likely to continue. This pos-
168
07Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:55 AM  Page 168
Rel ig ious Change and Democrat izat ion in  Postwar Taiwan
sibility is further aggravated by the reluctance of the association to reach out
to political parties other than the KMT, whose appeal is deteriorating. To
reverse these trends, the BAROC would have to embrace the reforms
proposed by Taixu, but this is unlikely, considering that the association has
rejected them for the last four decades. Over the last three decades, immensely
popular monks and nuns such as Xingyun, Zhengyan, Shengyan, and others
have explicitly stated their intention to carry out the ideals of Taixu. As a
result, the views of these reformist monks a¥ect an ever-increasing number
of lay Buddhists and active members of the saΩgha outside the BAROC.
Stranded in its conservative ideological position, the association is unable to
develop mass Buddhist support and articulate a more principled political
position than simply o¥ering KMT governments moral encouragement.
Since , when a candidate from the opposition DPP won the ROC presi-
dency, this represents a particularly untenable position.
THE FOGUANGSHAN MONASTIC ORDER
The Foguangshan monastic order is an international organization primarily
devoted to the proselytizing of the particular form of Buddhism taught by
its founder, Xingyun. Foguangshan promotes a version of humanistic
Buddhism that embodies many of the reforms advocated by Taixu, includ-
ing greater lay responsibilities and the legitimacy of political participation
on the part of Buddhists. The e¥orts of Xingyun to develop this brand of
Buddhism in Taiwan have, however, generated considerable controversy
over the years, many having accused him of providing spiritual support to
the government during the period of martial law. In the mid-s, the
founder of Foguangshan appeared to prove these critics wrong by taking a
principled stand against the government. In the final analysis, however, this
stand represented a rearguard advocacy of the status quo ante rather than a
call for further political change.
The Political Behavior of Foguangshan
After barely more than three decades of existence, Foguangshan ranks as one
of the most widely known associations in the ROC. The Government Infor-
mation O≤ce (GIO , ) used to advertise its monastery as one of the
main tourist attractions of the island and as a major center of Buddhist
scholarship in Taiwan. The monastery was closed to the public in 
and has since reverted to its original vocation as a retreat where monks and
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devotees can practice their religion (“Foguang fengshan” ). Over the
years, the temple in the county of Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong) that served as its
headquarters represented a major stopover for visiting foreign dignitaries.
Among the prominent figures staying there were Al Gore, who came in 
while he was still a senator, and the Dalai Lama, who attended a ceremony
during his six-day trip in March  (“Dalai Lama Arrives” ; Fokuang-
shan Buddhist Order , ).10
Besides its purely religious activities, Foguangshan provides health care
and education through an intermediary, the lay a≤liate organization Guoji
Foguanghui. (The most important chapter of the Guoji Foguanghui is led
by a prominent KMT member, Wu Boxiong, the former interior minister
and KMT vice chairman.) To finance its numerous activities in Taiwan and
abroad, Foguangshan relies on the sale of religious paraphernalia, books,
and tapes. The wealth generated by these activities has provoked heated
controversies over the years. People in academe and in the media, as well as
some lay Buddhists in Taiwan, have criticized the monastic order for putting
too much emphasis on the pursuit of wealth and for commercializing
Buddhism. Although these critics do not imply that Foguangshan acquired
wealth through fraud, they believe that Buddhist institutions, as well as
individuals, must embrace a frugal lifestyle.
More important for our purposes, however, some Taiwanese condemn
Xingyun for his relations with previous governments and have, therefore,
labeled him a “political monk.” Some milieus supporting Taiwanese
independence, in particular, have vehemently chastised the monastic order
for its close relations with the KMT when the ruling party persecuted those
advocating Taiwanese self-determination. Passions have sometimes run
high: in , Foguangshan received two terrorist threats, whose authors
were never identified (“Foguangshan shaofang zhi ‘zha’ dan xujing yiyang”
). Xingyun’s close relationship with the KMT remains to this day a  sen-
sitive issue. Criticism has stung so much that the founder of Foguangshan
has felt compelled to respond, as we will see below.
The religious activities of Xingyun have, indeed, served the interests of
many ROC governments very well as a form of informal diplomacy (Fu
, ). For decades, for instance, Xingyun has been instrumental in rein-
stating the ordination of women in countries belonging to the Hinayana
tradition, thereby indirectly helping the KMT present an image of Taiwan as
a progressive country, an important factor when one considers the diplo-
matic isolation of the ROC (“Daughters of the Buddha” ). Foguangshan
also tried to help the KMT in cross-strait relations, either by opening new
channels of communication with the PRC or by scoring propaganda points.
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In , Xingyun hoped to act as an informal mediator when he headed a
delegation of two hundred visiting the PRC. There, he met with the high-
level o≤cials Li Xiannian and Yang Shangkun, in response to an invitation
extended by Zhao Puchu, the head of the Buddhist Association of China (Fu
, –). Xingyun also helped the ROC win points in the contest
between Beijing and Taipei over which regime is more tolerant of religious
diversity. The mutual understanding between Xingyun and the Dalai Lama
contrasted with the lack of flexibility displayed by the PRC authorities.
Xingyun also involves himself in domestic a¥airs. Since , he has
served as a member of the KMT Central Committee (CC) and as an adviser
on party a¥airs. Membership in the CC is, however, essentially honorary: the
CC meets only three days each year, when it elects members of the Central
Standing Committee. As pointed out by his biographer, Xingyun himself
does not know for sure what the party expects from him in this capacity (Fu
, ). In , he also accepted an appointment by the cabinet-level
Overseas Chinese A¥airs Commission (Qiaowu Weiyuanhui) to a commis-
sioner’s post (“Buddhist Master Named Commissioner” ). These activ-
ities, which have won Xingyun praise from KMT o≤cials (“Fokuangshan
Receives Government Award” ; “Foguangshan kaishan sanshi nian”
), understandably confirm the views of those who accuse him of coop-
erating too closely with the government.
However, the political activities of Foguangshan are not limited to
cooperation with the KMT. In several cases in the s, Xingyun chose to
demonstrate his opposition to the ruling party and its policies. In the legis-
lative election of , the founder of Foguangshan sponsored the candidate
Jiang Shiping as an independent (wudang) representative of the Taipei city
multiseat constituency and introduced him as a Foguangshan devotee
(Zhongguo shibao [China times],  November , ; Ziyou shibao [Liberty
times],  December , ). Although Jiang did not win, that setback did
not prevent Xingyun from supporting the candidacy of Chen Lü’an for the
ROC presidency against the incumbent, Lee Teng-hui. Finally, even though
Chen did not win, Xingyun remained politically assertive. In , he set up
a campaign, dubbed the “Caravan of Love and Mercy” (Cibei Aixin Lieche),
that joined a grassroots protest movement and led to the resignation of the
KMT premier Lian Zhan. However, Xingyun has, subsequently, maintained
a lower political profile, and he did not support any candidate in the 
ROC presidential election. Xingyun’s brief involvement in oppositional
politics came after the lifting of martial law and was directed against a gov-
ernment that was instrumental in fostering democratization. This suggests
that his motives were not related to concerns for democratic consolidation.
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Xingyun’s Rationale for Buddhist Political Participation
Xingyun’s religious beliefs help make sense of the various approaches to
politics that he has adopted throughout his career. His political beliefs and
actions are subordinated to his central religious objectives of promoting
Renjian Fojiao and building a Pure Land on Earth. The theology that he has
adopted, Renjian Fojiao (also known as “Rensheng Fojiao,” or Humanistic
Buddhism), represents the continuation and actualization of doctrinal
changes advocated by Taixu in China before . The core belief of Renjian
Fojiao is that salvation is not obtained in a next life but can be attained by
any lay devotees in this world through the performance of good deeds. This
belief contrasts sharply with the traditional doctrines approved by the
BAROC, according to which salvation depends on the individual ascetic
practices of the clergy. If the theology of Renjian Fojiao eventually led Taixu
to find common ground with nationalists, socialists, and anarchists, Xing-
yun’s career indicates that, despite his claim to embody the legacy of Taixu,
the founder of Foguangshan shares none of the radical political views
upheld by his spiritual predecessor.
In a  speech delivered at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei, for
instance, Xingyun explained the form that, in his view, political participa-
tion should take.11 The faithful, he stated, must prioritize good ethics as the
foundation of their politics, an injunction that he calls “ethical democracy”
(minzhu daode de zhengzhi). This ethic should, in turn, lead to conduct that
“fosters a social climate where everyone respects each other” (xianghe hujing
de shehui), helps the country “strive for a rational economy” (qushe heli de
jingji) without too many inequities, and, finally, encourages people to lead
“optimistic and industrious lives” (leguan qinfen de shenghuo). Although
these political goals are vague, the religious principles that buttress them
have clearly conservative political implications. In particular, and despite his
avowed intent to implement a modern, humanistic, and this-worldly  Bud-
dhism, Xingyun has over the years tirelessly reasserted the importance of
conventional and orthodox beliefs and practices when he includes the “puri-
fication of minds” (xinling jinghua) among the four goals of Foguangshan
(Foguang shiji [Buddha Light newsletter],  June , ).
Xingyun and his followers may view “purification” as a purely religious
concept, yet the term holds conservative political implications. According 
to Foguangshan Buddhists, modern society is corrupt, and the source of
violence,“unreasonable pursuits” (wangqiu), and other modern social ills is
to be found in “self-attachment” (wozhi), ignorance (wuming), and other
individual flaws. The best answer to “insatiable desire, anger, ignorance, and
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violence” is, Xingyun a≤rms, “wisdom, morality, virtue, and conscience”
(Buddha Light International Association , –, ). In other words, the
founder of Foguangshan believes that the key to the betterment of society
resides in the reform of individual behavior rather than in political mobili-
zation. It is unclear whether Xingyun’s rhetoric represents a Buddhist variant
of a classic conservative perspective, one suggesting that politics is a neces-
sary evil best left to a few experts, or a more ambitious vision in which a
Buddhist political program would aim at far-reaching transformations of
individuals. Implicit in these perspectives is the idea that, without the inspi-
ration of the moral principles upheld by Buddhist thought, democracy is not
likely to help solve social problems.
This view has resulted in considerable ambiguity: while Xingyun’s doc-
trine denigrates current government policies as the source of moral decline,
social malaise, and crime, his organizations are forced to cooperate with the
very politicians he blames for these problems. In particular, spokespersons
for Foguangshan have had a hard time explaining why Xingyun simulta-
neously supported Chen Lü’an and cooperated with the regime that Chen
opposed. Xingyun’s sponsorship of Chen Lü’an obviously makes sense, in
the light of the ideas that both men share within the tradition of Renjian
Fojiao. Chen Lü’an’s call for “clean government” (qinglian zhengfu),“rectifi-
cation of the national morals” (duanzheng renxin), and “talent nourish-
ment” (peiyu rencai) mirrors the emphasis of Foguangshan on purifying
minds. Xingyun has made it clear that, in his view, Chen’s vision for the
future of the ROC and his past record as a politician with moral integrity
made him the most qualified to lead the country (the Venerable Manhua,
personal communication,  May ). Furthermore, Foguangshan’s
sponsorship of Chen was very likely a result of the fact that the former presi-
dent of the Control Yuan had once been a disciple of Xingyun’s (“Chen
Lü’an shi wo de tudi” ).
It is more di≤cult, however, to understand the founder of Foguangshan’s
cooperation with a government that he criticizes for not meeting his stan-
dards of morality. The implications of Renjian Fojiao, as the members of
Foguangshan interpret it, shed light on the rationale for this attitude.12
Xingyun has, they explain, reconciled the contradiction between support for
Chen and continuing collaboration with the government on the grounds
that, because they are concerned with the welfare of all, Buddhists must work
with those who have the power to alleviate su¥ering among the people. This
duty to serve and benefit society perpetuates a tradition going back to the
Tang dynasty, when emperors sought spiritual counsel from Buddhist clerics
and the latter worked as imperial advisers. Seen in this context, Xingyun’s
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support for Chen Lü’an represented the most principled attitude that he
could adopt. Once it became clear that the people preferred someone other
than Chen to govern them, the best ethical choice for Buddhists became
acceptance of the people’s verdict and cooperation with the new government.
These pragmatic considerations, Foguangshan members have explained,
embody the theology of harmony advocated by Xingyun.
The avoidance of confrontation advocated by Xingyun owes much to his
own experience. On the mainland, both the Communist Party and the KMT
wrongly suspected him of espionage and had him arrested. After the ROC
government relocated to Taiwan, the KMT had him arrested again on the
basis of the rumor that some of the three hundred monks in Taiwan were
acting as spies for the mainland government. After these episodes, recalls one
of his biographers, Xingyun understood the necessity for the saΩgha and lay
Buddhists to improve their relations with authorities if they were to survive
(Fu , –). Members of Foguangshan use this last episode to explain
the attitude of Xingyun toward conservative politicians during the period of
martial law. They argue that he had no choice but to collaborate with the
authorities for the benefit of Buddhists and the people in general during that
period.13 As Rubinstein (chapter  in this volume) points out, other organi-
zations in Taiwan did make di¥erent choices. The monastic order did not,
admittedly, benefit until the s from the support of fellow Buddhist
organizations with an international scope. In that respect, its experience
di¥ered from that of the Presbyterian Church. Nevertheless, even when
during the s and s Foguangshan set up international branches, it did
not become more assertive in the push for democratic consolidation.
What has emerged clearly from conversations with members of
Foguangshan and from the literature that Foguangshan has published, how-
ever, is the fact that the monastic order has in the s been more critical
of the KMT’s mainstream faction than it was of the factions in charge of the
ruling party before . The opposition to the KMT from  to  was
qualified: it was directed against the mainstream faction led by Lee Teng-hui,
not against the conservative factions. After the election of Chen Shuibian to
the presidency in  and the expulsion of Lee from the KMT in ,
Foguangshan may again find the former ruling party’s vision compatible
with its goals. No other political party currently proposes a program that
could implement the ideals of Xingyun, and, at least for the moment, the
monastic order does not appear willing to launch its own political organi-
zation. Therefore, for lack of a better alternative, Foguangshan is poised to
continue cooperating with conservative parties as long as doing so remains
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in keeping with its moral ideals. Although the content of the specific policies
that the monastic order could support remains unclear, at least one position
can be surmised. The criticism of the KMT during the s by Foguang-
shan cannot be construed as support for Taiwanese independence. To the
contrary, many members of the monastic order believe that, under Lee
Teng-hui, the party leaned too far in that direction and that, therefore, it was
to be blamed for political divisions on the island.
CIJI GONGDEHUI
After modest beginnings in , Ciji is now the largest Buddhist organi-
zation in Taiwan (Kang and Jian , –), and its founder, Zhengyan,
ranks as one of the most popular personalities on the island. Ciji, however,
di¥ers from Foguangshan in the important respect that it is a lay organiza-
tion o≤cially registered as a charitable foundation. Its political motivations
also seem to be di¥erent. Although Zhengyan and her followers claim to
implement the theology of Taixu’s Renjian Fojiao, which inspired Xingyun
to support Chen Lü’an, Ciji did not follow suit, which has led many to spec-
ulate that Zhengyan is sympathetic to the cause of Taiwanese independence.
The founder of Ciji has, however, always declined to discuss this issue
directly, mentioning only that she has never wished to become involved 
in the “complexities” of politics. The fact that Ciji does not lend its support
to political candidates does not, however, mean that it holds itself aloof
from society, much less that it harbors hostility toward the state and its
representatives.
The Political Behavior of Ciji
Zhengyan sought to fulfill a mission of “helping the poor and educating 
the rich” (jipin jiaofu) when she established Ciji. Her goals have inspired
thousands of volunteers, who provide services to the poor that range from
financial relief to health care to vocational education.14 However, the orga-
nization’s charter prohibits members and volunteers from getting involved
in politics. Zhengyan believes that the members of Ciji should neither flatter
nor criticize the authorities but, rather, focus on the practice of Buddhism
and the provision of relief to living beings (Feng , ). Over the years,
politicians have hoped to harness the mobilization potential of Ciji, but not
one has succeeded (“Ciji Gongdehui bu she zhengzhi” ).
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Zhengyan may have frowned on the perplexities of politics, but she has,
nonetheless, frequently had to depend on the support of KMT politicians to
guarantee the growth and development of her organization. Although most
of Ciji’s financial resources come in the form of modest private donations,
the organization still relies on the government: to secure permission from
relevant ministries for construction projects, to obtain certification of pro-
fessional competence for the sta¥ of its hospitals and schools, and so on. For
their part, both the central and local governments appreciate the contribu-
tions that Ciji has made to society. Lee Teng-hui, a politician on whom Ciji
had often relied for support, expressed the view of many o≤cials when, in
, as provincial governor, he declared that Ciji does more social work than
the government (Zhengyan , ). The Hualien county authorities
heaped similar praise on Ciji both because the organization’s hospital has
long compensated for the inadequate government service provided in that
region and because its nursing college addressed a labor shortage (“Enlight-
ened Volunteers” ). Over the years, Ciji has provided many services not
available from the government: for example, it has provided for the care and
training of mentally handicapped children, created a bone-marrow bank,
and supported research on the health problems of aboriginal people (“Ciji
meili zhengtan qingdao” ).
Although Ciji encourages people to take responsibility for the welfare of
their fellow citizens, Zhengyan and her entourage do not involve them-
selves in the design of health-care policy (Feng , ). The members of
the organization are never asked to assess, evaluate, or criticize government
policy, nor do they take the initiative and do so anyway. Zhengyan never
intervened in the public debates leading to the establishment of national
health insurance. It is, therefore, di≤cult to infer whether she and her fol-
lowers support calls for a more comprehensive health-care system in Taiwan
or whether they believe that they should supplement existing programs on
behalf of the state. The leadership of Ciji has also never attempted to mobi-
lize volunteers, workers, and contributors to pressure the government. This
enthusiasm for volunteer work, coupled with a refusal to engage in public
debate, tacitly endorses the government’s view that private health care of the
kind managed by Ciji is more e≤cient than state-sponsored services are. In
line with this approach, Ciji has never joined other civic and charity groups
to lobby the government for improvements in social-welfare or health-care
policy. For instance, even though Ciji provides children’s programs, it did
not join an alliance of social-welfare associations and academic groups that,
in , pressured the government for the implementation of legislation pro-
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moting the welfare of children (“Luoshi ershao fufa” ). Similarly, no Ciji
leader has ventured into the Hualien county political arena despite the orga-
nization’s considerable local involvement.
Admittedly, until martial law was lifted, it was di≤cult for any Buddhist
groups other than the BAROC to mount lobbying e¥orts. Since , how-
ever, such lobbying has become commonplace: witness the activities of, for
example, Foguangshan. Nevertheless, Ciji continues to devote itself solely to
relief e¥orts. In other words, for Zhengyan and her followers, the practice of
Renjian Fojiao does not include views comparable to the “preferential option
for the poor” upheld by Christian “liberation theology.” The practical
consequences of Ciji’s religious ideals are, obviously, compatible with a neo-
liberalism advocating minimal state intervention and reduced social spend-
ing, policies implemented by successive KMT governments. This fact need
not, however, be construed as proof that Ciji has been working on behalf of
the former ruling party. After all, failure to respond to government calls to
provide relief would mean disregarding its raison d’eˆtre. The resulting sense
of obligation rests, in turn, on Zhengyan’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the
Buddhist ideal of compassion.
The Legacy of Yinshun and the Political Philosophy of Ciji
The philosophy of Ciji owes much to the influence of Yinshun, a disciple of
Taixu’s, recognized as the “Chinese monk-scholar of our generation” (Lai
, xx). Yinshun’s style di¥ers considerably from that of Xingyun, Taixu’s
other living disciple. Yinshun does not lead a large organization like
Foguangshan or Fagushan. Still, many Taiwanese Buddhists deeply admire
him, and Zhengyan, herself a disciple of Yinshun’s, naturally benefits from
the association. In one important respect, however, Yinshun di¥ers from
Taixu. As we have seen, the latter briefly joined forces with certain revolu-
tionary factions. Many of Yinshun’s admirers have, as a result, perceived him
as no more than a “pamphleteer” and have turned, instead, to Yinshun for
guidance, seeing him as an authentic Buddhist scholar endowed with gen-
uine spiritual authority (Lai , xx). Like Taixu, Yinshun does encourage
greater involvement in society on the part of lay Buddhists. However, unlike
Taixu, Yinshun shuns political activity and emphasizes, instead, a return to
appropriate religious practice and charitable activity on the part of devotees.
His views about this, especially as far as monks and nuns are concerned, are
unambiguous: they “should not go to places where there is singing and
dancing, or visit brothels, red-light districts, bars, and political organizations,
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because doing so could easily arouse defiled thoughts and deeds” (Yin-shun
, ; emphasis added). Although Yinshun’s exegesis of Taixu’s doctrine
does not forbid political participation on the part of lay Buddhists, it makes
it clear that, contrary to Xingyun’s own interpretation, involvement in
politics stands in the way of spiritual growth.
Zhengyan has demonstrated her adherence to Yinshun’s teachings by
refusing to get involved in the controversies dividing the saΩgha and by
avoiding political participation. She bases her attitude on her own belief that
religious people are inherently more honest and sincere about the welfare of
the population. As she puts it: “The true religious person has surpassed the
desire for gaining merits and benefits. The political person wants to have
merits and benefits” (Zhengyan , ). In sum, Zhengyan believes that
politicians’ lack of moral virtues (daode) and their contempt for religion are
the root of all the predicaments faced by Taiwan and the world (Zhengyan
, –). Because she advocates the value of “compassion for all,” how-
ever, the founder of Ciji cannot condemn politicians; she simply does not
trust them. Given the revelations in the newly liberalized press of politicians’
unethical behavior, it is likely that Zhengyan is not alone in her distrust (see
“Shiwei xinke liwei toushang” ).
Solutions to such social problems as poverty, crime, or environmental
degradation cannot, Zhengyan believes, come from politicians, whom she
sees as part of the problem. Rather, they must come from the observance of
appropriate moral values (Zhengyan , –). Members of Ciji have not
only endorsed this view but also expressed skepticism about the campaign
of spiritual reform launched by President Lee after his election in ,
which they dismissed as no more than “sloganeering” (kouhao). Zhengyan,
in fact, goes further, distrusting the very essence of the democratic political
process, at least as it has found expression in industrialized societies. Thus,
because she finds the antagonist nature of politics upsetting, she avoids
involvement in public debates. For the most part, the members of Ciji agree
with her position, describing politics as too “complicated” or “divisive.”
They also believe that alliance with a political party would destroy Ciji’s
reputation for compassion, impartiality, and universality, making it di≤cult
for the organization to accomplish its goals.
Zhengyan’s conduct has not changed over the years. Even when the need
to fight for social and political change seemed incontestable—as during the
era of martial law—Zhengyan refused to embrace political activism. When
pressed to give her opinion on that issue, she responded: “Fighting for the
downtrodden and shouting about justice will make the situations [sic] even
more complicated and confused. Many injustices are not as simple as they
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seem, so do not be too hasty to fight for justice, because you might just make
things worse” (Zhengyan , ).
Such disapproval stems directly from her faith, which enjoins her to
state: “A sense of responsibility is more important than a sense of justice. If
everyone acts this way . . . then there is a possibility that society will become
even more fair and just” (Zhengyan , ). This statement represents an
articulation of Zhengyan’s Buddhist belief in the law of causes and e¥ects
(yinguolü), the doctrine that one is responsible for actions taken during
previous lives and that one gains spiritual merit for good deeds performed
during one’s current life. When Zhengyan asserts that individual e¥orts to
relieve fellow living creatures of their su¥erings represent a far more e≤cient
way in which to gain such merit than calling for political reform, she articu-
lates her own interpretation of the doctrine of impermanence (wuchang).
Seeing all things as fleeting and evanescent, she regards lobbying for social
and political change as an ephemeral and, hence, wasteful activity devoid of
value. Ultimately, then, Zhengyan’s reluctance to intervene in matters polit-
ical derives from a concern for harmony.
In practical terms, the performance of charitable activities reforms the
lives of the individuals so engaged, in line with the principles of Buddhism.
According to the holistic approach that underpins this form of apolitical
social activism, social reform must begin with moral reeducation and reli-
gious reconstruction. Therefore, when someone joins Ciji, she is doing more
than assenting to a program of relieving su¥ering; she is expressing agree-
ment with a holistic program of social transformation that is much more
comprehensive than mere political reform. As one participant at a retreat
(huoying) in Hualien expressed it: “Thanks to her social work, Zhengyan is
a most radical politician.” Viewed in that perspective, Ciji is more than just
a charitable organization: it is a lifestyle, an inspiring ideal, a reformist pro-
gram that transcends the limitations of politics.
A holistic approach that advertises itself as apolitical and stresses the
reform of individual morality has important practical consequences for
public policy, especially when it advocates minimal government interven-
tion. One such consequence is Zhengyan’s belief that health care should be
a matter of individual compassion and family support rather than a scheme
enforced by the government through taxes. This belief is consistent with her
interpretation of Buddhist theology, which promotes a Taiwanese version of
communitarian values stressing social harmony, individual responsibility for
the welfare of the community, and the fulfillment of duties. It remains to be
seen whether the members of Ciji would maintain their apolitical stance if
a majority of Taiwanese citizens favored government-sponsored health care.
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Content with the performance of charitable activities as a means to
salvation, the members of Ciji o¥er a striking contrast to activists associated
with the Presbyterian Church, for whom advocacy of social reform is the
logical consequence of their salvationist ideals (see Wang ). This di¥er-
ence emerges clearly when one considers how Zhengyan has reacted to
many of the issues that the church has addressed over the years. While the
church has called for Taiwanese self-determination since , she has always
maintained silence on that issue, merely reiterating her concern for national
security. While, in its “social gospel,” the church advocates political and
social change to address the problem of poverty, she continues to believe that
people will be able to escape the scourge of deprivation if they are cured of
their ills, in accordance to her view that poverty is caused by disease (Zheng-
yan , ). Clearly, Zhengyan and the members of Ciji accept the current
sociopolitical status quo and do not question the economic conditions that
give rise to disparities in well-being (Wu ).
CONCLUSION
Taiwanese Buddhists have come a long way since , when they had to
report to a single organization supportive of the authoritarian regime.
Members of the reformist clergy have clearly gained the upper hand in gar-
nering the support of devotees. The current prominence of a saΩgha that
promotes this-worldly Buddhism does not, however, mean that a majority
of Buddhist nuns, monks, and lay devotees agree among themselves about
political developments in the country. Two main trends have emerged, each
represented by the two most important organizations in Taiwan. On the one
hand, the leaders of Foguangshan believe that this-worldly Buddhism
should translate into political participation on the part of the saΩgha and lay
people alike. On the other hand, the spiritual founder of Ciji and her fol-
lowers are convinced that their spiritual values preclude political participa-
tion. Furthermore, the contrast between Foguangshan and Ciji is not limited
to their respective views on political activism. These organizations’ leaders
have developed neither a comprehensive perspective on political economy
nor a detailed social doctrine. However, we can infer their views on govern-
ment policies by considering their respective attitudes toward the capitalist
economy hitherto steered by the KMT and supported by all other major
parties. The positive valuation of wealth by the Venerable Xingyun and his
followers is entirely compatible with the liberal economic policies pursued
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by the KMT and DPP governments. On the other hand, the radical advocacy
of frugality and selflessness by the Venerable Zhengyan and her followers
suggests a suspicion of liberal capitalism, if not an outright critique. In that
respect, Ciji contrasts with the contemporary Confucian tradition, as dis-
cussed in Jochim (chapter  in this volume). Both organizations also di¥er
with respect to the issue of Taiwanese independence: Foguangshan and its
lay followers oppose it unambiguously, while Ciji’s leaders and members do
not commit themselves on that issue.
The divergences in behavior documented above should not, however,
obscure some important similarities between political beliefs, similarities
from which Buddhists could eventually forge a common political platform.
The three Buddhist organizations examined here have not nurtured
relations with the DPP in any way comparable to those developed with the
KMT, nor have they made any significant moves toward the other parties.
The reverse is equally true: the NP, the PFP, the TSU, and the Taiwan Inde-
pendence Party have made no attempts to cultivate relations with Buddhist
organizations. The DPP and NP leaders’ close links with Christian churches
cannot explain this fact: the KMT, which has been headed by Christians
during most of its history, has courted Buddhists as well as followers of other
religious organizations. This mutual indi¥erence between Buddhist organi-
zations and opposition parties—whether they are proindependence or pro-
reunification—is an issue that deserves further exploration.
At the ideological level, Taiwanese Buddhist organizations appear in
remarkable harmony with the religious neotraditionalism that Clart
(chapter  in this volume) analyzes. Taiwanese Buddhist organizations also
reinterpret their tradition in ways that are compatible with modernity and
that are not inherently hostile to trends associated with democratization.
This reinterpretation of tradition, in particular, accords laypeople and
women a far greater role in its development. Despite these progressive
trends, however, Taiwanese Buddhist organizations di¥er from their Chris-
tian, Islamic, Hindu, and even Buddhist counterparts in other countries.
They do not advocate a “third way” between socialism and liberalism, and
they do not articulate the kind of radical views associated with liberation
theology. They shun principles such as the “preferential option for the poor”
and are not associated with the trend of engaged Buddhism pushing for
democratic consolidation that thrives in South and Southeast Asia. So far,
despite di¥erences over strategy among their leaders, Chinese Buddhist
organizations in Taiwan limit their political intervention to the preaching of
morality.
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NOTES
1. The Government Information O≤ce reported that, in , there were in Taiwan
, Catholics and , Protestants, including the , members of the
Presbyterian Church (GIO , –). According to the same source, the Bud-
dhist population was ,,, or . percent of the total population (GIO ,
).
2. A typical assertion of this perception can be found in Needham (, –).
3. For a recent biography of Taixu stressing the political significance of his ideas, see
Pittman ().
4. For a concise summary of the origins of the incident, see Hugues (, –). For
more lengthy accounts, see Kerr (, –) and Mendel (, –).
5. I am grateful to Marcus Günzel for this point.
6. Reports of such meetings can be found in the Zhongfohui kan (BAROC newsletter):
for example, Zhongfohui kan, nos.  ( March ): ;  ( March ): ; 
( February ): ;  ( March ): ; and  ( March ): .
7. For a detailed account of that particular protest, see Xiao ().
8. Before the announcement of his candidacy, Chen resigned from these positions.
9. See “Zhongguo Fojiaohui zai xianjin jiaojie” (), an interview with Jingxin,
current secretary-general of the BAROC.
10. On Xingyun’s views on politics, see Chandler (, chap. ).
11. The full text of this speech, taped in Mandarin and Minnanhua, can be found in
Xingyun (). An abridged version can be found in Xingyun (, –).
12. The material presented in this paragraph is taken from interviews conducted with
Yikong and Manhua, Foguangshan monastery,  November , as well as from
Manhua, personal correspondence,  and  May .
13. Interview with Yikong, Foguangshan monastery,  November .
14. On the work done by Ciji volunteers and their motivations, see Ting ().
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funded in recent years. The growth of Buddhism since  has been par-
ticularly rapid. While Interior Ministry statistics are open to interpretation,
they do give some glimpse of this growth. The Buddhist population grew
from , in  to . million in , a sixfold increase against an
overall population increase of about  percent. In addition, the number of
registered Buddhist temples rose from , to ,. While the proportion
of men ordaining as monks has decreased in Taiwan, nuns and lay Buddhists
have taken on greater leadership responsibilities.1 Buddhist books are best-
sellers, including Still Thoughts by Dharma Master Cheng Yen (Zhengyan
) and Handing Down the Light (Fu ), a biography of Master Xingyun,
the founder of the expansive Buddhist organization based at Foguangshan
(see Lin ).2 The growing popularity of college Buddhist groups is easy
to track as they all rush to put up their webpages on the Internet. Taiwanese
Buddhist contributions to the  American presidential campaign made
the growing influence of Taiwanese Buddhists known even in U.S. political
circles.
When the Japanese presence in Taiwan ended and the Kuomintang and
its followers migrated to the island, the future of Buddhism in Taiwan was
not clear. The influx of so many well-educated ordained monks had an
immediate institutional e¥ect on Buddhism,3 but the e¥ect of Buddhism on
general Taiwanese religious culture was uncertain. In mainland China, the
number of Buddhist monks, nuns, and adherents had been declining for
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decades. How did Buddhism develop in postwar Taiwan to reach the level of
popularity that it enjoys today? The powerful e¥ect of the well-educated and
highly committed monks who moved to Taiwan during and after the war is
clear. The leadership and teaching of these aging monks continued to domi-
nate Taiwanese Buddhism even in the s. But there was another, less obvi-
ous, factor in the growth of Buddhism in Taiwan: the migration of devout
lay Buddhists. The Taiwanese Buddhist saΩgha depends on the reciprocal
relationship between the community of celibate monks and nuns and the
broader community of Buddhist laypeople. As in other Buddhist commu-
nities, the laypeople depend on the monks for spiritual guidance and for
ritual performances. The ordained monks and nuns depend on the financial,
political, and social support of laypeople, whether family members, local
community members, or the government. Without supportive or at least
reasonably tolerant government o≤cials, the Buddhist community in Tai-
wan would have faced a very di¥erent future. And, of course, the financial
support of those in business and government was also crucial in building new
temples, monasteries, and convents, publishing Buddhist texts and period-
icals, and providing ongoing material support for communities of ordained
Buddhists.
Among the soldiers and government o≤cials of Chiang Kai-shek’s
retreating Kuomintang government, there were devout lay Buddhists who
contributed to the growth and transformation of Buddhism in Taiwan.
These devout Buddhists greatly strengthened the lay Buddhist community
in Taiwan, which would provide the support for the monastic community
led by the newly arrived monks from the mainland. This essay discusses one
contribution made by these devout mainlander lay Buddhists after they
moved to Taiwan—the publication of conversion narratives. The particular
stories discussed here all recount the writer’s devotion as the result of a
salvific encounter with the bodhisattva Guanyin. These narratives were
published in the new and expanding Buddhist printed media, privately
published Buddhist literature, and popular devotional periodicals. Several
narratives discussed in this essay come from a useful anthology of Guanyin
narratives edited by Layman Zhicheng; he drew his collection primarily
from the following Buddhist periodicals: Ciyun yuekan (Cloud of compas-
sion monthly), Xin juesheng yuekan (New awakening monthly), Jueshi xun-
kan (Awakened world periodical), Guanshiyin yuekan (Guanyin monthly),
Putishu yuekan (Bodhi tree monthly), and Ciming yuekan (Compassionate
wisdom monthly) (Zhicheng ).
Among the earliest, longest, and most dramatic narratives were those
published by mainlanders recalling their conversion to Buddhism and
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Guanyin devotion in the midst of the wartime disasters of s and s
China. These narratives by lay Buddhists recount horrifying experiences of
war, famine, and illness over which they felt no control. These Chinese saw
their calamities as chaotic and beyond comprehension. In their confusion
and desperation, they turned to a familiar figure of traditional Chinese
Buddhism—the bodhisattva Guanyin, the personification of Buddhist
compassion.
The writers saw themselves trapped in su¥ering with no way out, and
they turned to the saving figure of the bodhisattva Guanyin for help. The
bodhisattva Guanyin is the most popular of bodhisattvas—beings who have
vowed to seek enlightenment in order to save all living beings from su¥ering
and endless rebirth. In twentieth-century Chinese imagery, Guanyin has
usually appeared as a lovely white-robed woman with a look of compassion,
often holding a vase and a willow branch. Guanyin appears in numerous
Buddhist scriptures, including the popular Lotus Sutra, Heart Sutra, and
Huayan Sutra and the scriptures of the Pure Land tradition focused on
Amitâbha Buddha. As Chün-fang Yü has shown, the popularity of Guanyin
as a Chinese bodhisattva was due primarily to the cults surrounding her folk
images and expressed through pilgrimage, iconography, and especially the
folk literature known as “precious scrolls” (baojuan) (see Yü ). Guanyin
also appears as the guiding spiritual presence in the popular Chinese novel
Journey to the West (Xiyou ji) and all the countless operas, puppet shows,
cartoons, and stories based on the novel. Thus, twentieth-century Chinese
knew about the bodhisattva Guanyin because she was known through both
popular culture and Buddhist scripture. In addition to these influences,
these modern tales draw heavily from a long history of miracle tales about
Guanyin. The earliest surviving collection of Guanyin miracle tales was
created by the scholar-o≤cial Fu Liang (–).4
The Chinese Buddhist writers of wartime conversion narratives relate
their tales out of gratitude to the bodhisattva Guanyin for saving them from
desperate situations; they o¥er no explanation for the su¥ering in which
they find themselves. They do not blame their su¥ering on political circum-
stances or their own past karma. They all focus, not on the reasons for their
predicaments, but on the saving compassion of Guanyin. As these Buddhists
saw it, they were trapped in su¥ering, but Guanyin saved them from their
problems. In gratitude, they changed their lives and spread word of the
bodhisattva’s saving compassion. Some of these narratives were published in
the s, soon after the immigrants arrived in Taiwan—in gratitude for
their recently realized safety. Others were not published until the s or
s, the writers taking the advantage of the perspective of age and, amid
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the growing prosperity of Taiwan, reflecting on the meaning of their lives.
As they found themselves in safer and more comfortable situations, they
could see more clearly the blessings that they had received.
I look first at a short but typical early narrative by Mr. Zhang Wenbing
from the mainland, published in  in Juesheng yuekan (Zhicheng ,
–). Zhang says that he came from an extremely confused and long-
su¥ering family. He tells his readers that his salvation came from chanting
the White-Robed Guanyin Chant (Guanyin Dashi baiyi shenji). This chant
praises “Guanyin bodhisattva-mahasattva of great compassion and mercy
who universally responds to save beings from su¥ering and distress.”5 It ends
with the wish that all people may escape their di≤cult situations and that all
hardships may leave their lives. Zhang decided to recite the White-Robed
Guanyin Chant in  because of the guidance of a deputy stationmaster
who had befriended him. He got into the habit of reciting it almost all the
time and found that it had unimagined e¥ects for his health and safety. He
did not speak of his belief in the reality of the bodhisattva Guanyin to any-
one because he felt that such a religious belief could not be proved and was
inappropriate for modern Chinese. While working for a trucking company
in  in the midst of the war against the Japanese, Zhang had a premoni-
tion of an accident, which later occurred to a truck in which he was a passen-
ger. But, owing to his chanting of Guanyin’s name, he (and the driver of the
truck) survived the accident without serious injury even though the truck
itself was nearly destroyed. From  to , as he traveled throughout war-
ravaged China on business, he said that he always recited the Guanyin chant
for the safety of all sentient beings.
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE
All these postwar narratives share an identifiable structure. Specific infor-
mation is given concerning names, dates, and places in order to make clear
that this is a verifiable example of Guanyin’s saving power. The specificity is
a crucial element because these narratives relate more than just a conversion
experience: they contain instructions and proofs to e¥ect the conversion of
others to Buddhism. They are meant as concrete evidence of Guanyin’s
compassionate protection.
The tragedy is described only briefly. There is an accident or an ill-
ness—usually of unknown origin. The writer describes the treatments and
their failures in some detail. If the writer is ill, there is usually an emphasis
on the failure of both Western and traditional Chinese medical treatments
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to heal him. A central element in many narratives is the important personal
relationship through which the devotion to Guanyin is introduced. We see
the presence of a compassionate friend, parent, colleague, or spouse who
chants the Great Compassion Chant, the White-Robed Guanyin Chant, or just
the name of Guanyin and urges the injured person to chant or to drink water
blessed by the bodhisattva. In Zhang’s narrative, it is a colleague, a respected
deputy stationmaster, who urges the narrator to try Guanyin devotion.
The climax of the narrative is some kind of encounter with the bodhi-
sattva. This encounter can be of three basic varieties. First, the bodhisattva
may speak or act in a dream to guide or heal the person. Guanyin’s healing
touch or an o¥ering of her healing water of compassion often accomplishes
this healing. Second, the bodhisattva may appear while the person is awake;
this manifestation may or may not be seen by others. She may take the form
of a doctor or a nurse or her iconographic form, wearing a white robe and
holding a vase containing the dew of compassion. Third, she may manifest
herself only through her voice, which saves by giving advice or warning.
The encounter with the bodhisattva usually results in some immediate
healing or protection from disaster. Frequently, the protection or healing is
not complete—some injury or illness remains, but not as much as the writer
would have predicted. The healing is followed by a commitment to bao’en,
the repayment of the bodhisattva for her great compassion. These Buddhist
writers most frequently repay the bodhisattva by vowing to recite her chant
regularly and to become vegetarians. Less frequently they decide to become
ordained monks or nuns.
The narratives detailing wartime experiences on the mainland di¥er
from narratives of later experiences in Taiwan in length and style but not in
basic structure. The Taiwanese narratives are accounts of specific encounters
with the bodhisattva, often recounted soon after the experience. The main-
land narratives are often longer, more introspective, and more philosophical
because they are recounted years later by men and women looking back on
major events in their lives and making sense of the paths that they have
taken.
KUOMINTANG SOLDIERS
Kuomintang soldiers contributed many conversion narratives to Buddhist
periodicals in the s and s. One of the early, lengthy narratives is by
Mr. Li Jinshou, published in  in Putishu yuekan (Zhicheng , –).
Li says that he wrote his conversion narrative to repay the compassion of the
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bodhisattva and to memorialize two benefactors, the man who saved his life
and the man who saved his sanity.
Li, an o≤cer in the Kuomintang army in Jiangxi, had just finished his
training in  when General Li Er ordered him and an o≤cer friend to take
charge of a problem military unit. This unit had murdered its commander
and then dispersed. Owing to a false accusation by another o≤cer, Li and his
friend were both imprisoned and condemned to death. After many days in
prison, he dreamed that an old Buddhist monk instructed him to recite a
simple chant to White-Robed Guanyin in order to be saved. After silently
chanting for ten days or so, he and his friend were both released.
When Li arrived in Taiwan with the retreating Kuomintang troops, he
was without money, property, family, or country. Since he was struggling to
pay for food, buying medicine was out of the question. When he developed
some kind of lung disease, everything seemed hopeless—until a benefactor
raised the money to send him to the hospital. While he was in the hospital,
another benefactor sent him a copy of the Guanyin chapter of the Lotus Sutra.
From reading this scripture about the bodhisattva’s vows to help those who
su¥er, he learned the source of his chant and renewed his earlier practice.
Li had told nobody of his Buddhist devotion to Guanyin for fear that he
would be laughed at for believing a silly superstition. Like Zhang, he seemed
to fear that Guanyin devotion was inappropriate for modern Chinese, espe-
cially for a Chinese soldier. Through the frequent recitation of the White-
Robed Guanyin Chant, however, Li recovered quickly. Although he still felt
some pain and was not fully healthy, he felt immense gratitude to Guanyin,
the Buddha, and the two men who helped him in Taiwan. He ended his nar-
rative with these hopes: that everyone will know the bodhisattva’s compas-
sion, that Buddhist literature will become more widely available in temple
reading rooms throughout Taiwan, and that the dharma will be preached to
all on Sundays so that all will have the opportunity to know the Buddha’s
teaching. We can see his wish as a desire for a more modern, educated form
of Buddhist devotion, which would go beyond the negative stereotypes that
had made him embarrassed to practice Buddhism publicly.
Another Kuomintang soldier’s narrative is that by the Buddhist Layman
Faci, published in  in Putishu yuekan (Zhicheng , –). Faci’s
father was devoted to Guanyin and urged his family and friends to call on
the bodhisattva for help. When Faci joined the army and fought the Japanese
in , his father wrote letters to him urging him to chant the name of
Guanyin silently in battle to avoid harm. Following his father’s advice, Faci
survived hundreds of military encounters with the Japanese and, later, with
the Communists without a single injury. Later in Taiwan—in —his
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devotion to Guanyin saved his wife from life-threatening di≤culties during
childbirth. Unfortunately, their infant died, as had been predicted in a dream
that Faci had had. As in most of these narratives, the loss and su¥ering are
accepted and the healing attributed to Guanyin. Writing from Taiwan in
, Faci recognized a pattern in his life whereby Guanyin continually saved
him from su¥ering. He explained that he had been a vegetarian for over four
years to repay Guanyin’s compassion.
Yet another soldier’s narrative is that by Mr. Zhou Xingyuan, another
Kuomintang soldier, published in  in Putishu yuekan (Zhicheng ,
–). When Zhou came to Taiwan in  with the army, he came down
with a severe illness that left his right leg paralyzed and, thus, impaired his
ability to walk. He heard a voice in his sleep telling him to heal himself. Zhou
then began a regimen of exercise, meditation, and chanting Guanyin’s name,
as he had been instructed to do by the voice in his dream. Through this
rigorous physical and religious routine, he regained almost full use of his leg.
Later on, he hastened his recovery from an operation and eliminated his pain
through devotion to Guanyin.
Zhou’s narrative displays an especially wide variety of auditory and
visual encounters with Guanyin. The bodhisattva spoke to him to give him
specific advice. And, when in time of distress he chanted Guanyin’s name,
the bodhisattva appeared in a white robe sitting on a beautiful lotus blos-
som. Zhou’s narrative stressed the universal value of Guanyin devotion and
pointedly told his readers that Guanyin devotion is not just for “pregnant
women and old ladies.” Like the other Kuomintang soldiers who wrote of
their encounters with the bodhisattva Guanyin, Zhou was disturbed by the
stereotype of Guanyin devotion as something too traditional for a man of
action. He clearly sought to oppose the widely held view that Guanyin devo-
tion might be inappropriate for a modern Chinese man. As Zhou looked at
himself, he saw the e¥ect of Guanyin devotion, not just in the healing that
he experienced physically, but also in the healing of his character, through
which he became an honest, straightforward man. He saw the moral trans-
formation of Buddhist devotion as relevant to his life as a former soldier
adjusting to a new society.
These soldiers’ narratives all lack certain elements that one might expect
in wartime religious narratives. There is no mention of any killing. And there
is never any demonization of the enemy troops. The Japanese and Commu-
nist troops are mentioned only in general as the enemy in battle. The focus
of the narratives is strictly on the protection of Guanyin and the response
to that protection. There is no discussion of the causes of su¥ering, either
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in political or in karmic terms. There is only the sense of men caught in suf-
fering that they do not understand and in situations beyond their control.
Unlike most later Buddhist narratives by both men and women in
Taiwan, these soldiers’ narratives are clearly male centered. For Li, there were
four men who aid Guanyin in bringing about his safety and recovery: his
soldier friend, a monk in a dream, and two male benefactors. For Faci, the
inspiration for Buddhist devotion was his father’s urging. Zhou mentions no
individuals, but he stresses that Guanyin devotion is not just for “pregnant
women and old ladies.” He directly rejects a popular modern view that
Guanyin devotion is a silly superstition in which only uneducated women
in distress would engage.
Whereas other conversion narratives by men and women often mention
a mother’s or some other female relative’s devotion to the bodhisattva Guan-
yin as influential, these soldiers present Buddhist devotion as being for men
and seem anxious to separate themselves from the stereotype that Guanyin
devotion is only for women. These men seek to move away from traditional
stereotypes about passive, superstitious, feminine Buddhist devotion. They
are in the process of forming a more activist, modern layman’s appreciation
of the compassion of the bodhisattva.
KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Narratives by Kuomintang government o≤cials are fairly common as well;
they share many characteristics with the soldiers’ narratives. One story is
striking in the compassionate role played by an enemy soldier, a Communist
army o≤cer. The account is by Layman Cui Zhenwei as told to Li Mengquan,
published in  in Putishu yuekan (Zhicheng , –).
In , Cui, his wife, and their children fled from the Communists in
Jilin to Changchun. Since Changchun was often besieged, the family expe-
rienced both military violence and severe famine. In the midst of horrifying
di≤culties, Cui held onto a bronze statue of Guanyin that he had brought
from home. He continued to chant the bodhisattva’s name. Just when he was
at his lowest point, having been without food for days, he dreamed that a
Buddhist monk told him to travel to the northwest the next day to move
toward safety. In spite of his wife’s concerns and the common view that the
northwest led to even worse disasters, the family followed this advice. With
the guidance of this dream and the help of a kind Communist army o≤cer,
he and his family were fed and led to safety.
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The manifestation of Guanyin’s compassion in the form of a Commu-
nist army o≤cer is surprising in a narrative published in Taiwan in . The
anti-Communist culture of Taiwan was overwhelming during this period,
but there is no trace of animosity toward the Communists in Cui’s narrative,
only gratitude toward an individual Communist o≤cer who manifested
Buddhist compassion. Cui’s story had the kind of happy ending sought by
most Chinese and Taiwanese—the happiness of longevity, prosperity, and
posterity. On the basis of Guanyin’s advice, Cui had gone into tobacco for a
while and then switched to another business. At seventy-four, he was a pros-
perous businessman in Keelung (Jilong) with a successful son who had
graduated from the prestigious National Taiwan University. And, as Cui
announced at the end of his narrative, he had become a grandfather,
certainly the greatest of blessings sent to him by the bodhisattva. The narra-
tive concluded with the grateful urging that more people chant the name of
Guanyin. Eighteen years after his desperate flight from war-torn Jilin, Cui
expressed his gratitude for all the blessings that he had experienced in the
safety of Taiwan during the intervening years.
Another Kuomintang government o≤cial, who used the pen name Hui-
xing, published his story in  in Putishu yuekan (Zhicheng , –).
Huixing first began his devotion to Guanyin when he saw the White-Robed
Guanyin Chant printed in the newspaper while he was studying in Beijing.
When he got a government job in Jiangsu, every morning before work he
chanted in front of his Guanyin altar at home. In , when the Japanese
invaded his area, he sent his wife and young son ahead to safety in Wuhan,
but she got stuck en route when the roads were blocked. She sent word that
she would wait until he decided what to do. With no transportation avail-
able to him, he chanted to Guanyin. Transportation appeared, and he was
able to reach his wife.
Further transportation di≤culties arose: the last boat to Wuhan was sold
out. But, after chanting the bodhisattva’s name, Huixing met a kind stranger
who o¥ered to sell him his tickets because he was unable to leave. Huixing’s
young family arrived safely at Wuhan, and he was able to join them in safety
later, again with Guanyin’s help and through divination at the local Buddhist
temple.
Later, in Henan, Huixing’s devotion to Guanyin intensified. While his
wife was pregnant with their second son, he was playing around with his
gun, unaware that it was loaded. He fired the gun, but the bullet was a
dud—a blessing attributed to Guanyin’s compassion. Later still, in ,
after the family had moved to Taiwan, his second son had a brain infection
from which he recovered after a mysterious dream in which another child
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grabbed his hat and told him to go home. From the father’s perspective, the
hat-grabbing child was the bodhisattva Guanyin taking away his son’s
disease and sending him back to the living. In spite of the tragic di≤culties
of this man and his family, Huixing sees only the working of Guanyin’s com-
passion in his life.
Another civilian Kuomintang writer, Mr. Zhong Qi, employed by either
the military or the government, published his Guanyin narrative in  in
Jueshi xunkan (Zhicheng , –). In , Zhong was in Sichuan
serving at the School of Motorized Troops, having fought in the war against
Japan for eight years. During those eight years of danger, he relied on the
protection of the bodhisattva Guanyin. He believed that he had the bodhi-
sattva’s protection because he knew that his foster parents chanted to the
bodhisattva Guanyin for him daily. He had planned to ask for a leave to go
to Chengdu in order formally to convert to Buddhism with the dharma
master at the Great Buddha Temple in Chengdu. Fortuitously, when he
went to turn in his request for leave, his supervisor ordered him to go to
Chengdu to pick up new transportation maps for the school. In addition to
this wonderful coincidence of religious desire and occupational duty, his
supervisor gave him five days’ leave and travel money. He saw this great
opportunity to convert to Buddhism as Guanyin’s amazing work.
He set o¥ in a truck with ten or so other people. When they spent the
night in a lodge en route, he dreamed of Guanyin telling him that the next
day at  .. their vehicle would overturn but that he should not fear because
she would protect him from harm. The next afternoon, in the midst of
stormy weather, their vehicle did overturn, and everyone was injured, except
him. Zhong looked up and saw a manifestation of the bodhisattva Guanyin
riding a golden dragon in the sky. She was dressed in red and held a vase with
willow branches in one hand and a duster with a red handle in the other. She
smiled gently at him as he tended to the injured. Zhong eventually made his
way to Taiwan and, in , was able to look back at his survival with Bud-
dhist gratitude.
A mainlander who became a representative to the National Assembly,
Mr. Zhou Hongji, published his  conversion account in  in Guan-
shiyin yuekan (Zhicheng , –). In , Zhou developed a severe
sore throat and high fever that continued for days without responding to
treatment. His younger sister went to a Guanyin temple and asked for help
for her brother. That same evening, he saw a very tall, red-robed spirit with
a white hat carrying medicine to him. He vowed that, if this were Guanyin
coming to heal him, he would devoutly practice Buddhism for the rest of his
life. Four hours later, he spit up mucus and began to recover quite rapidly.
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In a postscript to his narrative, Zhou said that he was moved to write this
narrative after reading similar accounts in volume  of Guanshiyin yuekan.
His narrative was one explicitly inspired by reading popular Buddhist
devotional literature. Zhou wrote this tale forty-seven years after the event,
following many years of relative comfort and political accomplishment in
Taiwan.
Like the soldiers’ narratives, these Kuomintang government o≤cials’
narratives neither discuss politics nor demonize the enemy. In fact, there is
the startling presence of a Communist army o≤cer in one account as the
compassionate instrument of Guanyin’s protection. All the narratives were
written more than a decade after the events and after the protagonists’
arrival in Taiwan. They were written by Kuomintang members who had
finally found comfortable lives in Taiwan after years of struggling to escape
di≤culties in China and years of adjusting to a new home far from family.
They contributed to the process of transforming Guanyin devotion from the
traditional practice associated with women into a more modern practice
relevant to the peaceful, prosperous life of modern Taiwan.
TAIWANESE NARRATIVES
It would be helpful to be able to compare the Guanyin conversion narratives
written by mainland immigrants to those written by Taiwanese. Unfortu-
nately, this is impossible. The tales of mainland conversion and salvation
almost always identify the writers by their place of birth as well as their place
of encounter with Guanyin. The conversion and healing stories that take
place entirely on Taiwan seldom give the writers’ place of birth, only their
place of encounter. The writer’s origin is not part of the Taiwanese narrative
structure. One would assume that a large proportion of the early Taiwan-
based narratives were written by mainlanders, but, without unearthing
biographical information on each writer, no conclusions can be drawn.
Since some of the writers use dharma names (Buddhist names given to
them by monks), research into the writers’ origins would have to overcome
numerous obstacles.
The narratives about encounters with Guanyin on Taiwan are more
immediate and sometimes more mundane. There are the tales of men and
women being cured of cancer or blindness, young people being saved from
motorcycle accidents, and families and homes being saved from fire. Some-
times relevant passages from the “Guanyin chapter” of the Lotus Sutra are
cited in relation to these life-threatening disasters. These narratives show
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greater familiarity with Buddhist texts and more e¥ort to create narratives
that are in harmony with those texts. In addition to lifesaving narratives,
there are also the less dramatic narratives of a gold earring lost and then
found with the bodhisattva’s guidance, the curing of insomnia, the birth of
a son to a couple with only daughters, or the easy removal of a fishhook
caught in a boy’s finger. These are narratives of a relatively prosperous
community at peace; there is no longer the widespread presence of war and
famine. The Taiwanese narratives of the s sometimes include the new
element of conversion from Christianity, which is described as a “fashion-
able” religion.
In these Chinese-language periodicals, I found only one account of a
Taiwanese conversion in pre- Taiwan under Japanese control. It was an
odd third-person account, clearly by a mainlander, about a Taiwanese man
who had served as a police o≤cer under the Japanese and had hurt many
people. (The narrator also points out that the man had taken part in the 
February uprising on the side of the Taiwanese who fought against the
Kuomintang.) This Taiwanese man was cured of an illness through Guanyin
devotion but later cursed the narrator and fell into insanity and immorality.
This narrative is atypical both for the political ax it has to grind (pro-
Kuomintang and anti-Taiwanese) and for the emphasis on negative karmic
retribution. The narrator exhibits the kind of suspicion and hostility toward
the Taiwanese that is never expressed in the other narratives even toward the
Japanese or the Chinese Communists. There is, apparently, no definite nar-
rative structure for traditional Buddhist wartime narratives on Taiwan.
Given the story’s lack of compassion, one could even say that this is not a
true Buddhist narrative. There appear to be few Taiwanese accounts of
Guanyin encounters before  (of course published only after , when
Chinese-language publishing would be possible). This absence of pre-
narratives by Taiwanese writers would suggest either that the Buddhist sol-
diers and government o≤cials who came to Taiwan with the Kuomintang
were primarily responsible for developing the genre of Guanyin conversion
narrative in Taiwan or that the Buddhist publishing world did not print pre-
 Taiwanese narratives.
Buddhist periodicals after  are filled with Guanyin narratives based
in both mainland China and Taiwan. With the single exception noted above,
the narratives are filled with gratitude to the bodhisattva and compassion for
everyone regardless of political views. The Taiwan-based narratives di¥er
primarily in their relative brevity and lack of wartime violence. The most
common Taiwan-based narratives describe healing encounters with the
bodhisattva Guanyin.
197
08Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:57 AM  Page 197
B A R B A R A  E .  R E E D
MODERN BUDDHIST MASTERS
Contemporary Buddhist teachers in Taiwan inevitably discuss Guanyin
narratives. Dharma Master Shengyan of Taiwan and New York recounts his
own Guanyin narrative, which follows the traditional structure closely. For
example, he was born a sickly child, but, thanks to his mother’s devotion to
Guanyin, he survived. When he went to Shanghai to seek admission to the
Buddhist academy, he failed the exam. But, after months of devotional
chanting to Guanyin, he took the test again and was admitted. Later, in ,
when he fled to Taiwan with the military, he was kept safe by Guanyin.
Although Shengyan recounts the traditional narrative without criticism or
rejection, the emphasis in his published teachings is on the dharma as inter-
preted through Chan Buddhist teachings. He uses the Guanyin imagery
primarily to discuss his own feeling of gratitude.6
A very di¥erent approach to these narratives is taken by another promi-
nent leader, Master Zhengyan, the charismatic Taiwanese nun who founded
the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation in . Although she
has her own story of how Guanyin saved her mother’s life, in her teachings
she emphasizes the role of Guanyin as an active model of compassion for all
to emulate. Her traditional narrative tells how her mother was dying of a
stomach ulcer in . Zhengyan chanted to Guanyin as she had learned to
do at the nearby Purple Cloud Temple. In addition, she vowed to become a
vegetarian and to trade twelve years of her own life for the well-being of her
mother. In Zhengyan’s dream, the bodhisattva Guanyin appeared from the
clouds and gave her a glowing bottle of medicine to cure her mother. When
her mother recovered her health, Zhengyan immediately became a vege-
tarian and eventually became a nun.7
Master Zhengyan has also been known to use what I would call “Guan-
yin counternarratives.” She has explicitly rejected the idea that one might call
on Guanyin for help; rather, one must help oneself and others. An episode
from her own personal narrative concerning Guanyin runs counter to the
popular Buddhist norm. One of her first religious insights came to her as a
child during the wartime bombing of Taiwan in her hometown outside
Taichung (Taizhong). Once, when the bombing occurred at lunchtime, she
saw housewives wildly running for a bomb shelter. They all cried to the God-
dess of Mercy, Guanyin, for help. Zhengyan relates:
There was an old man in the shelter, wearing solid black. He shook
his head and said,“How can the Goddess of Mercy protect you? It’s
your Karma that caused this to happen! Can’t you see that your
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wrongdoings have saddened the Goddess of Mercy? She is crying
harder than you; she has no more tears left and is shedding blood!
Don’t you know that the only ones who can save you are your-
selves? According to the teachings of Buddha, there will be no vio-
lence on earth only when all butchers have lain down their killing
knives!”
I stared at that old man in black and remembered his every
word, not knowing that it was at that very moment Buddhism
entered my heart. Yes, it was almost five decades ago, when I was a
child in Clear Water, hiding in a bomb shelter and listening to the
airplanes soaring overhead! 
—Ching , 
For Master Zhengyan, the point was to imitate Guanyin’s compassion
and perseverance. She said when she founded the Buddhist Compassion
Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, “We will become Guanyin’s watchful eyes and
useful hands, and the world can never call us Buddhists a passive group
again” (Ching , ).8 There is, however, the hint of Guanyin devotion
among Zhengyan’s followers, who see in this charismatic nun a manifes-
tation of the bodhisattva and who display her photograph as if it were a
Buddha image. But, even here, the response to her compassion is active
moral engagement rather than the devout chanting found in the traditional
narratives. The emphasis on social activism is seen by some leaders as being
problematic if not founded on a clear understanding of Buddhist teaching.
Even Zhengyan’s dharma teacher, the highly influential Master Yinshun,
has noted that there are those who are active all day doing Buddhist vol-
unteer work but who then go home and become angry with their family
members and unforgiving of their flaws, forgetting all the teachings of the
Buddha. Master Yinshun emphasizes the traditional Buddhist teaching that
the practice of meditation and the cultivation of wisdom are also necessary
for the true practice of Buddhist morality.
CONCLUSION
The strong component of social activism in Taiwanese Buddhism is seen 
not only in Zhengyan’s Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation
with its social-welfare and health-care programs. Foguangshan, founded by
Dharma Master Xingyun, is also actively involved in educational outreach
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and holds Buddhist examinations internationally, at four hundred sites in
ten languages. The Dharma Drum Mountain Cultural and Education Foun-
dation, an organization associated with Master Shengyan, has developed
environmental and antidrug projects (Lin , ). The largest Buddhist
organizations in Taiwan present Guanyin narratives to inspire imitation of
the bodhisattva’s compassion and wisdom. The Guanyin narratives have
contributed to the modern, activist form of Buddhism that has become
known as “engaged Buddhism.”
Encounters with the bodhisattva Guanyin were life changing for the
Kuomintang soldiers and civilian employees who migrated to Taiwan. Their
lives were saved, and their lives were changed, according to these narratives.
The changes came from their new relationship with the bodhisattva Guan-
yin and their need to repay her for her compassionate acts on their behalf.
They began their relationship with Guanyin because they were encouraged
to do so by another significant relationship in their life, often one with a
parent, a male colleague, or a male friend. The narratives are told in terms
of relationships and the obligations that relationships entail. The narratives
all suggest that, because Guanyin performed specific acts of compassionate
salvation and healing, the writers are obligated to chant her name, tell their
stories, and perhaps become vegetarians. As Huixing’s narrative concludes,
Guanyin “liberates all sentient beings, saves them from the sea of su¥ering,
to climb up to the other shore”; therefore, “how can we not sincerely,
devoutly worship the bodhisattva Guanyin?” (Zhicheng , ).
The new relationship with Guanyin changed the Buddhists’ lives by
adding new obligations to repay her compassion. These Buddhists see
changes of religious and moral behavior as changes in the network of social
obligations. Their new moral and ritual behavior stems from their new or
changed relationship of obligation with the bodhisattva Guanyin.
The early postwar narratives of Buddhist immigrants seem rather tradi-
tional; in fact, the saving actions of the bodhisattva reported in them are
similar to those found in the fifth-century collection by Fu Liang.9 Both the
fifth-century and the twentieth-century stories recount numerous instances
of salvation by a seemingly external power, the bodhisattva Guanyin. But the
Taiwanese narrators are not merely passive recipients of compassionate
action. Many were soldiers and government o≤cials who had traveled
throughout China and experienced the horrors of modern warfare. They
actively sought liberation from su¥ering; devotion to Guanyin was just one
means, along with medical, military, and other resources. They did not at all
fit the negative stereotypes of Guanyin devotees as envisioned by Chinese
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critics of Buddhism—pregnant women, old ladies and weak monks (as one
soldier put it), or hysterical housewives running for bomb shelters (as Master
Zhengyan put it, recalling her experience as a child). The particular narra-
tives discussed here present the Buddhist devotion of active military and
government men who saw the compassion of the bodhisattva Guanyin
throughout their tragedies and recoveries. The conversion narratives pub-
lished in postwar Taiwan present a Buddhism meaningful to the modern,
active man or woman facing su¥ering. Their narratives contributed to the
transformation to the modern, activist Buddhism taught by leading Bud-
dhist masters such as the charismatic Taiwanese nun, Master Zhengyan, and
the Chan teacher from the mainland, Master Shengyan.
What is the role of these Guanyin conversion narratives in spreading
Buddhism in Taiwan? The narrators perceive their narratives as an impor-
tant way in which to spread Guanyin devotion and to repay the bodhisattva’s
compassionate protection. However, few of the narratives actually cite
another written narrative as the inspiration for their Guanyin devotion.
The inspiration is almost always the compassionate urging of a friend or
relative. The devotion is spread personally, one-on-one. There are the
accounts in which one is urged in a dream to practice Guanyin devotion, but
it may be that, in stressful times, one remembers in dream the long-ago
urging of a parent or friend. So the oral narratives behind these published
accounts may be most significant for the spread of devotion. Reading written
accounts is valued in the narratives because these written accounts confirm
the conversion experience and, in some cases, encourage people to spread
their own narratives orally and in published form.
How are these narratives used in contemporary Buddhist teaching? The
narratives raise some significant questions for contemporary Buddhists in
Taiwan, particularly with regard to the ways in which they view the proper
understanding of the cause of one’s su¥ering and the way to end it. These
conversion narratives seldom include discussion of karmic retribution as an
explanation of disease or disaster. The narrators do not see themselves as the
cause of their own su¥ering and, in fact, do not discuss the causes of su¥er-
ing at all. That is not part of the narrative structure. Guanyin saves people
from su¥ering regardless of the cause, so there seems to be no narrative pur-
pose in analyzing the cause.
According to the narratives, the easiest way to end one’s immediate
su¥ering is to ask for the intervention of the bodhisattva Guanyin. The role
of the Buddhist is to ask for the intervention and then to repay the bodhi-
sattva for her compassionate assistance. The narratives usually recount the
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writer’s e¥orts to try in some way to repay the compassion of the bodhisat-
tva. The most common means of repayment are devout chanting of the
mantra or the name of the bodhisattva and the spreading of Guanyin devo-
tion through the sharing of the narrative. The secondary means is through
becoming a vegetarian to express compassion to all beings. And there are the
rare narratives in which the writer has become an ordained monk or nun in
gratitude to Guanyin. Modern Buddhist teachers ask even more of their fol-
lowers. They ask that Taiwanese Buddhists strive to manifest the wisdom and
compassion of the bodhisattva Guanyin. This is a modern, engaged Bud-
dhism that is far from the passive stereotype mentioned by the Kuomintang
soldiers as they struggled to define their own Buddhist experiences. The early
Guanyin narratives published by Kuomintang soldiers and government
employees were part of the transition to modern, engaged Buddhism in
Taiwan.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of trends in male and female ordination in Taiwan, see Jones (,
–).
2. For more information about Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, see Laliberté (chapter
 in this volume).
3. For the institutional history of Buddhism in the twentieth century, see Jones ().
Jones’ study also provides an excellent overview of the state of Buddhism that con-
fronted the mainlander monks and laypeople who moved to Taiwan after the war.
4. Fu Liang’s and two other early collections of miracle tales are discussed in Yü (,
chap. ).
5. The White-Robed Guanyin Chant is brief, and, in modern Taiwan, it is, therefore, often
printed in various forms: with other Guanyin chants; in calendars of Guanyin festival
days; and in testimonials about the e≤cacy of the chant.
6. Shengyan’s autobiographical accounts of Guanyin encounters are found in several of
his publications. For his Chan interpretation, see Sheng-yen ().
7. For the story of Zhengyan’s encounter with Guanyin from her mother’s perspective,
see Ching (, ). A brief biography, including this story, may also be found in
Jones (, –).
8. This general idea is also found at several points in Zhengyan ().
9. All seven stories from the original collection are presented in Yü (, –). A
striking contrast between these early narratives and Taiwanese narratives is found in
the first story in the collection: when the main character faced a devastating fire, he
“told his family members not to try to carry things out of the house nor to try to put
out the fire with water, but just to chant the sutra with sincerity” (). In contrast,
the main characters in the Taiwanese narratives emphasize personal responsibility and
action as well as devotion to the bodhisattva.
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A S  T H E  P A R A L L E L dramas of socioeconomic modernization and political
liberalization unfolded on Taiwan over the course of the past three decades,
the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan (PCT) (Taiwan Jidujiao Zhanglao Jiao-
hui) began to define new roles for itself: those of witness bearer, voice of con-
science, evangelist of political morality, and advocate of selfhood for both
the pre- Minnan (Hokkien) and Hakka immigrants and the Yuanzhu-
min (Austronesian aborigines). By assuming these roles, this indigenized yet
still Western-connected (or, more accurately, World Council of Churches
[WCC]–connected) church entered into conflict with the authoritarian
Kuomintang (KMT) (Guomindang or Nationalist Party)–dominated state.
It was that regime’s military forces, the Presbyterian leadership remem-
bered, that had attacked its institutions and its members during the painful
days and weeks of the tragic  February incident of . Like the popula-
tion at large, the PCT remained threatened and politically quiescent over the
course of the first two and a half decades of KMT rule, but, after , with
the KMT regime increasingly under siege, the church began to take action
and challenged the state. What resulted was a sustained and many-leveled
church-regime confrontation that took place over the course of the s
and the s. This confrontation was paralleled by the evolution of a strong
working relation between the liberal Taiwanese-led but Western-connected
church and those anti-KMT organizations such as the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP) (Minjindang) that directed the secular struggle for the
Taiwanization and democratization of the Republic of China (ROC).
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This essay is both a broad overview of the history of a major church, the
PCT, and a study of the role that that church played in the Taiwanese
people’s ongoing struggle for democratic government, for a more inclusive
society, and for sociopolitical change. It links the processes of local church
history to the processes of political history, examining the sphere that is the
meeting ground of ecclesiastical and political activity. Most of the sections
that follow provide a general history of church-as-church development and
an overview of church-state relations. Breadth of coverage, not detail, is the
dominant mode of presentation. However, such an approach is, at certain
points in the narrative, inadequate if the reader is to understand the signifi-
cance of the PCT in modern Taiwanese life. Thus, the coverage of events in
the fourth section, “The Church Militant, –,” di¥ers from the
pattern of coverage one finds elsewhere. Here, I present an in-depth, detailed
examination of the way the PCT played a crucial role as an actor in the
process of a confrontational church-state relation. The shift from macro-
presentation to micropresentation may seem jarring, but it is a shift that I
feel is absolutely necessary given this essay’s stress on the relation between
religion and ethnic or national identity or selfhood.
The essay is divided into six sections. The first section o¥ers an overview
of the origins of this church and covers the period from  to . It traces
the complex missionary roots of the church, the missionaries’ attempts to
create a church that would be self-su≤cient and would become independ-
ent of the two linked Western Protestant churches whose missionaries
converted the Taiwanese to their faith. It also covers the painful later years
under the Japanese (–), years that saw the Taiwanese forced to lead
their church without guidance from their Western missionary mentors.
The second section deals with the brief but eventful span of years known
as the Retrocession (the KMT’s term for the recovery of the province of Tai-
wan from its Japanese colonial masters) that began in  and ended in late
 as KMT o≤cials came to the island and made it their bastion against
the Communist tide. These were dramatic and painful years of restructur-
ing made more di≤cult by the KMT’s policy of treating Taiwan as a province
of pro-Japanese traitors and exploiting its power to pillage the island in the
guise of governing it. The trauma of  February, the Taiwanese populace’s
revolt against the KMT liberator-occupiers, and the role that the Presbyte-
rians played during this revolt and the purge that followed are discussed.
The third section examines the events of the years from the fall of 
until the end of  and focuses on the development of the PCT in the com-
petitive environment of the “missionary invasion” of the s and early
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s. It shows how the church both reorganized its regional and local
organizations and redefined its relation with the Presbyterian missionaries
from Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It also explores the
process of church growth and explains why and how the PCT was able to
expand among those populations with whom it had worked during its
almost one hundred years of institutional life on the island.
The fourth section is, as suggested earlier, the core of this long discus-
sion of the intertwining of church building and nation building. It covers 
the dramatic span of years from  until . During this period, when the
PCT stood almost alone—and very exposed—in its struggle against 
the KMT-controlled state, we discover the ways in which this independent
(but not indigenous) Christian body assumed the di≤cult and hazardous
roles of advocate of Taiwanese selfhood and agent of societal change. This
section and the section that follows are more detailed than the others.
The fifth section deals, although in less detail than the fourth, with the
dramatic and eventful years from late  to . It begins with a discus-
sion of the PCT’s role in the Meilidao movement, a mass movement that was
both a struggle for independence and a struggle for the creation of a multi-
party democratic government. The movement took its name from Meilidao
(Beautiful island) magazine, the press organ of the dangwai (“outside the
[o≤cial] party,” i.e., the KMT) activists. The movement climaxed, as we shall
see, in the Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong) incident of  December . The section
then shifts to a discussion of the church in the aftermath of the Kaohsiung
incident as well as its role in the era of confrontational, demonstration-
driven street politics of the s that ended only with the legalization of
the opposition and the introduction of a number of key reforms. This
period ends in  as Taiwanese pushed the reform agenda with street
demonstrations.
The sixth section covers the years from  to . It is during this
period that major reforms are introduced and large steps toward democra-
tization are taken. President Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo) begins the
reform process in –. Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) then begins to
implement the reform policies introduced by his predecessors and moves
Taiwan step-by-step toward becoming a constitutional democracy in fact as
well as in name. The nature of these many-faceted reforms are outlined, and
we then see how these reforms and the democratization of Taiwanese society
a¥ected the church, forcing it to redefine its role in the life of the people of
the ROC on Taiwan. This section summarizes these political reforms and
shows how the church responded to them and to the new Taiwan that the
process of reform and democratization helped bring to fruition.
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In the concluding section, I attempt to assess the role of the PCT both
as a religious presence and as an advocate of Taiwanese selfhood and large-
scale social change.
This essay is a study of a religious body that played roles both spiritual
and secular—as an advocate for a Western yet, by today, also a deeply
Taiwanese mode of spirituality and as an agent for sociopolitical transfor-
mation and ethnic rights and participation. It is the story of a Christian body
in a non-Christian land that came to see itself both as bearing witness to
personal salvation through Christ and as bearing witness to the ongoing
Taiwanese struggle for selfhood and political rights.1
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRESBYTERIAN PRESENCE ON TAIWAN, 1865–1945
Missionaries representing the English Presbyterian Mission pioneered
Protestant e¥orts in Taiwan and were followed by their brethren from the
Presbyterian Church in Canada. William Burns, James Maxwell, and other
representatives of the English mission had come to Fujian in the mid-s,
soon after the treaty ports were opened to Western merchants. The Presby-
terians centered their e¥orts in Amoy (Xiamen), in the provincial capital,
Fuzhou, and in the northern Guangdong port of Swatow, in an area heavily
populated by Hakka. The Fujian-based missionaries developed a romanized
version of Hokkien (or Minnanhua), the dialect of the counties along south-
coastal Fujian, and, using this as their tool, evangelized among the Minnan-
hua speakers with some success. They also adopted the goal of planting and
nurturing congregations that could stand on their own and act as inde-
pendent churches within a larger and formally defined church polity. This
stress on qualified independence was to be the hallmark of the Presbyterian
e¥ort on Taiwan (Johnston , ; Band , –).
Taiwan became a mission field in the s, after the signing of the
Treaties of Tianjin and Beijing, the expansion of the number of treaty ports,
and the Qing government’s guarantee of protection for Christian mission-
aries.2 Members of the English Presbyterian Mission moved to Taiwan-fu
(later renamed Tainan) in southern Taiwan and established a presence there.
Over the course of the next three decades, in the face of fierce local opposi-
tion, they worked among the Yuanzhumin and the Han Chinese, converting
people to their faith, and building churches, schools, and medical facilities.3
This willingness to serve as Christianizers and Westernizers proved to be a
key to the success of these missionaries and their brethren from Canada.
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The English mission was the first of the two Presbyterian e¥orts. The
second was the work of the Presbyterian Church in Canada—and especially
the missionary George Leslie Mackay. Mackay was a man from the province
of Ontario whose parents had come to Canada from Scotland. He was born
in  and grew up in a small town, Zorra, in Ontario. His parents were
members of the Free Church, a Calvinist church allied to the Presbyterian
Church of Scotland (Mackay ).
Mackay was sent to the river town of Tamsui (Danshui) in northern Tai-
wan, a few miles distant from the Taipei basin (Mackay , –). The town
served as a small port for cities upriver such as Taipei, the provincial capital
of the Qing-held island that would subsequently become the Japanese capi-
tal, Taihoku, and the capital of the KMT-controlled ROC on Taiwan. Tamsui
itself remained a small and quiet riverside city until late in the Nationalist
era, when new highways and commuter rail links transformed it into yet
another quasi-urban suburb of the sprawling monster that is Taipei city.
Mackay then began a long and fruitful missionary career that saw him
convert many Hokkien-speaking Chinese, Hakka, and Yuanzhumin. He built
churches and worked to create a viable Protestant community in northern
Taiwan. He was so successful in his e¥orts to convert the people of northern
Taiwan and to establish a network of churches that he was able to start a
seminary. It was there that he and his fellow missionaries trained the pastors
and future leaders of the Northern Synod of the PCT (Mackay , ).4
The Presbyterian presence was well established by the time the Japanese
claimed the island and then took it over after a military campaign in .
The Presbyterian missionaries often served as negotiators between the local
residents and the Japanese and earned the respect and praise of the Japanese
military leaders. However, they also earned the enmity of many of the
island’s more nationalistic and militant citizens. As a result, a wave of anti-
Christian violence shook the island in the years after the Japanese invasion
and conquest. Once this had passed, the Presbyterians found that they could
return to their work. They also discovered that they had the support of the
Japanese civilian authorities, who looked on them as the forerunners of their
own e¥orts at modernization (as outlined in Jones [chapter  in this volume]).
One must add that, during these same years, the Japanese were courting the
British and winning their favor, and, thus, treating the missionaries well was
to their advantage. During four of the five decades that the Japanese con-
trolled the island, the Presbyterians would find a welcome there.
The years following the Japanese conquest also proved important for 
the development of an independent Taiwanese Presbyterian Church. The
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missionaries in the south worked with their Taiwanese and Yuanzhumin
brethren to found the Presbytery of South Taiwan. Missionaries were now
to serve (theoretically) as support sta¥ for the evolving Taiwanese-managed
church. The Westerners had more influence than it appeared, however, for
the mission boards in Great Britain and in Canada often subsidized these
local Taiwanese churches (Band , –). The missionaries and the
pastors of the northern, Canadian-promoted church followed the lead of
their older brethren. By , a northern presbytery had been proposed,
approved, and formally organized (MacLeod , –). With these new
structures in place, the leaders of the church and their Western advisers
moved to a logical next stage: the creation of a united Presbyterian church.
After serious negotiations, such a church was established. It would take the
form of a synod with each of the presbyteries serving as equal partners
(Band , ; MacLeod , –). The union proved to be a formal or
institutional one, but the di¥erent origins of the northern and southern
churches, as well as the di¥erent church populations (e.g., the northern
church had Hakka from the Hsinchu [Xinzhu] area among its members),
meant that the churches would remain e¥ectively apart. These di¥erences
also meant that the two church bodies would be at odds with each other dur-
ing the remaining decades of the Japanese Occupation (MacLeod , ).
The years following World War I saw Great Britain weakened and unable
to provide the support needed by the churches on Taiwan. Taiwanese pastors
and lay leaders were forced to assume an even greater role in their churches.
They rose to the challenge and learned how to be self-reliant, thus weaning
themselves from the breast of the mother church in England (Band ,
–).
One characteristic of the church under the Japanese was the develop-
ment of institutions such as schools and hospitals that served the greater
populace as well as the Presbyterian flock. Oxford College in Tamsui emerged
as an important center for secondary education and became the place where
thousands of Taiwanese were able to receive the middle and high school edu-
cations that the Japanese were unwilling to give them.5 The Changchung
Middle and High School in Tainan, located near the city’s east gate, served
much the same purpose for church members in the south. The church also
moved ahead in developing hospitals. The Mackay Hospital, which had been
located in Tamsui, was now moved to Taihoku (Taipei). The Presbyterian-
run hospital in Tainan, which had been founded before the Japanese con-
quest, also expanded in order to meet the needs of the people in the south
(Band , –).
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The last decade and a half under the Japanese proved di≤cult for the
missionaries working with the two parts of the PCT (or, to all intents and
purposes, the two Presbyterian churches on Taiwan). The Japanese were pro-
moting State Shintô, and, by the early s, children in the church schools
were forced to attend the Shintô shrines and participate in government-
sponsored State Shintô ceremonies. By , the churches and the mission-
aries lost control of the hospitals that they had founded and had been
running. Three years later, in early , the Tainan Theological College was
forced to shut its doors, and, by November, the Taiwan mission of the
English Presbyterian Church was shut down and the missionaries ordered
to leave the island. At the same time, the Canadians who served in northern
Taiwan were also forced to leave (Band , –; Historical Commission
, –).
The final step in the Japanese transformation of the church came in ,
when the church became part of a larger Japanese-run Christian Church of
Taiwan and all church property was put into the hands of the new Japanese
administrators. The basic identity of the church was, thus, destroyed for as
long as the Japanese continued to hold Taiwan (Historical Commission
, –).
This, then, is a highly compressed narrative of Presbyterian develop-
ments before Retrocession. One thing is clear: the Presbyterian missionaries
were serious about helping those whom they had converted to create a
viable and independent Presbyterian presence on the island. How well
theory was translated into action is a point still debated among those who
study the church and those who serve it. It must be stated that the attempt
to create an independent Presbyterian Church was ambitious and, on the
whole, successful, especially when one compares the e¥orts of the Presby-
terians to the e¥ort of other Protestant missionaries from major denomi-
nations to create self-sustaining and self-governing Chinese churches.
However, one may argue that, in comparison with a truly indigenous church
(i.e., a Chinese-founded church such as the True Jesus Church), one finds
that, before , the Presbyterian Church was still tied to the Western
church by strong bonds of personal and institutional relationships and by
Western modes of church polity and doctrine. Thus, I prefer to term the
church “independent” rather than “indigenous.” What seemed to be a curse
turned out to be a blessing, however, for, as I will argue, this semicolonial
quality proved to be an advantage for the Presbyterian Church as it entered
a new phase of life as a quasi-political entity in the years after Taiwan’s
takeover by the KMT in .
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THE PCT DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF RETROCESSION 
AND THE 28 FEBRUARY INCIDENT
The years from the fall of  to the fall of  proved to be dramatic and
traumatic for Taiwan and pivotal in the life of the Presbyterian Church. Dur-
ing these years, the leaders of the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church were forced
by events to define the role that their church would play in the now KMT-
controlled island. At the core of this process of redefinition lay the inter-
twined themes of the church’s ongoing establishment of its operational
independence and its identification with the cause of Taiwanese ethnic and
national selfhood. The evolution of the church was connected to its leaders’
ability to meet these two related demands. By observing just how the church
leaders met these demands, we can see how the processes of establishing
their independent status and identifying themselves with the national fate of
the Han Taiwanese and Hakka whom they pastored (or were trying to win
for Christ) played themselves out.
The first demand made by the church elders and laymen throughout the
island was to reorganize and restructure the northern and southern presby-
teries and the islandwide synod into the Taiwanese-controlled entities that
they had been early in the twentieth century. The decision that church leaders
throughout the island made in the years immediately before and after the
KMT took control of Taiwan seemed simple, but it had a host of complex
implications. The leaders first took the simple but radical step of meeting
separately to reconstitute as best they could their own presbyteries. Thus,
the first step meant the destruction—or deconstruction—of the national
church. Only then did they attempt to determine whether a national—and
united—church should be restored and reconstructed.
The first move that each side—representing the northern churches and
the southern churches—took was to formalize a series of uno≤cial (and, in
Japanese eyes, illegal) steps taken during the final years of imperial Japanese
control. The elders and pastors in the north (the Canadian-related branch
of the church) held meetings in February  and established their own
synod. This meeting set an important precedent, for it established the prin-
ciple that each church would now follow its own path of development.
When the General Assembly of the now independent Northern Synod met
again in October of , after the Retrocession had formally begun, they
rea≤rmed this basic decision (Historical Commission , ). Those in
the south took their lead from their northern brethren. In a meeting held
that same month, they recognized what the Northern Synod had done and
acted accordingly, determined to follow their own independent course.
211
09Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:59 AM  Page 211
M U R R A Y  A .  R U B I N S T E I N
The meetings held in each of these areas were much the same. Those
who attended these regional conferences focused on basic problems of orga-
nization. The structures of local bodies were now designed, and the relations
between local churches and the major councils and regional administrative
bodies—for the Presbyterians had a history of operating both administrative
and representative bodies as elements of their ecclesiastical structure—were
defined and diagramed. A flowchart of authority was, thus, put in place. The
major church leaders were also chosen. Finally, control of the regional
middle schools and high schools and each of the theological colleges was
rea≤rmed, and steps were taken to reinvigorate each of these educational
institutions. The thread that ran through these meetings was the demand for
local and regional authority on the part of the Taiwanese Presbyterian lay
leadership and pastorate. This demand reflected the recognition that ten-
sions had developed between the two regions since the o≤cial establishment
of the union of northern and southern churches in . There was also the
recognition, that before one could re-create an e¥ective national church, one
had to restore the core churches to the earlier state of viability that they had
enjoyed before the Japanese had instituted their own ultranationalistic pro-
gram of reorganization (Historical Commission , –).
The second demand concerned the Western missionaries and their rein-
tegration into the Presbyterian Church. Both Western church leaders and,
perhaps, the Taiwanese laity demanded that church leaders on Taiwan re-
develop working relations with the mother churches in England and Canada
and with the missionaries who served those churches. The missionaries had
been forced from the island in . Now, with the war over, they were
returning and were discovering that their status and their roles in the newly
reorganized regional churches were uncertain. They also discovered that 
the Taiwanese leaders and pastors had proved quite capable of running the
churches and the synods without their (sometimes unwanted) help.
The missionaries soon discovered that, while the Taiwanese could run
their own churches, they were not unwilling to welcome their old friends
and coworkers back. Thus, many of the “old Taiwan hands” were invited to
serve in the churches in which they had worked, sometimes for decades.
These men and women returned and were warmly welcomed back to cities
and villages and congregations that they had known for years. However, both
sides realized that things could not return to their prewar status and that the
relation between the missionaries and their churches and synods had to be
renegotiated and redefined (Brown , –).
Both groups, the churches and the missionaries, were familiar and com-
fortable with the older patterns of dependency, but each was also aware of
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the changes that the war years had brought. Thus, a new set of formal and
working relations had to be developed carefully and slowly and with agree-
ment from both sides. Experimentation was called for as the missionaries,
their home boards and churches, and the Taiwanese churches and synods
decided what roles the missionaries could play and what the limits of their
authority and influence were to be. In the years from  to , the first
steps were taken toward redefining this relation.6
Even as these processes of restructuring and reintegration went on, both
synods moved ahead with their e¥orts to evangelize among the populace
and to indigenize the form of Christianity to which they were winning
souls. As other evangelists (such as those missionaries representing the
Southern Baptist Convention on the Chinese mainland in the years between
 and ) had discovered, chaotic times produced a greater openness to
the Christian message. The Presbyterian presence on Taiwan was able to
expand during these years immediately following the war and the end of the
Japanese Occupation. Taiwanese and Hakka joined the church in ever greater
numbers, as did the Yuanzhumin of the island’s central mountain range.
A further comment is necessary here. The Presbyterians had worked
with the Yuanzhumin during the last decades of Qing rule and, as James
Johnston and George Leslie Mackay have shown us, were able to make
converts and prepare the ground for further conversions. However, the Japa-
nese attempted to isolate the Yuanzhumin in reservations and built electri-
fied fences to separate these lands from those of the Han Chinese who
settled the island’s lowlands. Even so, both Presbyterians and evangelists of
the True Jesus Church had been able to make inroads and prepare the
ground for evangelism during the fifty years of Japanese rule. Thus, when the
Nationalists came in and made the mountain reserves more accessible to
missionaries (albeit only by special permit), the mountain people responded
and converted in great numbers (Vicedom , –). Within a few years,
tens of thousands of mountain people were counted among the expanding
Christian community, and the churches now faced the task of training
ministers and lay leaders among this new population. The Presbyterians,
long involved on Taiwan, and long stressing building an independent
church, made the most notable gains.
The Presbyterians were successful among the Yuanzhumin for the same
reasons they were successful among the Taiwanese and Hakka of the island’s
western coastal plains: they had developed useful romanizations of the local
dialects and languages. They thus introduced a medium that would be used
to maintain the regional dialects such as Hokkien and the tribal tongues as
well. The missionaries also worked to foster a sense of local cultural and
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ethnic identity even as they developed an indigenized and more responsive
form of Reformed Protestantism. This stress on establishing a written lan-
guage and fostering pride in place and pride in the Han Taiwanese, Hakka,
and Yuanzhumin past would be used to confront the KMT’s potent form of
cultural imperialism, Mandarinization, from the s through the late
s.
The Protestant e¥orts to preserve culture and heighten awareness of self-
hood had a number of dimensions. One was the process of developing and
making extensive use of the Hokkien romanization that the English Presby-
terians had first developed in Amoy. Another was to rebuild the system of
Presbyterian-run schools such as those in Tainan and Taipei counties that
had long been the cradle of the emerging Taiwanese middle class. Heroes of
Taiwanese resistance to KMT repression such as the political scientist Peng
Minming had attended such schools, which provided him and thousands of
others access to a university education in Japan. Thus, such schools were the
place where the Taiwanese elite were trained. While the Presbyterians had
prepared at least two generations of Taiwanese leaders, they had not yet
taken a next step—that of identifying their church with the Taiwanese
people as a whole. Nor were they ready to bear witness to what many
Taiwanese saw as KMT oppression. A crisis had to unfold before this could
take place and before an unbreakable bond could be created between the
members of the Presbyterian Church and the majority of Taiwan’s non-
Christian populace. Church leaders and members, and thousands more Tai-
wanese (who were believers in the popular traditions, in Buddhism, in
Daoism, and in regional and China-wide sectarian movements such as
Yiguan Dao), had to experience a baptism of fire and a baptism of blood
before this bond could be forged. That crisis was the  February incident
(er-er-ba shijian) of .7
On  February , a scu≥e broke out in Taipei between police work-
ing with the Monopoly of Alcohol and Tobacco and the local populace.
These men attempted to arrest a woman selling cigarettes, an illegal act that
challenged the state’s authority. They also shot a bystander who protested
their actions. This was only the beginning. The authorities refused to hand
over the policeman who fired the fatal shot, and the crowd attacked the local
police station and then went on a rampage. Violence against mainlanders
and against Taiwanese who collaborated with them continued the next day
and in the days that followed. Thousands of Taiwanese began to vent the
long-suppressed anger that they felt toward the mainlanders, whom they
now looked on, not as their island’s liberators, but as its occupiers. Members
of the local populace, Han Taiwanese and Hakka, took over the governments
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of a number of cities. A group of Taiwanese leaders then formed a commit-
tee that drew up demands in an attempt to settle the situation with the KMT
authorities. There were thirty-two such demands. The island’s governor,
Chen Yi, reluctantly accepted these demands and promised not to have
additional troops sent over from garrisons on the nearby Fujian mainland.
Taiwan was, as it had been fifty years before, temporarily independent. And,
again, this state of independence would be short-lived (Lai, Meyers, and Wou
, –; see also Kerr ).
On  May, two months later, ten thousand troops landed at Keelung
(Jilong), and another three thousand landed at the southwestern port of
Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong). What appeared to be an indiscriminate slaughter of
civilians then took place. However, in the opinion of George Kerr and such
scholars as Thomas Gold and Stephen Phillips, the process of liquidation
that began on that day in May  was really a quite conscious and success-
ful attempt to destroy the island’s intellectual and social elites. Newspaper
editors, lawyers, teachers, and Presbyterian clergymen were all considered
fair game. In the end, ten thousand people lost their lives either in the streets
or in the prisons (see Lai, Meyers, and Wou , –; Kerr , –;
Gold , –; and Phillips ). The PCT’s newspaper, the Taiwan
Church News, was shut down as the KMT wave of repression widened.
Those older Presbyterian ministers and theologians whom I interviewed
over the course of the s recalled these days of terror and stated that they
believed that their church and its leaders were targeted for elimination.
Once the objective of the intellectual decapitation of the island had
been achieved and the island was again securely in the hands of the KMT
authorities, the regime admitted that it had made mistakes and that some of
the o≤cials on the scene had been corrupt and had acted improperly. It tried
to clean house and rid the provincial administration of the worst o¥enders.
Chen Yi, the man in charge, was found guilty of serious crimes and was exe-
cuted. This was done, however, not out of any deep commitment to justice,
but because it was becoming a possibility that Taiwan might soon become
the only province that the ROC government controlled. Chiang Kai-shek
sent trusted allies and subordinates to the island to prepare the way for his
regime’s possible exile there. Chen Cheng, a trusted associate, and Chiang
Ching-kuo, the generalissimo’s son and one of the most capable of the
ROC’s administrators, were sent to Taiwan to head various agencies of the
regime (Gold , –; Clough ; Lai, Meyers, and Wou , –).
The ROC had now begun, belatedly, to court the island’s remaining elites as
a means of securing the goodwill of the populace. They wanted to fall back
on a secure Taiwan that was still relatively friendly.
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The  February incident is to this day seen by many as a critical event
in Taiwan’s recent history. It is also seen by members of the PCT as a defining
moment in their own history. Since the s, the events have taken on an
added significance because of the KMT’s means of handling what was legiti-
mate public protest that came only after people were pushed to their limits.
Given the open and very public role that church leaders played during the
incident and the degree of su¥ering that church leaders and members
experienced, the event and its painful aftermath were seen as a defining
moment of consciousness. The PCT leaders determined then that they
would continue to raise their voices, this time speaking for the population
of Taiwan as a whole, and would accept as their burden any punishment that
this public form of protest engendered.
The years from  to  were crucial in the modern evolution of the
PCT. This was a time of institutional crisis that reflected, in microcosm, the
crisis that Taiwan itself was experiencing. It was also a time during which 
the Taiwanese leaders of the church asserted their identity. This forced the
Western mother churches to begin the process of redefining the relations
between themselves and the Taiwanese church that they had helped bring
into being. How the church survived and prospered even as it worked to
indigenize itself in more complex and profound ways in a Taiwan that was
now becoming the KMT’s last bastion must now be examined.
THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH ON ISLAND CHINA, 1949 –1964
The transformation of Taiwan from Chinese province to KMT-dominated
and American-bankrolled nation-state created new challenges and new
opportunities for the PCT. The years from  to  would see the church
change in important ways as it responded to the new political, cultural, and
spiritual climates created by the KMT’s loss of the Chinese mainland and its
leadership’s retreat to the large and already populous island in the South
China sea. These years would also demonstrate the wisdom of the church
leaders’ decision to make their church the independent ecclesiastical body
that it had become by . Finally, these same years would demonstrate in
subtle ways how intuitively correct it was for church elders and pastors to
embrace the cause of Taiwanese selfhood and the Taiwanese population’s
striving for a sense of ethnic and provincial identity.
The first challenge that the PCT faced stemmed from the KMT’s deci-
sion to transform the province of Taiwan, with its own set of languages and
dialects and its own unique history as a maritime frontier, into the ROC
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regime’s vision of the one real and authentic China. The KMT’s program
had a number of di¥erent facets. The first was public security implemented
by the security forces commanded by Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang, the first
among equals of the newly formed Political Action Committee, demon-
strated both his well-known administrative abilities and a ruthlessness that
he had not exhibited while carrying out his previous assignments, as when
he had served as the mayor of Shanghai. He first put under arrest and then
had killed thousands of Taiwanese and newly arrived mainlanders in the
process of carrying out a wide-ranging purge of so-called corrupt elements
(Gold , ). The ball field in downtown Taipei became an ROC version
of a killing field. This stark fact was discussed by the British journalist—and
enthusiastic supporter of the generalissimo and his regime—H. McClear
Bate (Bate ). Bate went on to provide a chilling portrait of Chiang, a man
who would spend much of his later career as president of the ROC demon-
strating how a¥able and likable a person he was and how much of a friend
of the Taiwanese people he wanted to be.8 The reign of terror had its intended
e¥ect: no organized large scale opposition to the regime was in evidence on
the island until the diplomatic and domestic crisis that came in the wake of
the Kissinger-Nixon initiatives of the early s.
The lesson was not lost on the Presbyterians. No matter how great their
need might have been to challenge the regime for its sins against the Taiwan-
ese, they decided to adopt an expedient course of action and carefully
watched their steps and measured their words. Such a careful public posture
is reflected in the PCT’s own Centenary History (Historical Commission
). In those sections that covered the di≤cult years of the late s,
referred to simply as the “bitter winter” of the church, the authors of this
otherwise detailed narrative history spoke only of the economic problems
on Taiwan and the problems of disunion within the church itself.
KMT social and educational policies created di¥erent sorts of problems.
The church had continued to use the romanized Taiwanhua (Hokkien)
Bible that George Band had prepared in the s and s and a roman-
ized Taiwanhua hymnal. Furthermore, church leaders in the north and the
south made it clear to all concerned that the language of prayer was Taiwan-
hua. The new KMT-led government opposed this use of the provincial
dialect. It saw itself as the government of China in exile and mandated that,
as a province of China, Taiwan was a guoyu-speaking nation (guoyu mean-
ing “national language” or “Mandarin”). The state authorities mandated that
the language of all public discourse had to be guoyu and that the language
taught in school was to be guoyu.
Children entering school were to be taught guoyu no matter what lan-
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guage or dialect was used at home. During the first decades of KMT rule,
children of mainlanders from guoyu-speaking households had the upper
hand, and many more of them—in proportion to their actual percentage in
the population—passed the all-important examinations for the better
middle schools, high schools, and universities and colleges. This advantage
was partially linguistic and partially political—the sons and daughters of the
island’s new rulers were given places of privilege, at least during the s
and s. Some Presbyterians whom I interviewed in the s believed that
the mainlanders continued to hold this advantage into the s and s,
but other Taiwanese dispute this assertion. Nonetheless, the perception of
advantage was more important than the reality, for it served as a subtext and
basis for Taiwanese resentment (Cheng , –).
This linguistic imperialism went beyond the classroom and into the
printing house. Presbyterians found that their attempts to continue to use
Taiwanhua as the language of instruction in their own church-run schools
and seminaries was made di≤cult by the government’s policy of prevent-
ing—or at least attempting to prevent—the preparation of romanized Tai-
wanhua texts and teaching materials. The government went even further,
however, for it attacked the e¥orts of the Presbyterians and of other churches
and missionary orders to prepare and publish workable texts in romanized
versions of the various Yuanzhumin tribal languages. Presbyterians were
active in evangelism of the Yuanzhumin and resisted the government’s
e¥orts at obstruction. Here, they were joined by seemingly unlikely allies, the
members of the Catholic Missionary Society in America, an order known by
most people as the Maryknoll Order. The Maryknollers had been active in
both Guangdong and Fujian and, after being forced from the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC), found that they could work among the Taiwanhua-
speaking majority as well as among the Yuanzhumin (Wiest ). The order
was based in Taichung (Taizhong), but the missionaries, both Maryknoll
fathers and sisters, also worked in the major cities of the western coastal
plain and among the Yuanzhumin communities of Nantou county. Thus,
their work paralleled that of the Presbyterians. The Maryknollers also took
another important and perhaps provocative step and made their mission
house an educational center where they prepared texts in Taiwanhua and
taught the language both to their own missionaries and to other Western-
ers, missionaries and nonmissionaries alike. The two groups—Catholic and
Protestant—thus forged a sub-rosa alliance to fight against their common
enemy: the linguistically imperialistic KMT state.
But there were opportunities in the realm of social policy. The govern-
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ment’s attempt to modernize as rapidly as possible meant that there were few
funds available for social services and for the creation of a modern health-
care system. Here, the Presbyterians could and did act and, as a result, had
considerable impact. They had pioneered the introduction of Western-style
medical knowledge and practice on the island and, by the s, had restored
the hospital centers that they had built in earlier decades in the major
regions of Taiwan to levels that equaled or exceeded these institutions’
pre–World War II e≤ciency. The reunited (and independent) Presbyterian
Church of the s stressed medical work and continues to do so to the
present day. To be sure, the Presbyterian Church was not alone in this e¥ort.
Newly arrived Western missions such as the Seventh-Day Adventists estab-
lished hospitals in Taipei and Taitung (Taidong). Other evangelical bodies
such as the Southern Baptist Convention set up clinics in the cities where
they worked. Maryknollers also operated eye clinics as part of their overall
program of service to the Hokkien-speaking and Yuanzhumin populations
with whom they worked. But it is clear that the Presbyterians led the way and
were certainly the most visible presence in this benevolent facet of Christian
activity. Of equal importance was the fact that many of the doctors, nurses,
and administrative sta¥ who worked within the Presbyterians’ health-service
network were themselves Han Taiwanese. Indigenization was a key element
in this as well as other aspects of the overall Presbyterian e¥ort.
There was, as the decade of the s unfolded, yet another policy of the
KMT regime that, on the surface, seemed to threaten Presbyterian evange-
lization e¥orts but actually served to strengthen them. This was the KMT’s
policy of opening Taiwan’s doors to Western missionaries. Beginning in
, Western missionaries from various mainline, evangelical, and Holiness
and Pentecostal denominations began moving into Taiwan. The leaders of
these groups saw the island as a potential place of refuge from the storm of
revolution and civil war then engulfing mainland China. Missionaries repre-
senting the Southern Baptist Convention, the Conservative Baptist Church,
and the Bible Baptist Church, to mention only evangelical denominations,
all moved to the island. Mainline Councilor (WCC-related) denominations
such as the Anglicans (Episcopalians), the Methodists, and the Lutherans all
sent missionaries across the strait to the major cities of Taiwan. Finally,
members of the Assemblies of God, the largest of the Pentecostal churches,
decided to settle on the island once it was clear that the KMT regime would
survive.
The Catholic Church also began to expand its presence on the island,
and, as had been its practice on the Chinese mainland, the Propaganda
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Fidei (the organ of the church that directed missionary activity) divided the
island into discrete geographic zones that were then apportioned to specific
mission orders. Thus, the Jesuits worked in Hsinchu, the Maryknollers in
Taichung, and the Vincentians in Kaohsiung. The Vatican Apostolate and 
the nuncio’s headquarters were located in Taipei, the capital in exile of the
ROC.9
In addition to these Western groups, one major Chinese indigenous
church moved personnel to the island to work with the new immigrant
communities and the pre–World War II Christian communities. This was
Watchman Nee’s Assembly Hall Church, a church that had been established
in the s and had become an important part of a growing indigenous
church community on the mainland. True Jesus Church evangelists and lay
members also migrated to the island during the troubled years of the late
s and strengthened that well-established indigenous, charismatic
church, which had become a very visible rival to the PCT.
At first glance, it would seem that this missionary invasion would work
against the PCT by providing the church with numerous rivals in the
struggle for Chinese souls. But the evidence available shows that the reverse
was true and that the Presbyterian Church profited from this invasion of
Christian brethren in important and unexpected ways.
First, when the Presbyterian Church was one of very few churches on the
island, as was the case in , it stood out as the only mainline Protestant
body and could easily be persecuted by the government. Now, however,
there were many witnesses to the government’s treatment of Christian
denominations. Furthermore, representatives of many of these groups—the
Southern Baptist Convention is one example—defended the KMT regime as
a paragon of religious toleration and a bastion against the “Red Chinese
hordes” who were driving the missionaries from their shores and restructur-
ing the many Christian churches into one state-controlled patriotic church.10
The regime could not a¥ord to alienate such friends. Thus, the Presbyterian
Church, with Southern Presbyterians from the United States now working
alongside it, was protected, at least during the s, by the expanding
Protestant umbrella.
Second, the vast majority of these newly arrived missionaries did not
have the inclination, time, or language skills to work with either the Han
Taiwanese, the Hakka, or the Yuanzhumin. Furthermore, many of these
missionaries were not willing to do the type of rural evangelism that was
required to gather in the flock in much of Taiwan. They had worked on the
mainland with guoyu-speaking Chinese who lived in the major cities. Once
on Taiwan, they continued to work with the groups they knew best in the
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urban environments such as Taipei where they felt most comfortable, and,
to their delight, these missionaries did find many of the newly arrived main-
landers receptive to the message of the gospel. Over the course of the years
from  to , the number of mainlander Protestants grew at impressive
rates. This response seemed to justify the tactical decisions that these newly
arrived missionaries and their home boards made when they came to the
island in the late s and the early s (see Rubinstein b, –).
What this meant was that, by and large, the Presbyterians were given an
open invitation to continue the work that they had been involved in for
eighty-five years. They could continue to work among the Taiwanese-
speaking majority, with whom they were now so solidly identified. They
could also expand their presence among the Yuanzhumin, who were joining
the Presbyterian community in increasing numbers.
But was the PCT ready to take advantage of these new opportunities?
Given its renewed division into northern and southern synods, the tensions
caused by this redivision, the unsettled state of relations with missionaries
from England, Canada, and the United States, and the devastation of its
membership after the series of ongoing purges, it seems, at first, that the
church was, indeed, not ready.
But the PCT leaders were aware of the problems that they faced and the
opportunities that they had before them. Thus, in  and the years that
immediately followed, they were able to restructure their church and redirect
their energies in order to take full advantage of the new status of Christian-
ity and the new possibilities for e¥ective and productive evangelism.
In May , the leaders of the Northern and Southern Synods estab-
lished representative committees to meet at a consultative conference. The
purpose of the conference was to draw up a basic law for the newly united
Presbyterian Church. The conference took place in June and July on the
grounds of the Changhua Presbyterian Church. Its task was to define regu-
lations and establish policies for seven facets of church work. These were
evangelism, church-sponsored activities (including medical work and pub-
lishing), the church in family life, youth work, religious practice, theological
education, and the relation between the church and the economic realm.
The deliberations produced a detailed set of fundamental regulations—
what can be seen as a new Presbyterian constitution—and a new structure
of governance for the united church’s General Assembly (Historical Com-
mission , –).
Once the document was completed, it was submitted to each of the
synods. O≤cials in both bodies critiqued and then ratified the document.
Only then did it become the fundamental law of the new united PCT.
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The creation of a united church was vital: It opened the way for a new
set of initiatives that served to strengthen the church even further. One
important step was to redefine the relation between the PCT and the foreign
missionaries. By , this process produced a new policy statement entitled
“The Relationship between the General Assembly and the Mother Churches.”
This statement was discussed at a meeting of the General Assembly. The
basic thrust of the new policy was to be that the General Assembly would
initiate the call for missionaries and appoint them to their work. The PCT
would be accountable and would provide the mother churches with yearly
reports about what the missionaries were doing and what expenses they had
incurred (Brown , ).
The statement was but the first step. The three decades that followed
were witness to the evolution of a more detailed program for the mission-
church relation. The missions themselves held parallel meetings, and, step-
by-step, the new policy was designed and implemented. The process was as
di≤cult as it was innovative since most churches established by missions
were still in states of dependency on their respective mother churches. Eliza-
beth Brown, who saw the process evolve over the past three decades, argues
that the policy’s fruition marked a new level of maturity for this national
East Asian church and its leaders (see Brown ).11
The church leaders also reached out in other ways. The PCT saw 
the value of cooperating with other churches and the importance of the
ecumenical movement. In , discussions were held with missionaries
representing another Councilor church that had begun work on Taiwan, the
United Methodist Church. The idea was to present a united church that
would have the Presbyterians continuing to work with the Han Taiwanese
and the Yuanzhumin and the Methodist Church working with mainlanders.
But this ambitious and logical step was not taken. The course of church his-
tory on the island might have been radically di¥erent had that union been
solemnized.12 However, the Presbyterian Church did become a member of
the WCC and continues to maintain an association with that important
international organization (Historical Commission , ). The church
also joined together with other East Asian churches as a member of the East
Asian Christian Conference (Historical Commission , –). Each of
these steps gave the church a voice in larger Protestant matters and also a
visibility in the wider Christian world that the other more mission-centered
churches or the indigenous sect-like churches, such as the True Jesus Church,
simply did not have. When the PCT was challenged by the KMT regime,
such membership and participation beyond the island’s shores proved to be
both a blessing and a curse.
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Even as these steps were being taken, some church leaders began to plan
for a major evangelistic initiative. They decided to attempt to double their
numbers in the decade before the church celebrated the centenary of the
founding of the Southern Synod of the now-united church. This “double-
the-church movement” was directed by the Southern Synod in . It was
aimed at Han Taiwanese living in the small villages and market towns of the
south Taiwan countryside. The years from  to  showed the largest
increase in numbers. The membership grew from , in  to , in
 and , in . By , the membership stood at ,.
In the north, the movement started in , some four years after its initi-
ation in the south. Growth had taken place in the period –—but
almost as a spillover from the aggressive and well-organized campaign of the
Southern Synod. In , the membership of the Northern Synod stood at
,. Two years later, it had reached ,. There then followed a decline
of some , members. When the double-the-church movement began in
earnest, membership almost returned to its previous high level (,), and
two years later it reached ,. There were a number of reasons that church
leaders found to explain this slower church growth rate in the north. One
was that the church was centered in the urban areas rather than in the
countryside and, thus, potential members felt the full weight of the evan-
gelistic campaigns of those newly arrived Christian groups that decided to
work with the Han Taiwanese majority. A related factor was “oversatura-
tion.” Just by living in the north, the people were exposed to too much
information. Too many Christians with messages redolent of outsiders were
vying for a population beginning to rediscover its own indigenous traditions
(Swanson , –).
The campaign thus slowed to a halt. Although impressive gains had
been made—by  there were , communicant members—the slow-
ing of the rate of growth disappointed the leaders of the church trying to be
united in fact as well as in name. But what had been demonstrated was that
the PCT could reach people in ways that other churches could not. In the
years from  to , the church had absorbed the full impact of the mis-
sionary invasion and had triumphed over its friendly rivals. The church
would continue to grow over the course of the next thirty years. During these
same decades, leaders of the PCT would become even more aware that their
church had now become an islandwide institution that had to deal with a set
of complex responsibilities to the citizens of the whole island, responsi-
bilities that no other Taiwanese-speaking institution could readily or easily
assume. Why and how the church came to play this new role are now to be
examined.
223
09Ch/Clart  7/25/03  8:59 AM  Page 223
M U R R A Y  A .  R U B I N S T E I N
THE CHURCH MILITANT, 1965–1978
The centenary year of  marked a turning point in the development of the
PCT. Events were to propel it along paths very di¥erent from those that it
had traveled in the previous fifteen-year period. The church abandoned the
gentleman’s agreement that it had had with the neutral or more pro-KMT
churches, and it became both the defender of Councilor and Reformed
Christianity and the defender of the Taiwanese people. It was forced once
again to assume the burden of witness.
Much of what took place can be explained by the situation in which the
larger Protestant community found itself in . It was in that year that the
leaders of the various Western missions and their client churches recognized
that their hopes of creating a Christian Taiwan were coming to naught.
Large-scale church growth virtually reached an end. As a result, many of the
missions and churches began self-study e¥orts.
With the aid of these studies, the churches were able to discern a number
of reasons for the plateauing of church growth. One was the economic
miracle that such scholars as Li (), Ho (), and Gold () have
explored in some detail. Times of cultural, social, and political upheaval pro-
duce the conditions in which Christianity grows best in an alien culture.
That this is so can be demonstrated by examining the record of the South-
ern Baptist Convention during the decades of the Republican revolution on
the mainland (Rubinstein , –). By , the various crises that
Taiwan had experienced in the early decades of KMT rule had been over-
come, and people no longer felt the need to turn to Western religions.
Rather, they returned to the major gods of Taiwan and began to worship in
the temples of popular religion devoted to specific gods or those temples in
which many of the idols, the shenxiang, of key gods in the Fujian/Taiwan
pantheon—Mazu, Guanyin, Guan Gong, Tudi Gong, or Baosheng Dadi—
were present. The second reason that was found for the drop-o¥ in growth
was simple oversaturation. The mountain peoples had been evangelized so
thoroughly that three of four Yuanzhumin were now Christian—either
Protestant or Catholic. The mainlander population had also been over-
evangelized. And, as the disappointing results of the double-the-church
movement had shown, the Taiwanese population also seemed to have
reached its point of saturation. Too many Protestants were now trying to
reach those who had still not yet heard the message and were still open to it.
It was under these circumstances that the more evangelical churches decided
that a strong evangelistic campaign would help remedy the situation. Their
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leaders invited the famous and fiery neoevangelical preacher Carl MacIntire
to conduct large-scale prayer meetings.13
Over the years, various churches had invited—and would continue to
invite—well-known Western and East Asian evangelists to come to the
island. These men and women—both Billy Graham and Ruth Carter were
invited in the s—would then serve as the center point of islandwide
evangelical campaigns. The message that they preached was su≤ciently
interdenominational for members of the various churches to feel comfort-
able when they attended the prayer meetings.
However, MacIntire broke the mold in an important way. Not only was
he a strict neoevangelical and against any hint of ecumenicism, but he was
also strongly anti-Communist. His message was one that attacked social-
gospel Christianity and anyone who even hinted at coming to terms with the
Three-Self Church of the PRC. Chiang Kai-shek was the heroic anti-
Communist in his eyes. Thus, the government welcomed him. While these
linked theological and political messages were acceptable to many of the
island’s mission-centered churches, they were anathema to the social-gospel-
oriented and avowedly ecumenical and WCC-connected PCT. The tensions
that were generated by the MacIntire campaign set the stage for the new and
more serious conflicts that would pit the PCT against its sister churches and
against the KMT-dominated state.
The next year saw a major escalation in tensions. A study committee of
the WCC—already infamous in the eyes of many neoevangelicals—recom-
mended in  that the PRC should be permitted to enter the United
Nations, replacing the ROC. Such a move was still six years away at that
point, but it was a recognition of the need of the Christian world to come
to grips with the reality of the socialist revolution on the mainland. Chiang
Kai-shek’s reaction was swift and to the point. He had his party pressure the
churches on Taiwan to protest the announcement by withdrawing from the
WCC. These churches did so in the face of the opposition of the largest and
most important of the island’s churches, the PCT. While the PCT did not
make a loud public stir, it did let the other churches know how it felt about
the action. What was needed, church leaders felt, was the proper time and
context to express their antagonisms to the government.
That moment arrived in  when there came a turning point in the
fortune of the ruling party and its regime. From  to , the government
of the ROC sustained a series of diplomatic setbacks. First came the disaster
at the United Nations when the United States withheld its usual veto and
allowed the other members of the Security Council to replace the ROC with
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the PRC. Next came the Kissinger talks in Beijing, followed by the Nixon visit
and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué. It was also around this time
that Japan, Taiwan’s friend and trading partner, recognized the PRC. Finally,
Taiwan and Japan found themselves locked in what would be the first in a
series of conflicts centering around a bleak group of islets, the Diaoyutai.
The United States, the ROC’s great protector, sided with the Japanese. This
was the final straw, and it showed critics of the regime on Taiwan just how
bad the situation had become.
These critics took advantage of the situation and what they saw as the
regime’s vulnerability and held a series of demonstrations calling for polit-
ical reforms. This political ferment provided the PCT with its long-awaited
window of opportunity. Late in , PCT leaders on Taiwan, working in
coordination with PCT leaders and activists in the West, began to issue a
series of dramatic and forceful public statements that challenged the regime
on a number of fronts.14
The first of these statements, issued by the Reverend Kao Chun-min
(Gao Junming), the general secretary of the PCT, was titled “Public State-
ment of Our National Fate” and was addressed to the international com-
munity and to the KMT regime on Taiwan. In its first section, it said quite
simply and forcefully that the fate of Taiwan should be left in Taiwanese
hands and not in the hands of outsiders such as the governments of the PRC
or Taiwan’s erstwhile ally, the Nixon-led United States. Such negotiations as
those carried on that produced the Shanghai Communiqué were a “betrayal
of the people of Taiwan” (“Public Statement” ).
The second section was addressed to the “Leaders of the Republic of
China,” and, in it, the battle with the KMT regime was joined. The church
leaders rea≤rmed the PCT’s strong hostility to communism. They then
called on the regime to open up the political process and to hold elections
for the National Assembly, a body originally elected in  and by  con-
sidered to be—given the age of its members—a wheelchair assembly. The
PCT leaders demanded that the assembly be restructured to represent the
ROC as it really was, that is, geographically the island of Taiwan. It concluded
with the statement: “Such demonstration of renewal will give the people of
other nations, as well as our own, the assurance that justice and internal
harmony will prevail” (“Public Statement” ).
This statement had the e¥ect that Kao and his associates wanted it to
have. It, and the church, became the center of a public debate. Kao recog-
nized that this was so in a second statement issued in April . In this new
statement, Kao recognized the fact that he and his church had toed the line
for many years and had obeyed a command that he said read, “Thou shalt
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not o¥end anyone.” He stated that this earlier and safer admonition had
been replaced by a new one, for the older directive forced the church to
disregard “the responsibility that Christians ought to have to society and
nation.” Now he argued that his church had a role to play in the political
process as a “light to the world.” There were, as he saw it, two circumstances
that forced the church to take such action. The first was when “political
power from without violates the nature of the Church and her carrying out
of her Mission on the earth. The second was when political power from
without violates human rights, that is, the dignity of human existence”
(PCT [] ).
Kao and his colleagues saw this statement as a confession of their faith. In
an interesting and important account of these years, Robert Donall MacCall,
the Southern Presbyterian who was the associate general secretary of the
church during much of the s, suggested that what these church leaders
had done was “political theologizing.” The government felt otherwise and
saw it as a dangerous step, for it was, according to MacCall,“the first time any
group had called for self-determination and elections” (MacCall , ).
There was another arena where this drama was played out—the United
States—and this arena would be a major one for the next three years.
Taiwanese church members in America rallied to the cause of the church on
Taiwan and would make statements, write letters to the newspapers, and talk
to all the politicians and groups they could in the name of their cause: polit-
ical rights and self-determination for the people of Taiwan.
This media campaign began in the summer of . In August ,
Taiwanese living in the Midwest joined together at a conference held at Lake
Geneva, Wisconsin. The conference was, in the Reverend C. S. Sung’s words,
a revealing one, for those who attended determined that they would reex-
amine their responsibility to the people of Taiwan and act accordingly.
The result of these deliberations was a statement that made it clear that the
church members in the United States and their brethren were now bearing
witness, in the long tradition of their church, and were speaking out for
political change (“Postscript” ). They linked religion and the struggle 
for human rights and, in that vein, were now calling for the government of
the ROC to end all political injustices against the Taiwanese and to give both
the Taiwanese-speaking majority and the large Hakka minority the right
both to participate in the political process and to determine their own fate
and the future of Taiwan (“Statement by Taiwanese Christians” ). This
was calling for Taiwanese independence without precisely saying so.
This powerful statement created a stir, and, in the months that followed,
debates on the nature of the church position and on the statements of Decem-
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ber  and August  took place. Various scholars and activists such as
Chen Lung-chu (Chen Longzhi) wrote on the issue of self-determination.
Chen’s piece was valuable for its clarity and for the way it presented the basic
issues (see Chen ). Debates and dialogues on the question also took
place, and the comments made at one of these discussions were then re-
printed in the pages of what was then a new journal, Self-Determination (see
“Some Questions and Answers” ).
A new and important step, one that marked the end of one year of
activism and the beginning of another, came in March . It was then that
a new group, Formosan Christians for Self-Determination, held a series of
press conferences and then laid out their views and made a call for funds
from Taiwanese in the United States to support their cause (“Press Confer-
ence Announcement” ). These meetings and press conferences took
place between  and  March . Then a series of meetings were held and
an alliance of Taiwanese groups based in the United States forged. Another
press conference was held on  March, at which the spokesmen for the new
group presented the group’s cause and also made it clear that this new body,
representing a coalition of many groups in North America, had been created
to support the PCT in its struggle for human rights (“Where Do We Go from
Here” ). The event was covered by newspapers such as the Evening Star
and the Daily News, and this press coverage gave impetus to the movement,
which would continue to evolve over the next few years.
Furthermore, a number of important scholars made their decision to
support this e¥ort. Key among them was T’ien Hung-mao (Tian Hongmao)
of the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, later to become the head of the
Institute for National Policy Research, a major Taiwanese-based think tank
and public policy center and an adviser to ROC president Lee Teng-hui.
T’ien wrote a brief but important piece entitled simply “A Statement Regard-
ing the Future of Taiwan.” In it, he addressed a number of audiences and
made the issues involved in the self-determination struggle clear to all (see
T’ien ). I see the very drafting of this statement as a courageous act for
a man whom many have come to recognize as perhaps the most important
political scientist writing on Taiwan’s political development.
The group also obtained support from these e¥orts. The Formosan
Church of Greater Chicago, for example, took a stand and, in a news release
dated  April , announced its support for the PCT’s statement. This
piece suggested that the lobbying e¥orts of the new body were having some
e¥ect (see “Statement of the Formosan Church” ).
In , the campaign in the West widened. A small conference was held
in Wuppertal-Barmen in Germany that began on the historically significant
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date  February and ended on  March. The conference focused on the PCT
statement of , and those who attended dealt with the struggle of the
church on Taiwan. It was here that Hwang Chang-Hui (Huang Zhanghui)
(who also used, and was better known by, his Japanese name, Shoki Coe) and
Huang Wu-tung made their case, and the conference members then drafted
an important statement that was printed, with other information about the
conference, in Self-Determination (see Hwang et al. ; “Our Statement
Concerning the Future” ; and Hwang a). That a conference on
European soil was devoted to the issue of Taiwan and the role of the PCT
suggests that the leaders of the U.S.-based movement were making headway
in their attempt to reach both the European audience and the Taiwanese
audience in Europe (“Press News from West Germany” ).
July and September  saw more progress both in getting the message
out and in creating united groups to press for the cause of Taiwanese self-
determination. A church conference was held in Camp of the Woods in
upstate New York from  to  July. The conference was to focus on theolog-
ical issues, but, once again, the political agenda of the PCT and its overseas
members took precedence. The level of political consciousness of those
involved in the meeting was high, and the result was the drafting of another
strong statement of support for the e¥orts of the PCT (see “Voice from
Camp in the Woods” ).
Early September saw another important step in the organization of the
overseas e¥orts to support the PCT and its human rights/self-determination
initiative. At a meeting in Vienna, a new umbrella organization was launched:
the World-Wide United Association of Taiwanese Clubs. Taiwanese repre-
senting clubs and organizations in the United States, Brazil, Canada, Japan,
and Europe all attended a conference that began on  September and ended
on  September. One purpose of the meeting was to promote friendship and
mutual help among these scattered groups representing Taiwanese. A
second, and equally important, goal was to develop an expanded network of
support for the cause of human rights on Taiwan. There was no specific
mention of the PCT, but the subtext of the statements made suggests that the
church and its e¥orts were important to many of those who attended (see
“A Grand Union” ).
A month later, a meeting held in Vienna from  to  October under the
auspices of the WCC dealt with issues related to human rights and self-
determination. Taiwan and the struggle of the PCT were discussed, and, in
the general statement produced afterward, special mention of Taiwan and
the self-determination issue was made (“Human Rights” ). That repre-
sentatives of the PCT, even those in exile, could make their case in this way
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before a major church body was a sign that the cause that the PCT had pio-
neered was now becoming one of which people in the world community
were ready to take notice.
The year  would bring further confrontation between the PCT and
the KMT regime and what amounted to a renewal of the very public conflict
that had begun in . However, before this confrontation took place, PCT
leaders on Taiwan saw that the e¥orts of its overseas network were bearing
some fruit. As we have seen, recognition of the self-determination issue and
the e¥orts of the PCT had been growing steadily since the first steps were
taken in early . January  saw a clear and bold sign that people of
influence were listening: the New York Times published an editorial about
Taiwan. That editorial recognized how complex the Taiwanese relation to the
mainland was and argued that the  percent of the population that were
pre- Taiwanese- and Hakka-speaking Han Chinese ought to have some
right in deciding the fate of the island.
C. S. Sung saw this as a statement of support, if guarded and carefully
worded, for the Taiwanese argument for self-determination. As he put it:
“The tide has turned in favor of the people of Taiwan. Our e¥ort to cry our
heart out, to make our voice heard, and to plead for justice of world opinion,
has seen its result” (Sung a; for the original Times editorial, see “The
Future of Taiwan” ). Hwang Chang-Hui wrote a reply to this editorial
that was published in the paper on  January. He used the line in the Times
editorial on self-determination as a springboard for a discussion of the role
of the PCT in this e¥ort and provided readers of the paper with a brief his-
tory of the work of the overseas Taiwanese community in support of the
PCT. In this way, a large and influential readership came to know something
about the role of the Presbyterian church in advancing the cause of human
rights (see Hwang b). This exposure would be very important to the
church on Taiwan as it began a new struggle that ended over the course of
the five years that followed with direct and painfully dangerous confron-
tation with the government of the ROC and its security and police forces.
Let us now shift back to Taiwan and the e¥orts of the Presbyterian
Church in its struggles against the KMT. As I suggested before,  would
be a year that would mark the beginning of another and even fiercer round
of battles that would end only with the PCT’s direct involvement in the
Meilidao movement and with the arrest of members of the church leader-
ship and central administration.
The battle began with the Bible and the attempt to publish it. In late 
and early , the PCT had prepared and begun to publish a new roman-
ized Taiwanese edition of the Bible. It then began to place these new Bibles
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in church bookstores throughout the island and to package Bibles and mail
them to overseas Taiwanese communities throughout the world. The
government saw these steps as direct disobedience of its policies mandating
the use of Mandarin. While it had repealed those statutes directly forbidding
the use of Taiwanese in such religious materials, it still felt that it had the
power to stifle e¥orts at distributing such books as Bibles, religious texts, and
hymnals in Taiwanese and in the languages of the Yuanzhumin. Thus, it took
action.
In January of , the government confiscated more than two thousand
of these Bibles from the Presbyterian bookstores. The church protested this
action. They were joined in their protests by organizations representing the
Presbyterian community in the West. The telegrams of support poured in,
according to the editors of Self-Determination, and, as a result, some six
hundred Bibles were recovered. However, the government did put in place
and attempted strictly to enforce a ban on the publication and distribution of
romanized Taiwanese and Yuanzhumin versions of the Bible (see Sung d).
The Western-based groups continued to monitor the situation and, at
their meetings and conferences, made public statements on both the self-
determination issue and the issue of the publication of the Bibles.15 This
level of support was important, for it demonstrated to the leaders of the PCT
just how widespread the overseas movement had now become. This would
prove to be important when the PCT made another statement that attacked
the KMT-dominated government and its various repressive policies. This
statement was prepared and then voted on at the meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Presbyterian Church on  November . It was entitled
“Our Appeal,” but it proved to be anything but a simple and straightforward
document. Rather, it was a six-page brief against the government and its
actions (see “Our Appeal” ).
The “Appeal” first reviewed what had happened on Taiwan since the
publication of the PCT’s initial statement in late . It then went on to lay
out five basic proposals that it hoped would help the government deal with
a variety of basic problems. The first point concerned the issue of religious
freedom and the right to publish and use the romanized Bibles. This was the
most immediate issue with which the church was concerned. The second
point dealt with the isolation of Taiwan within the world community. The
church stated that the government supported a policy of people-to-people
diplomacy and membership in worldwide organizations. It wondered, then,
why it was formally prohibited from being a part of the WCC. The third
point dealt with the relation between the government and the PCT and sug-
gested that a direct working relation between government authorities and
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the church be set up to allow both bodies to deal with future problems. The
fourth point covered the question of Taiwanese participation in the various
organs of government and a call for the end of discrimination against the
Taiwanese-speaking majority. The fifth point was the reiteration of the argu-
ment for human rights and for the welfare of the people. Here, the church
was dealing with issues of both political and social change and calling for
greater progress in each of these areas (“Our Appeal” ).
The church leaders then moved away from their political agenda and dis-
cussed issues directly related to the church and what it had to do for itself
during these critical times. It called for members to be concerned with issues
of sociopolitical justice and defended itself against those critics who said that
it should be still. It called for higher levels of church unity and a deeper con-
cern with church doctrine and theology as a basis for belief and action. It
called on its members to strive for the independence of the church and move
away from reliance on mission boards. Finally, it called on church members
to be conscious of issues in the wider world and to work for justice in this
larger environment, thus putting behind them the parochial and narrow
concerns of a small island. These were bold statements to make, but it was
seen as necessary that these statements be as clear as possible (“Our Appeal”
). The church leaders knew that acting as they did opened the way for
greater pressure from the government. I therefore see the “Appeal” as a semi-
nal document, a statement that the church knew would open yet another
Pandora’s box but that it nevertheless knew it had to make.
The churches and church bodies outside Taiwan came to the defense of
the PCT and supported the “Appeal.” By December , a number of groups
had expressed their support. Perhaps the most important of these was the
General Assembly of the WCC. On  December, Philip Potter, the general
secretary of the WCC, composed a letter expressing his dismay that the PCT
could not be at the WCC meeting in Nairobi, adding that the WCC sup-
ported the church’s e¥orts to promote the human rights of the Taiwanese.
Similar letters of support were received from the head of the World Alliance
of Reformed Churches and from the Vatican (see “Letters of Concern” ).
The major church bodies were aware of the bold actions of the PCT and
were in support of them. The groundwork that had been laid by such
overseas leaders as the Reverend Huang and the Reverend Sung was now
paying o¥.
The year  proved to be a quiet one in terms of a church-state con-
frontation, but the same could not be said for . By then, the Carter
administration had taken command of U.S. foreign policy, and Cyrus Vance,
the secretary of state, was following up on the Shanghai Communiqué and
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attempting to improve the state of U.S.-PRC relations. The ROC and the
PCT were wary of the steps that the United States was taking, and each
responded to what it perceived as a danger to Taiwan’s autonomy and to its
relation with its old friend and ally the United States.
The Presbyterian Church made its own distinctive move on  August
, issuing a document titled “A Declaration of Human Rights.” The dec-
laration was addressed to President Carter and to “all countries and to
Christian Churches throughout the world.” It began with a statement of faith
and expressed the fear that Taiwan was facing a major crisis. That crisis,
Jimmy Carter was told, was caused by his attempt to rework the relation
between the United States and the PRC. It was feared that U.S. recognition
of the PRC would push the PRC and the ROC to talk about reunification or
would result in a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The right of the people of Taiwan
to self-determination was asserted, and the opinion was expressed that the
actions of Carter and Vance were threatening the Taiwanese people and
their right of choice. The PCT also addressed the government and called on
the KMT-dominated regime to declare Taiwan a new and independent
nation (“A Declaration of Human Rights” ).
Once again the church was making a bold and even dangerous move. It
called in question the policy of Taiwan’s closest friend, the United States, and
it called on the government to do the impossible: to declare itself a de jure
and not simply a de facto state. It called for this step realizing full well that, if
it were to be taken, the ROC would cease to exist and the party that controlled
it would be seen as an illegitimate ruling body (see “Chronology” ).
The worldwide church community recognized how daring a step the
church had taken and rallied to its defense in the weeks that followed. The
United Reformed Church leadership recognized this and stated the fact in
its letter of support. Similar letters of support were soon received from the
churches of Germany and from the head of the British Council of Churches.
These bodies supported fully the PCT’s call for self-determination and its
support for the human rights of the people of Taiwan (see “Responses to the
Declaration” ).16
The new statement was a call to arms and was a toreador’s cape to which
the KMT had to respond. One must note that  was a troublesome year
in general for the KMT, and, as the year went on, the challenge to the author-
ities intensified. The climax came in November . The dangwai activists
ran a slate of candidates throughout the island and had done well in the face
of KMT opposition. They had seemed to win the race in Zhongli township
in Taoyuan county, but the vote count showed otherwise. As a result, the
local citizens felt that a miscount had taken place and responded by holding
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a mass demonstration. The demonstration turned violent, and protesters
burned down a police station in the town. This mass demonstration became
known as the Zhongli incident. Despite the government’s attempts to stifle
news of the confrontation, it spread by word of mouth, and soon many
learned of this direct attack on government authority by an enraged popu-
lace. These events in the political realm provide context and subtext for the
regime’s reaction to the PCT’s simply worded and quite powerful—and
well-publicized—statement (see “Chronology” ; and Rubinstein ,
‒).
The government soon took steps against the church. On  August, it
confiscated copies of the Taiwan Presbyterian Weekly that contained both the
declaration and the newspaper’s editorial support for the declaration. Then,
to cool the tensions down, secret talks were held over the course of the next
two months between members of the government and members of the
church. The government was well aware of the actions of the various over-
seas groups, which had published an advertisement in the New York Times
supporting the PCT’s appeal. Knowing of these organizations’ influence, the
government asked that the church modify its stand by changing a few crucial
words in the declaration. The basic problem was one that would continue to
haunt Taiwan: that of Taiwanese independence and the issue’s role in the
ROC’s political process.
Word of the talks became public, however, as a magazine, China Tide
(Xiachao), published articles that were critical of the church and its letter to
Carter. Many assumed that certain factions within the government or the
KMT did not want to see the quiet negotiations continue and had, thus,
publicized the church’s actions in a way that was sure to gain wide attention.
In December, another set of sharp attacks on the church and its policy were
published in Chung Ho Monthly. These pieces directly challenged the PCT
and asked whether its leaders had the right to take the steps that they had.
Early February saw Kao, the PCT’s general secretary, attacked in yet another
article, this time in Zhonghua zazhi (Chung-hua magazine). This press bar-
rage seemed to forebode even more dramatic action by the state against the
church. The road to further confrontation was now set (see “Chronology”
).
The first step in the new campaign against the church came in mid-
February, when four thousand copies of the Taiwan Presbyterian Weekly dis-
appeared. The authorities claimed no knowledge of what had happened, but
the state certainly would have had a reason to interfere with the magazine’s
publication, for the issue contained an article about one facet of the Zhongli
incident.
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On  March, the Northern Synod met and discussed church policy. A
number of delegates attacked the General Assembly and its appeal and called
for a direct criticism of these actions. There ensued a heated debate, and the
motion was defeated. However, the event was carefully watched by the
media, and the events of the meeting seemed to suggest that there were
problems within the church (see “Chronology” ). The reading that C. S.
Sung gives of these events is that the KMT had packed the house with oppo-
nents of Kao and the other leaders of the church.
A further escalation took place on  March. The Ministry of the Interior
wrote a letter to the General Assembly that warned the church against making
political declarations of any kind, arguing that these statements jeopardized
both the state and the church. The members of the government then took
this even further and visited members of the church before the meeting of
the General Assembly to try to convince them not to vote for Kao, who was
up for reelection (see below). Other people received threatening letters. The
government was determined to make the church pay for its open advocacy
of human rights and self-determination (see “Chronology” ).
The climax of the government’s actions came during the PCT’s twenty-
fifth General Assembly. The assembly was held at the Tainan Theological
College, a hotbed of self-determination activism. Government authorities
and members of the security units carefully monitored the proceedings, and
this created an atmosphere of tension that pervaded the four-day meeting.
A number of critical issues were discussed, and key among them was the
“Appeal” that the Executive Committee had published. This issue was debated
with considerable passion, and, in the end, when a motion was made that the
publication of the “Appeal” be supported, the vote was  for,  against,
and  abstentions. A second critical issue centered on the reelection of Kao
as the head of the church. The government had lobbied against his reelec-
tion, in the process threatening members of the church. The members of the
General Assembly responded by approving his reappointment by a vote of
 for,  against, and  abstentions. The members had spoken: they would
not be intimidated (see “Chronology” ).
The government kept up the pressure by feeding the rumor mill with
suggestions that the church leadership would be arrested in mid-April.
Church members responded to these rumors by sending letters and appeals
to the government asking that this step not be taken. The government
decided not to move at this time but continued to watch the leaders of the
church closely and let these men and women know that they were being kept
under surveillance (see “Chronology” ). The church leadership
responded to these attacks in a most public way. They drafted yet another
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detailed public statement, one that they termed “A Clarification on ‘The
Declaration of Human Rights.’” They then had this piece published in the
Taiwan Presbyterian Church News. The piece was both a history of the events
that had transpired in March and a defense of the actions of the Executive
Committee and the General Assembly as a whole. The church did not back
down. It explained its actions and then let matters stand. Kao and those
around him demonstrated once again that they would not be intimidated
(Sung c, –).
The world church community and the U.S.-based organizations had
watched the events on Taiwan and, in the months that followed, sent in
letters of support. Again, the WCC followed these events and expressed its
support of PCT initiatives. The Presbyterian Church in the United States
also wrote a strong letter in support of the actions of the PCT. Finally, the
Taiwan Christian Council of North America voiced its support of the PCT’s
actions (see “More Responses” ). This support was vital for the church
and, again, demonstrated the value of the lobbying that had been done in the
years before the real struggles with the ROC began.
The state had created other weapons to use against the PCT and other
religious organizations. This was the “Law Regulating Temples, Shrines,
Churches, and Mosques,” which was designed to give the government the
power to interfere directly in the operation of religious institutions. The law
had been introduced in  and was still on the drawing board as the con-
frontation with the PCT unfolded. However, all were aware that the govern-
ment wished to promulgate the law and viewed even the discussions about
it as a lightly veiled threat (see Cohen , ).17
The church now stepped back a bit, and the dangwai activists and their
vanguard, the leaders of what became the Meilidao movement, took center
stage. In late , the United States declared its intention to recognize the
PRC. This threw the Taiwanese political arena into turmoil. The government
responded by suspending the elections that were to be held in the late fall of
. The opposition responded, in turn, by declaring that it would hold
demonstrations and confront the state at every opportunity. The core of the
dangwai leadership began to edit Meilidao magazine and use this as the base
for their campaign of confrontation. Over the course of , tensions
escalated, as did the frequency and size of demonstrations. Finally, a clash
occurred at a large-scale demonstration held near the railroad station in
Kaohsiung. Police and hired thugs confronted the dangwai activists and their
followers. This confrontation became the legendary Kaohsiung incident.
The next day, most of the leaders of the Meilidao movement were
arrested. Shih Ming-te (Shi Mingde), the Lenin of the movement, escaped
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capture and managed to remain free for a few more months. The man who
helped hide him was the Reverend Kao. Shih was, however, eventually
arrested, and, soon thereafter, so were Kao and eight members of his sta¥
(Sung b). The Meilidao leaders and the church leaders then underwent
months of interrogation followed by public trials. Guilty verdicts were
handed down, even though most of the defendants recanted the confessions
that had been forced out of them, and the core of the dangwai leadership
began long prison terms. Kao and the others arrested with him were also
sentenced to long terms in prison. The government had finally done what it
had wanted to do at many moments over the course of the s—arrest the
leaders of this troublesome and very publicity-oriented church.18
THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH: REFORMIST POLITICS AND 
SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S
The months and years immediately after the trials of the Kaohsiung
defendants and the Reverend Kao, through , proved to be di≤cult for
the church in a number of ways. One aspect of this was a direct result of the
earlier confrontations that had pitted church against state. The church and
its members and other religious institutions continued to find themselves
besieged by the state, now using proposed regulations to wear down the will
of especially the leaderless PCT. They also found themselves to be under
attack by what might be termed “extralegal” arms of the state.
Let us examine this facet of the assault first. In February , the mother
and twin daughters of the lawyer and Kaohsiung defendant Lim Gi-Hong
(Lin Yixiong) were murdered in the family’s apartment, located on a side
street a few blocks from Hsin-yi Road and Hsin-sheng South Road. The
crime remains unsolved even today (in ). Lim was at the time in jail and
was in the midst of his trial as one of the seven major Meilidao defendants.
The explanation for this brutal murder that many observers o¥er is that the
killers were working with the permission of the KMT state, but this asser-
tion has never been proved. Church leaders such as John Tin found that they
could turn this tragedy to their advantage. Lim’s wife gave the family’s apart-
ment to the PCT, which in  founded a church on the site. This is the
Gikong Church, and it became a center for political and social activism over
the course of the s. I was given a tour of the church in  conducted
by the fiery theologian John Tin, who pointed out just where Lim’s
daughters had been cut down. I also attended services there that same year,
services also attended by such key church figures as Donall MacCall and the
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Reverend Kao’s wife. The services were quietly powerful, and the place of
death became a place of hope and religious life. It had gone from serving as
the home of a powerful dissident leader to the home of a socially and polit-
ically conscious congregation of Presbyterian leaders and activists. It repre-
sented what the church had been and what it would become over the course
of the s (for more on the murder and the evolution of the church, see
Tin []).
Over the years the church and its members continued to honor the
memory of those who had died. For example, on  February , a memo-
rial service was held at the church. This service was o≤ciated by the Rever-
end Hsu Tien-Hsien (Xu Tianxian), the pastor of the church and, like Lim
Gi-Hong, a former political prisoner. The sermon was given by the Reverend
Wang Hsien-Chih of the Tainan Theological College. Once again, the power
and the reach of the church were being demonstrated even as the tragic
events that led to the founding of the church were recalled (see Occasional
Bulletin: Taiwan Church News , no.  []: ).
The church also faced the problem of continued harassment when it
tried to mail its publications to subscribers. Issues of the Church News that
the authorities deemed too dangerous never reached subscribers. Let me add
that, over the course of the s, I was a subscriber to the newspaper and
that I became aware that, each year, certain issues of the biweekly newspaper
never reached me. Usually, these issues concerned the  February incident.
After the political thaw and the end of much of the press censorship in the
late s, such issues were sent out and did reach subscribers as far away as
Peekskill, New York.
New sets of government regulations were also developed to control
facets of the church’s activities. The Tainan Theological College was marked
for control or for shutting down because it used Taiwanese as a medium of
instruction and because its teachers taught a socially conscious form of Prot-
estantism. The college was the place where many of the most radical of the
PCT activist pastors were trained, and this too made it a marked institution.
I was given a clear idea of what the institution faced when I visited it in 
and met with its president and such key members of its faculty as John Tin,
a longtime, and very articulate, enemy of the KMT and all it stands for.
The local government in Tainan then found various ways to harass the
Tainan Theological College and its sta¥ and tried to stop its development
and its planned expansion. It went even further in  and tried to find ways
to close the college’s doors. The city government devised various strategies
to shut it down, even going so far as to argue that it was not under the Min-
istry of Education but under the Ministry of the Interior and that, therefore,
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the sta¥ did not have the right to instruct students there. These attacks were
met by protests from churches throughout the world, and the local govern-
ment was forced to retreat (Cohen , ).19
The government also returned to its idea of tightly regulating many of
the religious institutions on the island. While all types of institutions were
mentioned in the draft regulation, it was clear that the PCT and the New
Testament Church, a radical charismatic church, were being singled out for
control and for harassment (Cohen , –).
The government attacked the church in a very direct way as well by
making life very di≤cult for the Reverend Kao, now serving his fourth year
in prison, and the other sta¥ of the PCT who had been sentenced as a result
of the Meilidao incident. At times, Kao was held in a cell with no chair or
bed—in what Marc Cohen saw as an attempt to break his spirit. The elder
Lin Wen-Cheng, who was also serving a prison sentence, was denied medical
treatment, and the authorities also seized her property and land belonging
to her relatives. Only after Kao staged a hunger strike to protest this treat-
ment was Lin released temporarily to seek medical treatment. A third PCT
prisoner, Lin Hung-Hsuan (Lin Hongxuan), was sent to the infamous peni-
tentiary on Green Island because he refused to submit book reports that
were assigned to him as part of his reeducation (Cohen , –). The
conversations that I had with John Tin and Donall MacCall confirm my and
Cohen’s accounts of the KMT’s treatment of Kao. These longtime friends
and coworkers of the Reverend Kao also informed me that the way he con-
ducted himself—his manner, his sense of faith, and his inner calm—showed
him to be a man possessed of a powerful faith. This, they suggest, helped him
win over his captors.20
Kao was seen as a martyr for his work for human rights and his personal
intervention on behalf of the Meilidao movement leader (and Roman Cath-
olic) Shih Ming-te. Reports had filtered out about how Kao was being
treated, and the worldwide Taiwanese network began to put pressure on the
government. Various organizations lobbied for his release, and that release
was arranged in August . Kao was then able to return to his position as
general secretary of the PCT. He took personal charge of the human rights–
related work of the church, something in which he had been deeply involved
during the decade of the s (Cohen , ).21
This era of conflict came to an end in . In , President Chiang
Ching-kuo began to introduce a set of major political changes and reforms
that would lead Taiwan to democratization and a more open, more tolerant
society. As we have seen, the years from  to  had proved to be turbu-
lent ones, with the church on the defensive as the state tried to take its
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revenge for church activities in the s. The church had survived such
attacks as well as the demand that it redefine its agenda in the face of
Taiwan’s sociopolitical change and in the face of the implementation of very
real political reforms and a real expansion of opportunities for Taiwanese in
the ROC’s political and government systems.
THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN AN ERA OF 
REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1986–2000
The final years of the Chiang Ching-kuo era would see the introduction of
an important and wide-reaching set of reforms in politics and government.
It then became the task of Chiang’s successor, the Taiwanese Presbyterian Lee
Teng-hui, to implement these reforms even as he consolidated his own base
of power within the KMT and within the ROC’s system of government. In
this final section, I first look at the larger process of political change and then
see how these reforms, and the opening of Taiwanese society that was largely
a result of these reforms, a¥ected the PCT and forced it to redefine its role
in the life of the people of the ROC on Taiwan.
President Chiang had begun the introduction of political changes in
 with his decision to set up an ad hoc committee of high-ranking
o≤cials to recommend wide-reaching reforms. KMT conservatives opposed
this measure, and, as a means of placating them, Chiang had a number of
opposition members arrested. The dangwai activists responded to this pres-
sure by holding a series of large demonstrations. Rather than continue the
policy of repression, Chiang now legalized the opposition and allowed it to
exist as a political entity. The dangwai activists thus became the DPP (Rubin-
stein a).
This step was but a prelude to a larger set of reforms that Chiang would
set in motion. Over the next year, the last that he lived, he began to make
changes in the realms of both domestic politics and foreign a¥airs, setting
the stage for the work of his successor. One such step was the end of martial
law. Taiwan had been formally under martial law since the s, which pro-
vided a rationale for the KMT’s often dictatorial control of the organs of
government. With the formal lifting of martial law, the dismantling of such
controls on the branches of government and on the rights of the citizens
could begin. The end of martial law also meant that substantive changes to
the constitution could now be made as well. Security was still a major con-
cern, and new security policies were put in place with the hope that new laws
could be formulated in the years to come. Such laws were drafted and then
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approved over the course of the early s. The end of martial law meant
that a new and more open society, with greater freedoms of speech and the
media, was now possible.
Equally far-reaching reforms were made in foreign a¥airs. Citizens of the
ROC were now permitted to go to the PRC as tourists. They were also per-
mitted to exchange currency in far greater amounts than before, thus allow-
ing those with relatives on the mainland to help their family members.
Taiwanese took advantage of this opening, and merchants, industrialists,
researchers, and religious devotees began making the trip to China via Hong
Kong. This step by Chiang also paved the way for a renewal of government
contact as each regime tried to reformulate its policies and its procedures for
dealing with the other.
Chiang died in January . His successor, Lee Teng-hui, was faced
with the task of building on the foundation of reform that had been con-
structed. Lee’s legacy was a transformation that was made possible by his
multifaceted approach. The significance of his accomplishment remains a
subject of dispute even as this essay is being written in late , but its
encompassing nature and its impact can be outlined (Rubinstein a,
–).
Lee first had to gain control of his own party. This he did over the course
of  and . He used public opinion to strengthen his hold even as he
built and then used coalitions and developed centers of authority. He created
a circle of both Taiwanese and mainlanders who became key o≤cials as he
built and then rebuilt his administration as the need arose. He had been a
man in “the government,” not in “the party,” but showed that he could take
control of the party organs when necessary. He did have opposition, but
those most vocal found that they were on the outside within a few years. He
also alienated some key leaders, mostly mainlanders, and, by , many of
these individuals had withdrawn from the KMT to form their own party, the
New Party (Xindang).
In the spring of , Lee and his regime were tested by a student move-
ment in Taipei that had taken its inspiration from the mainland student
movement that had won the sympathy of the world media until its destruc-
tion by the PRC regime in . The Taipei student movement was not
nearly as radical, nor did it demand changes as widespread as those made by
the students in Tiananmen Square. These students wanted more Taiwanese
in government and certain basic constitutional changes such as the weaken-
ing of the National Assembly. They occupied the entrance to the Chiang Kai-
shek Memorial Park in Taipei to make their demands clear. Chiu Hei-yuan
(Qu Haiyuan), a sociologist at the Institute of Ethnology of the Academia
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Sinica, served as go-between, and, in the end, the president listened to the
students and promised to push a reform agenda after convening a national
consultative assembly in the summer of .
That assembly of politicians, civil servants, academicians, and returned
dissidents was held in July  and came up with an agenda that Lee seized
on as the basis for his presidential program. The next four years saw him
trying to implement these reforms even as he strengthened his own power
base and public image as a means of preparing himself for what would be
the first democratic election of a president on Taiwan. The details of those
reforms and the political battles that took place to make them law and then
implement them have been dealt with at great length elsewhere by political
scientists and historians and reporters on Taiwan and in the West.22
By the time of the presidential election of March , Lee and his
running mate, Lian Zhan, could look back at a host of accomplishments, not
the least of which being the laws that made it possible for that presidential
election to take place. The constitution had been changed in fundamental
ways, sunshine laws had been passed, organs of government had been trans-
formed, and a government in which executive and legislative branches
shared power had become a reality. The president had also pursued a foreign
policy that allowed Taiwan to grow closer to the PRC without surrendering
any of its autonomy. Economic and cultural relations were becoming
stronger between the two states on the Taiwan strait, but few substantive
formal (as opposed to quasi-government) state-to-state relations had
evolved except for those of a problem-solving and pragmatic nature. There
was much more to be done, and, given the weakness of the DPP and New
Party slates, it was clear to most observers that Lee would be in the presi-
dential palace to make those and other changes.
Lee and Lian went on to win the election by a landslide, but Lee’s hopes
for a second term of major and far-reaching accomplishments were not to
be realized. One problem was the gradual breakdown of KMT unity. The
party had already lost those who had defected to the New Party, and, in ,
in an attempt to weaken James Soong, the very popular governor of Taiwan
(and rival to Lian Zhan), Lee had created further tensions that led to further
splintering of the KMT, as Soong broke away to run on the platform of the
newly established People’s Party. The DPP had, for its part, conceded the
election and was working to make itself ever more visible and ever more
sophisticated an actor in the political arena. It looked ahead to the  elec-
tion and foresaw a real run for the presidency.
The election year of  proved to be di≤cult for the KMT and the man
acknowledged as its candidate, Lian Zhan. Lian su¥ered from a singular lack
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of charisma, as both political scientists and most media pundits on Taiwan
agreed. No matter what he might do, he was depicted as distant and cold and
was thought of as a gray bureaucrat, not an exciting, magnetic political
leader. Lian faced a DPP with a strong, media-savvy, and very exciting can-
didate, Chen Shuibian. Chen had been the mayor of Taipei and had proved
to be a man who could read the public will and respond to it and who knew
how to use the media and his own mayoral government to show himself to
best advantage. Late in the year, he would take another bold step, nominating
a prominent woman, Annette Lu (Lü Xiulian), to become his running mate.
Lu was a controversial figure but one who had proven herself a good legis-
lator and county executive, Furthermore, she was one of those Meilidao
movement leaders who spent time in jail in the aftermath of the  Decem-
ber  incident. Thus, she embodied the spirit of Kaohsiung—that
singular moment in Taiwan’s struggle for selfhood.
Just as the campaign was getting o¥ the ground, disaster struck the
island. On  September, an earthquake hit near the center of Taiwan, and
the resulting tremors destroyed buildings as far from the epicenter as Taipei.
The political campaign was suspended while recovery e¥orts were mounted,
and, when it resumed, it was clear that it was now a three-person race. The
actual party platforms were quite similar, but the candidates di¥ered in
style and in skill of presentation. Pollsters and political observers followed
the campaign carefully, and the Government Information O≤ce provided
Westerners with excellent daily coverage. The parties themselves proved to
be media and Internet savvy and produced excellent webpages filled with
rich data on platforms and personalities. In the end, Chen Shuibian was 
the winner, with James Soong a close second. Lian, the KMT candidate, ran
far behind. The DPP had won the day, and a historic milestone had been
achieved: an opposition party had won control of the government in a free
and fair election. Much of what the PCT had hoped for had come true.
Thus far, this section has focused on political development, but the
observer could also see major changes in society, culture, and religion taking
place during this period. Taiwan had become more open, and information,
even that which was critical of the regime in power, was now readily avail-
able. Taiwanese society had also become far more materialistic, and this can
be seen in the rise of the quality and price of housing in Taipei and the rise
of high-end shopping centers and specialty shops with their trendy and very
expensive Western clothing, home furnishings, and audio components.
Individuals, nongovernment organizations, and interest groups were more
conscious of and willing to deal with large- and small-scale societal and
environmental problems. While the Palace Museum continued to show the
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world of China as it had been—a world that some were trying to hold on to
or recapture—Taiwanese culture itself became far more open, far more
Taiwanese, and far more postmodern. This can be demonstrated by looking
at what is shown in Taiwan’s art galleries and in the exhibits at the Taipei
Museum of Art and the refurbished—and now thoroughly modern—
Museum of History.
Religion on the island was changing as well, influenced by the new free-
dom of expression and the new ability to make contact with individuals and
religious organizations in the PRC and elsewhere. There evolved on the
island a number of strongly evangelical Buddhist missionary organizations
to challenge the church. Syncretistic bodies such as Yiguan Dao rose as yet
another challenge to Christian e¥orts, as did a strong group of popular cults,
with the cult of Mazu in the lead. Finally, Western-style, but East Asian–
centered, charismatic church groups and interdenominational crusades had
developed, and such movements as the Prayer Mountain movement threat-
ened to win over members of PCT churches. What this all meant for the PCT
was that, while its friends had won many of the political battles, the battle
for the hearts, souls, and minds of the Taiwanese people remained to be won.
First, let us see just where the PCT was in these political struggles of the
late s and the s. The church was where it had always tried to be: right
in the middle of things. Let us go back to  to see how this was so.
During the s and s, the church began to play a role in the
evolving dangwai-DPP politics of a now rapidly democratizing Taiwan. Its
leaders had espoused independence, privately if not publicly, and they had
also critiqued the regime when discussing the general situation on Taiwan.
When I first met o≤cials of the church in its old Taipei headquarters, I
learned much about the dark side of the Taiwan Miracle and much more
about the repressive nature of the (by then liberalizing and democratizing)
KMT. During the Meilidao movement, ties between the church and the
dangwai activists became ever closer, as has been suggested in the previous
section. Thus, it was no accident that key figures in the DPP leadership were
active in the church and devout in their Presbyterian faith.
That this was the case in the new and more open era could be demon-
strated in late . During the elections held that fateful year—the first time
that the DPP candidates could run as insiders, not outsiders (dangwai),
eleven members of the PCT ran for and won seats in the Legislative Yuan and
in the National Assembly. Pastors had played a role in DPP politics and
would continue to do so (Cohen , ).
In the late s, the church continued to call for greater political rights
and continued to be confronted by the government when it did so. This
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could be seen in October , when the church sponsored a rally on behalf
of the Reverend Chuan Tai-yu, a leader of the Formosan Public A¥airs Asso-
ciation, an overseas Taiwanese organization, who had been arrested. Four
hundred PCT members attended the rally and protested the arrest. Church
leaders also held islandwide services to mark the tenth anniversary of the
 human rights appeal, which had begun the core phase of the church-
state struggle (Cohen , –).
The relation between the DPP and the PCT was at the center of all this.
In June , I could see yet another example of the relation between the
PCT and the DPP. Shih Ming-te had been released from prison by Lee Teng-
hui, the PCT member who had become the president of Taiwan. Shih then
began to give a series of speeches at meetings set up for him and other
Meilidao movement defendants and leaders. One such meeting was held at
a Presbyterian church in the old part of Taipei, near the Lungshan temple.
On this occasion, Shih met with members of the church who had o¥ered
him help during his time of need.23
A number of church leaders played a role in both the liberalization of
Taiwan and the process of church outreach to a wider world. The Reverend
Kao Chun-min began to redefine his own role in this process as a spokesman
for his church and an exemplar. In , Kao was given permission to travel
and speak to Western audiences about his church. He traveled for four
months, visiting the o≤ces of the United Reformed Church in London, the
WCC in Geneva, the Presbyterian Church of the United States, the Presby-
terian Church in Canada, and the Presbyterian Church in Korea. He spoke
in his capacity as head of his church, but he also spoke as a man who was
known to give of his life for his church and his people, and he came to give
thanks to those who had supported him and who had lobbied for him in the
dark years of his struggles (see “Dr. Gao” ).
It has been suggested that the church faced a number of challenges in 
the face of these multifaceted political and societal changes. One pivotal
problem that was often discussed by church leaders during the late s and
the early and mid-s was the direction that the church would take. The
PCT needed to redefine itself and its agenda now that most of the wars for
selfhood had been won and now that the struggle for Taiwanese political
participation had also largely been won. That it was able to do so can be seen
by examining the church’s annual reports and o≤cial statements at di¥erent
moments during these years.24 These documents chart the nature of the
various activities and also lay out specific church programs and activities.
Church leaders decided to extend their work to communities and popu-
lations perceived as victimized. Thus, the church took an even more active
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role than it had before in working with the Yuanzhumin and helping these
people deal with the plethora of social problems that they faced (Cohen ,
). The church also began to work with communities of fishermen and
their families, fishermen being often detained by other nations when their
ships were blown o¥ course or violated other nations’ territorial waters.
Church leaders and o≤cials set up a Fishermen’s Service Center designed to
help this population. It also devoted considerable time and energy to fight-
ing the exploitation of underage prostitutes who worked near Taipei’s infa-
mous Snake Alley (Occasional Bulletin: Taiwan Church News , no.  []:
). The church has also been active in providing highly focused types of
social welfare. The two major PCT seminaries both o¥er the master’s in
social work degree, and annual conferences have been held to develop large-
scale programs and to discuss the result of PCT e¥orts in this area.
By and large, the PCT is the only major Protestant church on the island
that devotes large-scale resources to social-welfare work and to health care.
There are simple explanations for this. The PCT is the largest single Protes-
tant church on the island and has the longest continuous history of any
organization, including that of the present government. It identifies itself
with the Taiwanese and the Yuanzhumin communities and is the only church
on the island to do so in such a thoroughgoing way. Its form of mainline
Christianity had a major focus on community building and societywide
benevolent work in the West, and this heritage of public concern and activ-
ism was carried by its missionaries and by its Western-trained Taiwanese
pastors as well as by those pastors and lay workers trained in the seminary
on Yangmingshan in Taipei and at the Tainan Seminary. It also has a social-
work program in its Tainan Seminary, which trains Taiwanese church-
connected social workers and also pastors in Western social-work and
social-welfare methods and theories. In , I visited the seminary and met
with the head of the program, who explained to me the nature of the pro-
gram and its place in the larger PCT structure. The PCT thus remains the
very embodiment of a universal and liberal form of Christianity that does
not recognize social barriers or religious consciousness when it decides to
help those in need.
The PCT also began to preach the need for environmental protection. As
early as , for example, an interfaith workshop on the environment was
held, a workshop that was designed to be the starting point for interfaith
cooperation in the discussion of environmental issues (Occasional Bulletin:
Taiwan Church News , no.  []: ).
In , the leaders of the church looked back at the PCT’s  years of
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existence. Church leaders and members commemorated this occasion with
grand celebrations held in various parts of the island and attended by twenty
thousand church members. President Lee, a man who considered himself a
devout Presbyterian, sent words of congratulations and praised the church
for its work in medicine, in activities related to social change, in education,
and in social justice. The church’s members and leaders could look back and
feel pride in what they had accomplished and in what their church had con-
tributed to their nation’s progress.
Yet these leaders also recognized what remained to be done. They were
aware of the challenges that they were facing from a revitalized Buddhism,
from popular religious cults, and from indigenous churches. They were also
stung by the loss of individuals and congregations to the Korean charismatic-
inspired, interdenominational Prayer Mountain movement. They recog-
nized the fact that their Taiwan had become a modern (even postmodern)
and increasingly open and progressive society—but at a cost. There were
now problems of crime, juvenile delinquency, the breakdown of the family,
prostitution, and domestic abuse. Thus, the leaders decided that spiritual
renewal was called for.
While church leaders recognized that the PCT had to remain committed
to social change, they also felt that their church had to develop a program
of spiritual renewal as a means of deepening the faith of church members.
Thus, this church that had played the role of agent of social change and
advocate of Taiwanese selfhood and self-determination was holding fast to
these roles but was also attempting to return to its own spiritual roots.
These leaders were convinced that Christian renewal was a way for the church
to hold on to its flock of believers even as it continued to help believers deal
with the real social and economic problems that they and their fellow
Taiwanese confronted.
During the first year of the new millennium, the PCT continued to
maintain a deep commitment to social work and sociopolitical activism.
Seemingly revitalized by its own e¥ective response to the disastrous 
earthquake, the church continued to provide a range of well-financed and
well-run benevolent activities. Over the course of the second half of the
nineteenth century, and through the long span of the twentieth century, the
Presbyterian Church built hospital complexes in the major cities of Taiwan,
with the Mackay Hospital in Taipei as its flagship institution. By millen-
nium’s end, the church also recognized that the AIDS crisis had come to
Taiwan. By the year , a total of three thousand cases had been reported,
but it is estimated that the actual number of infected individuals may be as
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high as ten thousand. In , the PCT set up a center, Grace House, to help
those a≥icted with AIDS. It was formally opened on  September  at
a ceremony held at the Chinan Presbyterian Church in Taipei.25
How did the PCT see itself in that first year of the new millennium? 
The PCT leaders themselves provided an answer to this question—and the
tougher question of just how church leaders and policymakers see the future
of their -year-old religious institution—in a series of pamphlets
documenting what was termed the “twenty-first-century church religious
revitalization movement” (see PCT b). In this series, church leaders dis-
cussed a wide variety of topics, laying out church policy on each. Some of
the pamphlets expressed the church’s continuing concern with the major
ethnic communities on the island and discussed its attempt to develop
strategies to help these communities even as it tries to continue winning
members of these communities to Christ. Others dealt with specific classes
and subgroups within society, such as the elderly and the young. Yet others
dealt with basic issues of faith and the process and meaning of ritual and
prayer. One can see these pamphlets as both a road map to the future and a
record of the past. Taken collectively, they are the bold statement of a church
that has refocused itself and begun the di≤cult process of both renewal and
redefinition.26
This final section of the essay has examined the processes of political
reform and social change under the last two KMT presidents and shown
how the PCT responded to these changes. We have seen that, having won the
major political and ethnic battles that raged over the long decades of KMT
rule, the PCT has set its sights on new, more spiritual battles. We have seen
that the church has not abandoned its role as an agent of social change and
as the creator of a broadly based and inclusive social-medical net. And we
have seen that the church continues to press its basic agenda of Taiwanese
selfhood and human rights in the more open public sphere created first by
the last scion of the Chiang dynasty and then by a Taiwanese—and Presby-
terian—KMT leader.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, it has been argued that the Presbyterians served as prophets and
leaders during each of the four major periods of Taiwan’s recent history.
Only in the last period, however, the years since the Chiang reforms, the Lee
presidency, and the election of the DPP candidate, Chen Shuibian, have they
begun to see their hopes for Taiwanese participation in the life of the ROC
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realized. Over this same span of decades, they also saw the need to play a
greater role in helping the Taiwanese, the Hakka, and the Yuanzhumin find
their own voices and their own paths to ethnic pride. Thus, they charted a
course toward selfhood that many still travel. They also became involved in
movements that called for social reform and the creation of a social safety
net. Here too, as we have seen, they were able to lead the way on key issues.
The political actions that the church took over the course of the s
and s were made possible to a large degree by the church leadership’s
dedication to the ideal of Taiwanese selfhood and the church’s commitment
to providing the people of Taiwan with social and medical services as well
as secular and religious education. One who studies the history of the church
and comes to know those who serve it comes to believe that there is an
almost inexorable logic to the alignment of certain types of activist, this-
worldly religion with social and political forms of action. During much of
the period of PCT history focused on in most detail in this essay—the years
from  to —the church could not act in the political realm without
risking its own destruction as a religious body. Thus, its welfare-related
activities and its educational and medical programs helped it gain public
attention and allowed it to expand its pool of educated and well-trained
sociopolitical activists. The sociopolitical agenda acted as a leitmotif that
underlay those programs and policies that the church developed, first by trial
and error, then by deliberate thought and praxis.
The leaders and the members of this independent and indigenized Prot-
estant body have come very far indeed since the days of the first British and
Canadian missionaries. Since the bitter and painful days of Retrocession, they
have come to serve, not only their own flock, but also the larger society—as
voices for reform, as voices of conscience, and as martyrs, as those who
risked all to create a more open, democratic, and egalitarian Taiwanese
society. This prophetic role is a part of their legacy and is a contribution to
the creation of the more open, more liberal, and more humane Taiwan that
we find as we study the church in the first years of the new century and
millennium.
NOTES
1. I have had a long and fruitful relationship with leaders and members of the PCT and
have observed them and other church leaders in action for the better part of two
decades. I have interviewed many key people within the church from  until the
present and touch base with friends in church headquarters in Taipei each year when
I visit Taiwan for research or for conferences. I have also had access to various church 
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materials and have subscribed to the PCT’s church newsletter. I have written about
the church in Rubinstein (b). This essay is based in part on Rubinstein (a).
That essay covered the years until . This essay expands the time frame of that ear-
lier essay and details the role of the church as political force and as force for social
change in the s and into the s. I make use of new materials, of interviews
with key actors, and of my field notes of some of the events under discussion.
2. The negotiator of the first of these treaties and an intermediary between the Chinese
and the foreign powers was Samuel Wells Williams, an American missionary serving
the American Board of Missionaries for Foreign Missions and, later, an American
diplomat and China Watcher. These events are discussed in Williams () and
Martin ([] ). See also Morse ([] , –).
3. For more on the di≤culties that the missionaries faced, see Johnston (, –,
–).
4. Let me add that Mackay’s book tells us about Taiwan in the late nineteenth century
and about the obstacles that the missionary faced and the work that he was able to
do. The many sides of the man and the depth of his love of his Taiwanese family (his
wife was Minnan) and his adopted home come across in this book.
5. The significance of the Oxford College was made clear to me by Michael Stainton,
a Canadian minister and missionary who served the PCT over the course of the s
and was a witness to the island’s political change.
6. Elizabeth Brown () lays out this process in detail. She suggests that it took twenty
years or so to work out the new patterns of church-mission relations and shows us why.
7. The  February incident was once a forbidden topic on Taiwan. Before the late
s, Westerners had access to George Kerr’s powerful and still very valuable
Formosa Betrayed (). Since the Chiang Ching-kuo liberalization, a veritable
explosion of books on the topic of  February has appeared. New books of many
types—from collections of documents, to chronicles of events, to memoirs—have
appeared with great regularity since the mid-s. One of this new wave of books
that was translated into English was Zhuoliu Wu’s moving memoir of the Japanese
period and the Retrocession, translated with great skill by Duncan B. Hunter, The Fig
Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot (Wu ). The government was pressured to
assign a respected historian to the task of editing and publishing government mate-
rials on the incident. This was Lai Tse-han of the Chung Shan Institute of Academia
Sinica and Chung Yang University. Lai was also one of the authors of a controversial
English-language study of  February, A Tragic Beginning, coauthored with Wei
Wou and the well-known economic historian Ramon Meyers of the Hoover Center
(see Lai, Meyers, and Wou ). Stephen Phillips has also written on the Retro-
cession and the  February incident (see Phillips ).
8. Chiang Ching-kuo’s desire to present himself as a leader in touch with his people can
be seen in Chiang Ching-kuo (), a photo biography of the late president. See also
Taylor ().
9. This missionary invasion is described at some length in Tong (), which is still
useful if overly optimistic. Dorothy Raber, a Conservative Baptist missionary,
described the period in her useful “church growth”–oriented study (see Raber ).
10. The Southern Baptist Mission Board, based for many years in Richmond, Virginia,
and now located in Nashville, Tennessee, had a sophisticated information and propa-
ganda network. Its missionaries had been enemies of those whom they described as
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“the Chinese Bolsheviks” since the early s and were among the first Western
groups in China to warn Americans at home about the Communists during the Chi-
nese civil war of the s. I have examined the Southern Baptist Convention and
its perceptions of China in a number of articles (see, e.g., Rubinstein , ).
11. Brown’s () study deserves a wide audience for its wealth of data and its insider’s
perspective on the process of church development on Taiwan.
12. These comments were made to me by Donald MacInnes in an interview conducted
at Maryknoll, New York, on  July . Over the course of his long and distin-
guished career, MacInnes was a Taiwan-based missionary, an instructor and admin-
istrator at Tunghai University (the United Board for Christian Higher Education in
Asia–sponsored university in Taichung), a key figure in the Maryknoll History
Project, and the author of major works on Christianity in the PRC.
13. A word of explanation is needed here. Fundamentalists were those Protestants who
took a strong theological position on the rebirth of the individual through the grace
and mediation of Christ alone and on the inerrancy of the Bible. The Fundamen-
talists rejected Darwinism and defended a view now termed “Creationism” before
and during the religious and scientific culture wars of the s. That theological-
cultural struggle gave the term “Fundamentalism” a distinctly negative connotation
in the mind of the American public, and, thus, during the s, those who accepted
the Fundamentalist belief system began to refer to themselves as “Evangelicals.” The
Evangelical movement was at the core of a widespread religious revival that began
in the s with the appearance of such evangelists as Billy Graham and Ruth
Carter (the sister of former U.S. president Jimmy Carter). Members of this second
wave of Evangelical preachers and popular theologians are usually referred to as
“neoevangelicals” by scholars in the field of religious history. Churches thought of
as strongly Evangelical or neoevangelical include the Southern Baptist, the Bible
Baptists, and a cluster of similarly conservative churches. Pentecostals and Charis-
matics accept much of the basic Evangelical doctrine but add to it faith in the
powerful gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as speaking in tongues and faith healing.
14. The basic source of the discussion that follows is Sung (c). An important PCT
theologian and activist, Sung was the editor of a small journal, Self-Determination,
that was published over the course of the s and detailed the PCT’s struggle with
the KMT over questions of selfhood and Taiwanese rights. This journal and the book
created from it (Sung c) are not, nor are they intended to be, objective history.
Rather, they are the stu¥ of which objective history can be made. One final note is
needed here. The simple fact that the most recent edition of this book was published
in Taiwan in  is an indication of how far Taiwan had come.
15. One example of the response of the overseas Taiwanese community can be seen in
the “Resolution Concerning Taiwan” that came out of the Camp of the Woods meet-
ing of July  (see “Our Resolution” ). Another example is “Declaration: The
Second Annual Meeting” ().
16. Let me note here that the various overseas Taiwanese groups that had supported the
e¥orts of the PCT also rallied to its defense even before the church had taken this
next bold step. In the months before the o≤cial statement, meetings in support of
the general policy of the church were held in New York and other areas, anticipat-
ing the escalation of the church-state conflict that would come once the PCT issued
its own formal statement on the policies of the Carter administration.
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17. Cohen () has an excellent chapter on religion and politics on Taiwan. The
account that I present here is based in part on Cohen’s useful, although very critical,
assessment of the ROC in the last few decades.
18. There is an extensive literature in Chinese on this period in the history of Taiwan and
a growing number of accounts in English as well. I cover the period in Rubinstein
(b, chap. ). See also Cohen (, –).
19. When I visited the Tainan Theological College in the summer of , I was told
about the various stratagems for closing down the school. When I returned to Taipei,
I was told that the police had questioned the school faculty about who I was and
what I was doing there.
20. These conversations with John Tin and Donall MacCall were held in the summer of
 during the period that churches and organizations outside Taiwan were lobby-
ing for Kao’s release.
21. As I suggested, I was well aware of what Kao was going through, and my account is
based both on Cohen () and on my own recollection of those weeks in the
summer of  that I spent with the associate general secretary, Donall MacCall,
with John Tin, and with other leaders and members of the church. A few years later,
after Kao had retired from his post, I was able to interview him in his home in Taipei
and discuss his life and work with him.
22. The political narrative that I use here can be found in Rubinstein (b, chap. ).
That account was based on a review of newspapers, magazines, and articles that can
be found in books edited by such major scholars on Taiwanese political development
as T’ien Hung-mao, the former minister of foreign a¥airs, and Alan Wachman of
Tufts University’s Fletcher School.
23. I met Shih in June  on the eve of the National Consultative Conference and spent
three days with him and his wife, Linda Arrigo, discussing various issues. I met with
them again in November  at my home in Cortland Manor, New York, when Shih
made his first trip to the United States.
24. This activity is charted in PCT (, , a). I also interviewed or had con-
versations with PCT o≤cials at the PCT headquarters in Taipei over the course of
the s and in  and .
25. See “Grace House Established for Aids Patients” at the church’s website: http://
www.pct.org.tw/english/newo_.htm. More information (in both English and
Chinese) on the AIDS work of the PCT can be found on the website.
26. As should be clear, this series of pamphlets is very rich in both ideas and hard facts.
I plan to make extensive use of these and related PCT materials in developing a por-
trait of the PCT in the final years of the twentieth century and the early years of the
twenty-first century.
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A S  O F  T H I S  W R I T I N G , the total population of Taiwan has reached twenty-
two million people, most of whom are descendants of Han Chinese from
mainland China. Although Taiwan became a protectorate of the Chinese
empire in , settlers from mainland China did not begin to arrive in large
numbers until the seventeenth century. Taiwan began to assume some
importance in modern Asian history with the arrival of large numbers of
Chinese settlers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The island
gradually became a way station between the East Indies and Japan as the
Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and English developed trade ties with East Asia.
The descendants of those early Chinese settlers are usually called “Taiwan-
ese.” In , after his defeat by the Communists in China, Chiang Kai-shek
(Jiang Jieshi) and nearly two million of his followers retreated to Taiwan.
These more recently arrived Chinese are known as “mainlanders” in Taiwan.
However, apart from the Chinese, there are still about , aborig-
ines (the Yuanzhumin) in Taiwan. The aboriginal peoples of Taiwan belong
to the Malayo-Polynesian family in terms of physical features, language, and
sociocultural characteristics (Mabuchi ). The ten aboriginal groups are
the Ami, Atayal, Bunon, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Siasiyat, Tsou, Thao, and
Yami. The Ami, with a population of ,, are the largest among the ten
groups. Before mass migration to urban areas started in the s, most of
the Ami lived in the Taitung (Taidong) valley and on the eastern seaboard
of Taiwan.
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At first glance, the Ami village called “Iwan” is just like an ordinary Tai-
wanese village except for its two prominent churches. For example, most
houses are built of cement in the Western style, and most inhabitants are
elders or minors, almost all the able-bodied having gone to urban areas to
earn a living. Owing to increasing migration since the s, contact with the
Chinese, the dominant outsiders, has increased, especially among members
of the younger generation, who spend most of their time in the cities. Con-
sequently, younger Ami have adopted more and more Chinese cultural ele-
ments. Nowadays, in the daily life of the village—whether in housing, eating,
or dressing—there is no significant di¥erence between the Ami and the
Chinese. In some ceremonies, such as weddings, funerals, and even ilisin,1
the important New Year ceremony, many Chinese cultural elements have
been adopted as well. For example, at times some Ami even consult their
Chinese friends about the Chinese lunar calendar in order to decide on dates
for a ceremony.
In sum, one cannot easily distinguish the Ami from the Chinese in terms
of the pattern of daily village life. Many people, including Chinese scholars
and the Ami elite, therefore believe that the Ami and other aboriginal groups
have borrowed so many cultural elements from other peoples that their own
traditional cultures are in danger of disappearing. This belief has spurred
many research projects whose aim has been recording and preserving the
culture of the aborigines. It has also contributed to the view—held by
many—of aboriginal culture as a “thing-like bundle of traits” (see Linnekin
), a view with which I cannot agree.
Since the s, a new conception of culture or tradition has been put
forward among social scientists (see, e.g., Hobsbawm ; and Cohen ).
This new conception emphasizes creativity in culture and its manipulation
by social actors. In accordance with this shift, the continuity of a cultural
system, rather than superficial changes in it, has attracted more attention
from scholars in recent years.2 From this starting point, we may begin to
reconsider the problem of group identity. For example, in a recent paper,
Norton (, ) observes: “The selective use of elements of ostensibly
traditional culture to a≤rm identity and strength in the face of economic,
social and political change has recently become a major subject of anthropo-
logical research in the contemporary Pacific islands.” In fact, this burgeon-
ing interest is directed, not only toward the cultures of the Pacific region, but
also elsewhere (see Jolly and Thomas ). In Linnekin’s (, )
opinion, this trend “can be traced to a more general dissatisfaction in the
social sciences with positivist and objectivist approaches to culture and
related concepts in western scholarship.”
258
10Ch/Clart  7/25/03  9:00 AM  Page 258
Accept ing the Best ,  Reveal ing the Di f ference
Underlying this new trend, there is a significant change in the concept
of culture (or tradition). According to Linnekin (), there is “a wide-
spread rejection of the objectivist concept of culture as a thing-like bundle
of traits amenable to scientific description, and an increasing tendency to
view culture as symbolically produced or ‘constructed’ in the present” ().
Consequently, “culture becomes a more or less conscious model, a repre-
sentation embedded in a particular social and political context and subject
to interested human manipulation, an idea or a locus of competing ideas,
rather than a thing” (). Norton (, ) points out that three related
concepts are often mentioned in this context: invention (or reinvention);
opposition; and objectification. He succinctly describes the interrelation
between these three concepts and their place while discussing ethnic iden-
tity: “[When] analysing ethnicity as a process in which groups selectively use
cultural elements to formulate and assert a distinctiveness in opposition to
others . . . culture is ‘objectified’ in an ‘oppositional’ process of a≤rming
identity.” In this essay, I shall discuss Ami cultural identity on the basis of the
comparative model that Norton provides.
In many studies, rituals are represented as “unchanging” and carrying
close connections to “tradition.” However, while in his historical study of the
Merina circumcision ritual in Madagascar Bloch () finds that,“from the
formal point of view, the ritual seems to have altered surprisingly little in its
symbolic aspects” (i.e., “the ritual acts, the songs, the objects used”), the
function of this ritual has changed frequently over time. Specifically, it has
mirrored political and economic change as it has passed “from a descent-
group ritual to a royal ritual and back again” (). Thus, in Kelly and Kap-
lan’s () opinion, Bloch “has provided a powerful synthesis of structural-
functionalism and political economy, an approach that allows rituals to
make functioning structures in some societies without jeopardizing the
ability of political economy to describe all real history” (). This view of the
persistence of ritual may help explain the long-term cultural continuities
and the symbolism of ritual. However, it seems di≤cult to understand in
these terms how, as a minority in Taiwan, the Ami have borrowed so many
foreign cultural elements. Most important, after their conversion to Chris-
tianity in the years following , the Ami have abandoned many of their
traditional rituals. In fact, a rite conducted in the Christian manner is an
essential part of many present-day ceremonies, such as weddings. The relation
between the borrowed elements and group identity thus becomes important.
On the basis of data collected in Iwan, I aim to show in this essay how
Christianity was first accepted and how Christian elements have been incor-
porated into the present-day Ami wedding ceremony. The purpose of the
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discussion will be to shed light on the relation between the borrowed
elements, for example, the Christian elements, and the construction of Ami
identity.
PRE-CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN IWAN
Iwan village, at the foot of the coastal mountains and facing the Pacific, is
located in Chenggong township, Taitung county. In June , it consisted of
about  households. Except for five Chinese families, three of them headed
by Taiwanese and two by mainlanders, most of the villagers were Ami. At
that time, about  percent of the Ami villagers practiced Catholicism, and
another  percent were Presbyterian. The remaining  percent of the Ami
villagers belonged to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church (two households),
practiced folk Chinese religion (three households), or practiced the Japanese
“new religion” Tenrikyô (one man only). All the Chinese villagers were non-
Christians. Until recently, these proportions remained roughly the same.
There are three grocery stores in the village, owned by the three Taiwan-
ese households. Although almost every household has a small patch of
paddy on which it used to grow rice, rice cultivation was totally abandoned
several years ago. Nowadays, almost all the household income comes from
the wages of the able-bodied young people working outside the village,
especially in northern or western Taiwan. Except during festivals, only the
elderly and minors are to be seen in the village, as is the case in most other
villages in rural Taiwan. This is an indication of the extent to which the Ami
in Iwan have been absorbed into the mainstream economic system of Taiwan.
Iwan village was founded by Ami around . Since then, there has been
an age-set organization3 and a village council in the village. In the early stage
of village history, the major task of the age-set organization was to protect
the territory of the village. All the adult males in Iwan had to meet this obli-
gation after their initiation. In order to unite di¥erent clans in the village, the
village council played a critical role, supplementing that of the age-set organ-
ization. All the councillors were elected by the villagers, and the chairman of
the village council was seen as the village head. When the village was a fully
independent political unit, the village council could pass a law and ask all the
villagers to obey it. At that time, the village was built on the top of a hill, and
a protective pale was constructed around it. Obviously, the influence of the
Qing court did not reach this area e¥ectively, and the fear of head-hunting,
practiced by other aboriginal groups, still existed. Indeed, this uncertain
situation continued in the locality until the Japanese government established
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control of the region in , a year after the Qing government ceded Taiwan
to the Japanese in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Since then, political and eco-
nomic forces outside the village have initiated radical sociocultural change.
The Ami term “kawas” (supernatural beings) is widely recognized as the
key to understanding pre-Christian Ami religious belief. Even today, over
forty years after their conversion, the Ami still use “kawas” in their religious
life, although its meaning has changed slightly over the years. To the pre-
Christian Ami, “kawas” was a multivalent word. On the basis of their gram-
mar, the Ami could generate numerous relevant concepts from the basic root
“kawas.” For example, they called a traditional healer “cikawasay.” This
means a man or woman with special kawas. They called anything mysterious
“kawasan.” Furthermore, there was no word in the Ami language correspon-
ding to the English word “religion.” According to some elderly informants,
the closest translation was “kawakawas” (the plural form of “kawas”).
The Ami classified kawas into six groups: gods; ancestors; souls of living
persons; spirits of living things; spirits of lifeless objects; and ghosts. In
normal circumstances, each kind of kawas existed in an appropriate loca-
tion, activated di¥erent cosmic potencies, and related to living persons in a
specific way. Although, most of the time, the ordinary people could not see
kawas with their own eyes, they knew of their existence through the works
of local healers and bamboo oracle specialists (midaway). The Ami used the
concept of kawas to explain their physical and social world. On the one hand,
the phenomena of everyday social life, such as one’s success or failure, abili-
ties, and the like, could be comprehended in terms of the concept of kawas.
On the other hand, these phenomena could also be seen as proof of the
cosmic potency of kawas. I do not mean to imply that the concept of kawas
encompassed all the Ami’s cultural knowledge. It was, however, the most
important form of knowledge that functioned as the final cause in inter-
preting their reality.
In the past, kawas were dealt with through lisin. In anthropological
terms, “lisin” can be understood as ritual, worship, or ceremony. There are
three further terms derived from “lisin”: “misalisin” means to worship or to
practice a rite; “cilisinay” is the person in charge of worship or a ritual; and
“kalisisinan” is the period of a ritual. Pre-Christian Ami rites can be classified
into four groups: life-cycle rituals; calendric rites; rites for natural disasters;
and healing rites.
With the increasing encroachment of the outside world on the formerly
fairly isolated village of Iwan, the importance of the Ami’s own kawas has
diminished progressively since the s. The pre-Christian healer is a good
example of this. Since the s, the original group of local healers has been
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supplemented by three other groups, which draw their potencies of kawas
from other peoples, such as the Japanese and the Chinese. While the tradi-
tional group could not resolve all the problems faced by the villagers, neither
can any of the new groups.
One reason why the Ami did not replace their religion with Japanese or
Chinese religions can be traced to the Ami’s images of outsiders. In the last
ten years of Japanese rule, the government proposed a “Japanization move-
ment” (Jpn: Kôminka undô). This campaign was intensified during the years
–, when the Japanese were involved in World War II. In this cam-
paign, both Taiwanese and aborigines were encouraged to speak Japanese at
home and to adopt Japanese names. The practice of Chinese religion and
Western Christianity was forbidden in aboriginal areas. In fact, Shintô was
advocated to such an extent that the villagers in Iwan were ordered to attend
an annual worship service at a Japanese shrine that had been set up by the
government on the outskirts of the village. Each household was given a
tablet on which the name of the Japanese supreme god was written. How-
ever, the Ami saw the Japanese as their oppressors. They knew that there were
significant di¥erences between the Japanese and themselves. They also knew
that the Japanese treated them badly. And few of them really understood this
new religion that had been imposed on them. Consequently, few accepted it
in place of their traditional religious practices. No wonder, then, that, when
the Japanese were defeated, the annual worship service in the Japanese shrine
of the village was discontinued immediately; only a few villagers continued
to worship the Japanese god privately, in their own homes.
With regard to the Taiwanese, the situation was more or less the same,
and their image as economic exploiters was imprinted in the Ami’s minds.
Owing to close contact with the Taiwanese, the Ami knew some details
about Chinese religion. After World War II, three households began to
worship Chinese gods in order to cure sick family members. However, the
negative image of the Taiwanese prevented other households from joining
this movement. In addition to this, an important factor limiting the wide
acceptance of Chinese religion among aborigines is the nonproselytizing
nature of this religion itself. That is, there is no motivation for the Chinese
to preach their religion to other people. Thus, even now for most Ami
people, the Chinese way of worship is too complicated to follow as it involves
using the Chinese lunar calendar, using incense for worship, and burning
paper money as an o¥ering to the dead and the gods.
On the other hand, after World War II, the Ami expected the Americans
to govern Taiwan since Japan had, for all intents and purposes, been defeated
by the United States. To their surprise, the Chiang Kai-shek regime took over
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Taiwan, and the new government practiced a policy of religious tolerance.
This provided the Ami with a chance to adopt Christianity, the religion of
the American victors. In fact, in the initial stage of its evangelization e¥orts,
the Presbyterian mission group defined its god as the god of the Americans
(Amelika a kawas).
THE ADOPTION OF CHRISTIANITY
The Japanese surrendered to the Allies on  August . The Chinese
government regained Taiwan on  October of the same year. However, the
Kuomintang, then the ruling party in China, faced many di≤culties both in
Taiwan and on the mainland. Thus, in terms of nationwide politics, Taiwan
was very unstable between  and . Correspondingly, signs of political
instability were also evident at the local level.
When Taiwan was under Japanese rule, the government disapproved of
evangelization among the aborigines. Records show that, at the end of the
war, there were fewer than two dozen Christians among the Ami. But, imme-
diately after , the Presbyterian Church began a series of evangelization
initiatives (for details, see Rubinstein [chapter  in this volume]). Conse-
quently, the Ami in Iwan had a chance to encounter the Christian god.4 Early
converts worshiped in each of the believers’ homes in turn. Sometimes they
went to worship services in Chenggong (a town about fifteen kilometers to
the south) and listened to the preaching of the minister.
In April , even though Presbyterian converts were still a minority in
the village, the mission had gained su≤cient support to establish the first
Presbyterian church in the village (which was set up in the northernmost
part of Iwan). At that time, there were fewer than ten households that had
accepted Christianity, out of a total of sixty-one. The pressure to abandon
Christianity from other villagers, especially from relatives, on the church-
goers was, therefore, severe. In this situation, the early converts were forced
to help each other in many areas of social and religious life, and the church
took over many of the traditional clan functions. Nevertheless, these early
converts still fulfilled their obligations to the village as a whole, for example,
participating in the annual ilisin on the open ground in front of the men’s
house (sfi, until  the dormitory for the single young men of the age-set
organization and the meeting place for village councillors).
This situation changed for the Ami in the s when local political
leaders began to convert to Christianity. A young leader (Asala) mobilized
all the Presbyterian Ami as a united group and refused to comply with the
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orders of both the village head and the leaders in the age-set organization.
In , the age-set organization collapsed after the Presbyterian Ami boy-
cotted it. At the same time, the men’s house was abandoned. Furthermore,
the Presbyterian Ami refused to participate in the annual ilisin. After that,
the ritual often took place on the seashore or in the brook bed, and only a
small proportion of the villagers joined in it.
By , the Presbyterians were in the majority in the village. Never-
theless, there were still many people who refused to join the Presbyterian
Church. Among them, the most important figure was the established village
leader, Copay, whose authority was, therefore, threatened. It is said that he
and some of his supporters refused to join the Presbyterian Church to avoid
having to submit to the young rebels’ leadership. This situation persisted
until the arrival of the Catholics.
Compared with the Presbyterian Church, the Catholic Church was less
localized in Taiwan before . As a result of this, its evangelization e¥orts
among the aborigines began much later than those of the Presbyterians. In
, several years after the Communist takeover in mainland China and the
subsequent expulsion of all Western missionaries, the Catholic authorities
decided to shift their mission workers in China to Taiwan.
A father of the Swiss Bethlehem Mission Society set up a Catholic church
in Chenggong in . Since he had been in the northeast part of China
(Manchuria) for a long time, he could speak fluent Mandarin and some
Japanese. This enabled him to communicate with the Ami people without
serious di≤culty. He trained several local Ami assistants and then traveled
around di¥erent Ami villages.
The newly arrived Catholic mission group did not need to spend time
teaching the basic religious concepts of Christianity, with which most of the
villagers were familiar thanks to the e¥orts of the earlier Presbyterian mis-
sionaries. Instead, they emphasized the di¥erences between the two churches,
in terms of history, organization, religious rituals, worldwide distribution of
fellow believers, and the attitude of the church toward local culture.
The Ami in Iwan set up their first Catholic church in . Mass conver-
sion to Catholicism began in , conversion of Copay a¥ecting the decisions
of many others. Between  and , Catholics became the majority in
Iwan. The Catholic authority then set up the Iwan parish in , which was
separate and independent from the Chenggong parish. Since then, there has
been a Catholic priest residing in Iwan, who also takes responsibility for
eight nearby villages. When a modern Western-style Catholic church, which
could seat at least two hundred persons, was built in , the development
of the Catholic majority in Iwan was consolidated.
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In addition to the Seventh-Day Adventists, there were some other
churches attempting to spread their influence into Iwan, such as the True
Jesus Church and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Not all these attempts were
successful. Compared with other churches, the Catholic Church was more
tolerant of many pre-Christian Ami customs, such as drinking wine during
some ceremonies and chewing betel quids. More important, in , the
Catholic priest encouraged the villagers to organize their traditional ilisin,
which had been discontinued between  and . Initially, the ritual took
place in the playground of the Catholic church. In the ritual, the worship of
Malataw (the Ami supreme god) by the village head was replaced by the
worship of Jesus Christ by the Catholic father. After the revival of the ilisin,
the age-set organization was reorganized to arrange this annual ceremony.
The Catholic father himself joined the age-set organization and partici-
pated in the whole program. For these reasons, many Ami thought that their
cultural traditions were respected by the Catholic authorities.
However, other villagers who belonged to other churches refused to
participate in the new style of ilisin because of its strong connection with the
Catholic Church. In the s, as many young Ami found jobs outside the
village, the conflict between the Catholics and the Presbyterians lessened.
Furthermore, the program of ilisin had changed slightly in that the Catholic
father said his ilisin mass in the Catholic church, leaving the Presbyterians
free to conduct their own ritual if they liked. Consequently, the ilisin became
a ceremony for the whole village again even though there remained some
significant di¥erences between the attitudes of the Presbyterian and the
Catholic Ami toward this activity.
Di¥erences between the Catholics and the Presbyterians can be found in
some other aspects of social life. Much of the data that I collected in Iwan
has been about the past, and, in it, a marked di¥erence between Catholics
and Presbyterians can usually be seen. For example, leaders in the Catholic
Church have provided me with much information about pre-Christian Ami
life, and they always stress the importance of unity and continuity in the his-
tory of Iwan. Generally, they support the revival of tradition and see it as a
means to village solidarity. Many of them even claim that Catholicism is
more or less similar to the Ami’s pre-Christian religion. The supreme god
Malataw is presumed to be the Christian god, the goddess Faydogi is pre-
sumed to be the Virgin Mary, and all other pre-Christian supernatural
beings have their corresponding counterparts in Catholicism. In contrast,
Presbyterians emphasize the importance of rupture and enlightenment in
Iwan history. For the Presbyterians, pre-Christian Ami life and its traditions
are best forgotten as they represent an embarrassing reminder of their pagan
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past before they were baptized into the church. Consequently, the Catholics
are much keener to talk about the pre-Christian era than are the Presbyte-
rians, with the result that the Catholics hold a practical monopoly both over
stories about the past and over the shape of any traditions that are revived.
This di¥erence can be also found in the present-day wedding ceremony, to
which we now turn.
THE PRESENT-DAY AMI WEDDING CEREMONY
Nowadays, a large-scale household-level ceremony, such as a wedding, a
housewarming, or a funeral, normally takes three full days. During this
period, all relatives currently living in Iwan have the obligation to gather every
day at the household concerned, which is normally the bridegroom’s house-
hold in the case of a wedding. The close kin, even those who are working in
urban areas, are expected to come back and join in. For the purposes of this
essay at least, all household-level ceremonies can be treated as essentially the
same. Therefore, I will concentrate here on the wedding ceremony only.
On the first day of the wedding ceremony, a pig is usually killed by expe-
rienced men and shared among all the kin during the evening meal. Other
relatives either help prepare for the ceremony, for example, setting up the
platform for the singing program the next day or cooking meals for all the
participants. All the duties are allocated in a traditional manner—the older
one is, the lighter one’s work assignment. Very often, elderly people just sit
and chat if there is no shortage of manpower. The second day is the busiest
day. A ritual in the Christian manner is held in the morning to ask for good
fortune. Guests both from the village and from outside are invited for a
lunchtime feast. Then on the third day comes the paklag ceremony that ends
the whole celebration. Tidying up is a major task, and fish is the most
important food item that day. The fish are either caught by young family
members or bought from the market. After the meals, traditional singing
and dancing takes place to celebrate the event. The ceremony is formally
finished with an announcement by a senior family member.
The second day is usually the most important one, and influences here
from the outside world are obvious. For example, the household concerned
usually provides a Chinese-style feast, often organized by a caterer hired by
the household. In addition to supplying the extra seating (usually round
tables and stools) needed to accommodate all the guests, the main business
of the caterer is the preparation of Chinese-style dishes for the feast. Some-
times the company chef will even help the household write the invitation
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cards—at no extra charge—since these normally employ Chinese characters,
which most Ami cannot manage. Invited guests are expected to bring gifts
of cash to the feast. The money, following Chinese custom, is put into a red
envelope.5 The name of the guest, usually the head of a household, is written
on the front of the envelope, and sometimes a few words of congratulation
will be added as well.6 Usually, the host will set up a reception table and ask
one or two trustworthy relatives to function as “treasurers,” receiving the
gifts from the guests. The name of each guest and the amount of money that
he or she gives will be recorded (in Chinese characters) in a specially
designed book, which must be bought in Chenggong beforehand.
A program of singing and dancing is usually included.7 In order to
accommodate this program, a platform must be set up in a corner of the front
yard of the house or the public square of the Catholic church, where the feast
will take place. An organizer—preferably one with a good command of
Mandarin Chinese—must be chosen to arrange the program. Ideally, a band
will be hired for the day to provide live music. When the program is pre-
sented, the organizer is the person who monitors the rhythm of the feast,
and sometimes he or she will sing a song if there is a lull in the program.
Most of the time, however, the singers are local young people, very often
young women, and the songs are predominantly Chinese pop music. In
some cases, the household concerned pays for some semiprofessional singers
to make the feast more enjoyable. If the food is not as good as expected or
the singing program is unsatisfactory, the host will be criticized as “mean”;
hosts therefore do their best to please their guests. On the other hand, if the
money that a guest gives is far less than expected, the host may be disap-
pointed, although he or she will try not to show it publicly. In the end, the
household normally expects to realize a small profit after all expenses have
been deducted from the total gift income.8
Although the Chinese influence here is obvious, the continuity of Ami
tradition is also significant. For example, all the bridegroom’s group-mates
(kapot) in the age-set organization are his potential best men. Therefore,
there are very often several best men at a wedding, sometimes even more
than twenty. The groom’s group-mates are expected to give some presents
to the new couple collectively. At the wedding feast, special seats are reserved
for the groom’s group-mates. If a member of this group is unable to attend,
one of his relatives must be present on his behalf. At the wedding feast, while
other guests are waiting where the feast is to take place, the bridegroom stays
with all his group-mates in the house of one of the group members. Then,
accompanied by a group-mate, he leads a procession of his group-mates to
the place where the feast is to take place, some participants carrying the col-
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lective presents, others lighting fireworks to signal their arrival. As the pro-
cession arrives and the participants are being seated, the already-assembled
guests cheer. My informants tell me that, according to custom, the feast
should not start before the arrival of the groom and his group-mates.9
The paklag ceremony is particularly important among the traditional
elements that are still practiced in the ceremonial context. In the past, the
paklag ceremony served to separate the ritual context from ordinary life:
after the paklag, all the taboos imposed during the ritual period were lifted,
and life returned to normal. Although, recently, the Ami have adopted a new
term, “wankag” (lit. “finishing work”) from Taiwanese,10 they still see this
ceremony as purely Ami tradition and use it as a “symbolic boundary” (see
Cohen ) to stave o¥ further Chinese domination.
The structure of a wedding is essentially the same among all Ami
families in Iwan. However, some variations do exist. When a ceremony of
this kind is held in a Presbyterian family, usually only water and soft drinks
are served, rather than wine and betel nuts, and very often the traditional
singing and dancing on the last day are also omitted. (This latter di¥erence
means that the ceremony is much shorter than usual.) Catholic kin are,
therefore, reluctant to attend because they consider the proceedings dull. In
Iwan, as a whole, the Presbyterians live much plainer and simpler lives than
do their Catholic neighbors. Presbyterians include certain traditional ele-
ments in their ceremonies only to fulfill their social obligations, while tradi-
tional practices are more important among the Catholics. This not only
shows that Christianity means di¥erent things to di¥erent villagers but also
reflects di¥erent ways of constructing Ami identity.
BORROWING AS INDIGENOUS APPROPRIATION
Nowadays, through mass media or personal contact, the Ami encounter
di¥erent types of novelty on many occasions. Their reaction in such situa-
tions can be summed up in the questions, What is that? What is it for? Which
group of people does it originally belong to? and, Is any supernatural being
involved? I find that an awareness of these reactions to novelty can help the
researcher understand the Ami process of borrowing.
Owing to their historical experience, the Ami dislike and, to some extent,
look down on other aboriginal peoples, especially the Bunon and the Atayal.
Although, after , there were several cases of intermarriage between the
Ami and other aboriginal groups, there is no sign that the Ami will accept
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anything that is classified as belonging to the Bunon or the Atayal. On the
other hand, if something is classified as belonging to the Chinese, the Japa-
nese, or the whites, then it has a higher probability of being accepted. This
is mainly because the Ami consider these three to be “more advanced” than
they themselves are.
Among the cultural elements that they have borrowed from dominant
outsiders, some are really welcomed by the Ami. For example, the Ami are
very good at singing and dancing. Therefore, they are delighted to learn new
styles from the Japanese and the Chinese. Furthermore, in the s, the
Japanese had little di≤culty persuading the Ami to grow paddy rice to
replace millet because the Ami thought that this could improve their living
standard. For the same reason, after the late s, more and more Ami
moved to western Taiwan, where they could earn higher salaries than they
could if they stayed in their home village.
However, the Ami do not always accept cultural elements from the
dominant outsiders without reluctance. The Chinese-style banquet is a good
example of this. Many villagers complained to me that it was a waste of
money. However, in their view, it is an essential element of the Chinese wed-
ding party; so, as long as the Chinese can a¥ord it, they will too. It seems to
me that “keeping up with the Chinese” is the main motivation for the Ami
borrowing this element from the Chinese.
Once an outside cultural element is accepted, it must then be recontex-
tualized. The Ami’s major concern here is whether to consider the borrowing
as ritual or nonritual. For example, a song used in the church service had
better not be sung in a nonritual context. Apart from this, some new
behavior patterns have been invented. For example, between  and ,
a few villagers tried to run businesses inside the village. But they all failed
and ended in bankruptcy, so, after , more and more Ami went to west-
ern Taiwan to earn their living. After , some of the villagers began to run
businesses outside the village. Then, after , three young men came back
to the village and set up small businesses there. On the basis of the new
notion that “business is business,” their enterprises are doing very well. In
kinship assemblies, such as those held on the first and final days of a wedding
ceremony, these three men are not expected to join in because they have their
businesses to run. However, in the banquet on the second day, their families
have to give two cash presents, one in the name of the householder, another
in the name of the shop. In other words, they are treated almost, but not
exactly, as if they were Chinese businessmen. Therefore, under the influence
of the dominant outsiders’ culture, the creativity of Ami culture is ongoing.
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The Ami’s wedding ceremony can be analyzed from this angle. A tradi-
tional wedding usually took place at dusk, which was the time for supper.
Therefore, one of the phrases used to refer to a wedding was “pakalafi’,”
which can be translated as “inviting someone for supper.” However, a formal
expression for marriage was “pataloma’,” which means “set up a family.” In
practice, “pakalafi’ ” and “pataloma’ ” have come to indicate not only two
expressions for a wedding but also two styles of wedding suited to two dif-
ferent kinds of life circumstances.
The Ami called the first marriage of a woman “malickah” and her
remarriage “miliyaw ciraramod.”11 Usually, the malickah was taken very
seriously by the household concerned, so the villagers normally carried out
the formal pataloma’ ritual for this wedding. The miliyaw ciraramod was less
important, and, therefore, only a pakalafi’ ritual was needed. I shall first
describe a typical pataloma’ ritual.
When the head of an Ami matrilocal household agreed to accept a man
as her son-in-law, the household started to seek an ideal marriage go-
between (kayakay). (It is said that an ideal go-between should be a happily
married man.) Once a go-between had been settled on, he was authorized
by the bride’s family to negotiate with the groom’s family. Once an agree-
ment had been reached, the wedding normally took place within three days.
In the early morning of the wedding day, the go-between went to the
bridegroom’s house and checked on the arrangements. Around two or three
o’clock in the afternoon, he and two or three persons brought presents from
the bride’s family to the groom’s. These included about two to three kilo-
grams of sidaw (salted meat), about one liter of ‘pah (millet or rice wine),
and a certain amount of hakhak (sticky rice). Then the go-between and the
groom went to the men’s house, where the groom’s group-mates in the age-
set organization were waiting for them. On their way to the bride’s house,
the go-between led the way, and two of the groom’s group-mates carried his
belongings—knife (fonos) and clothes (kolak)—from his natal family to 
his wife’s.
At the time that the groom and his party were expected to arrive at the
bride’s house, the bride went out and waited for them to appear. She stood
by the front door of the house, watching them enter one by one. When
everyone was inside, she came in. If the new couple had had sexual relations
before the wedding, a special pakciw ritual followed. In this ritual, the bride’s
household put a kciw (dish of roasted pork) on the doorstep. When entering
the house, everybody had to avoid stepping on it. It is said that this ritual
purified the new couple. This also implies that, in the past, engaging in
sexual intercourse outside marriage violated a taboo (palafoay).
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The supper began immediately after the arrival of the groom and his
group-mates. They sat down and formed a circle with the salted meat and
sticky rice in the center. These two kinds of food were considered very valu-
able in the past. The bride did not join them at this stage. When they had
finished eating, the bride’s family took out the wine. The go-between served
the wine to everyone in turn (mitaki), and the bride joined the group. Mean-
while, the bride’s relatives started to drink and sing. After a little while, the
go-between stood up and gave a speech in public to congratulate the couple.
Then the faki (maternal uncle) of the bride performed a miftir ritual; this
was to inform their ancestors in Heaven about the wedding.
After this, the bridegroom’s group-mates were free to go. After they were
all gone, the bride’s family packed up the food that they had not eaten and
gave it to the go-between to thank him for his services. Then the groom sent
the go-between home. He himself slept in the men’s house with his  unmar-
ried group members. Early the next morning, when the cocks crowed for the
first time, he went to the bride’s house and slept with her. This might be as
early as two o’clock in the morning. On the same day, the bride’s family held
a paklag ceremony to complete the wedding. They also invited the groom’s
parents or his mother’s brothers to supper since they were now relatives by
marriage.
An important point worthy of notice is that the marriage payments were
from the bride’s household to the groom’s. In the s in Iwan, the domi-
nant marriage rite was called nicopayan, from Copay. Copay, as mentioned
above, was the village leader from  to . According to some inform-
ants, Copay thought that the traditional wedding was too simple and unfair
to men (although he was not against the custom of uxorilocal postmarital
residence per se), and he introduced a new wedding ceremony, which was
widely adopted by the villagers. This ceremony, a mixture of the traditional
ritual (no to’asho) and some new elements, was named after him.
Copay’s innovations included the following: First, the size of the gift
from the bride’s family to the groom’s was increased. For example, if the gift
was pork, it should be at least half a pig, or, if it was water bu¥alo, it should
be one back leg. As for wine, at least two big pots would be needed. Further-
more, the presents should include a big sticky rice cake (mokin), which was
of a round shape, about one hundred centimeters in radius and five centi-
meters thick. Second, the size of the present to the go-between should be
increased. In addition to the food items left by the groom and his group-
mates, there should be added more wine, meat, and rice cake. Third, some
ritual elements were eliminated. For example, the pakciw ritual was to be
discontinued, and the custom of the bridegroom staying in the men’s house
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was abandoned. In other words, the new couple could sleep together right
after the wedding feast. Fourth, some of the wedding elements imposed by
the Japanese government were adopted. The most important of these was
bowing to the tablet of the Japanese supreme god, Ametedas. Finally, both
the bride’s and the bridegroom’s families (or even clans) could join together
to have a big feast followed by singing and dancing. At least, the two families
involved should have a paklag ritual together.
This changed style was widely accepted in the s and s, and its
basic structure remains in place to the present day. Obviously, the amount
of influence coming in from the outside world was increasing, as is seen in
the way in which some new elements were accepted into the wedding ritual
and some old elements were modified.
The Ami in Iwan call their present wedding-ceremony pattern “no
aniniay” (modern style). Informants explain that this pattern is a mixture of
the traditional style (no mato’asho), Copay’s invention (nicopayan), and influ-
ence from the Taiwanese (masa no payragan) and the whites (no padaka).
However, from my informants’ point of view, the whole ceremonial struc-
ture is still essentially Ami because it is defined by such traditional elements
as the paklag and the killing of a pig and sharing it among kin in the tradi-
tional way. Japanese features (such as worshiping the Japanese supreme
god) are no longer practiced. Instead, Chinese influence (such as a wedding
banquet) is accepted because the Chinese have replaced the Japanese as the
dominant outsiders since . The Christian wedding rite has been prac-
ticed in the church since the Ami conversion. All these borrowed elements
are contextualized in and by the Ami classification system. Therefore, rather
than saying that borrowing causes social change or cultural loss, I suggest
that the process of borrowing should be seen as the Ami’s way of reinvent-
ing their cultural system through the incorporation of new elements. This
perspective provides a good base for rethinking Ami identity.
CONSTRUCTION OF AMI IDENTITY
In Wagner’s () original usage, “invention” refers to the continuing
manipulation of symbols to create new meanings. Thus, the cultural crea-
tivity and the dynamics of imaging entailed in the process of historical
transformation are emphasized (see Jolly and Thomas , ). However,
others argue that “invention” implies de novo creation or even falsity and
fabrication. For example, Hanson (, ) claims that cultural invention
“is, after all, much too strong a phrase to use for everyday social reproduc-
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tion.” Following this consideration, I will accept Linnekin’s () suggestion
and choose the more neutral word “construction” to replace “invention.”
The Ami call all the elements that they borrow from the Chinese “no
payragan” or “no kapigan” (belonging to the Chinese). Thus, in the feast pat-
tern described above, the Chinese dishes, the cash gifts in red envelopes, and
the singing program are all classified as belonging to Chinese. Nevertheless,
there are still many elements “belonging to the ancestors” (no mato’asay).
That entitles the Ami to claim that the whole ceremony structure is still
“belonging to the Ami” (no Ami).
For the majority of the villagers, including the Catholics and those prac-
ticing Chinese religion, the distinction between “belonging to the ancestors”
and “belonging to the Chinese” is crucial to their ethnic identity. It is practic-
ing the elements belonging to the ancestors in the ceremonial context that
helps them keep their own identity distinct from that of the Chinese.
There are several points worth noticing about kinship assemblies such
as those that take place on the preparation day and the concluding day of a
wedding ceremony. Proper Chinese cookery is no longer needed on these
occasions. Sticky rice and some simple dishes cooked in the traditional way
are normally served. The relatives, usually four to seven persons in a group,
sit or squat on the floor, facing the rice and other dishes, and eat their meals
with their fingers. In fact, in daily life, almost all households have their
meals at a table and eat with chopsticks. The sharing of food among kin in
the so-called traditional way is not only convenient but also intentional and,
therefore, significant. When an informant explained to me, “We are all Ami
people, why bother to use chopsticks,” I began to realize that there might be
a link between the sharing of food among kin in the traditional way and the
expression of Ami identity.
During a kinship assembly, very often a pig is killed and cooked in the
traditional manner. Then the pork is distributed to all participating relatives
according to their age—the oldest person present gets the largest amount
and best quality of meat. For the Ami, the sharing of the pork is important
in two ways. First, the pig is slaughtered and cooked in the traditional way,
and, thus, the taste is di¥erent than it would be if pork purchased from Chi-
nese in the market were being served.12 Second, they emphasize that only the
Ami know how to distribute meat properly. I have observed that, on many
occasions, some of the younger generation have, in fact, been scolded by the
more experienced in the following words: “Are you a Chinese? Why don’t
you know how to do it our way?” On many occasions during kinship assem-
blies, I have also heard the elderly people say: “Don’t just come, eat, and then
go away as Chinese people do.” This implies that proper Ami share food and
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time together during the whole ceremony. To many Ami people, Chinese are
“clever but too money oriented.” In contrast, the Ami are willing to spend
time with their kin.
Obviously, the traditional elements help the Ami distinguish themselves
from the Chinese. This is important because, on certain occasions (weddings
or housewarmings), some Chinese households—most often those who have
been living in Iwan the longest—adopt a ceremonial pattern that is similar
to that of the Ami, o¥ering a program of singing or even asking their Ami
neighbors to assist during the ceremony. However, they do not include
Christian elements in their rituals, and they do not practice such Ami
customs as paklag. The Ami explain this by saying: “They are Chinese. They
are di¥erent from us.”
As Cohen (, ) says: “The symbolic nature of the opposition means
that people can ‘think themselves into di¥erence.’” In Norton’s (, )
words,“There is strengthened emphasis on the importance of cultural prac-
tices that contrast most sharply with the foreign.” In the Pacific region and
some other places, very often “Europeans precipitated a more extreme
contrast between ‘our ways’ and ‘their ways’” (Jolly and Thomas , ).
Thus, it seems to me clear that, under strong influence from the Chinese, the
Ami are struggling for their identity. In the construction of their identity, the
Chinese are represented as “others” in opposition to whom the Ami can for-
mulate their own distinctiveness, and the construction of the Ami identity
highlights the process of “objectification.” As Norton (, ) explains it,
the idea of “objectification” means that “people may come to talk about,
exaggerate or modify certain beliefs and practices as signifiers of their iden-
tity, as distinct from simply routinely living their culture.”
When we utilize the concept of objectification to analyze data from the
Ami, we find that the killing of a pig and the distributing of its meat are no
longer mere routine social practices but also signifiers of ethnic identity. In
fact, such practices as sharing food without using chopsticks, distributing
meat according to age, and paklag are important because they allow the Ami
to a≤rm their identity. That is, these practices are “shaped as much by the
concern to contrast distinctiveness selectively as by the survival of ideas and
practices from pre-modern times” (Norton , ).
I think that the continuing economic growth in Taiwan after  has
provided the Ami with a solid foundation on which to build a satisfactory
religious and social life. Thus, I would suggest that, although the Ami live in
what Norton calls a “cultural form of colonial situation,” their situation
squares well with his description of the process of social-identity construc-
tion in Fiji, in which “the oppositional element has been relatively marginal
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in the constitution of Fijian identity,” a fact that “has been crucially impor-
tant in the relative containment of ethnic conflict that has characterized Fiji”
(Norton , ). In other words, compared with the objectification of
traditional culture in other locations, the oppositional element is not as
important in the construction of Ami identity. However, with regard to the
relation between Christianity and ethnic identity, the oppositional element
is highlighted among the Ami.
In an illuminating paper, Errington and Gewertz suggest that the
Chambri, a Melanesian society, perceive borrowing as providing a new way
of getting old power. In this context, outside influences such as importation
and immigration are themselves manifestations rather than sources of
power. Furthermore, because “Chambri identity rests partly on the preser-
vation of a system of power,”“the Chambri explicitly regard their society as
based on borrowing” (Errington and Gewertz , , ).
I suggest that the Ami have a very di¥erent concept of power from the
Chambri. Rather than seeing borrowing as a manifestation of old power, the
Ami have a di¥use concept of power. In other words, not only do their tradi-
tional supernatural beings have power (or cosmic potency) when rituals are
conducted properly, but other people’s religions can produce power as well.
Elsewhere, I argue that the Ami’s conversion to Christianity happened
against a background of belief that Christianity was more powerful than the
religions of the Ami, the Chinese, and the Japanese (Huang ). Therefore,
their conversion to Christianity not only helped them pursue a brighter
future but also helped them show their resistance to the dominant outsiders,
that is, the Chinese.
The meaning of Christianity for the Ami can be considered in this con-
text. The majority of Catholic villagers in Iwan are not particularly enthusi-
astic about church activities. Most of them are also not interested in the
teachings of the Bible. What is really important for them is that there shall
be a blessing from the priest or “voluntary apostle” on every important
occasion, such as a wedding, funeral, or housewarming ceremony. Their
need to worship a supernatural being to ensure good fortune is just the same
as that of their ancestors. Thus, for most of them, the Christian god is seen,
not as their own, but as still belonging to the whites.
To some extent, the Presbyterian Ami have the same practical attitude
toward religion. For example, they too have many rituals concerned with
health and prosperity. In other words, the pursuit of good fortune is the
keynote among the Ami. Religion is a means, or a technique, for them to
ensure the achievement of this goal. The di¥erence between Catholic and
Presbyterian Ami is mainly that the latter emphasize eternal salvation more
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than the former. Furthermore, the Presbyterians’ degree of devotion to
church matters is much higher than that of their Catholic fellow villagers.
Consequently, the Presbyterians tend to know the Bible much better than the
Catholics do. They hold the view that all human beings are descendants of
Adam and Eve, a view that most of the Catholics in Iwan do not take seri-
ously. Furthermore, compared with the Catholics, they tend to see God as
the Lord of all human beings. Their Ami identity is mainly expressed in the
use of Ami language, which has been better preserved and used in their
church than in the Catholic church. It seems that, for the Presbyterians, their
Christian identity is much stronger than their Ami identity and that, for the
Catholics, it is just opposite. This requires further study.
However, both the Catholic and the Presbyterian villagers are very proud
of their religion. As they liked to remind me, the highest leaders of the  ruling
party and the government, such as Sun Yat-sen (the national father of the
Republic of China [ROC]) and Chiang Kai- shek (the late president of the
ROC), were all Christians. Even a recent president of the ROC, Lee Teng-hui
(Li Denghui), is a Christian. From time to time, I heard the villagers criti-
cizing the Ami in Falagaw (a village near Taitung), who have accepted the
Chinese religion, as “silly.” In their opinion, Christianity is the “most
advanced religion in the world.” Therefore, they are puzzled by the behavior
of the Falagaw Ami.
It seems clear that the Ami’s satisfaction with Christianity comes to
some extent from their ethnic identity. In other words, both Catholic and
Presbyterian Ami see Christianity as the most advanced religion in the world
because it came from the West. Consequently, they claim that they are more
advanced than most Chinese, who are still practicing Buddhism or Chinese
folk religion.13
CONCLUSION
Although the Ami have accepted many cultural elements from the outside
world, I would argue that they and their culture are not disappearing. In fact,
by practicing some of their traditional cultural elements, they can still dis-
tinguish themselves from the Chinese. In other words, I would argue that the
construction of the Ami identity is based mainly on the “objectification of
culture.”
Apart from that, rather than seeing them accepting foreign things ran-
domly, I would suggest that they borrow from the outside world selectively.
They borrow di¥erent things from di¥erent peoples for di¥erent reasons.
276
10Ch/Clart  7/25/03  9:00 AM  Page 276
Accept ing the Best ,  Reveal ing the Di f ference
For example, they avoid borrowing anything from other aboriginal peoples.
Most of them avoid having any contact with Chinese religion. And most of
the elements that are borrowed from the Chinese are recontextualized in a
nonreligious context. Motivations for borrowing from the Chinese are either
to improve their living standard or to show that they have caught up with
the Chinese.
On the other hand, Christianity was accepted by the Ami even though
they were never ruled by Westerners. Therefore, conversion to Christianity
could represent a form of resistance to the dominant outsiders. Unlike the
Kwaio (Keesing ) or the Vanuatu (Norton ), who struggled against
Christian colonial powers, the Ami do not see Christianity as a symbol of
colonial oppression, as they see Chinese religion in their struggle against
Chinese domination. Instead, I would suggest that the practice of Christian-
ity strengthens the Ami’s identity. However, this strengthening is achieved
neither by “the mutability and continuity of tradition as process” (Toren
, ) nor by “reconciling biblical and ancestral origins” (Burt , ).
In fact, the Ami can express their identity and oppose Chinese domination
through Christianity precisely because most of the Chinese are non-
Christians.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that Christianity makes a significant
contribution toward helping the Ami rebuild their confidence and express
their identity. Although the Ami do not use Christianity solely to distinguish
themselves from the Chinese, this borrowed religion does strengthen the
Ami’s confidence and expresses their di¥erence from the Chinese. Therefore,
I would suggest that borrowing does not necessarily cause, but rather helps
avert, an identity crisis.
NOTES
1. Fey () is a useful guide to the pronunciation of Ami native words.
2. Interestingly, when, in recent years, scholars have studied Christianity, terms such as
“indigenization,” “enculturation,” “contextualization,” and “vernacular Christianity”
have very often been used (see, e.g., Schreiter ; and James and Johnson ).
3. There are two main types of age system employed in the anthropological literature:
age grading and age setting (Gulliver ; Baxter and Almagor , ). According to
Spencer (, ), the term “age set” “may be used to refer to all those who are initi-
ated in youth during a definite span of time, and as a group share certain constraints
and expectations for the remainder of their lives,” whereas “age grade” “refers to a
status through which every individual passes at some period of his life unless he dies
first.” The Ami age organization is a good example of an age-setting system.
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4. In the early days of evangelization in Taiwan, Western medical care was an essential
adjunct for the missionaries. The first missionaries were mainly seen as healers
because they concentrated on caring for the sick.
5. Red envelopes are also employed at housewarming parties. However, at funerals,
white envelopes are employed, also in accordance with Chinese custom.
6. Of course words of condolence in the case of funerals.
7. This does not apply to funerals.
8. I was asked to be the treasurer on three occasions. On one of these, a housewarm-
ing ceremony that took place in , the total amount of cash received from the
guests was NT$, (about US$, at that time). The average gift was roughly
NT$, (about US$).
9. At a funeral, a unique custom is still practiced. After the burial ritual (usually on the
second day after death), and before the paklag ceremony (usually on the third day),
there is a michog ceremony. In this ceremony, the descendants of the dead person are
guided by a senior family member to all those households that have kinship relations
with them.
10. In the past, “paklag” had a strong religious meaning. After the Ami’s conversion to
Christianity, the religious aspect of “paklag” has diminished gradually. The adoption
of the new term “wankag” from the Chinese reflects this trend. However, some
elderly people insist on calling this activity “paklag” and continue to see a religious
meaning in it.
11. In the past, the Ami practiced matriuxorilocal residence, and most heads of house-
holds were women. Starting in the s, under the influence of first the Japanese and
then the Chinese, this custom became increasingly less widespread. It almost dis-
appeared in the s when the salaries of young men became the major source of
household income, replacing agriculture, which had a close connection with the
traditional gender division of labor.
12. When slaughtering the pig, the Ami use a thin bamboo or iron stick to prick the pig’s
heart, allowing the blood to remain inside the body. Thus, the color of the meat is
red rather than pale. Furthermore, they use dried bamboo or grass to burn o¥ the
fur of the pig before cooking; thus, the skin tends to be gray rather than white.
13. Barrett (, ) reports that, in mid-, . percent of the population of Taiwan
were Chinese folk religionists and that . percent were Buddhists. At the same time,
the total number of Christians in Taiwan was ,, only . percent of the total
population.
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as it is the assortment of temples and shrines, deity cults, rites of propiti-
ation, pilgrimages, funerals, graveside observances, and daily o¥erings that
makes up “Chinese popular religion.” Students of Chinese religion are par-
ticularly aware that this history is a scholarly creation because it has been an
especially contentious and contested history, tied up in issues of field (what
data should be included in the study of “religion”?), class (what agents of his-
torical process are worthy of study?), and ethnicity (is Taiwan a “laboratory”
for research on “Chinese” religion, or does it represent a separate people with
a religion and a culture distinctively its own?). These and similar questions
have shaped the study of religion on Taiwan since the s, and it is our
view that structures of lineage and temple organization can be understood
only through the lens of the various scholars, native and foreign, who have
made use of these data for their own political and intellectual purposes.
Our objective is to analyze popular religion as an object of analysis. It is
an object that is not only dynamic in itself—responding to an environment
of modernization, urbanization, and political liberalization that has un-
folded on Taiwan in the postwar period—but is also dynamic as an object
of definition, formulation, and reformulation.
The first scholars to engage in the study of the religion of the Hokkien-
and Hakka-speaking majority were American and British anthropologists
conducting fieldwork in the s and s. Chinese anthropologists in the
early postwar period were documenting the social organization and reli-
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gious practices of Taiwan’s aboriginal populations and would not turn to the
study of Taiwanese culture until  and after. For Western scholars, Taiwan
was not always the destination of choice, and, although the focus of their
research was carefully circumscribed and their ethnographies responsibly
contained, there was a nearly universal tendency to make two comprehen-
sive claims: first, that the study of popular religion was essential for the
broader understanding of Chinese religion as a single field; and, second, that
Taiwan was a window into Chinese culture. The first claim required argu-
ment and justification; the second was simply assumed. We can find any
number of statements by Western scholars arguing that Chinese religion
must be studied in its totality, integrating “elite” and “popular” phenomena
(or, at the very least, that the study of Chinese religion cannot overlook
beliefs and rites at the popular level), but challenges to the identification 
of Taiwanese culture as Chinese were not heard or addressed for at least
thirty years.
The claim that popular religion was something integral to religion as a
whole, that the study of religion should not confine itself to the ritual and
textual products of social elites, was a major methodological issue in reli-
gious studies in the s and s. In the study of Chinese religions, C. K.
Yang was the first to argue the point explicitly, although it was certainly
implicit in the work of James Legge and J. J. M. de Groot. By now, it is a battle
won, and there is no longer a methodological separation between the study
of “great” and that of “little” traditions, but, in the early period of religious
studies on Taiwan, this was a claim that required explicit argument. We 
now look at Maurice Freedman’s often-quoted statement as a monumental
and powerfully persuasive proclamation: “A Chinese religion exists; or, at 
any rate, we ought to begin with that assumption: the religious ideas and
practices of the Chinese are not a congeries of haphazardly assembled ele-
ments. . . . Behind the superficial variety there is order of some sort. That
order might be expressed by our saying that there is a Chinese religious
system, both at the level of ideas (beliefs, representations, classifying prin-
ciples, and so on) and at that of practice and organization (ritual, grouping,
hierarchy, etc.)” (Freedman , ).
This statement, first made in an address in , was in response to C. K.
Yang’s di¥erentiation between “institutional” and “di¥used” religion, made
in his seminal study Religion in Chinese Society (Yang ). Yang’s distinc-
tion was sophisticated and should not be correlated with the “elite”/“popu-
lar” dichotomizing of earlier generations, but Freedman sought an even
fuller integration and the definition of a field, labeled in the singular
“Chinese religion,” that was comprehensive in scope and method. American
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and British scholars working in Taiwan in the early postwar period echoed
this statement as a leitmotif: it provided a powerful legitimation for the sig-
nificance of their work to sinology. It meant, too, that the study of popular
religion would be taken seriously. Today, the study of popular religion is
considered essential and informs almost all scholarship on Chinese religions.
While the relevance of popular religion to Chinese religion was argued
explicitly and was clearly the product of broader intellectual trends, the
relevance of Taiwanese religion to Chinese religion was important for other
reasons, principally, the inaccessibility of the mainland to foreign scholars
and the demands of social-science theory, not to mention publishers and
granting agencies, that ethnographies not limit their conclusions to their
localities but have a broader application and significance. In a scathing
attack, Stephen Murray and Keelung Hong maintain that Western ethnog-
raphers intentionally underplayed Taiwanese distinctiveness and were,
therefore, complicit in the state’s agenda to erase any cultural elements—
from dialect to beliefs and customs—that would permit the articulation of
a specifically Taiwanese identity (see Murray and Hong ).
This argument is highly polemical, and it is beyond the scope of this
essay to argue in defense of the many anthropologists whom Murray and
Hong condemn, but it is undeniably true that foreign ethnologists of the
early postwar period were interested in showing the relevance of their work
to a broader understanding of explicitly Chinese social organization and reli-
gious beliefs and practices. Murray and Hong found, for example, that well
over  percent of books and articles by American anthropologists writing
on religion in Taiwan employ “China” or “Chinese” in the title. We have
confirmed this figure by examining Western-language titles in Lin Meirong’s
comprehensive bibliography of general works on religion on Taiwan (Lin
[] , –); by contrast, in the same category, only  percent of books
and articles in Chinese have zhong, zhongguo, or zhonghua in their titles, and
nearly  percent indicate “Taiwan” or a specific locality. Again, supporting
Murray and Hong’s evidence (if not their conclusions), even in looking at
titles in English that specify “Taiwanese,”“Formosan,” or “Hokkien” culture
or religion (e.g., Diamond ; Jordan ; Pasternak ; Wolf ), the
objective of these studies was clearly to analyze phenomena as more broadly
“Chinese.” For example, David Jordan describes his own work in Gods,
Ghosts, and Ancestors: Popular Religion in a Taiwanese Village (Jordan ),
a book based on fieldwork conducted during the period –, as “a case
study of Chinese religion” and, in particular, as a contribution to the study
of “Chinese popular religion” (xv–xvi). These statements are representative
of other Western ethnographies on Taiwan. The objective was, not to iden-
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tify Taiwan’s “uniqueness,” but to describe Chinese religion in the light of
popular beliefs and practices.
THE SCHOLARLY CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD
American and British scholars working on Taiwan in the early postwar
period were concerned with describing the basic structures of Chinese
popular religion, basing their analysis on close ethnographic fieldwork at the
village level. These studies describe the “gods, ghosts, and ancestors” of the
Chinese religious landscape.
Meanwhile, Chinese anthropological work of the s and s focused
on aboriginal populations on Taiwan. There are various reasons for this: aca-
demic factionalism that resulted in the triumph of the ethnology of minority
groups over self-referential studies, state sponsorship of census work on
Taiwan, and the ideological objective of establishing cultural links between
the newly reconquered island and the mainland.
In Chinese anthropology on the mainland before the war, there were two
major schools: the “northern school,” based at Yanjing University in Beijing,
and the “southern school,” based at the Academia Sinica (Zhongyang Yan-
jiuyuan) in Nanjing (Li , ; Tang ). The northern school con-
ducted village-based fieldwork on Han-majority populations and employed
functionalist approaches to the study of religion, family structure, and com-
munity organization. These scholars had studied abroad and published in
both Chinese and English; they include Fei Hsiao-Tung (Fei Xiaotong),
C. K. Yang (Yang Qingkun), Lin Yueh-hwa (Lin Yaohua), and Francis L. K.
Hsu (Xu Langguang). During the war, the northern school moved to Yun-
nan and continued to conduct research on Han Chinese social structure and
traditional customs and behaviors in rural communities in southern China.
Following the Communist victory in China, anthropology as an academic
field was routed and no longer had as its object the culture, institutions, or
behaviors of the Han Chinese majority (Wang ). On the mainland,
fieldwork on traditional religious practices of the Han majority has
reemerged only in the past decade.
Representative of the southern school of Chinese anthropology before
 were scholars based at the Academia Sinica in Nanjing. Eschewing the
functionalist study of Han Chinese village life, scholars at the Academia
Sinica were archaeologists trained in ethnology and sinology. They con-
ducted fieldwork on ethnic minorities in border areas and research on
archaeological materials and the Chinese classics. Their objective was to link
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non-Han groups to their Han “origins” in antiquity as part of a broader
political e¥ort to unify China’s multiethnic populations. Dual training in
ethnographic fieldwork and archaeology became the basis for a theory of
cultural di¥usion, which stated that the aboriginal populations of East Asia
and the South Pacific were the cultural descendants of the ancient Chinese,
as evident in their religious practices. It was this group that retreated 
from the mainland with Nationalist forces and established the Institute of
Ethnology at the Academia Sinica on Taiwan.
Archaeological research dominated scholarship in the period from 
to : applied, first, to the ethnographic study of Taiwanese aborigines
(dating from a team investigation of the Atayal people in Taichung [Tai-
zhong] County beginning in ) and, second, to the study of the relation
between the cultures of the Han Chinese in antiquity (based on sinological
research) and Pacific aborigines of the present day (including aboriginal
groups on Taiwan). In this period, Chinese scholars did not conduct ethno-
graphic fieldwork on Hokkien- or Hakka-speaking Chinese living on Taiwan;
their object of study was aboriginal customs and ancient Chinese religion.
The early work of Chinese scholars on Taiwan was governed by the same
dual focus as seen in the southern school on the mainland: the ethnographic
study of non-Han populations and archaeological and philological research
on ancient Chinese religion.
The published work of Ling Chunsheng is representative of this era. Ling
Chunsheng served as director of the Institute of Ethnology at the Academia
Sinica (Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzuxue Yanjiusuo) from  to .
Under his leadership, the Institute of Ethnology became the leading center
of cultural anthropology (including, eventually, the anthropological study of
popular religion) on Taiwan, and his ideological orientation set the course
for this first phase of religious studies in the postwar period. Ling studied
under Marcel Granet at the Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, earning the
Ph.D. in . In the s, Ling conducted ethnographic fieldwork on the
Hezhe people on the Chinese-Russian-Korean border. This research, pub-
lished in  (and cited in Ling ), represents the first ethnographic study
in the modern sense of the term by a Chinese scholar and was a clear appli-
cation of the ideological objective of unifying Han and non-Han culture.
This objective motivated Ling’s study of aboriginal populations on Taiwan
in the s and s.
Ling’s research interests spanned aboriginal populations from Taiwan to
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and the study of both archaeological
materials and early written sources from Western Asia, China, Southeast
Asia, and the Pacific. Behind these e¥orts was the attempt to establish a
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direct connection between religion of the Zhou dynasty and ritual practices
among aborigines of the present day and, thus, to uncover a unitary pan-
Pacific culture, one originating in the Jiangnan region of ancient China and
extending from Oceania to the North American coast. Ling maintained that
Taiwan was a bridge in the transmission of Chinese cultural traits to South-
east Asia and the South Pacific, as can be seen in the study of religious
rituals among contemporary aboriginal groups (Ling , ; Li ).
There was no absence of nationalistic expression in this scholarship, and
Ling berated European theories that claimed the provenance of South Pacific
island cultures in Central and South America and ignored archaeological
and philological evidence from ancient China. Ling argued on the basis of
his sinological research for the Chinese origins of Pacific culture. Moreover,
Ling was convinced that aboriginal Paiwan rituals were an essential resource
for understanding ancient Chinese culture and could solve the “irresolvable
questions” of the evidential-research (kaozheng) scholars of the late Qing on
the meaning and significance of Zhou rites.
The question of the origins of Taiwan’s native people has reemerged in
the s as a contentious academic and political issue, and scholars today
are more inclined to assert a continuum of native aboriginal and “Tai-
wanese” identity rather than linkages of either group with the mainland. But,
for Ling, every significant cultural trait of Oceanic and Taiwanese aboriginal
culture could be found as well in ancient China; thus, Chinese ethnology,
archaeology, and philological studies can uncover cultural origins and trans-
mission from the Asian continent to a wide pan-Pacific region.
By the s, this general orientation began to be questioned, and a
number of younger scholars o¥ered these tentative criticisms of the work of
their teachers: First, none of the first-generation scholars conducted field-
work in Hokkien- or Hakka-speaking communities or made use of Japanese
ethnographic materials from the period of the Japanese Occupation. Second,
none engaged with Western sinologists or anthropologists, including the
missionary scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who
also made use of both classical Chinese and ethnographic description (such
as de Groot, Shryock, and R. F. Johnston), or the anthropologists beginning
fieldwork in Taiwan and the New Territories of Hong Kong in the s.
Third, none addressed theoretical problems associated with the anachro-
nistic use of ethnography from the Pacific islands, Japan, and Taiwan to settle
scholarly puzzles from China’s antiquity. Finally, all assumed that the part
reflects the whole, that isolated cultural elements can be the basis for broad
cultural identities; thus, comparative cultural analysis was reduced to the
accumulation of isolated facts, without attention to general structures and
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contexts or to agents’ interpretations of their own conceptions and practices.
In the case of religious studies, the focus in this period was entirely on the
religion of Chinese antiquity, not the history of religions as actually prac-
ticed among Han Chinese (Chang ).
As early as , we can find an explicit criticism along these lines. Chen
Qilu wrote: “If we look critically at our work, we can see an overemphasis on
ethnology [minzuxue] at the expense of social anthropology [shehui ren-
leixue]. In the ethnographic work that has been done, the least attention has
been paid to religion. Moreover, for the most part, there has been a prepon-
derance of shallow quantitative research, with little in the way of in-depth
analysis” (Chen , ). Chen spoke admiringly of Bernard Gallin, Arthur
Wolf, and other young American anthropologists for their intensive work in
single villages and neighborhoods of the Hokkien- and Hakka-speaking
majority.
Inspired by such criticisms, the research focus changed direction begin-
ning around . First, less attention was paid to primitive cultures (whether
contemporary aborigines or the cultures of antiquity); second, social forces
called on scholars to explore contemporary social issues, such as moderni-
zation, urbanization, dysfunctional behaviors, and other problems facing a
complex society. As a result, scholars in the second generation conducted
fieldwork primarily among the Han Chinese and had little or no training in
sinological studies (archaeology, philology, and classical Chinese literature).
Their first object of study was family organization in Hokkien- and Hakka-
speaking villages.
SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND TAIWANESE LINEAGE
Li Yih-yuan has described the second phase of anthropological work on Tai-
wan as the flowering of ethnology (Li ). This generation of scholars
shifted its attention away from the study of aboriginal groups and ancient
Chinese religion to the description and analysis of domestic religion in
Taiwanese communities. This second phase is also the period when, for the
first time, Western and Chinese scholars came into dialogue, focusing princi-
pally on lineage organization, burial practices, and ancestor veneration.
Younger anthropologists who came of age on Taiwan were interested in
patterns of identity among Hokkien- and Hakka-speaking Chinese and the
social functions of domestic cults, and they formed their conclusions in
response to the Western scholars who had preceded them in their ethno-
graphic work.
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The first American and British anthropologists working on Taiwan
investigated both domestic and community religion, identifying overarch-
ing patterns of religious belief and practice as much as the specific character-
istics of their target communities. They described a system of gods, ghosts,
and ancestors closely mirroring the social bureaucracy of imperial China
(for a representative statement, see Wolf []). A functionalist orientation
is evident in much of this work: religion is generally a static, conservative
force, supporting and preserving social cohesion (cf. Feuchtwang ).
Chinese scholars in the s and s conducted research on family
structure, clan organization, and ancestor veneration, with secondary atten-
tion paid to temple organization and deity cults. In the forty-six works
published in the Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzuxue Yanjiusuo zhuankan
monograph series between  and , twenty-two were concerned with
kinship and only four with religion on the community level (Huang ,
). As in the s, political and ideological pressures determined the range
and scope of ethnographic work. Through the Institute of Ethnology and
other research bodies, the state gave financial support to the canvassing of
Taiwanese households for census-taking purposes. Ideologically, inquiries
into family practices were less politically sensitive than was research on
social organization at the village level, given the “social-planning” measures
of the Communist government on the mainland and the concerns of the
Kuomintang government on Taiwan that social analysis was a disguised
form of political criticism (for this view, see Wang ).
Apart from the political demands guiding this research, the focus on
family organization also reflected the tremendous influence exerted by
Maurice Freedman on Chinese anthropologists working on Taiwan. Since
most Han Chinese living on Taiwan originated in southeastern coastal
China, Freedman’s studies of Guangdong and Fujian were models of com-
parison. Among the twenty-two monographs published in the Minzuxue
zhuankan series prior to  on kinship organization, fourteen directly cite
Freedman’s Lineage Organization in Southeastern China ().
Freedman’s work on family organization in southeast China describes
the “ideal” family system: a unified, patrilineal organization with wealth in
trust, ancestral lands, an ancestral temple and shared cemetery, and carefully
maintained genealogies. For Freedman, the common worship of a single
ancestor reinforces the conviction that the members of the clan belong to a
common group. Ancestor veneration is a reflection of deeper principles of
lineage organization, and lineage organization is the basis and model of
social organization in general. When Chinese first settled Fujian and Guang-
dong, descendants with the same surname relied on the worship of common
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ancestors as a basis of family unity and, thus, had an advantage in settling
new areas in the construction and upkeep of irrigation projects, communal
farming, self-defense, and so on. Those with the strongest family organiza-
tions, reflected in the maintenance of communal assets, were best equipped
to survive in a frontier environment (Freedman ).
By contrast, the first settlers to arrive on Taiwan—from the late seven-
teen century to the mid-nineteenth—came individually and from di¥erent
native places. They were not supported by strong lineages. The frontier was
as harsh as anything found in coastal Guangdong and Fujian, but, in the
absence of family support, the early settlers were required to form non-
agnatic alliances, and lineage organization of the kind described by
Freedman appeared much later and in an attenuated form. (For further
information on early settlement history, see Jones [chapter  in this vol-
ume].) The Japanese Occupation did nothing to strengthen Chinese lineage
organization, and the already-minimal clan holdings were parceled out or
sold o¥ in many Taiwanese communities. In the s, Western scholars
noted the weakness of lineage organization throughout Taiwan: Sanxia in
the Taipei basin (Ahern ),“Hsin Hsing” in Jianghua (Gallin ), Kun-
shen along the coast of Tainan county (Diamond ), Datie south of Ping-
tung (Pingdong) (Pasternak ), and so forth. They found little in the way
of common ownership, a greater emphasis on household altars over the con-
struction of ancestral halls, simplified ancestral rites, and weak maintenance
of genealogies.
A number of Chinese anthropologists in the s and s came to a
di¥erent conclusion and argued for strong lineage ties in Taiwanese families.
Chinese scholars couched these findings in specific reaction against the
Western anthropologists who noted an “absence” or “weakness” in Taiwan-
ese family structure (for a representative example, see Yu []). From a
political point of view, we might look at these statements as expressions of
“Taiwanese identity”—the assertion of strong family organization with
peculiarly Taiwanese characteristics.
Chinese ethnographic studies of this period describe the creation and
maintenance of agnatic bonds through religious beliefs and practices di¥er-
ent from but just as vital as the domestic cults of southeastern China—and
far more dynamic and complex. Family identity is created and sustained in
a number of “fortified” family-based institutions, through ritual means.
These extraordinary family rites and institutions include the creation of lin-
eage ties through uxorilocal marriages (the incidence of which is higher in
Taiwan than in other regions of China), ghost marriages (minghun), and
ghost adoption (guofang: adopting a son for a dead father) as well as the
establishment of single-surname groups and multisurname ancestral cults
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(Hu ; Ruan ). The practice of ancestral veneration thus remains the
ideal, even if ancestral lines must be created and maintained by ritual means.
In the case of Jinjiang village, for example, the people have maintained
their identity as a single descent line by taking turns worshiping at the
incense burner, without an ancestral hall (citang) or ancestral cemetery
(zufen). This is in opposition to Freedman’s evidence from south China that
only with hereditary property (zuchan)—shrines and cemeteries—can there
be multigenerational ancestor worship and strong kinship identity (Chen
; Yu ). But, even here, lines of patrilineal descent are nothing like
Freedman’s lineages and have largely been invented through a process of
“fusion” that has created social organizations that mimic families worship-
ing a common ancestor (cf. Cohen ). In many communities, ancestral
veneration is directed toward tablets with multiple surnames or toward
tablets with single surnames in the absence of actual blood relations (Chen
, ).
On the basis of studies of ancestral veneration in the absence of
hereditary property and clan identity, Chinese anthropologists on Taiwan
attempted to define a method and field of study that was indebted to func-
tionalist theory yet adapted to the peculiar conditions of Taiwan’s early
settlement. A number of scholars made the point that Western anthropo-
logical approaches may not be best suited to Taiwan, especially in the areas
of family structure, marriage, property, and ancestor veneration. What is
needed is a “sinification” of social-science methodology and analysis (for a
representative statement, see Chen [, –]). Thus, anthropologists in
Taiwan distanced themselves from Maurice Freedman’s studies of lineage
organization in southeast China and from Emily Ahern’s “critical” analysis
of descendant competition in rural Taiwan (see Freedman ; Ahern ).
From the idealized perspective of southeast China’s “model” lineages,
Taiwan has never enjoyed strong lineage organization, and the already-weak
family system has become weaker still in the postwar period owing to urban-
ization and social mobility, economic liberalization, and the increasing
emphasis on the nuclear family as an economic unit over multigenerational
and complex agnatic ties. But Chinese scholars have described unique forms
of religious legitimation and have employed the existence of ancestral cults
based on ritual kinship as evidence of a unique Taiwanese identity.
TERRITORIAL IDENTITY IN DEITY CULTS AND TEMPLE WORSHIP
In the absence of blood relations, the first settlers to Taiwan organized
themselves on the basis of their place of origin on the mainland, which
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determined patterns of immigration in the Ming and Qing dynasties. As a
result, the principal form of religious practice on Taiwan is the common
worship of gods in village temples rather than the worship of ancestors in
family shrines (Chuang ). In many multisurname villages on Taiwan, the
village temple is the center of local organization and, thus, serves the same
function as the ancestral hall in a single-surname village (Diamond ;
Feuchtwang ; Xu ). In the later stages of settlement on Taiwan,
descendants established kinship organizations by the ritual means of single-
surname cults, uxorilocal marriages, ghost marriages, and so on. Thus, the
principles of religious organization on Taiwan were quite varied from the
start.
As opposed to the prototypical single-surname village of southeast
China, patterns of religious and social organization on Taiwan involve com-
plex, overlapping fields of organizational identity. Religious organizations at
the neighborhood and village level include “kinship associations” (based
either on a single surname or on multiple surnames), intermarriage village
alliances, mutual-aid societies (for funeral expenses),“worship associations”
and “guild associations” (based on native-place origins on the mainland),
“temple associations” and “festival associations” (based on common settle-
ment), and deity associations (worshiping a specific god), which are increas-
ingly islandwide in scope (Hu ; Lin Meirong ; Schipper ).
As with the peculiar forms of kinship organization cited above, Chinese
anthropologists have attempted to identify patterns of religious organization
that are uniquely Taiwanese, elaborating models for describing and analyz-
ing the social functions of local religious institutions. One of the most
influential of these models is that of the “worship circle” (jisiquan), devised
by the Japanese anthropologist Okada Yuzuru on the basis of his field-
work in Shilin (a northern suburb of Taipei) in the s (Okada ).
Okada observed that people from di¥erent native places worship di¥erent
deities and that the territorial extent of the worship community coincides
with the territorial extent of intermarriage boundaries and the market area.
Okada coined the term “jisiquan” to describe this territorial community. He
defined the jisiquan as “the settlement area of residents who worship the
same principal deity” (Okada , ). The translation into Chinese of his
paper on Taiwanese worship circles (see Okada ) had a significant
impact on Chinese religious studies, and the paper continues to be cited
today.
The jisiquan can be defined as a group of individuals inhabiting a pre-
scribed area, usually loyal to a particular temple (although some are not
temple based), who maintain shares (fen) in the association through the
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sponsorship of temple construction, festivals, operatic performances,“terri-
torial inspection tours,” and so on. The jisiquan is based on common origins
(ethnicity) and on surname identity (single-surname groups) as well as
membership in a residential community.
In the s and s, Shi Zhenmin and Xu Jiaming, among other
scholars, attempted to refine Okada’s model to describe peculiarly Taiwanese
patterns of religious association. After conducting fieldwork in the Zhuo-
shui/Dadu river delta, Changhua (Zhanghua) county, Shi described the
worship circles of native-place and common-surname associations on the
basis of their deity cults—from Tudi Gong and Youying Gong at the simplest
level to local cults of Mazu, Wangye, Wenchang, Guan Gong, and so on in
larger settlements—as well as organizations responsible for temple festivals,
periodic o¥erings (jiao), pilgrimages (jinxiang), single-surname opera per-
formances (danxingxi), and so on. His survey of the Changhua plain showed
a close correspondence between native-place origins and the major gods
worshiped in village temples: the western coastal area is dominated by
settlers from Quanzhou (Fujian), and most temples in this area are dedicated
to Wangye; the eastern hills are dominated by settlers from Zhangzhou
(Fujian), and most temples there are dedicated to Kaizhang Shengwang; and
the Hakka population predominates in the Yuanlin area of the Changhua
plain, where the principal deity of most temples is Sanshan Guowang. Thus,
the worship circles of the area are defined by settlement (a quan, “circle” or
“orbit,” of residence), native-place origins, and, in some cases, common-
surname identity (Shi ).
Xu Jiaming employed the concept of the jisiquan in his fieldwork on
Hokkienized Hakka populations in the same Zhuoshui /Dadu survey.
Expanding on Shi’s identification of jisiquan with specific deity cults, Xu
elaborated four necessary qualifications of a worship circle (Xu , –):
fiscal responsibility for temple construction and repairs, festivals, and so on
(a necessary, although not a su≤cient, condition as temple committees may
solicit contributions from individuals outside the worship circle); the right
to serve as the incense master (luzhu) or one of his associates (toujia) (annu-
ally chosen by lot before the image of the principal deity); the right to take
temple images to one’s home on a permanent or temporary basis (often to
attend at weddings and funerals but also for general protection of the home);
and territorial inclusion in the god’s periodic “inspection tours.” Whereas
Shi’s emphasis was on deity cults, Xu focused on temple organization.
Clearly, the jisiquan is limited in terms of geographic proximity. The
territorial extent of the jisiquan ranges from the hamlet to larger villages or
a contiguous group of villages but is limited to “the distance a person can
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walk from one end to the other and back in a single day.” In the absence of
strong clan associations, the worship circle is, for Xu, the most basic and
most distinctive form of Taiwanese religious and social organization (Xu
, ).
Looking at the complex forms of social organization suggested by the
jisiquan, it is possible that C. K. Yang overstated the distinction between
institutional and di¥used religion (Yang , –) and certain that he
overstated the weakening of di¥used religion in the modern period (Yang
, –), at least as applied to Taiwan (on this point, cf. Chang ).
Village and neighborhood temple organizations remain very strong in
Taiwan, are extremely well organized (many maintaining extensive records
of voluntary participation and fiscal contributions, census data for the local-
ity, as well as temple genealogies), and continue to support festivals, rites of
propitiation, and other religious functions. While the employment of the
jisiquan as a framework for describing the scope and extent of temple-based
religion is derived from the work of a Japanese scholar in the s, it has
served as a “Taiwanese” conception of local religious organization on
Taiwan.
Okada Yuzuru’s model of the worship circle can be applied best to the
period of early immigration to Taiwan, when settlement was at least partly
definitive of social identity and temple membership was confined to a par-
ticular neighborhood or village (thus the use of the term “jisiquan,” which
literally means “worship circle”or “worship territory”). But, when we contrast
the nature of religious identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
with religious identity today, it is more di≤cult to identify a particular ter-
ritorial scope. As Yu Guanghong observes: “Locality-based temples have
already extended their reach to all of Taiwan. This is a natural consequence
of constant social expansion. The situation is quite di¥erent from the time
of the Japanese Occupation [to say nothing of the period of initial settle-
ment], when each temple defined a tightly knit worship circle” (Yu ,
).
Contrasting two early settlements, the island of Penghu and the port city
of Lugang, Yu discovered that, whereas village (territorial) identity remains
strong in Lugang to this day (see DeGlopper ), on Penghu the identifi-
cation of temple membership with local residence is now almost completely
severed; temples established on Penghu on the basis of native-place origins,
guild membership, military units, and other forms of social identity have
now seen the descendants of their founders scattered widely throughout
Taiwan, maintaining weak religious ties but no territorial identity (Yu ).
Thus, the integrity of worship circles (i.e., the “territorial nature” of temple
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and deity cults) weakens with growth in social mobility (cf. Jordan ,
–). Today, religious associations see themselves as part of islandwide
networks, and deity cults have gained ground at the expense of local temple
cults. Also, as Jones (chapter  in this volume) points out, the simple expan-
sion of the island’s transportation infrastructure facilitated travel, giving rise
to temples of islandwide prominence and encouraging allegiances from
clienteles farther away. What Lin Meirong has described as “belief circles”
(xinyangquan), with no territorial limitation, are ascendent over the “wor-
ship circles” (jisiquan) of traditional Taiwan (Lin ).
People from a certain place on the mainland tended to settle in the same
areas, and competition for land and resources often led to violence among
settlers from di¥erent native places living in close proximity. Ethnic, sub-
ethnic, and native-place competition remains significant on Taiwan,
although it is expressed less often in violence than it is in competing claims
of cultural and religious legitimacy (Sangren ). Typically, this compe-
tition is framed in religious terms, with local temples claiming an earlier
provenance and more direct ties to their parent temples on the mainland.
Temples are related both to the communities that serve them and to each
other, and the lines of filiation among temples on Taiwan, and between tem-
ples on Taiwan and on the mainland, are highly contested today. In the s,
certain temple associations even claimed to be the parents of branch temples
on the mainland rather than the earliest branch temples on Taiwan—an
assertion of Taiwanese hegemony in support of local preeminence.
CONCLUSION: POPULAR RELIGION AND TAIWANESE IDENTITY
Together with the rapid development of Taiwan’s economy since the war,
religion on Taiwan has flourished. As Pas (chapter  in this volume) points
out, huge resources are expended on temple construction and renovation,
temple festivals are increasingly elaborate and expensive, religious com-
merce (shamanism, liturgical priesthood, geomancy, fortune-telling, lecture
circuits, and workshops) is thriving, and religious participation is growing
in every segment of society—from temple-based deity cults to Buddhist
meditation societies among urban professionals.
Religion on Taiwan today is no longer limited to the ancestral veneration
and temple-based deity cults of traditional popular religion. Political
liberalization, economic expansion, modernization, and urbanization have
been accompanied by new forms of religious expression, in two principal
directions: () the growth and spread of islandwide deity cults and the
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commercialization and politicization of temple organizations (no longer
tied to particular localities and their patrons) and () the weakening of
ancestral cults and neighborhood associations and the growth of “new reli-
gions” and voluntary religious associations, especially in urban areas. These
changes are reflected in scholarship, with a significant emphasis on religious
change, new religions, and urban-based religious associations (for recent
Chinese studies, see Li [, ], Sung [], and Zheng [, ]).
Wang Jianchuan has employed interdisciplinary scholarship with an impres-
sive collection of essays on “vegetarian sects” and “phoenix halls” (spirit-
writing cults) (Wang ). Wang has also founded (in ) and served as
the general editor of a new journal, Minjian zongjiao (Popular religion), con-
taining articles by Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars (the work of the
latter translated into Chinese) on popular religion with a focus on religious
sectarianism.
While a number of Western scholars have “returned” to the mainland for
the study of Chinese religions, fieldwork-based research on popular religion
has become a booming industry among Chinese scholars since the late
s. This is inspired by growing government support for research in the
humanities and social sciences, the liberalization of government controls on
the exercise of religious freedom, the dramatic growth of popular religious
display during a period of remarkable economic expansion, and the power
of popular religion as a symbolic lever in debates concerning “Chinese” and
“Taiwanese” identity. Comparing two bibliographies on anthropological
research on Taiwan, we can see the explosion of scholarly publications on
religion: in his  Guangfu yilai Taiwan diqu chuban renleixue lunzhe mulu
(Bibliography of anthropology in Taiwan since Retrocession), Huang
Yinggui listed  works related to religion; Lin Meirong’s Taiwan minjian
xinyang yanjiu shumu (A bibliography of Taiwanese folk religion), first pub-
lished only eight years later, contained more than , entries (see Lin
[] ). Fieldwork on popular religion enjoys vital support from depart-
ments of anthropology and ethnology at major universities and research
institutes as well as from national and provincial government o≤ces. Con-
ferences and seminars dealing with religion in China and on Taiwan are held
almost monthly, and scholarship on popular religion is published regularly
in new and established scholarly journals. With social transformation has
come, not only the emergence of new forms of religious expression, but also
a remarkable expansion of research.
The history of religion in postwar Taiwan is a case study for the inter-
penetration of power and knowledge, as expressed in the shaping of aca-
demic study by political control and political ideology. Threats of internal
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dissolution in the s to s inspired the first generation of scholars on
Taiwan to argue for the Chinese origins of a single pan-Asian and pan-
Pacific culture. State-sponsored research as well as scholarly reaction to
Western ethnography led second-generation scholars to studies of ancestor
veneration and family structure. In the third phase of religious studies on
Taiwan, liberalization of government controls has inspired the current
generation to undertake macroscopic, interdisciplinary studies of temple
organization, deity cults, pilgrimage, voluntary associations, and religious
professionalism and to articulate a uniquely Chinese or even Taiwanese
theoretical model.
Western scholarship on religion in Taiwan focused in the early period on
the “gods, ghosts, and ancestors” of domestic and temple cults. Although
methodologically committed to the study of popular religion, these scholars
were not yet fully invested in the integration of Chinese religions as a field:
most saw popular religion in static terms, analyzing institutional structures
rather than dynamic processes, and few were trained in written Chinese,
sinological research methods and resources, or Chinese history. The studies
of the s and s described family, lineage, temple, and community
organization and saw religion as a conservative force (for an exception, see
Seaman [])—maintaining a political and celestial bureaucracy that
mirrors the living and the dead. Observing religion in Taiwan over the whole
of the last fifty years, however, we know it to be far more fluid and dynamic
than the first scholars could see from the vantage point of their village studies.
Chinese scholars have asked more fundamental questions about the
relation between Taiwanese religion and Chinese culture. Is religion on Tai-
wan a variant of Chinese religion? Or can there be found in kinship rites and
temple organization a distinguishable Taiwanese religion? To what extent
may scholars like Ling Chunsheng have invented links between religion on
Taiwan and its cultural origins on the mainland? And to what extent have
scholars in the postwar period invented a unique cultural distinctiveness?
Western scholars have tended, on the whole, to identify religion in Taiwan
as “Chinese religion.” From David Jordan working in the s to Paul Katz
in the s, the emphasis is the linkage of domestic and temple cults to their
forebears on the mainland (Jordan ; Katz ). Among Chinese
scholars, an earlier generation was politically as well as intellectually com-
mitted to the identification of Taiwanese and Chinese culture, while today
this linkage is extremely contentious and is a direct object of defense or
attack (Chang ; Li ). Scholars of religion are ideologically motivated,
and Chinese scholars of religion on Taiwan have contributed significantly to
the assertion of ethnic identity, discovering in the complexity of domestic
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cults and worship associations forms of religious expression that are
uniquely Taiwanese.
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Aiguo Fojiao Hui  !"
Ami  
Amoy (Xiamen) 
An lingbao zhenwen  !"
Anxi 
Bai 
bai Tiangong  
Baisheng  !
Bao’an Tang  
bao’en 
baojuan 
Baosheng Dadi  !
Baozhen Tan  
Baozhong 
Beidou 
Beigang 
beiguan 
Beitun 
Ben’gang 
bentuhua  
Benyuan 
butsudan (Jpn.) 
Cai 
Cai Chaoqu  
Cai Fen 
Cai Maotang  
Cai Renhou  
Cai Yangliu  
Cai Yushi  
caituan faren  !
Canche 
Caotun 
Cen Yicheng  
Chan 
Chang Hsun (Zhang Xun) 
Changchun 
Changhua (Zhanghua) 
Changhua (Zhanghua) county 
 
changzhai 
Chanhepai  
Chen 
Chen Cheng 
Chen Chung-min (Chen Zhongmin)
 
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Chen Dongcheng  
Chen Jianfu  
Chen Jinggu  
Chen Jun 
Chen Liangjin  
Chen Lifu  
Chen Lung-chu (Chen Longzhi)
 
Chen Lü’an  
Chen Menglin  
Chen Qilu  
Chen Qi’nan  
Chen Qingbiao (Faben)  
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Chen Ruitang  
Chen Shang 
Chen Shuibian  
Chen Wenmei  
Chen Wuchang  
Chen Xiangshui  
Chen Yi 
Chen Zhongxin  
Chenggong township  
Chi 
Chi Wangye  
Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo)
 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)
 
Chiayi (Jiayi) 
Chiu Hei-yuan (Qu Haiyuan)  
Chongsheng Tang  
Chu Ron-Guey (Zhu Ronggui)
 
Chuang Ying-chang (Zhuang
Yingzhang)  
chujiadao  
Cibei Aixin Lieche  !"#
Cihui Tang  
Ciji Gongdehui  !"
Ciming yuekan  !
citang 
Ciyun yuekan  !
Cui Zhenwei  
Dacheng 
Dadaocheng  
Dadi dili zazhi  !"
Dadu 
Dai Lianzhang  
Dakeng 
dandingpai  
Dangdai Xinrujia  !"
dangwai 
danxingxi  
daode 
Daofa Ermen  !
daoguan daoshi  
Daojiao Xueyuan  !
daotan daoshi  
Daoyuan  !
Datie 
datong 
dawang 
Daxue 
Dazhen Tan  
Diaoyutai  
didao 
Dili 
ding 
Donggang 
Donglong Gong  
Dongshi 
Dongyue Dadi  !
Dongyue Miao  
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duanzheng renxin  !
er er ba shijian  !
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Erlun 
Ershui 
Eryuan county  
Faci 
Fagushan  
fandaode zhuyi  !"
Fang Dongmei  
Fei Hsiao-Tung (Fei Xiaotong)
 
fen 
Feng Youlan  
Fengtian Gong  
Fengyi Gong  
Fengyuan 
fenxiang 
“Fofa gailun”  !
Foguangshan  
Fojiao Ciji Gongde Hui  !"

Fojiaofa cao’an  !"
Fu Liang 
Fu’an 
fuji 
Fujian 
Fulong 
fuluan 
fulupai  
Fuzhou 
Gao Boyuan  
Gikong Church  !
Gongmin yu Daode  !"
Gongzhao Tan  
Gotô Shimpei  !
Guan Gong 
Guandu temple  
Guangdong 
Guanshiyin pusa lingying shiji shilu
 !"#$%&'(
Guanshiyin yuekan  !"
guanxi 
Guanyin 
Guanyin dashi baiyi shenji  !
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gun (Jpn.) 
guocui 
guofang 
Guoji Foguanghui  !"
guojia 
Guomin shenghuo budao weiyuanhui
 !"#$%&
Guowen 
Guoyu 
Hakka (Kejia) 
Han 
hangyequan  
Hao Bocun  
He Jian 
He Lin 
He Shujing  
He Xiangu  
Hemei 
Hezhe  
Hoklo-Hakka  
Hong Chaohui  
Hong Ji 
Hou Jiaju  
Hsinchu (Xinzhu) 
Hsu Tien-Hsien (Xu Tianxian)
 
Hu Taili  
Hualien (Hualian) 
Huang 
Huang Chün-chieh (Huang Junjie)
 
Huang Deshi  
Huang Guangguo  
Huang Guoxing  
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jinxiang 
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Jiuku Tianzun  !
Jixuan Heyi Tang  !"
Jueli 
Jueshi xunkan  !
Juexiu Gong  
Kaitian Gong  
Kaizhang Shengwang  !
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Kang Yuanshuai  
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 
Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong) 
kaozheng 
Keelung (Jilong) 
kezaishi  
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Kong Decheng  
Kong Meng Shengdao Hui  

Kong Meng Xuehui  !
kouhao 
Kunshen 
Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang)
 
kyûkan shûkyô  !
Lai Yunta  
Lee Fong-mao (Li Fengmao)  
Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui)  
leguan qinfen de shenghuo  !
 
Li Chuanshou  
Li Guoqi  
Li Jie 
Li Jinshou  
Li Jinwu  
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Li Jiuniang  
Li Junqing  
Li Junzhong  
Li Mengquan  
Li Minghui  
Li Xiannian  
Li Yi 
Li Yih-yuan (Li Yiyuan)  
Lian Zhan 
Liang Shuming  
liangguo 
Liao Zhonglian  
Lienü zhuan  
ligui 
Lim Gi-Hong (Lin Yixiong)  
Lin Anwu  
Lin Benlian  
Lin Gengshen  
Lin Hengdao  
Lin Hung-Hsuan (Lin Hongxuan)
 
Lin Meirong  
Lin Shaniang  
Lin Yanggang  
Lin Yueh-hwa (Lin Yaohua)  
Lin Yunteng  
ling 
Ling Chunsheng  
Lingbao 
Lingjiushan  
Linji 
Lishi 
Liu Mingchuan  
Liu Shu-hsien (Liu Shuxian)
 
Liu Zhiwan  
Longhua Jiao  
Longhua Zhaijiao  !
Longhushan  
Longshan temple  
Lü Xiulian (Annette Lu)  
Lü Zhenghui  
Lu’ermen  
luan 
luanshu 
luantang 
Luanyou 
Lugang 
Lugu 
Lunbei 
Lunyu 
Luo Qing 
Luojiao 
luzhu 
Ma Yifu  
Maoshan 
Marui Keijirô  !"
Mazu 
Meilidao  
Mengjia 
Mengzi 
Miaoli 
minghun 
Mingjian 
Minjian zongjiao  !
Minjindang (DPP, Democratic
Progressive Party)  
Minnan(hua)  
Minsu quyi congshu  !"#
Minsu quyi  !
minzhu daode de zhengzhi  !
 
minzhu kaichulun  !"
minzuxue  
Miyazaki Naokatsu  !
Mou Zongsan  
Nan Ying Fojiao Hui  !"
Nan’an 
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nanguan 
Nantou 
neidihua  
neisheng 
Nü sishu  
Nü’er jing  
Okada Yuzuru  
pa daoti  
Paiwan 
peiyu rencai  !
Peng Minming  
Penghu 
Pingtung (Pingdong) 
Pitou 
Putishu yuekan  !"
Puxin 
Puzhao Tan  
Qian Mu 
Qianjiang 
Qiaowu Weiyuanhui  !"
qichu 
qinglian zhengfu  !
Qingshan Qi Tan  !
Qingshui 
Qingshui Zushi Gong  !"
qinwang 
Quanguo Focha Daoguan zonglan
 !"#$%
Quanzhen 
Quanzhou 
Quemoy (Jinmen) 
qushe heli de jingji  !"#$
rendao 
Renjian Fojiao  !
Rensheng Fojiao  !
Rinzaishû (Jpn.)  
ru 
Ruan Changrui  
Rumen 
Ruzong Luanjiao  !
Ruzong Shengjiao  !
Ruzong Shenjiao  !
sancai 
sancong side  !
Sanfeng Gong  
Sannaipai  
Sanshan Guowang  !
Sanxia 
Sanyi 
Shajika (Jpn.)  
shang jiuliu  
Shanhui 
shanshu 
shantang 
shanzhai dawang  !
Shehui 
shehui renleixue  !"
Shengde Baogong  !
Shenghuo yu Lunli  !"
Shengli She  
Shengshou Gong  
Shengxian Tang  
Shengyan  !
Shenhu 
shenminghui  
shentan 
shenxiang 
Shi 
Shi Duanhui (Dingsheng)  
 !
Shi Jiaomiao  
Shi Jinluan (Dingjiong) 
 !
Shi Jinsang  
Shi Lang 
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Shi Xueli  
Shi Yiwan  
Shi Yue 
Shi Zhenmin  
Shi’er Zhinian Wenwang  !

Shih Ming-te (Shi Mingde)  
Shilin 
Shishi 
shisuhua  
Shouzhen Tan  
Shulin 
sidian 
sifenlü  
Sishu 
Song Chuyu (James Soong)  
Song Qili  
Sôtôshû (Jpn.)  
Sung, C. S. (Song Quansheng)
 
Sung Kwang-yu (Song Guangyu)
 
Swatow (Shantou) 
Taichung (Taizhong) 
taima (Jpn.) 
Tainan 
Taipei (Taibei, Taihoku) 
Taitung (Taidong) 
Taitung (Taidong) county  
Taiwan Daomiao zhi  !"
Taiwan fengwu  !
Taiwan Fojiao Daoyou Hui 
 !"
Taiwan Fojiao Longhua Hui 
 !"
Taiwan Fojiao Qingnian Hui 
 !"
Taiwan Jidujiao Zhanglao Jiaohui
 !"#$"%
Taiwan jingyan  !
Taiwan qiji  !
Taiwan Sheng Daojiao Xiehui 
 !"
Taiwan sheng simiao jizi banli gongyi
cishan shiye banfa  !"
 !"#$%&' (
Taiwan wenxian  !
Taiwanhua (“Taiwanization”)
 
Taiwanhua (Taiwanese dialect)
 
Taixu  !
Takabayashi Gentaka  !
Tamsui (Danshui) 
tan 
Tang Junyi  
Tang Meijun  
Taoyuan 
Tenrikyô (Jpn.)  
ti 
Tian 
tiandao 
Tiande Shengjiao  !
Tianwei 
T’ien Hung-mao (Tian Hongmao)
 
Tong’an 
Tongxuan Tan  
toujia 
Tu Wei-ming (Du Weiming)  
Tudi Gong  
tuzhuhua  
waiwang 
Wan Jinchuan  
wang 
Wang Bangxiong  
Wang Hansheng  
Wang Jianchuan  
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Wang Kuo 
Wang Sung-hsing (Wang Songxing)
 
Wangchuan Ji  
wangchuan 
wangjiao 
wangqiu=
wangye 
Wanhua 
Wen =
Wen Wangye  
Wen Xingjun  
Wen Yuanshuai  
Wenbu 
Wenchang 
Wenhua Jianshe Weiyuanhui  
 !
wenjiao 
wozhi 
Wu Boxiong  
Wu Kuang-ming (Wu Guangming)
 
wuchang 
wudang 
Wuhan 
Wujia 
Wujiao heyi da zheng  !"#
Wujing 
Wumiao Mingzheng Tang  

Wuming  !
wuming 
Wuqi 
Wusheng Laomu  !
Wuwen Shizhe  !
Xiachao 
xianghe hujing de shehui  !
 
xianghua heshang  !
xiansheng 
Xiantian Dao  
Xiao Jie 
Xiao Xinyi  
Xie Zhongming  
xiejiao 
Xigang 
Xigong 
Xihu 
Xilai An shijian  !"
Xiluo 
xin 
Xin juesheng yuekan  !"
Xindang 
Xindao  !
Xing Fu Wangye  !
xing 
Xingtian Gong  
Xingyun  !
xinling jinghua  !
Xinru Jiaohui  !
Xinrujia  
xinyangquan  
Xinzhuangzi  
Xiong Shili  
Xitou 
Xitun 
xiushen 
Xiushui 
Xu Dong 
Xu Fuguan  
Xu  Jiaming  
Xu Langguang (Francis L. K. Hsu)
 
Xu Qingxian  
xuanjiang 
Xuanyuan Jiao  
Xun fudao  
Xunnü baozhen  !
Xunzi 
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Yan Jiagan  
Yang 
Yang Caiyuan  
Yang Guoshu  
Yang Qingkun (C.K. Yang)  
Yang Shangkun  
Yang Tongbao  
Yang Yixian = 
Yang Zuhan  
Yangmei 
Yangmingshan  
Yanpu 
Yazhou Renmin Fangong Tongmeng
 !"#$%
Yiguan Dao  
Yin Demin  
yinguolü  
Yingwang Ping’an Jidian  !

yingwang 
Yinshun  !
yinsi 
yong 
yonghu guoce  !
you jiao wu lei  !
Youying Gong  
Yu Guanghong  
Yu Qingfang  
Yü Ying-shih (Yu Yingshi)  
Yuan Baoxin  
Yuanlin 
Yuanying  !
Yuanzhumin  
Yunlin 
Zeng 
Zeng Hezhou  
Zeng Rongjie  
Zeng Shaoxu  
Zeng Ziyu  
zhai 
Zhaijiao 
zhaitang 
zhaiyou 
Zhang Desheng  
Zhang Enpu  
Zhang Heng 
Zhang Junmai  
Zhang Ling 
Zhang Lu 
Zhang Wenbing  
Zhang Xun 
Zhang Yuanxian  
Zhangzhou 
Zhao Puchu  
Zhaohui  !
Zhen Yesu Jiaohui  !"
Zheng Boxun  
Zheng Chenggong  
Zheng Zhiming  
zhengtong zhongyi  !
Zhengyan  !
Zhengyi 
Zhicheng  !
Zhinan Gong  
Zhishifenzi  !
zhiyi 
Zhong 
Zhong Qi 
Zhongguo 
Zhongguo Fojiaohui  !"
Zhongguo luntan  !
Zhongguo Wenhua Fuxing
Weiyuanhui  !"#$

Zhongguo wenhua yuekan  !

Zhonghua 
Zhonghua Lao-Zhuang Xiehui
 !"#
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Zhonghua Minguo Daojiaohui
 !"#$
Zhonghua Minguo Lingji Xiehui
 !"#$%
Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yuekan
 !"#$%
Zhonghua zazhi  !
Zhonghua Zhanyan Xiehui  
 
Zhongjing Wang  
Zhongli 
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan (Academia
Sinica)  !"
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzuxue
Yanjiusuo  !"#$%
 
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzuxue
Yanjiusuo jikan  !"#
 !"#$
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzuxue
Yanjiusuo zhuankan  !
 !"#$%&
Zhongyang yuekan  !
zhongyuanzhai  
Zhou Hongji  
Zhou Qunzhen  
Zhou Xingyuan  
Zhu 
Zhu Jianmin  
Zhuang 
Zhuang Yi 
Zhuluo xianzhi  !
Zhuoshui 
Zhushan 
Zhutang 
Ziwei Gong  
zongjiaohua Ruxue  !"
zuchan 
zufen 
zumiao 
zuoren 
Zuozhuan 
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Academia Sinica (Zhongyang Yanji-
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Chinese traditions in, 7, 258,
266–267, 269, 273–274; Christian-
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of, 257; pre-Christian religion of,
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